

THE ROMAN WAR OF ANTIOCHOS THE GREAT

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JOHN D. GRAINGER

THE ROMAN WAR OF ANTIOCHOS THE GREAT



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BY

JOHN D. GRAINGER



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ABBREVIATIONS

1. Ancient Sources

App. <i>Mac</i>	Appian, <i>Macedonian Wars</i> .
<i>Sic</i>	<i>Sicilian Wars</i> .
<i>Syr</i>	<i>Syrian Wars</i> .
Athenaios	Athenaios, <i>Deipnosophistae</i> .
Austin	M. M. Austin, <i>The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest</i> , Cambridge 1981.
Diod.	Diodoros of Halikarnassos— <i>Universal History</i> .
Dio	Dio Cassius, <i>Roman History</i> .
Ditt. Syll. (3)	W. Dittenberger (ed.), <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd ed., 1915–1924.
Eusebius, <i>Chron.</i>	Eusebius, <i>Chronographia</i> , ed. Schone.
<i>FGrH</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i> .
Hieron., <i>In Dan.</i>	Hieronymos, <i>In Danielam</i> .
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> .
<i>I. Iasos</i>	W. Blumel, <i>Die Inschriften von Iasos</i> , Bonn 1985.
<i>I. Ilion</i>	P. Frisch, <i>Die Inschriften von Ilion</i> , Bonn 1975.
<i>I. Lampsakos</i>	P. Frisch, <i>Die Inschriften von Lampsakos</i> , Bonn 1978.
<i>I. Perg.</i>	M. Fraenkel, <i>Inschriften von Pergamon</i> , Berlin 1890–1895.
Jos. <i>AJ</i>	Josephos, <i>Antiquitates Judaicae</i> .
Nepos, <i>Hannibal</i>	Cornelius Nepos, <i>Life of Hannibal</i> .
<i>Cato</i>	<i>Life of Cato the Elder</i> .
<i>OGIS</i>	W. Dittenberger (ed.), <i>Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i> , Leipzig 1903–1905.
Paus	Pausanias.
Pliny, <i>NH</i>	Pliny the Elder, <i>Naturales Historiae</i> .
Plut. <i>Cato Maior</i>	Plutarch, <i>Life of Cato Maior</i> .
Plut. <i>Flam.</i>	<i>Life of Titus Quinctius Flaminius</i> .
Plut. <i>Philop</i>	<i>Life of Philopoimen</i> .
Plut.	'On the Fortune of Alexander', <i>Moralia</i> 326D <i>et seq.</i>
Pol.	Polybios, <i>Histories</i> .
Polyainos	Polyainos, <i>Stratagems</i> .

- Welles *RC* C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period*, New Haven 1934.
 Zon. Zonaras.

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CAH (2)—*Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd ed.
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INTRODUCTION

The rise of Rome to paramount power in the Mediterranean basin is quite correctly one of the major preoccupations of historical studies. The Roman empire is, after all, the major element in ancient history, the hinge between ancient and medieval, and its influence is with us still. However, it is all too easy to assume that Rome's eventual power and success was an inevitable historical outcome, and that therefore it is only Rome's achievement which needs serious study. Thus the city's progress to the domination of Italy, its conflict with and victory over Carthage, and then to its domination of the eastern Mediterranean, is a sequence which tends to push its victims to one side. The study of Carthage, for example, is scarcely a central issue in ancient studies, and even Hellenistic Greece has often been relegated to an appendix of its supposedly glorious 'classical' period.

Into this historical dustbin the Seleukid empire is also consigned. Its long existence—almost two and a half centuries in the central area of Syria—provides a link between the almost coterminous Achaimenid empire and the Roman empire, but to study it as a subject in itself is thought somewhat eccentric. When I suggested some years ago to a publisher that a biography of Antiochos the Great might be a good subject for a book the idea was rejected, yet there are biographies of some of the most obscure of Roman emperors. So a king who ruled all the lands from India to Greece for a third of a century is not regarded as a suitable subject, yet the half-mad emperors Nero and Caligula rate repeated study. The effect on world-history of these two men must be rated as minimal; that of Antiochos is almost as great as that of Alexander or Constantine.

Of course, Antiochos fell into a war with Rome, was defeated, and surrendered a large territory as a result. The outcome can thus be used to justify a concentration on Rome, since it was Rome's success in this war which was one of the foundations for the later empire, and one of the factors in the eventual disintegration of the Seleukid kingdom. In addition this was the third defeat of a great power by Rome in less than two decades—Carthage, then Macedon, then the Seleukid kingdom—and by far the least well documented

of the three. A certain weariness in historical writing on the subject after the earlier wars is clearly visible.¹

Yet such an attitude is clearly wrong. The importance of an event or a problem or a war or a state does not depend on a historian's preferences, or on the quantity or quality of the sources available—though this last may affect his ability to work on the problem. The defeat of the Seleukid kingdom by Rome is, by any objective standard, an event of world significance, and it is necessary to study its origins, its course, and its result in as much detail as possible, and with as much care as possible. It is, for example, a clash of greater powers than that between Rome and the Macedonian kingdom, and of an equal importance with the second war with Carthage.

The collision of the Roman Republic and the Seleukid kingdom of Antiochos III which culminated in the war of 192–188 is thus a major event. The other powers of the Mediterranean world had all been reduced to the second rank by this time and the clash was one in which the two remaining super-powers squared up to each other. And so the most recent study of the way in which this conflict came about is subtitled 'a study in Cold War'.²

This interpretation clearly arose out of an apparent repetition in historical circumstances. Our own recently-concluded Cold War had been between the great western republic (i.e., U.S.A. = Rome) and the great eastern autocracy (Soviet Union = Seleukid monarchy), each of which had been victorious in beating down competing aspirant super-powers (Japan and Germany = Carthage and Macedon, and Ptolemaic Egypt, respectively). This was not a very convincing analogy even at the time, and it is even less so now, but it is a measure of the overall neglect of the problem of this war that this interpretation is still generally accepted—it is repeated, for example, in the new edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*.³ In fact, even a cursory investigation shows that the actual events in the Rome-Seleukid collision have none of the aspects of the twentieth century Cold War—quite apart from the fact that the latter eventually faded out, while the former ended in a 'hot' war. It is an analogy best discarded.

¹ R. M. Errington, *The Dawn of Empire*, London 1981, polishes off the war in a single chapter (12 pages), less than the account of the war with Philip V.

² Badian, 'Rome and Antiochus'.

³ Vol. VIII, Chapter 8 (by Errington), allocated the same space as the wars with Philip V and Perseus; it is not seriously dealt with in Volume VII.

My aim therefore has been to start from scratch, to follow through the crisis in relations between Rome and Antiochos the Great from the first contact of the two to the final peace settlement which marked the end of the war. It is a highly complicated problem, hence the unexpected length of the book, and the more it is studied the more complex it seems to get. For it is not merely a war between these two states, but it involves all the states of the Mediterranean in one way or another. And, of course, this complication, as in all ancient history, is made worse by the deficiency of the sources.

It will be seen in this account that I have taken a sceptical attitude to the accounts of Polybios and Livy, above all that of the latter. Both of these historians were concerned to write accounts of Roman history, though Polybios included extensive accounts of events in Greece and the East, large parts of which have been lost. Livy's accounts of eastern events, based as they are largely on Polybios' version, are perfunctory, patchy, always Rome-centred, and often distorted. As an account of the period of this crisis and war, neither Polybios nor Livy is satisfactory—unless a Rome-centred viewpoint is all that is required—and, of course, still less so are the shorter and even less competent accounts in Appian and Justin.

An investigation of a crisis is inherently unsatisfactory if it concentrates only on one side, and still more so if it adopts the viewpoint of the sources where these are all partial to a single side of the issue. It is therefore a necessity to take a stance which is as far as possible impartial between the two major participants. This is not easy, and it may be that in reaction to the bias of the sources I have bent overmuch towards the Seleukid viewpoint. In defence I would point out that the Roman viewpoint has been studied repeatedly, the Seleukid rarely. This also involves making some assumptions about the Seleukid empire and its government, particularly in relation to the knowledge which the Seleukid court and government had of Roman affairs, a matter which cannot be documented. This is one of the reasons for the initial chapter, in which relations between the two states before the collision are discussed, to show that they were in fact reasonably familiar with each other for a long time before that collision. This is, after all, only to be expected. They were, after 273, no more than two seas and a peninsula apart, and it would be only self interest to investigate each other. The fact that we do not have the secret reports of each on the other does not prevent the assumption of relative familiarity being overwhelmingly likely.

My approach also involves suggesting causes for events which again cannot be precisely documented. Yet this is the historian's task is to *explain* what happened, to put himself in the position of the participants, to suggest *why* something took place rather than simply relating *what* happened. History is a work of the imagination, based on the sources which survive, but it must not be ruled by the source material. Where there are gaps in the sources, as there clearly are on the Seleukid side of the argument discussed here, or where the sources show only one side of the argument, as Livy, Polybios and the others do, then the historian's imagination must be employed to see how the events looked from the other side. This is not a matter of invention, but a necessary work based on such source material as exists. Unless a historian uses his imagination, the only history which can be written is a reproduction of the original sources.

CHAPTER ONE

EARLY CONTACTS

The roots of events and collisions lie always in the past, and never do they happen without good cause or without a long previous history. To all appearance, the war between Rome and Antiochos the Great contradicts this view, in that it seems that the two had little or no contact before 200 B.C., and their relations were in crisis-mode within a few years of that date. But this perception is an artefact of the sources, which are heavily Rome-centred, and Rome in the years before the meeting with Antiochos had serious problems—Italy, Hannibal, Macedon—which pre-occupied the ancient historians and which sequence is inevitably followed by their modern successors.

Yet by 300 B.C. the Seleukid kingdom was one of the great powers of the Mediterranean state-system, and Rome, as an actively expanding state, cannot have avoided knowing of it. Making such an assumption, however, is not demonstrable fact. So this first chapter is devoted to examining the contacts of Rome and the Seleukid state before the collision took place. It has to be said that the evidence is by and large indirect, but, given the obvious likelihood that mutual knowledge existed, contacts can be discerned in the difficult sources.

In 273 B.C. Ptolemy II of Egypt, being at war with the Seleukid king Antiochos I, made formal contact with the Roman Republic,¹ which itself was at war with an alliance of King Pyrrhos of Epeiros and several cities in Magna Graecia, above all Tarentum, the leader of the Italiote League. Pyrrhos himself was also at war with the Carthaginian Republic, which had, not long before, concluded a firm and lasting agreement with Ptolemy to define their mutual boundary in Africa. This was the first recorded official contact between Rome and any of the successor kingdoms of the empires of the Akhaimenids

¹ Livy, *Per* 14; Dio, fr. 41 (= Zon 8.6.11); Diod. 20.14.1–2; Justin 18.2.9.

and Alexander in the eastern Mediterranean.² The geopolitical complication of the situation is normal for all such later contacts.

The Mediterranean in the 270s was an area which was politically volatile to a degree rarely seen before. The various wars, and therefore the accompanying diplomacy, brought every state of any significance into contact with every other state. Apart from these Pyrrhic-Roman and Seleukid-Ptolemaic Wars, Pyrrhos was also fighting Antigonos Gonatas of Macedon, and in 272 invaded Greece, while Gonatas was allied to Antiochos I, and Antiochos and Gonatas were both fighting Galatian invaders from the north, as was the Aitolian League.

Ptolemy's diplomatic gesture of contacting Rome was carefully timed, at the precise moment when Rome was on the verge of a clear victory over Pyrrhos, and it was initiated in part because Ptolemy had been a longtime sponsor and ally of Pyrrhos. Indeed, both he and Antiochos I had provided Pyrrhos with help towards his Italian expedition.³ Since then, however, Pyrrhos had failed to conquer in the West, and this earlier support could well turn into a political embarrassment for his associates. Further, since Pyrrhos' western expedition had been launched, Ptolemy's half-brother Ptolemy Keraunos had gone down to ruin and death in his stolen kingdom of Macedon in the Galatian invasion. As a result Ptolemy II at that precise moment (i.e. 273) had very few friends left; furthermore, his governor of Kyrene, Magas, had recently rebelled and had allied with Antiochos I by marrying the latter's daughter.

The perpetrators of the killing of Keraunos, the invading Galatians, were relatives of Rome's inveterate enemies, the Gauls of Cisalpina, and after his death the ruined and impoverished Macedonian kingdom had fallen into the hands of Antigonos Gonatas, who was allied to, and in fact in large measure a client of, Antiochos I. Indeed Antiochos was married to Stratonike, Antigonos' sister, while Antigonos himself was now married to Antiochos' own half-sister, Phila.⁴

² Holleaux, *Rome, La Grèce*, 60–83, discusses the matter to exhaustion, and Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 62–63, minimally, with earlier references; Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 33–51, is detailed, but misses the military contribution by Antiochos I (next note).

³ Justin 17.2.13–14; Ptolemy II provided troops for two years, Antiochos provided money, and Antigonos II sent ships; all were glad to get rid of Pyrrhos for a time; Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 40–41 appears to believe Ptolemy II gave no help, but Justin is explicit, even if his numbers look exaggerated.

⁴ *Vita Aratos*; Diogenes Laertius 7.1.8; the marriage took place in 276/275:

There is no indication that Rome really welcomed this tentative initiation (if it really was the first contact) into the complex world of Mediterranean great-power diplomacy. The Senate replied politely, by sending a distinguished embassy to Alexandria, but it was nonetheless non-committal.⁵ Ptolemy had initiated the contact, and though his precise reason is unrecorded, the timing shows that he was particularly concerned over Roman intentions once Pyrrhos was finally beaten. In particular, he would wish to know if they intended to pursue the king across the Adriatic into Epeiros. If so, Ptolemy would be more than politely concerned. Pyrrhos was one of his few remaining allies in the Greek mainland, and his conflict with Antigonos Gonatas—he invaded Macedon in 274 and Greece, as an explicit enemy of Antigonos', in 272—was very helpful in distracting Antiochos I. On the other hand, an attack by Rome on Pyrrhos' own homeland of Epeiros would necessitate Ptolemy assisting Pyrrhos, to the corresponding advantage of Antiochos I.⁶

In such an event, Rome would be aligned with Antigonos Gonatas and Antiochos I, who, like Rome, were enemies of the Galatians. The Senate could thus claim to be forming a common front in defence of civilisation against them. Ptolemy II, on the other hand, actively recruited them into his army, and his only claim to a Gallic victory, of which Rome, Antiochos and Antigonos could all claim plenty, was the suppression of a mutiny by these troops.⁷ The trumpeting of this event by one of his court poets would not have fooled many and certainly none of his contemporaries in diplomacy and war. Revenge for Pyrrhos' attack on Italy and a defiance of the Galatians,

W. W. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, Oxford 1913, 173–174, does not make enough of this, for the marriage was a signal of Antigonos' subordination to, and protection by, Antiochos, who thereby avoided the need to enforce his own claim to the Macedonian kingship; I have looked at this in my *Seleukos Nikator*, London 1990, 207–208.

⁵ The precise level of the agreement reached in Alexandria is much discussed, but since it led nowhere this seems unnecessary; Gruen's conclusion (*Hellenistic World*, 62–63), following most others, is that it was *amicitia*, nice and vague and essentially non-committal; cf. Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 34–37.

⁶ It is said (e.g., by Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 63) that Ptolemy's object was friendship, and that Rome responded passively (e.g. Errington in *CAH* (2) VIII, 83) but this is totally to ignore Ptolemy's situation at the time, and Pyrrhos' own position. The episode must be taken in the full context of the times. See also Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, appendix 7, 'The World Position in 273'.

⁷ Kallimachos, *Hymn to Delos*, 171–197.

were both sufficient causes for war in Roman eyes: Rome fought wars for lesser reasons than these.

The Senate, however, had no intention of involving itself in the complexities of Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean kingdoms, at least not yet. The wariness with which the Senate reacted to Ptolemy's contact is a clear sign that the senators knew full well what it signified.⁸ The three envoys sent to Egypt in reply to Ptolemy's initiative included one double-consul, Q. Fabius Maximus Gurgus (cos. 292, 276) his relative Numerius Fabius Pictor, and a future consul, Q. Ogulnius (cos. 269).⁹ This was a fairly distinguished set of men, but not so distinguished that Ptolemy could take much encouragement. Fabius Gurgus was already known as a philhellene, having been instrumental in the dedication of the first temple of Venus at Rome (in 292), while Ogulnius was responsible for establishing the temple of Aesculapius of Epidauros on the Tiber Island in 296 or soon after.¹⁰

There were, that is to say, Romans who knew of and were sympathetic to Greece and Greek culture at the time. Contacts such as those of Fabius Gurgus and Ogulnius, were scarcely new, and it seems reasonable to assume more or less full Roman knowledge of the state of affairs in the east. The great events of the previous half century in all the lands between Epeiros and India can scarcely have been unknown in Italy; even in 323, when a Roman delegation may well have been in Babylon to see how Alexander intended to use his new and enormous powers,¹¹ Rome was the most significant power in Italy. It would be reasonable that Rome should at least investigate the events in the east at the time.

In the succeeding decades, the rise of Seleukos I to the position of the nearest successor to Alexander's power—for he ruled most of his empire, including, for a few months before his death, Macedon¹²—

⁸ App. *Sic.* 1; Justin 18.2.9; Eutropius 2.15; the delegation is said to have presented the rich gifts they had received to the *aerarium* on their return; this is interpreted as a gesture of selflessness, but it is also a clear signal that they were acting for the city in an official capacity, and not for themselves, and that Ptolemy's influence was very limited.

⁹ Dion. Hal. 20.14.

¹⁰ Venus: Livy 10.31.9; Aesculapius: Livy 10.47.7 and *per.* 11.

¹¹ Pliny *NH* 3.57, quoting Kleitarchos, but none of the main Alexander-historians mentioned this; it occasions much discussion in modern accounts of Alexander.

¹² Of course, he was killed before reaching Macedon, but he was king in succession to Lysimachos, and so for perhaps six months.

was too significant an event for an ambitious power like Rome to ignore. It has been calculated that contact was made between Rome and Rhodes about the end of the fourth century, or so at least it was claimed by Rhodes at a difficult moment in the relations between the two much later; if correct, this is a testimony to Rhodes's acute political antennae, but then Rhodes had extensive commercial relations, and could be expected to be concerned about political conditions in such a big market as Italy.¹³ Similarly, for other states the progress of Rome in its conquest of the various cities and nations in Italy was not something any Mediterranean state would fail to notice. If Pyrrhos knew enough to attack Rome's power, the rest of Greece clearly also knew. The Aitolian League, for example, established proxeny-relations with Rome about 271, in the immediate aftermath of the Pyrrhic War, in which Aitolia had been carefully not involved, though rather friendly towards Pyrrhos.¹⁴ Ptolemy II obviously knew all about Rome's power, as the timing of his diplomatic contact shows; for his own protection, Antiochos I will have acquired much the same information. Their joint sponsorship of Pyrrhos' expedition to Italy suggests as much; and if they knew of Rome, Rome knew of them.

It is one thing, however, to impute knowledge; another to estimate the degrees of mutual understanding. It is impossible to know to what degree the eastern monarchies appreciated the intricacies of the Roman system of government, and it is then to all too easy to suggest that lack of understanding is the equivalent of ignorance. But even if it is difficult for modern historians to appreciate those intricacies, it is not necessarily the case that ancient diplomats found it difficult to locate Roman power-centres. Greek history and contemporary Greek states produced many oligarchies; Rome was clearly another. On the other hand, actual direct diplomatic contact between Rome and the eastern states requires solid evidence, and that is in rather short supply.

¹³ Pol. 30.5.6–8; Schmitt, *Rom und Rhodos*, 1–3; Errington, *CAH* (2), 84; Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 29–46, does not accept this argument; Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 246–247 minimises the contact; Berthold, *Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age*, 233–237, discusses it in an appendix, concluding that the agreement was one of 'bare' *amicitia*, with possibly a trade discussion.

¹⁴ *IG* IX.1.17.

Furthermore every one of those contacts has been doubted by one or more modern researcher. This is an odd situation, one which appears to be intended to separate off Rome from the rest of the world into a unique organism; it is perhaps a symptom of the equally odd idea of defensive imperialism: the interpretation of events which insists that Rome was never the aggressor, and that all her wars of conquest were fought to defend herself against attack, usually unprovoked. Conquest thus became the victim's own fault.¹⁵

In reality, even a brief examination of the contacts which are recorded shows that they are all quite credible. Rome is to be seen as a normal Hellenistic state, with the usual diplomatic capabilities, and with as good a knowledge of affairs outside her territories as any other. If in 273 Ptolemy II knew what was going on in Italy and Sicily, it is only reasonable that well-informed Italians, and in particular Roman senators, should know what was going on in the eastern Mediterranean.

It is my concern, in this chapter in particular, but also in the rest this account, to see these events in the widest context. To take one item and examine its source is all very well, but these events did not take place in isolation. This chapter is thus concerned to develop the longer-term context of Roman contacts with the east, and later the more short-term context of the last few years before the development of the crisis which led to war with the Seleukid kingdom. It is normal that such a context is applied to Rome, where the war with Antiochos III is always presented as the third in the sequence Hannibalic Carthage-Philip of Macedon-Antiochos the Great; it is only reasonable that this be applied to Antiochos as well.

Thus it is necessary to consider the context of the only suggested contact which is recorded between Rome and a Seleukid king before 200 B.C. This took place in the reign of either Seleukos II (246-226) or Seleukos III (226-223), but it is known only through a comment by Suetonius that the Emperor Claudius found a copy of a letter to a 'King Seleukos' in the Roman archives. It referred to a request

¹⁵ See the discussion by J. Linderski, '*Si vis pacem, para bellum*, Concepts of Defensive Imperialism', in W. V. Harris (ed.), *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome, Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome*, 29, Rome 1984, 133-164. The first part of Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, chapters 1 and 2, is a systematic attempt to cut Rome off from the eastern powers, but even he cannot argue away the Egyptian contact of 273.

by Rome that Seleukos respect the autonomy of the city of Ilion.¹⁶ The date would be either the mid-240s, before Seleukos II lost control of Asia Minor after the rebellion of his brother Antiochos Hierax, or the mid-220s, when Seleukos II and then Seleukos III were actively campaigning in Asia Minor against Hierax, and then against Attalos I of Pergamon. Hierax, in fact, had used Ilion as the site of one of his mints, and had controlled it for perhaps thirteen years.¹⁷ With his defeat and death in 229/228 the city was thus endangered by the potential attack by one of the Seleukoi—particularly since one of Hierax' defeats took place nearby, in Hellespontine Phrygia.¹⁸ This is the most credible moment for the Roman display of interest. In the 240s Rome was fully occupied in the First Punic War, and Ilion was not endangered.

The concern for Ilion was, of course, due to the Romans' claim to descent from the Trojan refugees, a myth which was actively used diplomatically in 262 in Sicily, and thus available also later.¹⁹ Also in the 220s the Senate had begun to manifest an active rather than a passive²⁰ interest in the world beyond the Adriatic, with the first campaign into Illyria in 229, the results of which were reported by Rome to the Aitolians and Achaians,²¹ who had been the main victims of the Illyrian 'pirate' raids in the recent past. The Senate then also sent similar explanations to the main diplomatic centres of Greece, Athens and Corinth, choosing the moment to visit the latter when the Isthmian Games had brought a great crowd to the city. The Senate and its magistrates knew well the propagandist methods to use in Greece,²² which argues an easy familiarity with the Greek world. That one reward was the admission of Romans to the games

¹⁶ Suetonius, *Claudius* 25.3.

¹⁷ C. Boehringer, 'Antiochos Hierax am Hellespont', in M. Price *et al.*, (ed.), *Essays in Honour of Robert Carson and Kenneth Jenkins*, London 1993, 37–47. The city had minted for Antiochos II and Seleukos II until 241, and then for Hierax until the end, in 228. The city was not therefore under any threat from Seleukos—and the Roman letter implies that it was—until the 220s.

¹⁸ *OGIS* 275, 278, 279, 280.

¹⁹ Zon. 9.8; it was also recorded in Timaios' pioneering history even earlier: Pol. 12.4b (= *FGH* 566 F 36).

²⁰ 'Passive', for, as Gruen points out (*Hellenistic World*, 62–63), the record of earlier contacts shows that the initiative for each one came from the Greek end.

²¹ Pol. 2.16.3.

²² Pol. 2.11.8.

as participants also indicates that Greeks and Romans were well acquainted with each other.

The genuineness of the letter to Seleukos has been doubted, of course, as has every item in these early relations, but inventing it—either by the Emperor Claudius or the historian Suetonius—is such an unlikely idea that the easiest course is to accept it.²³ Accepting it does not violate any other sources, nor is it unlikely, so long as it is equally accepted that the Roman Senate was alert to events elsewhere. The letter, in fact, implies that the Senate was more than passively involved in events in the east. To send such a letter on a subject such as the city of Ilion was to become involved in the affairs of the whole Aegean. Ilion was a city which had been under Hierax' control until his expulsion by Attalos I of Pergamon in 228,²⁴ and the war waged by Seleukos II and Seleukos III on both of these rulers was aimed at recovering, amongst other places, Ilion. The city lay by the Hellespont, the vital commercial highway between the Aegean and the Black Seas, and the control of which affected every state around those seas. Only a few years later a war would be fought involving Byzantion, Rhodes, and others over the issue of tolls on the traffic at the Bosporos, the other choke-point on that much frequented sea-route. Thus Ilion was a city which lay at one of the most sensitive geopolitical and economic points of the ancient world, involving virtually every political power between the Adriatic and the Arabian desert. It is not believable that Roman senators did not know this.

It follows that the Senate's letter was a deliberate diplomatic move to involve Rome in the affairs of Greece and Asia Minor. The 220s were a decade in which major changes were taking place in that region: apart from the wars in Asia Minor, this was the decade of the Spartan revolution under Kleomenes III, and of the consequent

²³ Notably doubted and rejected by by Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce* 46–60, largely by expanding the issue to one of *maiestas*, which is not justifiable; Schmitt, *Untersuchungen*, 291 and 293, and De Sanctis, *Storia* 3.1.269 accept it; Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 64–65, does so grudgingly.

²⁴ Attalos in effect recognised the city as independent in 218, along with Alexandreia Troas and Lampsakos, which, in the way of such things in the Hellenistic period, put the cities within his area of influence: Pol. 5.78.6. They were said to have remained loyal to Attalos, which can only mean loyal to him as against the growth of Akhaïos' power since 223; before that all three had been controlled by Hierax until 228, and had minted for him: cf. Boehringer (note 17).

return of Macedon to power and influence in the Peloponnese and central Greece after the Selassia battle in 222. In the background was the almost visible decay of Ptolemaic power. The Ptolemies had exercised control at the Hellespont from c. 246, and still had posts in the area.²⁵ Rome was overlord of numerous Greek cities in Magna Graecia and Sicily, the ally of King Hieron of Syracuse, and the protector of the Greek cities of Kerkyra, Apollonia and Epidauros on the east side of the Adriatic; it was therefore an Hellenic power, a situation recognised by the admission of Romans to participation in the Isthmia from 228. Rome had demonstrated its military power very convincingly by its conquests, and had shown its naval reach by invading Sicily, Sardinia, Africa, and Illyria. By showing its interest in Aegean affairs, Rome was asserting its great power status in an undisputable manner, and was using a method which was instantly understandable by the Greeks and by all the Hellenistic kingdoms with an interest in the Hellespont—every single one, that is.

There was no immediate follow-up, of course, for some years. Seleukos II's war in Asia Minor ended with his death in 226, and that of Seleukos III with his assassination in 223. The rebellion of Akhaïos against Antiochos III in the next year then put off the issue of Seleukid power in Asia Minor for another decade. Rome was busy as well, first with the Gallic invasion of 225 and the subsequent Gallic wars in the north, then with the developing crisis with the Barkids in Spain, and finally, from 218, with Hannibal, his army, and his invasion of Italy. Yet even if the concern for Ilion was not followed by a concerted new policy of involvement in the east right away, it was a harbinger, not a flash in the pan.

Only a dozen or so years later, in the midst of the great war against Carthage, Rome had the will and the strength to intervene in Greece. Note the coincidence of events in the years 213–211. In the west in those years Rome conquered Capua and Syracuse, but suffered a rebellion by Tarentum. In the east, Antiochos III suppressed the rebellion of Akhaïos and captured Sardis, by which achievement his power overshadowed all the cities of Asia, including Ilion. And Rome, provoked by Philip V of Macedon, and in the wake of the rebellion of Tarentum which would give Philip an entry

²⁵ R. S. Bagnall, *The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt*, Leiden 1976, 159–161.

point to Italy if he activated his alliance with Hannibal—the same entry point used by Pyrrhos—stirred up war against him in Greece by sending a powerful fleet across the Adriatic. That fleet was instantly the most powerful naval force in Greek waters from the moment it arrived.

In the light of all this it is most interesting that Antiochos III does not seem to have imposed his overlordship on Ilion while he was in western Asia Minor in 213 and 212. One reason was, no doubt, the agreement he had made with Attalos I in 216, for Ilion was recognised as being in Attalos' sphere in 218. But by leaving the city alone Antiochos may also have been making a tacit acknowledgement of Rome's interest there. There is no evidence for this interpretation, of course, but pleasing two powers by doing nothing at Ilion would be good politics. Antiochos III was a fairly cautious political operator, and with a formerly rebellious and still restless Asian province to control he would not wish a foreign power of such potency as Rome to be given the opportunity to stir up trouble against him, as it was so successfully doing against Philip in Greece. The tremendous war in the west was something which a wary king, on a throne which was by no means wholly secure—he had faced rebellions, an army mutiny, an overbearing minister, and a massive military defeat during his ten-year reign so far—would be well to keep clear of.

At the same time, it is surely no coincidence that Rome's next manifestation of interest—that we know about—in matters Seleukid concerned exactly the same place. In 205 the Senate sent a delegation to collect the Asian Magna Mater. Our sources conflict on the origin of the goddess: Livy says Pessinous in Phrygia, Ovid names Mount Ida in the Troad.²⁶ If it was Pessinous then the co-operation and active assistance of Zeuxis, Antiochos' viceroy in Asia Minor, was essential. Livy is somewhat confused, for he sends the delegation to Attalos, who then escorts the Romans to Pessinous. But Pessinous was not part of Attalos' kingdom in 205,²⁷ and so Ovid's

²⁶ Livy 19.10.5 and 11.7; Ovid., *Fasti* 4.247–292. Livy is followed by other historians, but this a reflection of the later situation and Livy's influence. M. J. Vermaseren, *Cybele and Attis, the Myth and the Cult*, trans A. M. H. Lammers, London 1977, 38–41, accepts Livy and Pessinous; E. S. Gruen, 'The Advent of the Magna Mater', *Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy*, London 1990, 5–37, opts for Mount Ida.

²⁷ The temple-state of Pessinous never was Attalid, it seems, even after 188; the

location of Mount Ida, which *was* Attalid, becomes more credible. And Rome's concern for Ilion was also, at least in form, a religious matter. So, whatever the precise origin of the goddess, Roman diplomatic involvement in Asia must be presumed, as well as good knowledge of the area.²⁸

It was thus only because of more immediate issues that Rome and the Seleukid kingdom did not come into a more direct contact before 200 B.C. Antiochos' absence in the eastern provinces between 211 and 205, and Rome's continued preoccupation with Carthage until 202 are quite sufficient to explain the lack of recorded diplomatic contacts. In 202, however, three events brought about the start of continuous contacts: Rome's army under P. Cornelius Scipio (Africanus) finally defeated the last Carthaginian army, in Africa; Antiochos III invaded the Syrian territories of Ptolemy V, lands which his family had claimed for a century; and, soon after, a secret agreement between Antiochos and Philip V, Rome's recent enemy, to partition the Ptolemaic territories, was revealed to the Romans.

The key event was, in fact, the death of Ptolemy IV, which took place in 204 or 203, but was concealed for some time.²⁹ The reason for the concealment is said by Justin to have been to allow courtiers to loot the palace,³⁰ which is very likely to have happened, but there were also very good reasons of state for the concealment. The child who inherited the Ptolemaic throne, Ptolemy V Euergetes, was only five years old when his father died,³¹ and it was obvious

letters inscribed on the temple walls (Welles, *RC* 55–61) show that it was always in formal terms independent; before 188, when Seleukid power was great in Asia, the temple depended on the Seleukid king, not Attalos.

²⁸ Neither Livy nor Ovid are really close to these events, so to decide between them on the origin of the goddess is not easy. Weight must be given to Livy's plain statement that the delegation was taken to Pessinous, which was in the no-man's-land between the Attalids and the Galatians, into which the Seleukids had moved to establish authority since Antiochos' conquest of Akhaïos in 213. Ovid's account, of a journey to Mount Ida, is of less authority, despite his obvious research, largely because Livy knows nothing of it.

²⁹ F. W. Walbank, 'The Accession of Ptolemy Epiphanes: a Problem in Chronology', *JEA* 21, 1936, 20–34, places the death of Ptolemy IV in August–September 204, and the accession of Ptolemy V (and therefore the revelation of the death of the new king's father), a year later in August–September 203.

³⁰ Justin 30.2.6.

³¹ Justin 30.2.6 says five years; Hieron., *In Dan*, 11.13–14, says four; he was actually six when his accession was proclaimed in 203; exactitude matters little in this case.

to all that as soon as the death of the father was known, Antiochos III would make a new attempt to conquer Phoenicia and Palestine. The treaty of 217 which had ended the previous war was a personal one between the two kings, Antiochos III and Ptolemy IV, and the death of one of them annulled the treaty. Previous Syrian Wars had all begun soon after the death of a king of one of the dynasties: in 280, after the death of Seleukos I; in 260, after the death of Antiochos I; in 246, on the death of Antiochos II; in 219, after the death of Ptolemy III. By concealing Ptolemy IV's death the government of Ptolemy V was able to make some military and diplomatic preparations for the inevitable conflict. By August/September 203, however, the news was out.

Antiochos III had faithfully observed the letter of the treaty of 217, but in some respects he had violated its spirit. The city mint of Arados, for example, had been producing silver coins to a Ptolemaic standard since about 212, coins which was clearly designed to be used inside the closed Ptolemaic economic area;³² the purpose—and it must have had the permission, at least, of Antiochos III—was obviously to undermine Ptolemaic authority, especially in Arados' fellow-Phoenician cities, Tyre, Sidon, Tripolis, Byblos.³³ His hostility to the Ptolemaic state was not a secret.

As soon as he received the news of Ptolemy's death, Antiochos began to make his own diplomatic and military preparations. The military aspect was not difficult: the kingdom's army was in fine fettle after a series of victorious campaigns stretching over fifteen years in Asia Minor and the East. Diplomacy, however, was a more difficult problem than in his previous wars with Ptolemy.

It was Antiochos' constant method in his wars to identify an enemy of his enemy, make an alliance with him or it, and thereby weaken resistance by either having him attacked from two sides, or at least depriving him of a potential ally. In the eastern campaign, for example, he had made preliminary agreement with the Indian ruler in the Paropamisadai, which served to neutralise Euthydemos, the Baktrian king, while Antiochos attacked the Parthian kingdom;³⁴ also,

³² O. Morkholm, 'The Ptolemaic Coinage in Phoenicia and the Fifth War with Syria', in *Egypt and the Hellenistic World, Studia Hellenistica* 27, Louvain 1983, 241–251.

³³ I have argued this in *Hellenistic Phoenicia*, Oxford 1981, 97–98; it is based on the research of O. Morkholm (previous note).

³⁴ Pol. 11.39.11, where Antiochos *renews* his alliance with Sophagasenos in 206;

in the campaign against Akhaïos in Asia Minor in 216–213 the ally was Attalos I of Pergamon,³⁵ an alliance which still existed in 203 since both kings were still alive.

In the preparations for the Fifth Syrian War Antiochos had the advantage that the Ptolemaic kingdom was in its weakest state for a century. The southern part of Egypt had been in rebellion for several years, a rebellion by native Egyptians who had elevated their leader to the rank of Pharaoh;³⁶ the rebellion was thus successful enough to establish a functioning state in part of Egypt. To make doubly sure, Antiochos also made contact with at least one member of the Ptolemaic court, Ptolemaios son of Thraseas, who proved to be willing to change sides at the ripe moment.³⁷ There is no evidence that Antiochos contacted the native Egyptian independent kingdom, but if he had done so it would not be a surprise; by its weakening effect, he perhaps did not need to.

Internationally, however, the situation had changed since his first war with Egypt in 219–217. He had then been able to ignore Asia Minor, in rebellion under Akhaïos, because Akhaïos' army had refused to march into Syria.³⁸ Now, however, in 203–202, Antiochos had

therefore the alliance dated from before 206; since Euthydemos kept out of the Parthian war, even though Antiochos' advance to the east clearly threatened him as well as the Parthians, he had been neutralised before Antiochos reached the east.

³⁵ Pol. 5.107.4; it may or may not have been succeeded by a 'more formal' treaty after the suppression of Akhaïos, as Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 59, argues; and cf. Schmitt, *Untersuchungen*, 264–266. For my purposes here it is clear that Attalos was an ally of Antiochos. What is usually ignored is the fact that this treaty remained in existence until the death of one of the kings, which did not occur until 197, when Attalos died. Therefore Attalos was a subordinate ally—necessarily so given the two kings' relative power—of Antiochos from 216 until his death. It appears that one clause of the treaty involved the payment of grain by Antiochos to Attalos, a matter which surfaced in the negotiations for peace in 190–188. The existence of this treaty has a substantial effect on our understanding of events in Asia Minor and the Aegean in that period.

³⁶ K. Vandorpe, 'The Chronology of the Reigns of Hurganophor and Chaonophris', *Chronique d'Égypte*, 71, 1986, 294–302, who uses the latest readings of the kings' names; also P. W. Pestman, 'Harmachis et Anchemachis, deux Rois indigènes du temps des Ptolémées', *Chronique d'Égypte*, 40, 1964, 157–170, using the previous readings. The rebellion began in 207/206, and was not fully suppressed until 186; Hurganophor died, or ceased to reign, about 200/199.

³⁷ D. Gera, 'Ptolemy son of Thraseas and the Fifth Syrian War', *Ancient Society* 18, 1987, 63–73, and, for his family, C. P. Jones and C. Habicht, 'A Hellenistic Inscription from Arsinoe in Cilicia', *Phoenix* 43, 1989, 317–319; cf. Grainger, *Prosopography*, 115–116.

³⁸ Pol. 5.57.6–8.

suppressed Akhaïos, and was allied with Attalos I. Attalos himself was an enemy of Philip V of Macedon, against whom he had fought briefly as an ally of Rome in the first Romano-Macedonian War.³⁹ That war had faded away, and peace was made in 206–205, but Philip's expansionist ambitions were clearly not sated. If Antiochos was to attack Egypt in Syria he needed to be confident that Philip would not take advantage of his preoccupation to adventure into Asia Minor either at the expense of Attalos, Antiochos' ally, or of Antiochos himself. Antiochos would need to be able to use his full military strength in an Egyptian war, and that would leave his Asian territories very exposed.

Asia Minor was by no means a loyal province of the Seleukid state. It had been ruled by the Seleukid kings from 281 until 241, but from then until 213 it had been ruled by rebels or enemies: Antiochos Hierax, Attalos I, Akhaïos. Antiochos III's reconquest was still very recent, and he had had to bring in military settlers from Babylonia to enforce a degree of loyalty.⁴⁰ There had still not been enough time to ensure more than passive acceptance of his rule, and the delicacy with which he had dealt with the area is evident. He had been generous in concessions to Sardis, for example, to help the city recover after the siege of 214/213,⁴¹ and he had only gently pressed the Greek cities of the coast into his alliance in the years since. Amyzon had been pressed into an alliance and other places nearby soon succumbed as well.⁴² He had left as governor of the

³⁹ Attalos had been active in the war for only a year, and his withdrawal is blamed on the outbreak of war between him and Prusias of Bithynia. But not only was his departure from the war early, his entry was late. His alliance with Antiochos III must have affected his actions, and the limited nature of his participation may well be partly explained by this background fact. Evidence from Pergamon itself suggests a permanent relationship between the two kings. A statue base names Zeuxis, Antiochos' governor of Asia, a statue voted by the *demos* of the city, and another names Antiochos, a statue set up by a *nomophylax*, and by referring to the king as *megas*, is to be dated after his return from the east in 205 (*OGIS* 236 and 240 (= *I Perg.* 189 and 182)). Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 60, note 108, believes these are signs of 'a short period of good relations between Attalos and Antiochos', and comments that it will not have 'lasted more than a few months', in 204 or 203. On the contrary, the evidence is of a constant relationship beginning in 216, and lasting through to 204 or 203; there is no reason for it not to have continued to the death of Attalos in 197.

⁴⁰ These were the Jewish Babylonian settlers, 2,000 soldiers with their families, recorded in a letter of Antiochos III to Zeuxis which Josephos quoted (*Jos. AJ* 12.147); there may, of course, be others.

⁴¹ P. Gauthier, *Nouvelles Inscriptions de Sardes II*, Paris 1989, 13–45.

⁴² Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, 66–68, with docs 5–14.

whole area his confidant Zeuxis, by origin a Macedonian, who would be congenial to the descendants of Macedonian settlers who lived in various places in the interior.⁴³ And the alliance with Attalos had neutralised the one serious alternative focus of loyalty in the area. But Antiochos could never be sure. Another focus for that loyalty could well be Macedon itself; most of the cities wished for independence, not Antiochos' protection; governors were liable to strike off on their own.⁴⁴ The whole situation in Asia Minor was unstable, and could only be made stable by a long period of peace and quiet.

Antiochos' overall nervousness can only have been increased by the diplomatic moves of the regency government of the child king Ptolemy V, when his accession was finally announced in the autumn of 203. Three envoys were despatched from Alexandria, one to Antiochos himself, one to Philip V, and one to Rome, travelling by way of Greece. Antiochos was requested to maintain the peace and to continue in operation the treaty of 217.⁴⁵ This deceptively simple request could only evoke a temporising reply, but even that would be a clear indication that Antiochos planned an attack. The envoy to Philip was Ptolemaios son of Sosibios, and Sosibios was the main power in the regency. Ptolemaios was charged to propose a marriage alliance, presumably between the child king Ptolemy V and a daughter of Philip's.⁴⁶ This was clearly aimed at Antiochos, and would, if accomplished, go far to prevent any attack by him, for such an alliance would direct Philip's attention particularly to Asia, and provide a sufficient threat to paralyse Antiochos. The third envoy, to Rome, is said to have been expected to dally in Greece, and in fact, it is not clear that he ever got to Rome.⁴⁷ It must have been obvious that no support could be expected from Rome while the war with Carthage continued, and the envoy was presumably intended to be on hand for when that war ended, and meanwhile was to work in Greece, for Ptolemy had old contacts in many of the Greek states. The Aitolian League was one such contact, and the Aitolian

⁴³ For his career see Grainger, *Prosopography*, 122–123.

⁴⁴ In Karia, Olympichos had been a Seleukid governor originally, as had Antiochos Hierax and Akhaios in Asia; in Baktria and Parthia, governors had rebelled successfully; Attalos I of Pergamon was the heir of one governor who had rebelled against Lysimachos and another who had rebelled against Antiochos I.

⁴⁵ Pol. 15.25.13.

⁴⁶ Pol. 15.25.13–14.

⁴⁷ Pol. 15.25.14.

statesman Skopas was commissioned to raise a mercenary army in Greece,⁴⁸ a very public process which would soon reach Antiochos' ears, and would be a plain signal of the determination of the government of Ptolemy V to defend its territories.

Antiochos reacted to this Ptolemaic diplomacy by himself contacting Philip V. There is no evidence for this actual move, except for the later existence of the agreement between them, but it is inherent in the situation. Antiochos had been warned by the arrival and message of the Ptolemaic envoy, and then by the news of the recruiting of mercenaries for Ptolemy in Greece. Even if he had not heard of the visit of Ptolemaios son of Sosibios to Philip, to the alert statesman such a move was an obvious one for Sosibios to make. Philip held the key to the situation, since Macedon was the one great power in the east which was uncommitted. He could therefore orchestrate a bargaining session. Even if Antiochos did not know of the envoy's message, Philip would be sure to tell him. It was up to Antiochos to make the next move, to match, or overmatch, the bid of the Ptolemaic government for Philip's alliance. Hence the assumption that Antiochos proposed a division of the spoils of Egypt.

The precise details of the negotiations are unknown, but the result is not: it was an agreement between the two warrior-kings to divide up the available Ptolemaic lands between them.⁴⁹ This agreement was secret, and the mechanism by which it was arrived at is unknown—it seems certain that the two kings did not actually meet. The most likely intermediary would be Zeuxis, Antiochos' governor in Asia Minor. Being secret, it took some time to be revealed, and then its details were never definitively known. Indeed, one ancient historian calls it a rumour only, but then goes on to give precise details of the supposed division of the spoils: Egypt and Cyprus to Antiochos, and Kyrene, the Kyklades, and Ionia to Philip,⁵⁰ an improbable division which neatly omits those areas which were actually taken by both kings.

The agreement's secrecy, which is hardly surprising in the context, has led some moderns to question its very existence.⁵¹ But such

⁴⁸ Pol. 15.25.16–17; for Skopas see Grainger, *Aitolian Prosopographical Studies*.

⁴⁹ Pol. 3.2.8, 15.20.1–8, 16.1.9; Livy 31.14.5; App. *Mac.* 4.1; Justin 30.2.8; Hieron., *In Dan.* 11.13.

⁵⁰ App. *Mac.* 4.1.

⁵¹ There are numerous discussions on the 'secret treaty': D. Magie, 'The "Agree-

an agreement was an obvious move for both kings to make in the situation which followed the revelation of the death of Ptolemy IV, and its existence seems to be borne out in the conduct of both in the next years. Antiochos invaded Koile Syria the next year, 202, and Philip attacked the Ptolemaic outposts in the Hellespont and the Propontis; the following year Antiochos continued his conquest of Palestine, and Philip moved south into the Aegean and western Asia Minor.

But the situation then changed again. Rome finally beat Hannibal in 202, and the peace with Carthage was finalised during 201. At the same time the news of the secret agreement between the two kings leaked out. The Rhodians, who were concerned at Philip's successes, which threatened to affect their sea-power and their trade, either deduced the agreement or discovered it, but without finding out the precise details, if, indeed, there were any details to discover. They hastened to tell the Roman Senate about it,⁵² as did the Ptolemaic government when they heard of it.⁵³ It cannot have come as much of a surprise by that time, since both Antiochos and Philip were attacking Ptolemaic territories, Antiochos in Syria, Philip in the Straits. However, the very fact that it was secret lent it an air of menace, and allowed those with an interest in doing so to twist the news of its existence to their own ends. Both of Rome's informants could, and did, put their own gloss on the agreement, suggesting that it was in reality directed against Rome, as well as against Ptolemy

ment" between Philip V and Antiochos III for the Partition of the Egyptian Empire', *JRS* 29, 1939, 32-44, and id., *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, Princeton 1950, vol. 2, 750, note 42; R. M. Errington, 'The Alleged Syro-Macedonian Pact and the Origins of the Second Macedonian War', *Athenaeum* 49, 1971, 336-354, are two discussions which dislike the whole idea, and Errington omits to mention it in his chapter in *CAH* (2) VIII; Schmitt has it in his *Staatsverträge*, 547, and discusses it in his *Untersuchungen*, 237-261; Walbank, *Philip V*, 113; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 66, note 108, plausibly calls it 'an informal agreement to co-operate', but this ignores the need for both sides to define their respective spheres, and this must imply something fairly formal, and quite possibly in writing; Will, *Hist. Pol.*, calls it an 'entente', and discusses it on 98-101; Gruen, *Hellenistic Kingdoms*, 615-616, accepts it, with reservations; Lampela, Rome and the Ptolemies, 76, is censorious; Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, 74-76, points out that the Seleukid advance in Karia stopped at untaken cities, such as Euromos, which were left to Philip.

⁵² Livy 31.2.1-2.

⁵³ Justin 30.2.8; this is often dismissed as not being independent evidence, but, given the existence of the agreement, its revelation would very likely provoke this sort of reaction from the government in Alexandria.

V. It was not so directed, for the two kings could not be expected to agree on anything but the most short-term measures.

Antiochos' purpose in negotiating the agreement had been purely to neutralise Philip, so that he could not interfere by joining in on the Ptolemaic side while Antiochos fought in Syria. In comparison with the huge armies campaigning there Philip's expeditions were puny.⁵⁴ Further, Philip was unreliable both as a commander and as an ally, and Antiochos was surely aware of his erratic, mercurial nature, a powerful contrast to his own careful, pragmatic methods. In fact, by 201 Philip had served Antiochos' purposes, and had become a nuisance. He had got involved in fighting with Antiochos' subordinate ally Attalos of Pergamon,⁵⁵ and had demanded supplies from Zeuxis, Antiochos' viceroy in Asia Minor,⁵⁶ and he had ravaged the lands of Alabanda and made an attempt on Mylasa, both by then under Seleukid control.⁵⁷ He had not in fact declared war on Ptolemy, while the Ptolemaic government had been careful not to provoke him to do so. Such agreement as there had been between the kings had therefore unravelled almost entirely by the time the news of it finally reached Rome. Indeed, it would be quite in keeping with the relations between the two kings, and with Antiochos' methods, for Antiochos himself to be the ultimate source of the Rhodians' knowledge of the agreement. Since it was secret, that knowledge must have come from one of the two, and it was certainly not in Philip's interest to reveal it. Nor would Rhodes easily believe anything told them by Philip, with whom they were at war, and whose peace-time behaviour had been such that no Rhodian could trust him. Their relations with Antiochos, however, were friendly. The test of 'who benefits' shows that the revelation of the agreement and its disclosure to the Romans served Antiochos' purposes, for Philip was soon drawn away from western Asia Minor. And this might help explain why relations between the two kings were afterwards always cool, to say the least.

⁵⁴ Philip's expeditionary force consisted of a few thousands, whereas the armies which fought in the great battle at Panion in 200 were at least 60,000 strong each, and perhaps more. Skopas recruited 6,000 men in Greece for the Ptolemaic service.

⁵⁵ Pol. 16.1.

⁵⁶ Pol. 16.1.9.

⁵⁷ Alabanda, Mylasa: Pol. 16.24.7. Livy 33.18.4, mentions Philip's forces in control of Alabanda, which has been doubted, provoking attempts at emendation, but Philip certainly ravaged its territory; cf. Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, 77, note 92.

Philip's conduct of affairs had been, in fact, disastrous. He annoyed Rhodes, who fought and defeated him, and reported that secret agreement to Rome, which added yet another item to his debit sheet there. He annoyed Athens, and sent detachments of his army to ravage Attika, whereupon Athens complained to Rome.⁵⁸ He ravaged the territory of Attalos I of Pergamon, who reacted by joining forces with the Rhodians in self-defence, and then also complained of Philip's conduct to Rome.⁵⁹ In addition, the Aitolian League had been angered when he had filched some of its newly acquired members in the Hellespont region, and the league had then sent a complaint to Rome.⁶⁰ Philip had, in other words, managed to annoy almost all those Greek states who had any influence at Rome.

To the Senate the complainants were a group of the old allies from the Hannibalic War days, who were being attacked by an old ally of Hannibal's. Only a caustic response greeted the Aitolian complaints, who were accused of deserting their Roman alliance in 206, but the Aitolians had nowhere to go but into continuing hostility to Macedon, and so did not need to be treated kindly by Rome. It was different with the others. And now by mid-201 Rome's hands were free to avenge insults. Preparations were made for a Macedonian War.⁶¹ The revelation of the kings' secret agreement arrived some time after the Senate's decision for war had been taken; it can only have confirmed that decision. It did not provoke the war, but it was, as the Rhodians must have seen, and as the government of Ptolemy V in Alexandria rapidly realised, excellent propaganda material.

Roman actions were very similar in their way to those made by Antiochos in his war-preparation. Apart from the obvious military mobilisation and the despatch of a naval expeditionary force, an energetic diplomatic campaign was mounted in Greece, in order to enlist as many allies as possible on the Roman side. The main Greek powers had already lined themselves up in Rome's camp—the Aitolian League, Rhodes, King Attalos, Athens—and the Achaian League

⁵⁸ Paus. 1.36.5–6; Livy 31.1.10.

⁵⁹ Livy 31.2.1; App. *Mac.* 4.2.

⁶⁰ App. *Mac.* 4.2; Livy 31.29.4.

⁶¹ V. M. Warrior, *The Initiation of the Second Macedonian War, An Explication of Livy Book 31, Historia Einzelschriften* 97, Stuttgart 1996, provides a welcome breath of fresh air into Livian studies by her insistence that the 'annalistic' sources have their own validity; her chronology is very convincing.

soon enlisted as well.⁶² These powers were now contacted by an embassy of three senators. The senior man was C. Claudius Nero, the victor of the Metaurus battle in 207, and with him came C. Sempronius Tuditanus, who had commanded in Greece at the end of the previous Macedonian War, when peace had been made; the junior member was M. Aemilius Lepidus, still early in his career (he did not become consul until 187) but clearly regarded as a coming man. This was a substantial heavyweight trio, all of them experienced in diplomacy and war. Apart from the work they did in Greece, they were also charged with contacting both Ptolemy and Antiochos, supposedly with orders to instruct Antiochos not to attack Ptolemy, though such a task is not believable. Almost as unlikely, they are said to have attempted to bring about peace in Syria. Most plausibly of all, they were sent simply to see what was going on and try to ensure that neither king could or would interfere in the Aegean.⁶³

The envoys were in Athens in April 200,⁶⁴ by which time the decisions at Rome for war had long been made. Soon afterwards they went on to Rhodes,⁶⁵ and then to Egypt and Syria.⁶⁶ Lepidus was detached to interview Philip as he besieged Abydos in August, an interview which was the final notification to him of the state of war.⁶⁷ Perhaps the others separated as well, for there were many places to go. Who it was who went to the eastern Mediterranean is unclear. Lepidus' family later claimed that he had become 'tutor' to Ptolemy V,⁶⁸ which suggests that he at least went to Egypt. But it is surely unlikely that the most junior of the three went on such a delicate mission alone.⁶⁹

⁶² Pol. 18.42.6; Livy 32.23.1–2.

⁶³ Pol. 16.27.5; Livy 31.2.3; App. *Mac.* 4.2; Justin 30.3.3–4; Broughton, *MRR* 1.321 and 325; Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.102–103; Briscoe, *Comm Livy* 1.56–57, with references.

⁶⁴ Pol. 16.25.4.

⁶⁵ Pol. 16.34.2.

⁶⁶ Pol. 16.27.5; Livy 31.2.3–4; no direct evidence exists that the envoys went further than Rhodes, but their formal instructions were to visit Ptolemy and Antiochos, and it is not possible to believe that they did not obey.

⁶⁷ Pol. 16.34.1–7; Livy 31.18.1–5.

⁶⁸ Justin 30.3.4; E. A. Sydenham, *The Coinage of the Roman Republic*, London 1952, nos 831 and 832, a coin minted on behalf of the future *triumvir*, Lepidus, in 61 B.C. This is not good evidence for the actions of Lepidus' ancestor in 200, but it does suggest a family memory of an Egyptian visit, at the least.

⁶⁹ If he did accept some sort of relationship at Alexandria he was overstepping the limits of both his own authority and the embassy's instructions. To become in

The envoys, probably all three of them, will have visited Antiochos as well as Ptolemy, in accordance with their instructions.⁷⁰ They will have known, before they returned, that Antiochos was winning his war in Syria. He had conquered Phoenicia and Palestine during 202 and 201, and was counter-attacked by Skopas' army out of Egypt and Gaza in 200. This army he defeated at the battle of Panion in that year, and the winter of 200/199 was occupied by the siege of Sidon, to which Skopas' beaten army had retreated.⁷¹ The envoys saw him during the summer or in early autumn, and will have known of Antiochos' victory by the time they returned west.⁷² No doubt Antiochos could reassure the Romans that he had no wish to intervene in the unfolding developments in Greece. While he had a full-scale war on his hands in Syria, his sincerity could not be doubted. And Ptolemy, of course, was incapable of interfering.⁷³ The news of Rome's determination to fight Philip would be good news to Antiochos, for this would ensure that Philip was not able to harass him in Asia Minor any more. For Ptolemy's government, on the other hand, it would dash any hopes they might have that Philip could be persuaded to join in a diversionary attack in Asia Minor.

Events in the Aegean area will have been as convincing to the Roman envoys as Antiochos' own words. Philip's actions had roused Rhodian fears, and they had attempted to block his move south, only to be defeated in a naval battle off Lade.⁷⁴ He had then taken

some way Ptolemy's guardian while the child king's government was at war, and while Lepidus himself was an accredited representative of the Roman Republic, was an official act which could only have produced a serious crisis in Roman-Seleukid relations. Of this there is no indication, then or later. One might conclude that, though he probably went to Alexandria, the rest of the family story is either mere legend or chronologically misplaced; cf. the discussion by Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 86–87.

⁷⁰ Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations*, no. 60.

⁷¹ Pol. 16.18.4–19.11; the actual date of the battle is not certain: cf. M. Holleaux, 'Études d'histoire hellénistique: la Chronologie de la cinquième guerre de Syrie', *Klio* 8, 1908, 267–281. For the war, cf. Grainger, *Hellenistic Phoenicia*, 99–105, and references there. The chronological uncertainty makes it impossible to coordinate military events with the Roman mission's movements, as Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 97–98, attempts to do.

⁷² Livy 21.18.1; Pol. 16.27; App. *Mac.* 4.

⁷³ Livy 31.9.1–3, records a Ptolemaic embassy offering forces to assist Athens, but only if Rome requested them, which was a ludicrous notion in the midst of the Syrian war; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.79. It may have been a first move, blocked by the Roman refusal of Ptolemaic help, to enlist Rome to assist in that war.

⁷⁴ Pol. 16.10.1, 14.5 and 15; the sequence of events in this war is in dispute,

over Miletos,⁷⁵ but found that his victory had roused another enemy to action, Attalos of Pergamon. If Philip could have expected anyone to be neutral it was Attalos, given Attalos' client-relationship with Antiochos, and his emergence as an open enemy was a shock.⁷⁶ It was implicit in the two kings' agreement that each king, and his clients, would help the other, at least by not interfering in his operations. But, in the Aegean such an agreement favoured Philip over Antiochos. Antiochos' main operations were well out of Philip's reach, whereas Philip was treading close to Antiochos' territories all the time he was in Asia, and Zeuxis, Antiochos' governor in Sardis, was without serious resources by this time, given that Antiochos needed to concentrate his army in Palestine. Any surplus military manpower in Seleukid Asia Minor⁷⁷ will have been taken to the the main field army in Syria, where the armies at Panion mustered well over 60,000 men on each side.⁷⁸ It follows that any troops still under Zeuxis' command in Asia were the bare minimum he needed to maintain local control. The relative persuasiveness of Attalos was therefore increased, for he had a small army and a useful fleet.⁷⁹ And Philip's conduct was such that for Antiochos to be too obviously supporting him was to have some of Philip's unpopularity rub off on him.

Further, Attalos had been involved in war against Philip before, while still under Antiochos' suzerainty, and while Zeuxis was viceroy in Sardis. Zeuxis and Attalos may be presumed to have had a fairly close understanding, and they could confer easily, their respective

but this is not relevant here; it is best to see the Lade battle preceding that at Chios, followed by the attack on Pergamon; cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, 117–125, and Appendix III, 307–308, De Sanctis, *Storia*, vol 4.1, 8–11; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 73; Holleaux is the principal dissenter, *Etudes* IV, 218–222.

⁷⁵ Pol. 16.15.5–6.

⁷⁶ Walbank, *Philip V*, 119.

⁷⁷ The Seleukid forces in Asia Minor were fairly substantial (see below, chapter 15, note 4), but were no match for either Philip's army or that which Antiochos could recruit in Syria. Akhaïos' army, in 222 had refused to march on Syria, and one reason will have been that they were strongly outnumbered.

⁷⁸ Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 7–19, admittedly based on inadequate sources, but Antiochos had over 70,000 men at Raphia, and perhaps 45,000 at Magnesia, the latter number reached after losses in Greece. Philip never had more than about 25,000 men in his battle line.

⁷⁹ Attalos had perhaps 30 warships of a substantial size at the Chios battle in 202 (Pol. 16.2.10); his army was always small, and his successor's army at Magnesia was less than 3,000 in number (Livy 37.39.9), though a larger total may be assumed for his full force.

capitals at Pergamon and Sardis being only sixty miles apart—say two days' travel for a courier, or less. Zeuxis was undoubtedly in the confidence of Antiochos, who in turn cannot have been keen to see Philip become too powerful. Therefore when Attalos joined Rhodes in fighting to stop Philip it was clearly done with the approval of Zeuxis and in accordance with Antiochos' general policy. This was confirmed when, after Philip had campaigned through Attalos' territories, he failed to secure more than the absolute minimum of supplies for his forces from Zeuxis,⁸⁰ just enough, in fact, to get rid of him.

All this had happened in 201, before the Roman envoys had arrived, and was obviously known to them. Such events will have cleared their minds of any suggestion that the agreement between the two kings was seriously meant as an alliance directed against Rome, for, whatever its original purpose, it was clearly at an end. It followed that Rome could conduct its war against Philip in Europe without any fear of Antiochos taking sides. The Seleukid king's pre-occupation with the war in Syria—the siege of Sidon lasted well into 199, and was then followed by another lengthy siege at Gaza, which did not end until the city's capture sometime in 198⁸¹—and Zeuxis' tacit support of Attalos in his enmity towards Philip, all added up to a policy of non-intervention by Antiochos in Europe. The secret agreement had been what it was always said to be, a short-term agreement to partition the possessions of Ptolemy.

One question remains. In Appian's version of the secret agreement's terms, where he purports to state which territories were to go to which aggressor, Egypt itself was assigned to Antiochos.⁸² This list is not in itself very convincing, if only for the assignment of Kyrene to Philip and the omission of Koile Syria, the main prize of the war, but it does point up the fact that Antiochos did not actually make any attempt to conquer, or even to invade, Egypt, even when he had the chance, after the capture of Gaza. This cannot have been due to the strength of the country, though it was notoriously difficult to conquer. The later Roman historians had an explanation,

⁸⁰ Pol. 16.1.1–9.

⁸¹ Pol. 16.18.1; 29.12.8; Errington, *CAH* (2), VIII, 251, dates it to 'summer 201', but if the city was in Seleukid hands after that, the Ptolemaic campaign to Panion in 200 is very difficult to understand.

⁸² App. *Mac.* 4.2.

which was that the envoys sent to both Antiochos and Ptolemy were to instruct Antiochos not to attack Egypt.⁸³ Polybios has a rather sickening passage on the secret agreement, condemning it as an amoral pact designed to deprive a poor orphan child—Ptolemy V—of his inheritance.⁸⁴ And the much later claim of Lepidus' descendant, the *triumvir* Lepidus, on the coin of 61 B.C., to have been guardian of Ptolemy V, reflects this attitude.

This interpretation, both the 'instruction' and the 'tutelage', cannot be accepted, but the root of it may lie in the undoubted concern at Rome that Antiochos should not become too overwhelmingly powerful. The Seleukid king already ruled from the Aegean to the borders of India, he had reduced all the independent kingdoms on his borders—Kappadokia, Pergamon, Armenia, Atropatene, the Parthians, Baktria, the Paropamisadae, Gerrha in Arabia—to dependence on him. He had conquered Koile Syria at last, and was clearly going to keep it in the peace settlement. To add Egypt with its enormous wealth of territories and resources to his empire would put Antiochos into the same power classification as Alexander the Great and Darius I. Between them Antiochos III and Ptolemy V had recruited armies whose total numbers in 217 at the battle of Raphia had approached 150,000 men, and in 200, well over 120,000 had fought at Panion. The union of Seleukid and Ptolemaic lands would thus create a potential military force double the size of the Roman army which had been destroyed at Cannae. It was an army bigger by a factor of three than anything Carthage had ever fielded, and bigger by a factor of five or seven than the army Philip could produce.⁸⁵

Such a union was thus a prospect no Roman statesman could contemplate with anything other than fear and trembling. This is surely what lies behind the Roman interpretation of the instructions to the envoys, that they were to prevent Antiochos attacking Egypt. It is beyond a doubt that the envoys were expected to voice their concern to Antiochos, and it is this which is at the root of the alternative Polybian version of their instructions, that they were to attempt to reconcile the two kings.⁸⁶ This, of course, was not an altruistic

⁸³ So Justin 30.3.3; 31.1.2; Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 97–98.

⁸⁴ Pol. 15.20.1–8.

⁸⁵ The largest army Hannibal had commanded in the late war was about 50,000 at Cannae in 216; Philip's largest army was perhaps 25,000 at Kynoskephalai.

⁸⁶ Pol. 17.27.5.

concern for peace, still less for the inheritance of the poor orphan child Ptolemy V. Rome's interest lay in the two kingdoms continuing to exist as separate entities, preferably mutually hostile, a condition which could best be assured by a peace settlement which left at least one side deprived and angry, and certainly not by a conquest of Egypt. Otherwise, from Rome's point of view, it was probably safer that the two should continue to fight each other, for in such a case neither would be able to help Philip in the war which Rome was then launching. But Antiochos was, by 200, clearly winning *his* war, and the Roman envoys were inevitably interested in his further plans. It may be assumed that he could reassure them; he did not intend to invade Egypt, and when at the end of the campaigning season of 198, having captured Gaza at last, he turned north, away for Egypt, the Romans could release whatever pent breath they had been holding. Antiochos had kept his word. It was a basis for further trust.

CHAPTER TWO

APPROACHES

When Antiochos III finally captured Gaza, sometime in 198, he had the choice of continuing into Egypt, or of moving against other Ptolemaic possessions. Invading Egypt would involve a major expedition requiring his full military strength and a long, difficult campaign. The prospect was of a war lasting several years. In addition Rome's envoys had already indicated by their very visit their displeasure at the prospect of the union of the Seleukid and Ptolemaic kingdoms, and to whom he may well have already indicated his intention not to undertake that campaign. To invade Egypt would bring on the enmity of Rome.

The alternative was much more immediately enticing. The Ptolemaic kingdom possessed territories all along the southern and western coasts of Asia Minor. Some of these had been the targets of Philip V's erratic campaigns between 202 and 200, but by 198 Philip had abandoned most of the conquests he had made in order to defend his home kingdom against the Roman attack. This he was doing with fair success, and that war was, in 198, still in the balance, though the probability was that Rome, possessed of much greater resources than Macedon, would be the winner. Whoever won, the situation in Greece and the Aegean—the whole great area between Rhodes and Epeiros, between Messene and Byzantion—would be reorganised, with either Rome or Macedon as the supervisor.

The exact position with regard to Philip's conquests in Asia and the Straits had become so confused as to be dangerous. One of Antiochos' subordinate allies, Attalos of Pergamon, was already involved in the Macedonian war—thanks to Philip's aggressions—but in the same minor, almost non-participatory way as in the earlier Roman-Macedonian war between 211 and 205.

Other Ptolemaic territories in Asia had not been touched by Philip, but Antiochos' urge to take them was all the stronger because they had once been part of his own family's kingdom. These were places in Kilikia, Pamphylia, and Ionia. Antiochos' public justification for his attempts to conquer Koile Syria was that it had had been unjustly

taken from his ancestor Seleukos I by Ptolemy I;¹ this did not apply to Egypt proper, though it could be applied in Asia Minor and Thrace. All in all, the hideous prospect of a long and difficult war in Egypt repelled as much as the prospect of good pickings in Asia Minor attracted, and the latter could be dressed up in a plausible dynastic justification as well. It is not surprising that Antiochos chose the latter option.

A combined land and sea expedition was organised. The land army, or most of it, would march along the Royal Road through inland Asia to Sardis, the centre of government for Seleukid Asia. This army was under the command of the experienced Ardys, and the nominal authority of Antiochos' son Mithridates (who later took the name Antiochos).² This army was not the full force of the kingdom, which was not required since a major enemy was not anticipated. It was, however, the usual field army, and it set out after winter quarters in the spring of 197.³ By doing this, and by transferring the weight of his authority into western Asia, although he was not present himself, Antiochos was establishing himself as a player in the game in the Aegean.

This main force marched in the spring of 197, as soon as the Taurus passes were open, but a smaller force was sent ahead in the autumn of 198. The evidence for this is indirect, and not wholly reliable, but such a move makes sense. They would be men who were domiciled in Asia Minor, being sent home after the conclusion of the Palestine campaign, which had required a major manpower levy of the whole kingdom. There would be no point in keeping them in winter quarters in Syria when the fighting in Palestine was over. It was the march of this advance force which would appear to be the basis for accusations made by an envoy of King Attalos in Rome in 198. Livy reports the existence of this embassy, which complained that Attalos' territory was suffering an invasion by Antiochos' forces at the very time that Attalos' own forces were fully employed in supporting the Senate in its war with Philip. And he

¹ Pol. 5.67.6-8.

² Grainger, *Prosopography*, 81 (Ardys), and 22-27 (Mithridates/Antiochos); M. Worle, 'Inschriften von Herakleia am Latmos I: Antiochos III, Zeuxis und Herakleia', *Chiron* 18, 1988, 421-476; Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, doc. 31.

³ Livy 33.19.9-10; Livy makes a typical mistake in calling both commanders sons of the king.

went on to ask that the Senate send troops to help defend his kingdom against these attacks.⁴

It is well to recall what this report amounts to: it is one by an historian, basing himself on an earlier writer, of an event a century and a half or more earlier, of a speech to the Senate by the envoy of a king who was not present, reporting on an event in Asia. It is permissible to entertain doubts as to the accuracy of the report, as to the truthfulness of the envoy, as to the motives of the king, and as to the actual events claimed to have occurred in Asia. Further, it is well to be clear what Attalos' envoy was said to be proposing. Attalos was already a subordinate ally of Antiochos III, and had been since they had made an alliance against their mutual enemy Akhaïos, back in 216. By inviting Rome to send troops to defend him against his own suzerain, therefore, Attalos was asking the Senate both to accept his allegiance and to prepare for a war with Antiochos, just at the moment when the main Seleukid army had been freed for action elsewhere by the definitive conquest of Koile Syria, and when the Roman army in Greece had still made only very limited progress in the campaign against Philip V.

There are also elements of distortion in the account which the envoy is said to have given of Attalos' activity as an ally of Rome in the war against Philip. As in the first of these wars Attalos had actually done very little. His early activity in Asia before 200 had been on his own behalf, since Rome did not formally declare war until 200. In that year he had been active diplomatically in working

⁴ Livy 32.8.9–11; Holleaux, *Études*, III, 331–335, rejected this as a fabrication; Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 82–83, and Schmitt, *Untersuchungen*, 264–270, accept it; none of these consider the likelihood that the envoys lied for Attalos' own purposes; Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.153–154; Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 538–539; Bevan, *House*, 2.36; A. Mehl, 'Zu den diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Antiochos III und Rom, 200–193 v. Chr.', in C. Borker and M. Donderer (eds), *Das antike Rom und der Osten, Festschrift für Klaus Parlasca zum 65. Geburtstag*, Nuremberg 1990, 143–155; Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, app. 6, 279–281, eventually, if hesitantly, decides it was an 'annalistic invention'. Livy's actual source is not known, and cannot be conjectured—Polybios' sections on these years have vanished—but to label them as 'annalistic' with the implication of unreliable, and add the word 'invention' to the label, is scarcely useful. The issue is not Livy's source, but the acceptability of the story. If it is concluded that it is a fabrication there is no more to be said; but if it is accepted, then it has to be explained. The detail, the follow-up (at Livy 32.27.1) and the very strangeness of the episode, make me accept it, though it is not necessary to accept that the king and his envoy were altogether truthful in their complaint.

up the coalition with Rome and several Greek states,⁵ which merely spread the burden onto those other Greeks. In the actual fighting, Attalos' fleet had helped the Roman fleet in the Aegean cruise in 199, during which he acquired the island of Andros, but it was Roman forces which had done most of the work.⁶ When his envoy therefore claimed that the king was zealous in his contribution to the common effort, a degree of exaggeration, to say the least, was involved.⁷

Therefore, when he also claimed that his own territory was under attack by Antiochos' forces, a certain scepticism is in order. We only have this evidence—by Attalos' envoy as reported by Livy—for this, and Attalos clearly had an interest in propagating the idea of a Seleukid attack. His purpose may have been to escape Seleukid suzerainty, though he can scarcely have expected Rome to accept him at the cost of adding a war with Antiochos to the war already being fought against Macedon. Attalos' real purpose, then, was presumably to escape the burden of the war in Greece. This had happened before, of course. In 208 he had withdrawn from the first war between Rome and Macedon for the very same reason, when his kingdom was attacked by Prusias of Bithynia. That attack had been instigated by Philip, whose brother-in-law Prusias was.⁸ Thus it seems probable that Attalos was using the same excuse again, but one which was invented this time, and not a real invasion.

It is useful to compare this tactic of Attalos' with that adopted by other states at this time. Athens had appealed for help, but was only convincing when Attalos and Roman envoys were on hand to witness an actual attack by Philip's forces: Athens had then publicly declared war on Philip, thus imposing pressure on Attalos and Rome

⁵ In particular by his embassy to Rome in 200 (Livy 31.2.1; App. *Mac.* 4.2) and his presence at Athens when the Roman envoys arrived (Pol. 16.25.1). It was the joint presence of Attalos and the Roman envoys, along with Rhodes, which persuaded the Athenians to declare war on Philip.

⁶ Livy 31.45.3–8; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 74.

⁷ Another error in Livy's report is to have Antiochos described as 'friend and ally' (32.8.13), a status which the king certainly did not have—'friend' (*amicus*) would be acceptable, after the embassy of 220, but 'ally' (*socius*) is not. Later Antiochos specifically requested that this status be agreed (Livy 34.57.6), which means that the earlier note is wrong. It is, however, not important enough to invalidate the whole event.

⁸ Livy 28.7.10; Walbank, *Philip V*, 95, is sceptical of Philip's involvement, though the sole beneficiary of the episode was Philip.

to assist the city. This tactic worked, but only because Rome had already determined to go to war anyway. One must presume that the Athenians knew this, probably from the Roman envoys who were present, since for the city to declare war on Philip without assurance of support from elsewhere was clearly suicidal. The Ptolemaic government, on the other hand, had emphasised Athens' plight to Rome and offered troops, in the full knowledge that Rome would refuse, and that they themselves could not supply them. In these circumstances the only conclusion is that, like Athens, the Ptolemaic government was aiming to get Rome to do Egypt's fighting for it; so too now was Attalos, and both he and the Ptolemaic government had in mind getting Rome to fight Antiochos. And both, by a different route, eventually succeeded. But the caution of the Roman Senate in taking on these obligations is equally notable. There is no sign that the Senate had any intention of involving itself in a war even farther to the east, but at least it would now be thoroughly alert to the minefield of intrigue into which it was moving—assuming that the envoys two years before had not already pointed this out.

The story related by Attalos' envoy served its purpose, and Attalos was able to withdraw from the war for the next year. Thus there is no reason to believe that any Seleukid invasion of his lands really took place. It is necessary to ask what Antiochos could hope to gain by such an act. He already had Attalos' alliance. In the near future he would himself be present to enforce it—perhaps one of the reasons Attalos wanted to go home. It could only have been an action initiated by Zeuxis, whose conduct of the affairs of Asia Minor had been cautious all along. So Antiochos could hope to gain nothing, and Zeuxis would do nothing without specific instructions. The invasion therefore probably did not take place, but was invented by Attalos to provide a reason for getting out of involvement in the fighting in Greece with his gains, the island of Andros, intact, and without further expenditure. He had helped stir up that war, now someone else could do the hard work and finish it.

It is also clear that the Senate was unimpressed by Attalos' story and his appeal. It had no intention of raising up a new enemy while the old one was both unbeaten and fighting well. So Attalos was permitted to withdraw his ships and troops from the Macedonian war.⁹ His contribution would be of little use anyway now that the

⁹ Livy 32.8.13.

fighting was concentrated in the Greek mainland, and especially now that the much more numerous, militant, and committed Aitolians had joined the Roman coalition.¹⁰ The Senate did, however, agree to send an embassy to Antiochos to upbraid him for supposedly attacking a Roman friend. Or, at least, so Livy says.¹¹

It may be doubted if this was the only or even the main purpose of the Roman embassy. Since the previous visit of Nero's embassy in 200, the situation in the east had changed drastically. The war in Syria was effectively over, and Antiochos' next move was one which, unlike the Syrian conflict, was now of direct concern to the Senate. If he moved against Egypt, he would be unable to concern himself with the Aegean and Asia for some lengthy time, but he would be far too powerful for Roman tastes. On the other hand, if he moved into Asia to seize Ptolemy's lands there he became an immediate problem rather than a long-term one, but one even more difficult to deal with, given the king's justifications for his actions—for he claimed only to be recovering territories which rightfully were his. The new Roman embassy was therefore presumably intended to discover what Antiochos aimed to do next. If the envoys set out late in 198 they would be able to visit Antiochos in Antioch in the autumn and winter of that year, and return during the winter: its news would be urgent enough to justify a winter crossing of the Aegean and Ionian Seas. It is clear from the sequel that Antiochos also sent his own envoy back to Rome with the Romans, and the return of that envoy to the east is noted in May of 197.¹² The two great powers were thus now, for the first time, in reciprocal communication.

Attalos sent an envoy to Rome with the gift of a gold crown, claiming gratitude for the Senate's help in repelling Antiochos. This, of course, is not evidence that Antiochos had originally invaded. Indeed, Livy's words in this notice even imply that no invasion had taken place, only that it seemed to Attalos to have been threatened.¹³ No doubt, if challenged on this—he never was—Attalos would say

¹⁰ Livy 31.40.7–41.1

¹¹ Livy 32.8.15–16; Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 115–116, discusses this at some length, but only from the side of Rome; he accepts the truth of Attalos' accusation without question; Schmitt, *Untersuchungen*, 273–276, interprets the result as a compromise between Attalos and Antiochos, which again involves accepting Attalos' story as true.

¹² Livy 33.20.8.

¹³ Livy 32.27.1.

that just the mere suggestion of senatorial involvement was enough to remove Antiochos' forces. But once he had lied about the invasion, he had to carry through the story by the expression of gratitude.

In fact, the meetings between the envoys of Rome and Antiochos imply a very different sort of relationship. Antiochos evidently reassured the Roman envoy, whoever it was, on the matter of the alleged 'invasion' of Attalos' territory. Antiochos' own envoy—who it was is also not known—was listened to by the Senate, and will have given an explanation of the king's intentions. The Senate replied with complimentary decrees in the king's honour.¹⁴ Therefore it is clear that Antiochos had persuaded the Senate that he had no intention of involving himself in the war between Rome and Philip. This meant that the new Roman commander in Greece in 197, T. Quinctius Flaminius, could get on with the task of getting to grips with the Macedonian field army without distraction. The timing of these embassies was clearly part of the Roman diplomatic preparation for the 197 campaign. This was necessarily the main Roman preoccupation at the time. Any reference to Attalos and the supposed invasion of his territory would be purely coincidental.

In the same way, it is necessary to remember, all through these developments, that Antiochos was also actively at war, with Ptolemy V. He might have won battles and conquered Koile Syria, but Ptolemy's government was by no means wholly without power and resources. A substantial army existed in Egypt still, partly fighting the rebels in the south, partly in garrison within Egypt, partly on guard against any Seleukid attack or raid along the Sinai desert route. There was also a Ptolemaic fleet, which was normally based in Egypt and in Cyprus, and which could not be ignored. A substantial fraction of Antiochos' strength had thus to be left in southern Syria to guard against a Ptolemaic recovery; similarly, a part of the Seleukid naval power had to remain in Syrian ports.

A substantial Seleukid naval force, however, was gathered by the spring of 197 for a voyage along the southern coast of Asia Minor. It carried a considerable military force as well, one which was intended to be strong enough to capture a series of small cities and forts, and numerous enough to leave garrisons in those which were captured.

¹⁴ Livy 33.20.8; Livy does not refer directly to this embassy; Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 116; Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 617, notes that this amounted to *amicitia* with Rome; cf. Holleaux, *Etudes* V, 160–163.

Antiochos' normal field army was 30,000 to 35,000 strong, which was the size of the force he took on the great eastern expedition. For brief periods he was able to mobilise as many troops again, as he did for the Raphia campaign in 217, and for the Panion campaign in 200, but this could only be done occasionally, for it was extremely expensive and very disruptive of society. So it was his field army which Antiochos employed in the next years, not the emergency force. In 197, however, this field army was divided into three sections: part had already been sent on ahead in 198, and was available for use in Asia Minor during 197; the main body was now sent to march by land into Asia Minor under Ardys and Mithridates; the remainder was to sail with the fleet under Antiochos' own command.

The naval force was a mixed collection of three hundred ships, a third of them naval vessels, of various sizes, but probably, from the term Livy uses, not bigger than quadriremes; the rest were were smaller, again of various sizes, classified as *cercuri* (a term usually applied to a merchant galley) and *lembi*, some of which would certainly be capable of fighting.¹⁵ This fleet could carry several thousands of soldiers, and was clearly more designed as an expedition for coastal conquest than for sea-warfare; that is to say, Antiochos had organised an expeditionary force with a specific task in view.

The two sources for Antiochos' progress are little more than lists of the places he captured, but they have intriguing differences. Hieronymos, apparently quoting Porphyrios, provides what seems to be a chronological list of captures, without detail, taking in the the whole expedition from Kilikia to Ionia.¹⁶ Livy's list begins in the middle, at Korakesion, and lists those places Antiochos had already taken,¹⁷ and in a slightly different order than that given by Hieronymos. There are also some interesting omissions from both lists. These

¹⁵ Pol 18.41a.1-2; Livy 33.19.10-11; Livy called the ships *tectae* and *apertae*, 'decked' and 'open', and so warships and merchant ships; cf. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship*, 134.

¹⁶ Hieron., *In Dan.* 11.15 (= Porphyrios, *FGrH* 260, F 46), naming Antiochos' conquests as, in this order: Aphrodisias, Soloi, Zephyrion, Mallos, Anemurion, Selinos, Korakesion, Korykos, Andriake, Limyra, Patara, Xanthos, Ephesos.

¹⁷ Livy 33.20.4.5, listing the conquests as: Zephyrium, Soli, Aphrodisias, Korykos, Selinus, Anemurium, siege of Coracesium; the only modern discussions are A. Mastrocinque, 'Osservazioni sull' Attivita di Antiochi III nel 197 e nel 196 A.C.', *La Parola del Passato*, 31, 1976, 307-322, and Schmitt, *Untersuchungen*, 271-276, who both deal mainly with events in Ionia.

differences and omissions provide useful clues as to Antiochos' methods and procedure in this campaign.

Livy's first three captures are actually listed in the reverse order by Hieronymos. The latter begins with Aphrodisias, then adds Soloi and then Zephyrion; Livy puts Zephyrion first. The first problem here is that there are two Zephyrioi, one a cape next to Aphrodisias, and the other a town a little east of Soloi. So Livy seems to assume Zephyrion is a town, and lists Antiochos' conquests from east to west, while Hieronymos puts the first conquest as Cape Zephyrion, on the southernmost tip of Kilikia Tracheia, followed by a mopping-up operation behind that point. Hieronymos' next listed town tends to confirm that process, for it is Mallos, a city of some size on the Pyramos river, even further east than Soloi.

Here Hieronymos' list is the more convincing, for it fits well with the strategic intention. The method of campaign implied is that Antiochos did not simply sail along the coast, taking towns and cities in succession as he arrived at them. Instead he established a forward post, at Aphrodisias, presumably with a military camp, where his main fleet could be provisioned and his sailors taken out of the ships, which could then be cleaned and dried. Meanwhile military detachments dealt with the Ptolemaic posts which were dotted along the coast of Kilikia Pedias to the east, which he had cut off by this manoeuvre. Aphrodisias was in fact a useful anchorage, protected from the western winds of spring by the southward-jutting Cape Zephyrion, as the name suggests. Its location is also significant for the fact that it is the closest point of the Kilikian mainland to Cyprus. This island was an old Ptolemaic possession and naval base. Antiochos' intentions for the campaign of 197 will have become very obvious once he began collecting his fleet, and an intervention by the Ptolemaic navy was always a possibility. If it did intervene, Cape Zephyrion would be the obvious place at which it would reach the mainland. By seizing it right at the start of the campaign Antiochos was preempting such a move. It is a place which we must assume remained the site of a major Seleukid garrison during the rest of the war; the presence there of a hundred Seleukid warships with crews and marine guards was sufficient deterrent for the present. The smaller Seleukid ships could then be used to land troops at other points along the coast, as necessary.

It is also to be noted that some places in Kilikia are omitted from both lists. The absence in any list of such places as Tarsos and

Seleukeia-on-the-Kalykadnos, and especially of the coastal cities of Aigaiai and Magarsos, which were presumably already in Seleukid possession,¹⁸ show the minimal nature of the Ptolemaic holding in Kilikia Pedias by this time. The annoyance these Ptolemaic posts must have caused the Seleukid government by their existence, intervening between the Seleukid posts and cities, would be all the greater for there being so few of them.¹⁹

The next stage of the campaign took in the mountainous Tracheian coast and the deep bay called the Pamphylian sea. Looking back from the siege of Korakesion Livy lists the taking of Korykos, Selinos, and Anemurion, all of which followed the capture of Zephyrion; Hieronymos, on the other hand, lists them in the order Anemurion, Selinos, Korakesion and Korykos. Again there is a problem of identification, for there are two places called Korykos: one was a town in Kilikia Tracheia between Soloi and Seleukeia, and the other was in Lykia, on the western side of the Pamphylian Sea; since Livy says it had been captured before Antiochos besieged Korakesion it may be that it was the small city in Pedias which was meant. In that case its late appearance in Hieronymos' list presumably means that his list reflects the chronological order of capture. On the other hand, if it is the Korykos in Lykia which is meant this would reflect the establishment of another advanced base by the main fleet. In view of the conclusion reached on the function and location of Zephyrion, it seems best to take the Lykian Korykos as that which is meant.²⁰

This Korykos will, therefore, have been Antiochos' second forward base, once the posts in Kilikia Pedias had been already mopped up. It is geographically in a very similar position to Zephyrion, to the eastward in the shelter of the Chelidonian Islands and the cape

¹⁸ A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1971, 198–199.

¹⁹ An inscription by 'Themison, nephew of the king', has been found at Aigaiai, and is plausibly dated to 197 (Ma, *Antiochos II and the Cities*, doc. 20, in anticipation of publication by M. Sayer in *Asia Minor Studien* 33. This Themison is known from other sources (Grainger, *Prosopography* 119—he should now be transferred to Part One, the Royal Family), and it may be that he was a Seleukid governor in Kilikia. The inscription is a dedication 'for the safety of' the king, queen and their children: a most suitable offering in anticipation of a sea voyage.

²⁰ The problem of the identity of Korykos also emerges in later Republican times, and has been pointed out by P. T. Keyser, 'Sallust's *Historiae*, Dioskorides, and the Site of the Korykos captured by P. Servilius Vatia', *Historia* 46, 1997, 64–79, who identifies, as I do, the Korykos in question as that in Lykia.

of that name, and would be a base for his fleet which could isolate all the coastlands of the Pamphylian Sea from any interference from the west, just as a post at Zephyrion blocked off any intervention from Cyprus. In Pamphylia intervention might come from any Ptolemaic forces remaining in Lykia or in the Aegean (and Samos was a Ptolemaic naval base where there had been ships for Philip to use four years before). Or intervention might come from any other fleet based in the Aegean or Greece, in particular that of Rhodes. It is reasonable to assume that Antiochos had anticipated problems from these forces, and seizing Korykos in Lykia was an intelligent move in that case.

Rhodes in fact did intervene, but in doing so it is remarkable that the city's envoys attempted to mark Antiochos' western limits at Cape Chelidoniai, west of Lykian Korykos, whereas he was at that point besieging Korakesion. This suggested boundary fits well with the idea that Antiochos had already established a base at Korykos—Pamphylia was already his by inheritance.

The second phase of Antiochos' campaign therefore, was, first, to transfer the forward base to Lykian Korykos, leaving a substantial garrison at Zephyrion to deter any Ptolemaic intervention designed to cut his rearward communications; second, he removed the Ptolemaic garrisons from places along the Kilikian and Pamphylian coasts. These, according to Livy and Hieronymos, were at Anemurion, Selinos and Korakesion, the last of which he had to besiege.

The places listed by these sources are presumably those where the Ptolemaic forces put up some resistance, and which would then merit the description of being captured. Those not listed were either, as in Kilikia Pedias, already in Antiochos' control, or succumbed without a fight. There are a number of places which one would expect to have been occupied by Ptolemaic garrisons but which are not in either list: to name only the more prominent, Kelenderis, Nagidos, Arsinoe, Charadros, and Antiocheia-ad-Kragum.²¹ Nor are any of the Pamphylian cities—famous names like Side, Phaselis, Aspendos, Perge—listed. Pamphylia had been a notable Ptolemaic prize in previous conflicts,²² and possession of this area had given the Ptolemies access to the Pisidian mountains inland where mercenaries could be

²¹ Jones, *Cities* (note 17), 198–199.

²² *Ibid.*, 127.

recruited. Ptolemaic control had faded by the time Akhaïos campaigned there in 217, and Antiochos no doubt had been recognised there after Akhaïos' death.

At Korakesion Antiochos met resistance,²³ as he may well have at the other places listed by Livy and Hieronymos. The city required to be besieged before it surrendered; perhaps this was no more than a matter of form for the garrison commander, though it is a strong position.²⁴ He and his men could not, after all, expect to be relieved, nor could they expect to hold out for very long against Antiochos' army, which had, in the last two years, succeeded in capturing the great fortresses of Sidon and Gaza. There is nothing to indicate that the capture of Korakesion was any more of a problem than the taking of Mallos or Aphrodisias or any of the other places named in the sources. The only difference is that we have an explicit statement in Livy that a siege took place.

It was at Korakesion that Antiochos' expedition first impinged upon the equally momentous events in the west, for it was there that the envoy from Rhodes met him. Livy, followed by most modern commentators, assumed that the Rhodians were in some way acting in Rome's interest,²⁵ and that the basic contest in all these events was one between Rome and Antiochos.²⁶ This is, of course, to read history backwards. Because these events eventually in part led to a war between the two powers, it does not mean that this was the inevitable result, nor does it mean that either power was intending a conflict at this time. To interpret Antiochos' expedition along the southern coast of Asia Minor in terms of a contest with Rome is to ignore the whole history of the Seleukid state. The basic Seleukid conflict was with Ptolemaic Egypt; into this situation Rome was a late comer and, in 197, only marginally relevant.

According to Livy the Rhodian intervention was undertaken on behalf of Rome, and his explanation is a remarkable example of special pleading and propaganda. It also contains some interesting

²³ Livy 33.20.4–5.

²⁴ J. and L. Robert, *Fouilles d'Amyzon en Carie*, Paris 1983, 157, quoting a military assessment of the place (the present Alanya).

²⁵ Livy 33.20.1–2; a ridiculous panegyric; it is this encounter which has attracted most attention: cf. Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.155–158; Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 539–540; Bevan, *House*, 2.40–41.

²⁶ Livy, at 33.19.11, actually claims that Antiochos' purpose in conducting this campaign was to bring assistance to Philip.

inaccuracies, all of which suggest that he was using a source which was putting a Rhodian gloss on these events,²⁷ and that the claim to be acting for Rome was in fact a Rhodian negotiating ploy. The envoys are said to have 'ordered' the king not to pass Cape Chelidoniai, 'made famous' as Livy says, 'by the ancient treaty between the Athenians and the Persian kings'.²⁸ That is, Antiochos is here being equated with Darius and Xerxes and Oriental despotism, and the Rhodians with the heroic Athenian resistance to that tyranny. But Chelidoniai is said to be in Kilikia, which it was not. It is an interesting mistake, and it fits well with the later attempt by the Rhodians to force the Seleukid boundary even farther east. That is to say, the Rhodians were bluffing when they claimed to be acting for Rome, and they were really acting in their own behalf, in an attempt to establish their own control over Lykia and perhaps Pamphylia, an aim they later returned to.

Antiochos was not deceived. He agreed to send an embassy to Rhodes to discuss the matter, and produced his own envoy who had just returned from Rome.²⁹ This cut the ground from under the Rhodians' feet. Their bluff was called, and they were shown not to be in touch with Rome, otherwise they would have known of Antiochos' diplomatic contacts there. Antiochos, however, sensibly ignored the Rhodian gaffe, and did not crow over his minor victory. He had no wish to fight the Rhodians, a contest he would probably lose. His fleet was a scratch one, cobbled together for this one expedition, encumbered by a huge train of smaller ships, and carrying large numbers of troops. It had had no experience of serious sea-warfare for the past twenty years, whereas the Rhodian fleet was powerful and professional, with a tradition of victory, and a willingness to fight against odds. Further, by entering into conflict with Rhodes, Antiochos would in fact also be involving himself in the

²⁷ This has long been realised; cf. Rawlings 'Antiochos . . . and Rhodes', 10 and note 46.

²⁸ Livy 33.20.2–3; for recent discussions of these events, cf., Rawlings, 'Antiochos . . . and Rhodes', and Berthold, *Rhodes*, 140–141, a very brief account; Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 116, accepts the Livian version uncritically. A fragmentary inscription from Rhodes refers to a Roman-Rhodian alliance (V. Kontorini, 'Rome et Rhodes au tournant du III^e s. av. J.-C. d'après une inscription inédite de Rhodes', *JRS*, 73, 1983, 24–32), but it is undated, and cannot be used to describe the relations of the two in 197, and certainly not with regard to relations of either with Antiochos.

²⁹ Livy 33.20.7–9.

Macedonian war, in which Rhodes was at war with Philip, and an ally of Rome. So Antiochos spoke fair words to the Rhodian envoy, noting the old friendship of his family with the city, and emphasised their mutual friendship with Rome. He also, it seems clear, agreed not to advance beyond Chelidoniai until the negotiations in Rhodes were complete. The interpretation of Livy, that Antiochos was 'ordered' not to pass the cape, is, of course, his own or his source's. In fact, that was exactly where Antiochos' fleet had reached, being anchored, or perhaps beached, at Korykos. The Rhodian 'intervention' is best seen as coming down to a request not to advance until an agreement had been reached. To this Antiochos was obviously happy to agree. He would, while the discussions went on at Rhodes, be able to complete his siege of Korakesion and sort out any problems in Pamphylia; also, of course, he could rest his men, particularly the sailors and the rowers. Nothing the Rhodians had said or done had affected his actions in any way.

It did not take long for the negotiations at Rhodes to be completed. Since Antiochos was at war with Ptolemy, and Rhodes was not, Antiochos had the psychological advantage in what was, in fact, a division of the spoils. This is the sort of problem which can lead to blows, but Antiochos had no wish to fight Rhodes, and was fully prepared to be moderately generous. So when the city's demands were scaled down, there was no difficulty. Rhodes was to be permitted to extend its control over the mainland to Kaunos, Myndos, and Halikarnassos, all formerly Ptolemaic places, and Antiochos gave an assurance that he did not intend to take over Samos, which had been an important Ptolemaic naval base.³⁰ Rhodes claimed to be preserving the liberty of these places, which is in the rhetoric of the times, but which only shows that freedom-loving republics can be as hypocritical in the use of language as any imperialist. In effect Antiochos was conceding Rhodes a free hand to expand its holdings on the mainland in parts of Karia; the city resorted to bribery to get the Ptolemaic soldiers out of Kaunos, at a cost of two hundred talents—or so it was claimed later.³¹ It is an interesting change of

³⁰ Livy 33.20.12; Shipley, *Samos*, 194.

³¹ Pol 30.31.6; K. J. Rigsby, *The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt*, Leiden 1976, 99 and 216, note 2; cf. P. E. Fraser and G. E. Bean, *The Rhodian Peraea and Islands*, Oxford 1954, 106–107; Rawlings, 'Antiochos . . . and Rhodes', 10–11.

attitude by the city which had revealed the 'secret agreement' between the kings to partition Ptolemy's territories.

Antiochos, by this concession, also established his own right to take over the Lykian cities which were still in Ptolemaic hands, and the list in Hieronymos continues to name them: Andriake (the port of Myra) and Limyra, which between them controlled access to the Lykian interior along valley routes.³² Upstream from Limyra, Arykanda also submitted to him, voluntarily, in the hope of receiving help in coping with its mountain of debts.³³ Next fell Patara and Xanthos, the former a large and useful anchorage, the latter controlling another important route inland.³⁴ Patara, the most important harbour in Lykia at the time, but now dry,³⁵ became a naval base for Antiochos' fleet, and this is a clear indication that Rhodes had been worsted in the power stakes in these negotiations, for Patara faced Rhodes directly across the Lykian Gulf. Its development in Antiochos' hands was fitting reply to Rhodes' arrogant claims. It was a standing threat, and Rhodes' conduct of the later war in many ways revolved around the existence of that Seleukid naval base.

During the negotiations at Rhodes it is reported by Livy that news arrived that Philip had been defeated at Kynoskephalai in Thessaly.³⁶ There is no reason to reject this synchronism, but Livy's comments on the coincidence—that the news dispelled the Rhodians' fear of Philip—may be disregarded. It is patently a device to get him out of the verbal trap he had set himself by stating that Rhodes was acting as a Roman surrogate in the dispute with Antiochos. In fact, in another four sentences he actually gives up his argument to return to events in Greece.³⁷ This then allows him to ignore the real results of the Rhodian meeting, which was the agreement between Antiochos and Rhodes to co-operate in suppressing the whole of the Ptolemaic presence in Asia Minor. And Antiochos and his fleet sailed through

³² Hieron., *In Dan.*, 11.15/16 (= *FGrH* 260 F 46).

³³ Athenaios 22.527F–528A (= Agatharkides, *FGrH* 86 F 16).

³⁴ Antiochos' acquisition of Xanthos is also attested in an inscription (*TAM* II, 1, 266) of 197, which gives an insight into the process, for it records that he dedicated the city to Leto, Apollo and Artemis, this presumably being the face-saving phraseology of surrender.

³⁵ G. E. Bean, *Lycian Turkey*, London 1978, 26.

³⁶ Livy 33.20.10.

³⁷ Livy 33.20.11–13.

Rhodian waters with Rhodian permission, and, no doubt, assistance; he is next discovered at Ephesos.³⁸

But the cooperation of city and king went further. Rhodes had suffered in its mainland territories from Philip's expedition to Karia, which had been directed more against Rhodes than anyone else. He had left forces there when he sailed away, and Rhodes had been fighting against these Macedonian troops in the earlier part of the year.³⁹ The fighting had concerned particularly the city of Stratonikeia, strategically placed to dominate the Karian interior. Soon after Antiochos' arrival and his passage through Rhodian waters, Stratonikeia was captured from the Macedonian garrison by a joint Rhodian-Seleukid operation.⁴⁰ Here clearly was another part of the agreement made at Rhodes. Further, it was a very generous gesture on Antiochos' part. Stratonikeia was a city formed largely from the synoecism of a local group of towns and peoples,⁴¹ but its name shows that this was an action sponsored by one of Antiochos' ancestors, probably Antiochos I, whose wife was Stratonike, or their son Antiochos II.⁴² Thus Antiochos III had a good hereditary claim to the city, which was exactly the argument he had used in the past to justify his attempts to conquer Koile Syria, and would use in the future in regard to Thrace. Yet in the case of Stratonikeia, this apparently compelling argument was ignored; Antiochos was a most pragmatic diplomat.⁴³

As he sailed north, Antiochos passed the places assigned to Rhodes, but, once beyond Myndos on the end of its peninsula, he reached the coast where Philip had been active, an area of small cities: Bargylia,

³⁸ Hieron., *In Dan.* 11.15/16; Livy 33.38.1

³⁹ Livy 33.18.1–20, said to be 'at the same time' as the Kynoskephalai battle; cf. Fraser and Bean, *Rhodian Peraea*, (note 30), 105, and Rawlings, 'Antiochos . . . and Rhodes', 10–11; Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.280–283.

⁴⁰ Livy 33.18.22; Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.283, with references.

⁴¹ Strabo 14.2.25; R. T. Marchese, *The Historical Geography of Northern Caria, A Study in Cultural Adaptation*, B.A.R. Supplementary Series S 536, 1989, 39 and 65.

⁴² Stephanos, *on Stratonikeia*; cf. Fraser and Bean, *Rhodian Peraea*, (note 30), 102–105; Rawlings, 'Antiochos . . . and Rhodes', 10–12; Ma, *Antiochos and the Cities*, 277, favours Antiochos III, as does Cohen, *Hellenistic Settlements*, 268–273.

⁴³ Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, 277–278, argues that Rhodes had possessed the city before 201, when Philip took it; the fact remains that Antiochos could have put forward his claim, and, since his troops were instrumental in capturing it, he could have made his claim good.

Iasos, Mylasa, Euromos. According to the Rhodian representative at the peace talks in Greece later in the year, Philip's troops still occupied Bargylia, Iasos and Euromos⁴⁴—as they did Stratonikeia until a little after Antiochos' passage. The king carefully ignored these places, for the time being. It may be that the area was assigned to Rhodes in their agreement, but it is more likely that he had marked it out for himself. It could be assumed that the Macedonians would be withdrawn, sooner or later, now that Philip had been defeated at Kynoskephalai, and as Rhodes later demanded, at which time Antiochos could press his own interest. As a group, these cities were close to Miletos, and to the great temple of Apollo at Didyma. This was one place Antiochos, with his familial piety, would not want to be exposed to any danger—for Apollo was one of his ancestors.

This general attitude to the Greek cities of the coast fits in well with his earlier expeditions into western Asia Minor. In most cases he had not exerted any serious military pressure on any of the cities. Certainly he had besieged and captured Sardis, which had suffered badly in the process, but that had been the headquarters of Akhaïos, a rebel against him, and a man with considerable local support, who had to be defeated if Antiochos' authority was to be accepted; and there was fighting when Zeukis moved against Amyzon, for Antiochos agreed to help pay for repairs.⁴⁵ But most cities had concluded agreements of one sort or another with him, which indicates their submission. This was clearly the preferred method on all sides, but it was a process of conquest nevertheless. An example of the process is Teos, which the king visited in 204 and which rendered honours to him next year, both indications of the city's submission.⁴⁶

The capture of Stratonikeia was thus also a lesson to be read by any city which was so independent-minded as to hold out against the increased pressure which the presence of Antiochos and his field army represented. There was still no indication that the older cities were to be attacked, but the capture of Stratonikeia was a reminder

⁴⁴ Pol. 18.2.3

⁴⁵ Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, 67.

⁴⁶ P. Herrmann, 'Antiochos der Grosse und Teos', *Anadolu*, 9, 1965, 79–159; see also for further discussion, R. M. Errington, 'Rome, Antiochos der Grosse und die Asylie von Teos', *ZPE* 39, 1980, 279–284, A. Giovannini, 'Teos, Antiochos III et Attale Ier', *Museum Helveticum* 40, 1983, 178–184, and F. Piejko, 'Antiochos III and Teos Reconsidered', *Belleten* 55, 212, 1991, 13–69.

of the strength and capabilities of the Seleukid army. The capture of Sidon and Gaza—and Korakesion—might not have registered in Ionia; that of Stratonikeia surely did.

Antiochos will have arrived at Ephesos fairly rapidly after the conclusion of the negotiations at Rhodes, for there was nothing to delay him on the way. There was, however, plenty to concern him on his arrival: the organisation of the capture of Stratonikeia, reports on the condition of the main army which had marched from Syria, the condition of King Attalos, who had suffered a stroke while in Greece and had been brought home to Pergamon to die, and the state of affairs in Greece. All of these will have imposed delay on further movement in favour of assimilation and consideration. Only the question of Stratonikeia called for immediate action, which it received.

Antiochos' campaign had coincided in time with the decisive Roman campaign against King Philip at Macedon. When he had been fighting in Palestine and Phoenicia, after the defeat of the Ptolemaic forces at Panion, the early Roman campaigns had been in Epeiros, and had been generally unsuccessful. The problem was two-fold: an inability by the Roman forces to break through Macedonian defences in the Pindos mountains, and a lack of useful allies in Greece from whose territory Roman forces could develop an alternative attack. The Aitolian League finally decided to join Rome late in 199,⁴⁷ but even then it was too late to effect much.

The earliest Roman commanders had been P. Sulpicius Galba, consul in 200 and P. Villius Tappulus, consul in 199. Their lack of military success hid some useful diplomatic progress,⁴⁸ which gave their successor T. Quinctius Flamininus a solid foundation on which to build. Flamininus also arrived to implement a modification of Roman policy in that he was prepared to conciliate the Greek states and to claim that he was fighting for their liberty. The resultant easing of his diplomatic situation, combined with success at the battle of the Aous River in June 198, allowed him to break through the mountain barrier.⁴⁹ This took place about the same time as Antiochos was finishing off the war in Palestine by the capture of Gaza.

⁴⁷ Livy 31.40.9–10; Walbank, *Philip V*, 145; Grainger, *League of the Aitolians*.

⁴⁸ The Aitolians, Amyndandros of Athamania, and Attalos, all were now participating on the Roman side.

⁴⁹ Livy 32.10.1–12; Plut. *Flam.* 3.4–5.1; Walbank, *Philip V*, 148–153.

Flamininus' victory, with the assistance of Aitolian military involvement, helped to transfer the main fighting to Thessaly, but little further progress was made in 198.

Flamininus' command was extended into 197, and he was supported in Greece by both Galba and Villius, who were appointed as *legati* with him from late 198.⁵⁰ He had to attend to the Greek states in his rear as well as to the Macedonian army in his front, and in several cases this meant seizing control of them: the Achaian League was coerced into the war,⁵¹ and cities in Phokis and Boiotia were seized,⁵² which meant installing governments sympathetic to Rome. (In the same way, Antiochos was installing regimes of his choice in the newly dominated areas of Syria, Kilikia and Pamphylia.) The new campaign in Greece in spring 197 was therefore a Roman and Aitolian invasion of Thessaly. The progressive domination of Greece by Rome had left Philip without any more options other than a dogged defence of his Thessalian territories.

This was the situation in which the battle of Kynoskephalai was fought. The point had been reached where Philip had to take the risk of a set-piece battle, or he would simply lose more and more territory. It was a rational decision which almost succeeded, but one which took several months to be consummated. The two armies began to approach one another from March, but distractions particularly affected the Roman forces: Flamininus had to wait a month for the Aitolian contingent to arrive; King Attalos had a stroke at Thebes in March and was sent back to Pergamon, dying. Philip then came out of northern Thessaly, at last, the two armies fought at Kynoskephalai, and the Roman-Aitolian army was victorious.⁵³ Even then the war was not over. Philip had been defeated, but his army was still strong enough to defeat and expel a Dardanian invasion, and the peace talks which were arranged after Kynoskephalai took time to arrange and even more time to conduct.⁵⁴ The Senate's ratification of the terms did not arrive until the end of 197,⁵⁵ and

⁵⁰ Livy 32.28.12; Broughton, *MRR* 1.334.

⁵¹ Livy 32.19–22; App. *Mac.* 7; Plut. *Flam.* 5.3; Paus. 8.8.2; Walbank, *Philip V*, 57–158; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 99–101.

⁵² Phokis (Opous): Livy 32.32.1–5; Boiotia (Elateia): Livy 32.24.1–7; Paus. 10.34.3–4.

⁵³ Pol. 18.18.1–27; Livy 33.4.1–9.10; Plut. *Flam.* 7.3–8.5; Walbank, *Philip V*, 167–172.

⁵⁴ Pol. 18.36.1–39.7; Livy 33.4.1–13.15; App. *Mac.* 9.1–3.

⁵⁵ Pol. 18.44; Livy 33.50; Plut. *Flam.* 10.1; App. *Mac.* 9.3; Justin 30.4.7; Walbank, *Philip V*, 179–180; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 272–287; De Sanctis, *Storia*, 4.1.95.

then the terms had to be enforced on the ground by the senatorial commission.

The coincidence of Roman and Seleukid conquests meant that, by late June or early July Antiochos was firmly established in Ionia, digesting his recent conquests, and Flamininus was more or less firmly in control in Greece in the aftermath of his great victory. Once Philip had requested a truce, soon after Kynoskephalai, it was clear that peace was likely to be concluded. The combined Rhodian and Seleukid attack on Stratonikeia therefore took place some time after Kynoskephalai, and had been arranged, no doubt, in the talks at Rhodes, in the knowledge that the battle had been fought. It is notable that Antiochos, except in this one instance, had been extremely careful not to embroil himself with any of Philip's forces in Karia. This remained his policy even after Kynoskephalai. The excuse at Stratonikeia was no doubt that the city was originally Seleukid, and that Antiochos and Rhodes were both entitled to recover it. The other Macedonian holdings, Iasos, Euromos, Mylasa, fell to him apparently without fighting, no doubt when Philip's troops surrendered or withdrew. An inscription from Iasos makes it clear that the city was in a bad state as a result, and was given help through the agency of queen Laodike.⁵⁶

In the warfare of the three months from March to June 197 Macedon was removed from its former status of a Mediterranean great power. This meant that, of the five great powers of the Mediterranean world which had existed five years earlier, only two were now left. Antiochos had knocked out the Ptolemaic kingdom, Rome had removed Carthage and Macedon. It was clearly necessary now for the two remaining great powers to communicate, and to come some arrangement as to their future relationship, all the more so since their successful commanders were now geographically proximate, only the Aegean Sea separating them.

The envoys which had been exchanged between the king and Rome the previous winter will have passed through Greece. A Roman envoy went east in 198, the king's man went to Rome in reply, and he had returned in time to report to the king at Korakesion, with news of the Senate's honorific decrees, by May 197. This is three successive journeys, and it is inconceivable that the Roman envoys did not report to Flamininus, whose own command was renewed in

⁵⁶ *I. Iasos*, 4.

December,⁵⁷ and who will have received that information as a matter of urgency.

It will be demonstrated later that Antiochos and Flamininus were in constant communication during the next several years, and it would seem that it was during the winter of 198/197 that they developed their interlocutory relationship. The purpose of the Senate's initial envoy in 198 had been, so Livy says, to upbraid Antiochos for encroaching on Attalid territory; if that message was passed on—it is perhaps doubtful—it was ignored by Antiochos. The main purpose was no doubt to discover Antiochos' intentions after his Syrian victories. Antiochos' own envoy to Rome will have conveyed such assurances as were required, but on his passage through Greece he could converse with the proconsul. Flamininus himself no doubt wished for reassurance: Antiochos' fleet of warships, and his seaborne army, now united with the bigger land army, could change the balance of power in Greece, if he chose to cross the Aegean. The fact that the Senate's reply to Antiochos' message consisted, at the minimum, of honorific decrees and fair words, is a clear sign that the king had been convincingly reassuring to both Flamininus and to the senators in Rome. The returning envoy who carried the senatorial decrees, passing through Greece, can be assumed to have also carried messages from Flamininus to the king, conveying his own reassurances that what Antiochos was about to do—which the king will have explained by way of his own envoy—was not something to which the Romans could object.

The evidence for this is, I readily admit, tenuous, and the content of the messages is mainly unknown, so that much of the previous paragraph is conjecture. Yet the original senatorial message to Antiochos is supposed to have had hostile elements in it, but when the king's envoys returned to him a few months later, the Roman message was friendly, even effusive. This change in attitude has to be explained somehow, and the obvious way to do so is to assume that the king's envoy to the Senate had been convincing in his assurances as to the king's immediate intentions. The further assumption I have made, that Flamininus was privy to these exchanges, is nowhere evidenced, but may be assumed, given his geographical situation, and in the light of the conduct of the two men later.

⁵⁷ Broughton, *MRR*, 1.336.

That is to say, Antiochos and Flamininus had reached an agreement similar to that which Antiochos had made with Rhodes. It differed, of course, in not defining boundaries, since this was not necessary, but there were mutual assurances that neither would trespass on the other's operational area. The two men must, nevertheless, have kept a close watch on each other's operations, particularly by sea. The events of May and June, the Roman victory at Kynoskephalai and Antiochos' arrival at Ephesos, will therefore have cleared the air, and Antiochos could now concentrate fully on establishing his new regime in Asia Minor, just as Flamininus could attend to the future of Macedon and Greece.

It also marks a new determination on Antiochos' part to tidy up the map of western Asia Minor. He had reached agreement with Rhodes, which amounted to an agreement to divide up the Ptolemaic possessions in Karia between them, and which implies that a definite boundary between the Rhodian and Seleukid territories was arranged; a clear boundary is a useful way of preventing disputes. The Rhodians had certainly not got anywhere near as much as they wished for, but they had certainly acquired more than they had at the beginning of the year. The return of Stratonikeia in particular was a generous gesture by Antiochos which should go some way to appeasing any Rhodian anger.

But there were many cities, all of them with their own interests, and many of them with individual arrangements with Antiochos. And now, from March 197 onwards, there also loomed the problem of the Pergamene kingdom. Attalos had his stroke in that month, and was brought home, paralyzed down one side. He was clearly dying, and finally did so in the late summer or autumn.⁵⁸ This obviously concerned Antiochos, for Attalos' death broke the alliance which had existed between them since 216. This in turn opened up the possibility of acquiring some or all of the Attalid kingdom as well as any remaining Ptolemaic fragments.

⁵⁸ Livy 33.21.1; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 10.

CHAPTER THREE

PEACE AND THE HELLESPONT

In the summer of 197, while Antiochos III was organising his naval and military forces from his headquarters at Ephesos, and directing the capture of Stratonikeia in association with the Rhodians, the war in Greece was suspended, and a peace conference was held at Gonnos in Thessaly. In fact, the terms of the Romano-Macedonian armistice were such that a resumption of fighting was most unlikely: Philip V delivered his eldest son Demetrios and some of his Friends as hostages, and handed over two hundred talents of silver as a down payment on the intended indemnity.¹ By accepting such conditions Philip had admitted defeat, and had been deprived of his war-chest. The negotiations at Gonnos produced a draft peace treaty acceptable to Philip and Flamininus, though some of the Greeks, in particular the Aitolians, were not happy.² However, so long as these terms were largely accepted by the Senate, peace between Macedon and Rome had been effectively established.

At the same time there was still much to do. Flamininus had paid scant heed to the views of his Greek allies in the negotiations, and already the Aitolians had made serious complaints. The Rhodians had not had their views accepted by Flamininus either, and they had turned to Antiochos to see to the suppression of the Macedonian forces in Karia, where the Stratonikeia issue briefly brought them together. King Attalos was dying, and in the meantime no decisions on important matters could be expected from Pergamon, a blessing for which Flamininus was no doubt quietly grateful. The allies of Rome could be relied on while the fighting went on, and while Philip was still a formidable military threat, but holding such an alliance together when Philip had ceased to be a clear threat was much more difficult. Already in the conference at Gonnos, Philip had mildly

¹ Pol. 18.39.5; Livy 33.13.14.

² Pol. 18.39.5; Livy 33.13.9–12; Plut. *Flam.* 9.4; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.273–274, and references there; considerable discussion has resulted from the passage, but this is not central to any purpose here.

exploited the inter-allied dispute between the Romans and the Aitolians over the fate of Thessaly.³ Then, on request, he had released the Boiotians in his service,⁴ and their leader, Brachyllas, soon hoisted himself to power in Thebes as one of the Boiotarchoi.⁵ There was also the problem of Nabis in Sparta, who had gained control of Argos, a city which the Achaians wanted. On top of all this Flamininus knew that in the spring, assuming the Senate ratified the terms he had worked out with Philip, he would have to argue them through in detail with a senatorial commission,⁶ in part undoubtedly staffed by men politically inimical to him,⁷ and then implement them on the ground.

And there was also, across the Aegean, the problem of Antiochos. No hints exist that Flamininus showed any concern at Antiochos' presence, or at his activities; yet he must have been concerned, and he must have received regular reports.⁸ For one thing King Attalos finally died, probably about September.⁹ His successor was his eldest son Eumenes, adult, unmarried, and still young, though not inexperienced.¹⁰

This change of king introduced a new element of instability into international relations. His father had been the ally of both Antiochos and Rome—as was Rhodes—and this link could be a useful starting

³ Livy 33.13.6–13; Pol. 18.38.3.

⁴ Livy 33.27.5–8; Pol. 18.43.1–4; Livy's comment that Flamininus wanted to build up Greek support for Rome as against Antiochos may be disregarded.

⁵ Livy 33.27.8; Pol. 18.43.3.

⁶ The exact composition of this commission is only partly known; cf. Broughton, *MRR* 1.337; Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 107; J. Briscoe, 'Flamininus and Roman Politics, 200–189 B.C.', *Latomus* 1972, 22–53, at 46.

⁷ Scullard, *Roman Politics*, ch. 6, not wholly to be accepted in detail, perhaps, but the picture of internal dispute and rivalry at Rome is probably accurate enough.

⁸ Both Livy and Polybios include occasional comments which imply that many of Flamininus' political actions were affected by Antiochos' own actions (e.g., Livy 33.18.6 and 33.31.6; Pol. 18.39.3 and 18.45.10); yet it is impossible to substantiate any of this, and these comments are best seen as *ex post facto* interpretations by the historians themselves. Flamininus showed no concern at all, in *his actions*, for Antiochos' moves.

⁹ Livy 33.2.1–3 and 21.1; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 10, n. 6.

¹⁰ He was adult enough to command in war two years later, but still young enough to be unmarried at his accession; mid-twenties would seem to be about right; his younger brother was born c. 220 (Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 151, n. 27). Eumenes is not mentioned in any source before his accession, but, given that the Attalids were a notably close family, it is reasonable to assume that he had received a good political education and an early grounding in affairs. Attalos I had had no hesitation in leaving his kingdom, and no doubt Eumenes had been left in command while the king was absent.

point in their relationship so long as the link was equally well-disposed to both. Judging by Attalos' complaints to Rome, Antiochos had exploited the Rhodian link in his discussions with the Rhodian envoys at Korakesion, when he pointed out their mutual friendship with the Romans.¹¹ That same speech, with minor alterations, could well have been addressed to Attalos. Antiochos' relations with Rhodes had produced the joint campaign against the troops holding Stratonikeia. No doubt Antiochos' intention had been to bind the island-city to him by their mutual interests. But, by delivering Stratonikeia to the Rhodians, Antiochos was in fact foreclosing on further co-operation. For the two states now had a mutual boundary. Antiochos' process of expansion was based on *reclaiming* lost lands, which could scarcely be given up again once re-acquired. Antiochos had established his control in Lykia and Karia right up to Rhodes' new boundaries, and by drawing such tight limits he had ensured that Rhodes' further ambitions were now thwarted. The Rhodians' demands had already been set out at the Korakesion meeting—Karia and Lykia¹²—and now they could not possibly be satisfied by any more concessions by Antiochos. The joint campaign against Stratonikeia, therefore, effectively marked the end of the Rhodian-Seleukid alliance, though perhaps neither party quite realised this right away. Rhodes could now only look to the enemies of Antiochos for the satisfaction of its territorial demands, but could only do this when a prospect of their realisation existed; Rhodes could scarcely expect to tackle Antiochos alone. For the moment this consequence of the joint action at Stratonikeia was not necessarily obvious, but it was latent in the situation, and would become clear once the operation was completed. And the only power which could apply the strength that Rhodes needed for expansion was Rome.

The accession of Eumenes at Pergamon acted in a similar way by severing the longstanding alliance of Attalos with Antiochos. Again, this had a greater potential for trouble than might have appeared at first. Attalos' territory had scarcely increased, in net terms, since his accession—except for his two overseas acquisitions, Aigina and Andros, acquired as a consequence of his participation in wars against Macedon, and as Rome's ally.¹³ But he had laid out a clear signal

¹¹ Livy 33.20.9.

¹² Livy 33.20.2.

¹³ Aigina was, of course, sold to Attalos for 30 talents by the Aitolians (Pol.

of his ambitions, when he had briefly occupied much of Asia Minor in the interval between the death of Antiochos Hierax and the arrival of Akhaïos, in the 220s. Akhaïos had pushed Attalos back to his original territory in Mysia, but his own subsequent rebellion made him also the enemy of Antiochos III. The defeat of Akhaïos had been achieved largely by Antiochos, who had thereby recovered the territory which Attalos had briefly occupied, and which he had ever since, surely, hoped to take over again. Indeed, if there is any truth in his accusation of aggression by Antiochos III in 198, it may be in this, that Antiochos was recovering lands which Attalos had occupied in the war against Akhaïos, but which Antiochos had only then retaken.

It has been plausibly argued that Attalos' ambition as king, at least after the suppression of Akhaïos in 213, was more to survive than to expand.¹⁴ Since he was hemmed in by Rome, Macedon and the Seleukid king, this was a reasonable thing to aim at. Nevertheless Attalos *had* expanded, acquiring Aigina and Andros, a pair of stepping stones to the Greek mainland, and in Asia in the 220s he had shown he was not averse to conquest. Attalos had also maintained his family's old connections with the cities along the shores of the Hellespont and the Propontis, such as Alexandreia Troas and Kyzikos.¹⁵

Eumenes inherited these family concerns and connections as well as the throne. It was therefore in Antiochos' interest to bind the new king to him as he had bound his father, if he could. For the moment, in the immediate aftermath of Attalos' death, this was not necessarily an urgent matter, but it was one of the many details of the political organisation of western Asia Minor to which Antiochos must give his attention. In the case of the Attalids the major complication lay in Attalos' periodic relations with Rome. Yet any alliance which may have existed there had also been severed by Attalos' death, leaving Eumenes free to consider his options. The evidence suggests that he did nothing for a year, and that Antiochos left him to contemplate for that time.

22.8.10); but Andros had been taken from Philip with, at the least, help from the Romans (Livy 31.45.7); given Roman naval power in the Aegean in both wars, Attalos held both islands by Roman permission.

¹⁴ Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 74–75.

¹⁵ McShane, *Foreign Policy*, 36–38, 63; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 14–15, 58, 61.

From Ephesos, where Antiochos apparently spent the autumn and winter of 197/196, he sent a contingent of troops to secure the main crossing point of the Hellespont at Abydos.¹⁶ This was a city which had suffered very badly from Philip's attentions in 200, and it may well have been semi-derelict when Antiochos' soldiers arrived. Philip had left a garrison in the city,¹⁷ but the inhabitants had largely died, either as a result of his attacks, or in the mass suicide that had occurred when he had entered.¹⁸ No doubt some citizens had survived and were in the city when Antiochos' troops arrived, but there was no Macedonian garrison present in 197; the soldiers were presumably been withdrawn to assist in Philip's war effort against Rome.

The Seleukid garrison at Abydos was a signal to all that Antiochos intended to expand his control over the whole Hellespont. Combined with the campaign along the south coast of Asia Minor, the *entente* with Rhodes, and the joint campaign to expel the Macedonian soldiers from Stratonikeia, it is evident—and it would be even more obvious to his contemporaries—that Antiochos was using his presence, and that of his army, to tighten up his control in all of western Asia Minor. There can be several reasons for this, which was a change of policy from his practice of several years before. Since his arrival in the area in 214/213, Antiochos had exerted only fairly gentle pressure on the local communities. This was no doubt the result of the turbulence and confusion of the previous thirty years, where cities will have been conscious that he was only the latest in a series of temporary rulers: Seleukos II, Antiochos Hierax, Attalos, Akhaïos, and now Antiochos III, all in less than thirty years. But by 197 Antiochos, either personally or through his viceroy Zeuxis, had been in control of the area for a decade and a half, and in that time he had achieved spectacular things in other parts of his empire. He was the conqueror of Koile Syria, he had been to India and had returned, and he had a grown family to inherit his kingdom. His great prestige, symbolised by the epithet *megas* which was awarded him or taken by him on his return from the eastern expedition,¹⁹ both demanded a greater element of control by him, and permitted

¹⁶ Livy 33.38.4; this occupation would seem to have taken place in autumn 197 rather than in or after the winter. The garrison was well established by the spring, and had made the tentative lunge for Lampsakos already.

¹⁷ Livy 31.18.8.

¹⁸ Pol. 16.34.7–12; Livy 31.18.6–8.

¹⁹ Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, 272–276, reviews the evidence and concludes

the Greek cities to accept that control. There could be no disgrace in submitting to such a king, in contrast to Philip, whose conduct was much less kingly; no-one would give him a title such as *megas*.

Hence, dating from the period after 197, documents survive from several locations in Asia Minor which show that Antiochos was actively sorting out his relations with the local cities. The evidence is largely epigraphic, consisting of the inscription of letters from the king to particular cities, or of decrees by the cities for the king or his family, but each letter or decree, in whatever direction it was sent, is a sign of the city's subordination to the king's authority. The city of Euromos, which was one of those which Philip had taken in his Karian campaign, received an offer of friendship and alliance from Zeuxis as early as 198/197, which was no doubt accepted, since the letter was inscribed and exhibited in the city from then on.²⁰ Its neighbour Iasos received help in the name of Queen Laodike in coping with an economic and social crisis about this time. The letter stated that Antiochos was keen to help the city: this help, of course, had its price, of which the city was undoubtedly well aware.²¹ These letters also indicate that Antiochos' help to Rhodes over Stratonikeia was limited to that city alone. Of the places in that area of Karia which were the subject of the Roman treaty with Philip, only Bargylia was left to be liberated by the ratification of the peace treaty.²²

The same process is visible in the Hellespont area. Antiochos' occupation of the site of Abydos was more or less contemporary with a letter from the king to the city of Ilion.²³ It is no more than

that he was called 'Great' on his return from the east, from 205, and 'Great King' after Panion in 200.

²⁰ M. Errington, 'Antiochos III, Zeuxis and Euromos', *Epigraphica Anatolica* 1986, 1-7; Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, doc. 29; the date of the city decree is Gorpaios 115 Sel. (September 197) which makes Zeukis' approach earlier than that. Zeuxis' letter was responded to by the city's ambassadors and they had to travel to Zeuxis and back before the city agreed: some time was clearly involved.

²¹ *I Iasos* 1.4 (= Austin 156); Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, doc. 26.

²² According to the Rhodian envoy at the conference in Lokris, Philip's troops still occupied Iasos, Euromos and Bargylia in November 198 (Pol. 18.2.3); these, with Pedasa, were listed by the Senate in the final peace terms, in spring 196, by which time Iasos and Euromos had already made their submissions to Antiochos (see notes 20 and 21); when P. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus went off to implement the peace terms, only Bargylia was left (Pol. 18.48.1).

²³ Welles, *RC*, 42; Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, doc. 34; the authorship is not certain, Antiochos III being only the most likely of the possibilities.

a fragment, but it is clear that, beneath the usual rhetoric, the king is fixing his control over the policies of the city in its external relations. The inscription, to be sure, does not state that the king will henceforth control the city's foreign affairs, but this is inherent in the situation. By his physical presence (that is, his nearby armed forces), by his prestige, by his gifts and goodwill, the king was in effect intimidating the city into an alliance. Since he was by far and away the predominant partner in this relationship, Antiochos was in control, most of all in control of its external relations. Ilion had had good relations, on a basis much nearer to equality, with Attalos; it was all the more necessary that Antiochos prevent similar relations developing with Eumenes.

Another inscription from Ilion is relevant here. This is the much discussed honorary decree of the city for King Antiochos son of King Seleukos.²⁴ The king in question must be either Antiochos I or Antiochos III. The decision between them is difficult, but the arguments tend to favour the earlier king. This means that the city had been part of the Seleukid realm in the 270s, so that Antiochos III's troops at Abydos were, from the king's point of view, re-establishing his family's authority in an area from which it had been absent for some time.²⁵

In the light of the evidence of Abydos and Ilion, therefore, Antiochos' policy towards two other cities, Smyrna and Lampasakos, becomes clearer. The pressure which Antiochos exerted on Smyrna and Lampasakos was both military and diplomatic. The king himself sent a force to menace Smyrna from his headquarters at Ephesos; the detachment of his army at Abydos was also used to threaten Lampasakos.²⁶ In addition he sent envoys to the two cities requesting their submission, probably before the troops were sent. One may presume that the sending of envoys had been the first stage in the process for all of the cities, and that most of them had quickly accepted Antiochos' terms. The exception was Abydos, occupied militarily and without warning, but the city was, so far as can be seen, derelict,

²⁴ OGIS 219, reinterpreted by F. Piejko, 'Antiochos III and Ilium', *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, 37, 1991, 9–50, and references, argues for Antiochos III; Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, 254–259, is the most recent discussion, and he argues for Antiochos I.

²⁵ Of course, for my present argument, it does not matter which king is addressed: I can have my cake and eat it. If Antiochos I it is Antiochos III reclaiming his inheritance; if Antiochos III he is being more obviously grovelled to by the city.

²⁶ Livy 33.38.4.

and, as a community, more or less in dissolution. An envoy to a ruin would be pointless.

To judge from the examples of the agreements which survive, the terms offered by Antiochos amounted to internal autonomy and submission to the king's foreign policy. These were the terms which Smyrna and Lampsakos were rejecting. Livy remarks that they were aiming to maintain their independence.²⁷ Yet this independence was already limited by their relatively small size, and by Antiochos' huge relative power. From Antiochos' point of view, they were also cities which had been part of his ancestors' kingdom in the past.²⁸ His stated aim, made more than once, was to reintegrate all the lost lands, and to make good all the claims his predecessors had made. Both of these cities had been part of the kingdom in the past: his grandfather Antiochos II and his father Seleukos II, as well as his uncle Antiochos Hierax, had all minted at Lampsakos.²⁹ Ptolemy III had probably taken Smyrna in the Third Syrian War,³⁰ and it had had close contacts with the Attalids since, as had Lampsakos.³¹ Such independence as they possessed was thus relatively recent, and their desire to be fully independent would not cut much ice with Antiochos III, given his restorative intentions. In the circumstances true independence was scarcely an option for either of these cities.

One option they might have tried was to appeal for assistance, or protection, to the new Pergamene king, Eumenes. Both cities had had friendly relations with Attalos I, a relationship best described as an alliance, though closer definition is very difficult.³² That neither city appears to have taken this option is significant. It would thus

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ As his minister Minnio pointed out in later discussion: Livy 35.16.6.

²⁹ C. Boehringer, 'Antiochos Hierax am Hellespont', in M. Price *et al.*, *Essays in Honour of Robert Carson and Kenneth Jenkins*, London 1993, 37–47; both cities minted for Antiochos II, and so as late as 246.

³⁰ At least he claimed to have taken 'Ionia', of which Smyrna was part: *OGIS* 54.

³¹ Pol. 5.77.6 and 78.6; however, both cities are clearly acting independently in 196, and were thus not part of Eumenes' kingdom at that time.

³² Hansen, *Attalids*, 155, gives up the attempt to distinguish the various types of agreement linking city and the dynasty; McShane, *Foreign Policy*, 70–72 and 85, finally, after several attempts, settles for the term 'alliance'; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, notes that Smyrna was Seleukid until the 240s (18), but then is impelled to suggest that "protectorate" rather than "overlordship" is the nearest applicable term (47). A precise term is probably not necessary, since the variety emphasises the individual nature of each agreement, and this lack of pattern was clearly the Seleukid method as well; see also Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities* generally, but especially 150–174.

seem that whatever ties bound the cities to the Pergamene kingdom had been severed by the death of Attalos I, just as his subordinate alliance with Antiochos III had ended in the same way. The new king Eumenes was an untried quantity so far, perhaps with no policy worth the name for the moment. Just as telling, surely, was the likelihood that Eumenes would be quite incapable of providing assistance—unless it was his suggestion that they should appeal to Rome in the first place.

For this appeal to Rome is, on the face of it, a somewhat surprising move. Neither city had had any contact with Rome before. Lampsakos had to make contact indirectly, by way of Massilia, which was an old ally of Rome's; both Massilia and Lampsakos were originally colonies of Phokaia. The envoy sent by Lampsakos, Hegesias, had thus to make a roundabout journey, and even then he was not the first choice of the city as its envoy, several men having refused the task before he accepted.³³ It thus seems doubtful that he can have sailed before the winter of 197/196, which was a close season for sea travel. This suggests that the threat posed to the city by Antiochos lacked a good deal in urgency, and that the 'attack' by the garrison of Abydos was not very serious; there is certainly no question of Lampsakos being placed under siege.

Nor can Antiochos' attack on Smyrna have been any more developed. Neither of these cities was ever captured by Antiochos, even though he had the strength and the time to do so over the next several years. There was thus little real reason for either city to appeal for Roman help, since any threat from Antiochos was minimal. It is also very odd that both cities should come up with the same idea at the same time, and this provokes one to search for a reason. The one common factor in their histories was their friendship with the Pergamene king. Thus it is quite possible that Eumenes quietly suggested the move to them. It was in the Attalid tradition to do so, of course, and Eumenes' father had twice made the attempt to get Rome to fight his battles for him. The second had failed, very recently. Eumenes would know this, and would need to use another channel to Rome for a new attempt. If so, he was acting as an *agent provocateur*; in his weak condition, as a new king, it was probably as much as he could do.

³³ OGIS 591.

Whatever the precise origin of these appeals, it is clear that Antiochos' threat to the two cities was not one which he necessarily saw as involving his prestige—which is what the whole matter was about. Livy comments that if Smyrna and Lampsakos were permitted to get away with defying Antiochos' demands, then the demands for independence would spread to other cities in Aiolis and Ionia.³⁴ But the fact is that their defiance was successful, and yet their example was not followed. In fact, the very terms in which Livy couches his comment reveals that it was his own gloss: for Aiolis was very largely part of Eumenes' realm, not Antiochos'. As so often with Livy's accounts of eastern events, it is necessary to separate the reporting from the comment and interpretation.

What therefore happened in the winter of 197/196 was that Antiochos sent out envoys to those cities which had not yet been persuaded to enter his system of alliance and overlordship on the terms which he deemed proper and acceptable, and these included cities which had, until late in 197, been reckoned part of the Attalid alliance-system. In most cases the cities accepted his terms. In addition, he sent a fairly small force to secure Abydos, the derelict city whose possession was vital for any power aiming to control the Hellespont. Only two cities rejected Antiochos' terms. They were menaced by Seleukid troops, maintained their defiance, and were then more or less ignored, though Antiochos did not give up his demands on them. Both appealed for Roman support, but not as a matter of urgency. This process lasted through the winter of 197/196.

It is clear that at Lampsakos this policy of resistance to Antiochos' demand was not all that popular. Several men declined to be named as envoys to Rome before Hegesias accepted.³⁵ Some of these men refused on grounds of expense and the length of time involved; others simply refused; their reasons are not given, but disagreement with the policy is likely enough. Hegesias himself sought out the first Roman commander he could find, the naval commander L. Quinctius Flamininus, the proconsul's brother, and received some modestly encouraging words. These were immediately reported home in exaggerated form. This would defuse internal opposition by suggesting active Roman support, but of this there really was none as yet.

³⁴ Livy 33.38.3.

³⁵ *OGIS* 591; cf. also M. Holleaux, 'Lampsaque et les Galates en 197/6', *REA* 18, 1916, 1-11 (= *Études* V, 141-155).

The geographical position of Lampsakos is the essential background to all this. The city is on the Hellespont, only twenty miles from Abydos. It had been ignored by Philip in his campaigns in the area in 202 and 200, but his erratic movements and appalling conduct can only have been frightening. Two of Lampsakos' neighbours, Kios and Abydos, had been taken and destroyed by him. Lampsakos had been associated with the Attalids and this may have protected the city then, but now Attalos I was dead, and in the same year Philip V was defeated. Life for a small city in the Straits was a precarious matter in the 190s. When Antiochos crossed the Hellespont in 196 he found most of the cities there only too pleased to submit to him, but the greatest city, Lysimacheia, was in ruins. For many men in Lampsakos submission to Antiochos was a sensible and rational policy; reliance on a policy of appealing for protection to Rome was not an option likely to meet with much success. No-one in Lampsakos can have known much about Rome and its policy—wherefore the early report by Hegesias, misleading but encouraging, after his meeting with L. Flamininus.

Smyrna was in a rather different situation. It was a larger city than Lampsakos, one more central to events, and perhaps with better information and contacts. Even here, however, it is highly unlikely that the policy of Rome towards Asia was anything more than conjecture, based on reports about the proconsul T. Flamininus' activities in Greece; this is hardly surprising, for, after all, Rome did not yet have a policy towards Asia. Conjecture would suggest a three-fold division of opinion in Smyrna, between those proposing an alliance with Antiochos, or with Eumenes, or with Rome. Of these the second is likely to have had considerable support, since it represented a continuity from the alliance with Attalos. But we cannot *know* this, for little is known of the internal situation in the city. The one relevant fact which is known is that a temple to the goddess Roma was instituted in the city in 195,³⁶ and this would appear to be the Smyrnaean equivalent of Hegesias' optimistic report home after his meeting with L. Flamininus. For by 195 Rome had certainly not extended her explicit protection to any Asian city, and the construction of the temple will have been voted for even earlier than the year of its institution.

³⁶ Tacitus, *Annals*, 4.56; cf. Magie, *Roman Rule*, I, 106 and II, 948, note 54.

In fact, a policy of requesting Roman support to maintain their independence conflicted with Greek perceptions, for Roman policy in Greece had been even more high-handed with regard to city independence than Antiochos' approach. In the previous winter Philip had handed over Argos to the control of Nabis of Sparta in exchange for his alliance;³⁷ when Nabis opportunistically joined the Roman side Flamininus let him keep Argos,³⁸ and the city went through a rather nasty revolution-from-above as a result; in the winter of 197/196, the election of the pro-Macedonian Brachyllas as Boiotarch at Thebes had provoked first his assassination (by three Italians and three Aitolians, so it was said),³⁹ and then a Roman invasion and conquest of the city.⁴⁰ From the point of view of these small cities—and Smyrna, Argos, Lampsakos, and Thebes, though they were important in Greek terms, were small in relation to the power wielded by Rome and Antiochos—there was surely little to choose between any of the great powers, Philip, Antiochos, or Rome, though Antiochos was being a good deal less unpleasant in his enforcement of his demands than either of the others. Proximity to one great power will have made the other the more attractive, and this is one possible reason for the appeals of Smyrna and Lampsakos. Submission for a quiet life was clearly the preferred option for most cities.

And yet, this formulation is perhaps too negative. Livy's comment that the example of Smyrna and Lampsakos might spread, is clearly not a prophecy which was fulfilled, if it was ever actually made. Other cities did *not* strike out for independence, even when the two defiant ones were not coerced. From this, two conclusions follow. One is that the other cities which accepted Antiochos' terms found their position within Antiochos' kingdom to be quite reasonable and acceptable, providing the security and prosperity which their inhabitants required. The second is that Antiochos did not use force under normal conditions, the cities which were not approached were in no danger of attack, and even that those who refused after being approached did not have to fear hostility beyond a gesture.⁴¹

³⁷ Livy 32.38.1–9.

³⁸ Livy 32.40.1–4; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 132–154.

³⁹ Livy 33.28.1–3.

⁴⁰ Livy 33.27.10–29.10; Pol. 18.43.5–13; P. Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie*, Nancy 1952 (?), 251–253.

⁴¹ It is necessary to emphasise this point, that is, that the attacks on Lampsakos

The contrast with the reaction of many of these same cities to Philip's campaigns is notable. The people of Abydos had committed mass suicide rather than fall under his power. Other cities had not reacted so extremely, but there is no sign that Philip's work was in any way acceptable to any of his victims. Which is all to say that Antiochos' policy was very largely successful; it was acceptable to most of the cities along most of the coast of Asia Minor, both in the south and in Ionia and the Hellespont.⁴²

Flamininus in Greece was no doubt fully aware of Antiochos' policies and actions, just as it is reasonable to assume that Antiochos was informed of Flamininus' problems and deeds. Further, Flamininus would seem to have gone out of his way to avoid the possibility of a clash with the king. When, in March 196, the ten Roman peace commissioners arrived to implement the peace treaty, they had a list of cities in Asia which Philip had conquered or occupied, and from which they intended he should withdraw.⁴³ But the list was already out of date because of Antiochos' actions during the previous year. He now had agreements with Euromos and Iasos, and he had occupied Abydos. In the event, the only Asian city with which the commissioners had to deal was Bargylia, and it was attended to later by P. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus.⁴⁴

Two other cities, Thasos and Perinthos, were in the list: the first was attended to by a commissioner, the other is not mentioned again, for by the time the commissioners got to work Perinthos had become a subject-ally of Antiochos.⁴⁵ Omitted from the list were several other cities, notably Lysimacheia, Maroneia and Ainos. The first was known to be in ruins, and so was perhaps thought to be defunct as a community; but the other two were active cities, and they were actually

and Smyrna were no more than gestures. In several accounts the impression is given that the cities endured sieges from the first mention in Livy to the Roman intervention in Asia in 190. For example, Walbank, *Philip V*, 177, notes the original attack on Lampsakos, and on 197 refers to 'the siege of Smyrna, Lampsakos and Alexandria' (note 5) even though the context of the first is 197-196 and the second 192. If these cities could hold out against Antiochos' forces for five years, why did they need Roman help to maintain their independence? Of course, the sieges never actually took place—though this is not to say the threat was not there.

⁴² For an account of the situation in these years cf. A. Mastrocinque, *La Caria e la Ionia Meridionale in epoca hellenistica (323-188 a.C.)*, Rome 1979, 176-180.

⁴³ Livy 33.30.3; Pol. 18.44.4.

⁴⁴ Livy 33.35.2; Plut. *Flam.* 12.1.

⁴⁵ Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, doc. 35.

visited by a commissioner and released from Philip's control. Also missing were Sestos and Kalchedon, known to have been taken by Philip. It has been suggested that their omission is due to delicate feelings in the Senate because they had been Ptolemaic holdings before Philip took them,⁴⁶ but other cities in the list were in the same situation—Abydos and Bargylia, at least—and no such concern was shown over them. The omission is perhaps better attributed to the Senate's ignorance of the exact situation; or perhaps because Sestos and Kalchedon, like other places, had been abandoned by Philip already. The list is so arbitrary, in both its inclusions and its omissions, that no firm conclusion can be drawn from it with regard to the Senate's intentions. Perhaps the omission of Ainos and Maroneia is the clue, for although not on the list they were in fact visited by a commissioner. That is, it would seem that the commissioners were provided with a basic list, drawn up in light of the knowledge of the situation as it was at Rome at the time, and this was backed up by general instructions that the main point was to remove Philip's troops and authority, but not to impose any other authority in its place. So, if Philip's troops still occupied a city, they were to be removed; if they had already gone, the work had therefore been done.

Thus it is evident that the only purpose of the commissioners and the peace treaty was to remove these places from Philip's control. If that task had already been accomplished, by Antiochos, by Rhodes, or by the inhabitants themselves, or by Philip's action in withdrawing voluntarily, then the commissioners were no longer concerned. The future control of the cities was not their concern, except in the sense that a proper gratitude was, no doubt, expected. The lack of fuss over these Asian cities is a good indication that Roman policy, whether represented by the commissioners or by Flamininus, or by both in combination, was uninterested in extending Roman power into Asia. No wonder Antiochos was not seriously concerned by the appeals of Lampsakos and Smyrna to Rome.

The Roman position therefore had a substantial element of flexibility built into it. The commissioners could have stood on the letter of their instructions, and demanded that all the cities in their list be

⁴⁶ Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* I 305–306; M. Holleaux, 'L'Expedition de Philippe V en Asie', *Études*, IV, 211–320, at 335; Walbank, *Comm. Pol.* 2.611.

evacuated, by whoever held them. Had they done so, trouble with Antiochos was certain, for he had garrisons in at least two of the cities in the Senate's list, Abydos and Iasos, and probably in Euromos and Perinthos as well. The decisions made, whether by the Senate or by the commissioners on the spot, were clearly to avoid any such confrontation. The commissioners did have an alternative available, a stipulation already made by the Senate on the issue of the city of Kios.⁴⁷ This was another of Philip's victims. There King Prusias of Bithynia had acquired the (deserted) site from Philip, after the latter's conquest. Prusias had no intention of giving it up, nor had the Senate any intention of exerting force to make him do so. Flamininus was therefore instructed to write to Prusias about liberating the city,⁴⁸ which was tantamount to ignoring the matter. There is in fact no sign either that Flamininus wrote, or that, if he did, Prusias paid any attention. The same non-action was taken over those cities in the list where Antiochos had established his suzerainty.

The expert on the spot was Flamininus, but there were others on the commission who were fully familiar with the situation in Greece. Two of the commissioners had been the consuls commanding in the war against Philip before Flamininus, and had been his *legati* in Greece for a year: P. Villius Tappulus and P. Sulpicius Galba—the latter, indeed, having been twice consul. Three others of consular rank were included on the commission: Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, P. Aelius Paetus (both consuls in 201, the year the peace with Carthage was implemented) and Cn. Servilius Caepio, consul in 203. P. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus and Cn. Octavius were of praetorian rank, and the junior member was L. Terentius Massiliota, aedile in 200. One member's name has been badly mangled in the sources, but is thought to be L. Stertinus, who held a consular command in Spain for three years. The tenth member might be L. Quinctius Flamininus, again of praetorian rank.⁴⁹ This was a most distinguished group, with plenty

⁴⁷ Livy 33.30.4; Livy in fact says that on this question Flamininus should write giving Prusias the decision of the Senate and the ten commissioners. It has been assumed (Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.306) that this double authority is a mistake, and certainly Polybios (18.44.5) omits it; but it may be that Livy is noting here that the commissioners did have the authority to vary the Senate's terms.

⁴⁸ Livy 33.30.4.

⁴⁹ The list is cobbled together from Livy and Polybios; for full references see Broughton, *MRR* I, 337–338; Scullard, *Roman Politics* 107, note 1; L. Flamininus is no more than a guess; L. Stertinus is a conjecture from mangled names in the

of experience both of the problems of Rome, and the problems of Greece. This did not mean they necessarily agreed, either with the Senate's stated policy, or with that of Flamininus, but since those policies were flexible within the broad outlines laid down by the Senate, details could be adjusted. The commissioners and Flamininus spent three months sorting out the details.

In the process it became clear that the actions and policies of Antiochos would need to be considered. Yet the immediate problems for the commission and the proconsul were necessarily Philip and the states of Greece; Antiochos—who had done nothing yet which could cause the Romans any concern—was not the main issue. Until the peace terms were implemented, Philip remained dangerous, and so Rome's allies in Greece had to be kept in line. It would therefore be folly to antagonise anyone needlessly, particularly Antiochos. The possibility did clearly exist that Antiochos could revive his understanding with Philip. This is, however, by no means to say either that Antiochos intended to adopt a policy of hostility to Rome and its settlement of Greece, or that the Romans, in Greece and in Italy, had any apprehension of hostility. There is, in fact, no evidence at all that they had any thoughts of Antiochos in connection with their work in Greece.⁵⁰

This attitude of benign neglect is, however, no indication of the policy of the Senate or of Flamininus towards Antiochos in the long term. Indeed, it is unlikely that there was any Roman policy towards any king or state other than in the short term, and the only likely policy with regard to Antiochos at the time was one of generalised friendship; it was, after all, only a year or less since the Senate had passed an honorary decree for the king. Of course Antiochos' actions would need to be watched, but the Senate was routinely watching the actions of all the other Mediterranean great powers anyway; this was part of the vigilance necessary to any great power, and was

MS; cf. Walbank, *Comm. Pol.* 2.619; Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.35, suggests that M. Caecilius Metellus was a member, and has doubts over Massiliota.

⁵⁰ Livy repeatedly asserts that apprehensions with regard to Antiochos actuated Roman actions, but they are all explicable by hindsight; so he says that Flamininus was suspicious of Antiochos and so he acceded to the request of the Boiotians to recover their fellow-citizens who were in Philip's service (33.27.6), but what connection there was with Antiochos is quite invisible, and inspiration fails to produce one. These assertions are not evidence, and must not be treated as such: they are Livian interpretations.

obviously automatic. And nothing Antiochos had done had yet been perceived by any Roman as a threat.

In the three months the commissioners spent discussing implementation of the peace treaty the situation did, however, change. The envoy of Lampsakos, Hegesias, encountered the Roman naval commander L. Flamininus, on his way to the west.⁵¹ Whether or not L. Flamininus was a commissioner, he was certainly in a position to pass on to the panel and to his brother Hegesias' version of the events at Lampsakos. No doubt the Romans would discount much of what Hegesias said as exaggeration or bias, but there is equally no doubt that an impression was made. If they had not realised it by then, the commissioners will have become aware of Antiochos' actions. Further, Hegesias will have known of Antiochos' new campaign into Thrace—he made no secret of it—and the fact that he had crossed the Hellespont was thus known to them early in the year. The connections between Rome and Massilia and Massilia and Lampsakos could not be ignored, and the commissioners and Flamininus will have realised that the Senate would now take note. Further, the Lampsakenes were enemies of the Galatians, at a time when the Romans were fighting a difficult Gallic war in Cisalpina, and Hegesias carried a message to Massilia for kinsmen of the Tolistobogii in Gaul concerning the Tolistobogii in Galatia.⁵² And one of the Senate's peace terms, the one which caused much of the commissioners' discussions, was that the Greek states should be free.⁵³ Hegesias' point of view, of course, was that Lampsakos already was free, that Antiochos was attempting to restrict, or even destroy, that freedom, and that his city was asking the Romans to extend their policy to provide protection for it. This approach fitted in all too well with the pre-conceptions and intentions of the Roman commissioners.

The meeting of Hegesias and L. Flamininus took place in March, as Hegesias was sailing for the west. Not long after, perhaps in April when the weather could be expected to be less dangerous, Antiochos sailed from Ephesos, where he had wintered,⁵⁴ for the Hellespont. Antiochos' army had marched from its winter quarters, which were

⁵¹ Ditt. *Syll.* (3) 591 (= *I. Lampsakos* 4), line 18.

⁵² M. Holleaux, 'Lampsaque et le Galates en 197/6', *REA* 18, 1916, 1-11 (= *Études* V, 141-155).

⁵³ Livy 33.30.2.

⁵⁴ Livy 33.38.1.

presumably among the cities of Lydia, to the Hellespont, and met the fleet there.⁵⁵ His advance force already held the eastern crossing point of the Hellespont at Abydos, and the presence of his fleet gave him control of the waterway itself. From Abydos his garrison had established their ability to control most of the eastern shore by marching as far as Lampsakos: no doubt their reach had extended just as far in the other direction, though we know that Alexandreia Troas remained independent.⁵⁶ The next phase was to transport the army across to the Chersonese.

The obvious landing place was the traditional one, Sestos, but Antiochos landed at Madytos, due west of Abydos (Sestos being due north). Madytos was a small city, but both independent and walled. It was, no doubt, smaller than Lampsakos, but the way Antiochos dealt with it shows what he could have done at Lampsakos—as at the greater Smyrna—if he had really wanted to capture that city. The troops landed near Madytos, and summoned the city; defied from within the walls, they at once surrounded the place, and Antiochos landed siege engines. The sight of these, an earnest of the king's intentions, persuaded the Madytans to surrender.⁵⁷ It was, no doubt, much the same sort of process as that which had occurred in the coastal cities and towns of Kilikia the year before.

Sestos, taken by surprise by the unexpected landing place, and unable now to resist, also surrendered at once, when summoned.⁵⁸ With Sestos and Madytos in his hands, Antiochos was now able to expand his control rapidly over all the peninsula. There were three other places of significant size—Elaiouss at the southern tip, Alopekonnessos on the west coast, and Kallipolis more or less opposite Lampsakos—but no record is available of the individual fate of any of them, though they are presumably included in the general Livian comment that the 'other towns' surrendered.⁵⁹ At the root of the

⁵⁵ Livy 33.38.8.

⁵⁶ It was independent in 192, when it was said, with Smyrna and Lampsakos, to be under pressure from Antiochos (Livy 35.42.2). There is no warrant for assuming, as Briscoe does (*Comm. Livy*, 2.206) that 'it had been captured by Antiochos, but had now defected'.

⁵⁷ Livy 33.38.9; the name Madytos is not actually in the Ms of Livy, but has to be 'restored'; the Ms actually reads 'Abydos', but this makes no sense; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.321–322.

⁵⁸ Livy 33.38.10.

⁵⁹ Livy, in his treatment of the conquests of Philip V in the Chersonese in 200,

peninsula on a site overlooking the Hellespont waterway⁶⁰ was the city of Lysimacheia, which, like Abydos, he found to be wrecked and substantially depopulated. This time the culprits were the Thracians, who had captured and sacked the city some years before.⁶¹

This circumstance was no doubt the main reason why the cities of the Chersonese gave in so easily to Antiochos: Lysimacheia, when alive and populated and active, had effectively blocked the isthmus. If it was wrecked the Thracians had free passage into the peninsula for their raids. In Antiochos' hands the city would automatically resume this blocking function, for at the very least he would garrison such an important site. In fact he went much farther, and refortified and repopulated the despoiled city. Since he clearly intended to control the Chersonese he would have done this anyway, but he seized the opportunity to proclaim his intention of restoring the city and its people.⁶²

This task involved three complementary parts: rebuilding the physical city, its walls and houses, as Livy puts it; collecting the former inhabitants, some of whom had moved—fled, perhaps—to neighbouring communities, while others had been enslaved: the latter to be ransomed, the former located; in addition, new colonists were to be recruited. Half the army and all the 'naval allies', that is, those troops, and perhaps the crews, serving on the ships from the Syrian and Ionian ports, were allocated to the rebuilding task, and they served simultaneously as a garrison for the city while it was vulnerable. The other half of the army, between 15,000 and 20,000 men, Antiochos took off on campaign.⁶³

This rebuilding and recolonising is an unusual matter for Antiochos III. He is not known to have done anything like this anywhere else

lists the places which he captured as: Elaious, Alopekonnese, Kallipolis, and Madytos (31.16.5); he is known to have taken Sestos as well (Pol. 18.2.4); other places he took are simply called 'some unimportant strongholds'. It is reasonable to assume that this list distinguishes the cities from the rest, and that these were the places Antiochos also seized control of.

⁶⁰ The exact site of the city is not certain, and it is frequently placed roughly equidistant between the coasts. Strategically it was better placed on the Hellespont, and a site has been located there with substantial remains; cf. a note by D. Hereward in *Archaeology*, 11, 1958, 129; Cohen, *Hellenistic Settlements*, 82–87, gives full references and discussion.

⁶¹ Livy 33.38.11.

⁶² Livy 33.38.12.

⁶³ Livy 33.38.14.

in all his reign. He is, in fact, one of the few Seleukid kings to whom no new cities can be attributed, and Lysimacheia is the only one he is even said to have restored. The great colonising impetus of the period of Macedonian expansion had run its course some decades earlier, and it seems that by the time of Antiochos III there were no sources of manpower available for new settlements—at least no Greek or Macedonian sources, which was what the kings looked for. This makes this episode at Lysimacheia all the more significant. That Antiochos should go to such unusual trouble is a clear indication that the place itself and his new expedition were of great importance.

It is also a sign that the city was to be restored, but not merely to its former local importance as a block to Thracian raids into the Chersonese, for which a new garrison and the reassembling of the former inhabitants would probably have sufficed. It was also to be restored to its original significance, which was as a major administrative centre for the whole region. It had after all been founded by King Lysimachos, who ruled Asia Minor, Macedon and Thrace, and for whom the city was a convenient governing centre. Later in the year Antiochos stated that he intended it to be a capital for his son Seleukos,⁶⁴ whose position was thus to be that of a viceroy. The geographical area of his authority would include Thrace, when it was conquered, the Chersonese and the Straits, and part at least of Asia Minor, possibly he was also to be the successor of Zeuxis as governor of all Asia Minor. The restoration of Lysimacheia may well have been the preliminary move towards the restoration of the kingdom of Lysimachos (and, in fact, of that of Antiochos Hierax).

All this took place while Flamininus and the Roman commissioners were discussing the implementation of the peace terms. They had met first at Elateia in Boiotia in March, soon after Flamininus had crushed the Theban rising, had then moved to Antikyra on the Corinthian Gulf, and finally on to Corinth.⁶⁵ They arrived at Corinth before the Isthmia, and so about late June. It was during these three months that Antiochos sailed to the Hellespont, took Madytos, seized the ruins of Lysimacheia, planned the rebuilding, and then vanished with half of his army into Thrace.

⁶⁴ Livy 33.40.6.

⁶⁵ Livy 33.31.7.

It is difficult to separate these discussions in Greece from Antiochos' actions at the Hellespont. Both Antiochos and Flamininus (and therefore the commissioners) were surely—though little direct evidence exists—fully aware of the other's moves and actions. So the restoration of Lysimacheia, which was a unique event in Antiochos' reign, takes on even greater significance. It was a political statement in the context of the situation in the Chersonese and Thrace, but it was also a political statement in the context of the peace terms stated by the Senate and the discussions about them which were conducted over the three months from March to June by the commissioners, just that same period during which Antiochos was active at the Hellespont. This is not a mere coincidence.

Antiochos was stating, for the attention of the Greeks and the Roman peace commissioners, and the proconsul Flamininus and the Roman Senate, that the Greek cities were safe in his hands. He will have known of the mission of Hegesias of Lampsakos, and of the envoy of Smyrna to the Romans, whoever he was; indeed it was obviously in the interests of those cities to publicise their appeals, since the very publicity would give them protection, and may well have been partly instrumental in removing the armed threat which Antiochos had appear to pose. The restoration of Lysimacheia was thus an answer to his denigrators, such as Hegesias and the Smyrnaeans, and perhaps also an implied contrast with the conduct of the Romans at Thebes and Argos. The subsequent invasion of Thrace was another statement—as well as being an extension of his power—in that it was a campaign against barbarians who were enslavers of Greeks and destroyers of Greek cities, in contrast to the Roman war against Macedon and Philip's Greek allies. Antiochos was showing that he was as active in extending the bounds of the civilised world as Rome, and in a way rather more important to the Greeks than the Roman wars in Spain or Cisalpine Gaul.

The refoundation of Lysimacheia was therefore a political action on several levels: at the simplest it was the rebuilding and repopulating of a city; at another level it was a move in the centuries-long contest between Greeks and Thracians, between Greeks and barbarians; at yet another level it was a propaganda move in the implied, but not yet open, and still friendly, contest between the king and the Romans. This contest had been implied ever since the Roman envoys contacted Antiochos and Ptolemy in 200; it underlay the two campaigns of 197, as the Rhodians saw and tried to exploit; and it

was still there in 196. Yet it was still only implied. Both sides stated their friendliness towards the other; neither side wished nor had any intention to elevate this contest to a quarrel, still less to a war. And both sides were taking steps to try to ensure that the contest remained low key and friendly.

The arguments among the commissioners were, if perhaps in formal terms confidential, nevertheless well known in Greece. The Aitolians knew soon enough, and publicly complained about it, that there seemed to be no intention of the Roman forces evacuating the 'Fetters' of Greece, Akrokorinth, Chalkis, and Demetrias.⁶⁶ The original peace treaty was, of course, a public document, and Flamininus, who wanted the evacuation of the three Fetters to take place, no doubt let it be known that some of the commissioners were not of that opinion. That is to say, it will have come to Antiochos' knowledge quickly enough just what the Romans wished to do, at least in general terms. The Senate's specific clauses included the removal of Macedonian troops from Euromos and Iasos, which had already been persuaded into Antiochos' system, Abydos, which Antiochos had already occupied, and perhaps Lysimacheia (though this may not have been in the list). But one of the vaguer clauses was a proclamation that all Greek cities should be free.⁶⁷

This 'freedom', of course, had to be interpreted; it was not unconditional; that is, the Romans did not mean what they said. The granting of freedom entailed a degree of continuing subordination of the grantee to the grantor. So, when the Roman Senate proclaimed the freedom of the Greeks, as its representative Flamininus did in such a wonderfully theatrical manner at the Isthmia in July 196,⁶⁸ in Roman, Greek, Macedonian, and Seleukid eyes this put the Greeks who were given that freedom into a subordinate political position to the Roman Senate, the giver.

The activity of Antiochos in the spring of 196, and perhaps in 197, is thus in part explained. He wished to establish his own grants of freedom in anticipation of those of the Romans. A city could scarcely be beholden to two patrons, and any city which owed its

⁶⁶ Livy 33.31.1-3; Pol. 18.45.1-6; Plut. *Flam.* 10.1.2.

⁶⁷ Livy 33.30.4 and 2; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.304-305; Pol. 18.44.2-3.

⁶⁸ Livy 33.32 and 33, a splendid account, showing Livy at his best, which should not obscure the fact that the settlement was of advantage to Rome and left the Greeks as Roman clients; Pol. 18.46.1-15; Plut. *Flam.* 10.3-11.4; App. *Mac.* 4.

freedom to Antiochos could not be expected to be obliged in the same way to Rome. Yet Antiochos knew he could not wholly exclude Roman patronage from Asia. One city in Karia, Bargylia, was held by Macedonian troops loyal to Philip until the peace terms were implemented, when it was surrendered by those troops at Roman behest, thus placing the city under an obligation to Rome; and Antiochos surely knew of the appeals of Lampsakos and Smyrna to Rome, appeals which amounted to requests for Rome to become their patron.

The work by Antiochos in the Chersonese cannot have taken more than a couple of months at the outside, and the campaign into Thrace will have begun about the end of May or early June. It follows that Hegesianax and Lysias, the envoys from the king who were interviewed by Flamininus and the Roman commissioners at the Isthmia at the end of June⁶⁹ had arrived with the news of the king's intention to take an expedition into Thrace as well as with an account of his actions in the Chersonese. Neither of the sources for the meeting actually says what the envoys' message was. Polybios says nothing; Livy says vaguely that they repeated their earlier speech at Rome. But the timing suggested above provides at least a likely set of topics: the envoys' task was therefore to provide an explanation of Antiochos' work in the Chersonese and his expedition into Thrace, together with reassurances. The current situation in Iasos, Euromos and Abydos was no doubt also explained. Antiochos' intentions in Thrace were surely discussed, and the Romans will have been reassured that the king's ambitions were limited and did not encroach on any areas of Roman interest and concern.

The reply by Flamininus to the envoys is reported in both Polybios and Livy to have taken the form of orders and reprimands. The envoys are said to have been told by Flamininus that the king should not enter 'Europe', to keep his hands off autonomous cities in Asia, and to evacuate those cities he had occupied which had previously been subject to Ptolemy and Philip.⁷⁰ This is simply not believable. The report fails to state what the king's envoys actually said—thus leading to the suspicion that the message was in fact friendly—and

⁶⁹ Livy 33.34.2; Pol. 18.47.1–4.

⁷⁰ Livy 33.34.3–4; Pol. 18.47.3 reports that some of the commissioners would be going to see Antiochos, which seems to be the answer to the invitation.

then states 'terms' which are supposed to have been proposed by the Romans, all of which were to be, or already had been, breached by Antiochos without the Romans doing anything about it. The fact that Antiochos was already in Europe, and that Flamininus and the commissioners knew this, shows that the account is thoroughly distorted. And indeed the actions of the Roman commissioners in the next months presuppose that no such 'instructions' were actually given. The report is clearly a Roman invention to justify later Roman actions and policy.

Flamininus' reply, that is to say, cannot have concerned itself with either Asian or Thracian affairs, other than to take note of what the envoys had said. Instead, since he had just proclaimed to the Greeks that their 'freedom' was to be 'restored', and that the three 'fetters' were to be evacuated, it seems probable that this was the message which the envoys were given to take back to the king: that the Roman policy was to evacuate Greece, having imposed its distant suzerainty by the restoration of freedom. Any warning will have been implicit: that Greece was Rome's sphere and the king should not encroach. Specific details might well have included the intentions of the commissioners to free Bargylia, Ainos, and Maroneia from Philip's troops, since all three were cities within Antiochos' current areas of concern. And one further item will have been included: a suggestion that a meeting should take place later in the year, at Lysimacheia, at the end of the campaigning season. Whose suggestion it was is unknown, but the king is most likely to have originated it since it took place in his city and at his timing. This was presumably another part of the king's envoys' message, the Roman's agreement to the meeting was what they took back with them.

CHAPTER FOUR

THRACE AND A CONFERENCE

Soon after the Isthmia, and after interviewing a variety of envoys, of whom Hegesianax and Lysias were only the first,¹ the Roman commissioners spread out over Greece and the Aegean to ensure that the peace terms agreed to by the Senate, and interpreted by the commissioners, were properly implemented.² There was, in fact, not a great deal to do. The mere announcement of the allocation of various places was usually enough for the terms to be implemented. Philip had pulled back to his Macedonian borders long since, and there were only isolated places in the Aegean which had to be dealt with. The commissioner Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, perhaps accompanied by one or two of the others,³ went to see Philip to suggest the suitability of his sending an embassy to the Senate, supposedly to request a treaty of friendship and alliance, in fact as a clear gesture of his submission.⁴ Lentulus then went on to the regular meeting of the Aitolian assembly at Thermos at the autumn equinox.⁵

The meeting with Philip took two or three days, no more, though Lentulus had done other jobs before he reached the king, but the Aitolian meeting was more difficult and lengthy. Lentulus' message, however, was just the same: send an embassy to Rome.⁶ The Aitolians were not happy about a lot of things, starting with Rome's conduct of the war, going on to Rome's implementation of the peace, and including the implication that the Aitolian League was a state subordinate to the Romans. The identical suggestion of sending an embassy to the Senate, made to the defeated enemy Philip and to the victorious ally Aitolia, was hardly calculated to conciliate the

¹ Pol. 18.47.1-5; Livy 33.34.1-2.

² Pol. 18.48.1; Livy 33.35.1

³ Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.316.

⁴ Pol. 18.48.3-5; Livy 33.35.3-6; Walbank, *Philip V*, 183.

⁵ Pol. 18.48.5; Livy 33.35.7-8 (correcting his place and occasion from Polybios).

⁶ Pol. 18.48.5-10; Livy 33.35.9-12.

men of the League. Above all, the Aitolians felt cheated at the distribution of rewards and favours in the peace. Lentulus' conduct did quiet the row for a time, and envoys were appointed to go to see the Senate, but the Aitolians can have had little hope for better things from Rome.⁷

Since the Aitolian meeting was in late September, Lentulus will have left Corinth perhaps late in August, and Polybios implies that the other commissioners left to fulfil their tasks at about the same time.⁸ It is more likely, in fact, that they went considerably earlier. P. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus had to cross the Aegean, deal with the situation in Bargylia in Karia,⁹ where there was a detachment of Philip's troops in occupation who had to be persuaded to leave, and leave quietly; then he had to sail north to the Hellespont. Two other commissioners, P. Villius Tappulus and L. Terentius Massaliota, were sent to consult with Antiochos at Lysimacheia, but waited an unknown length of time at Thasos first.¹⁰ They were perhaps also supervising the work of a third commissioner, L. Stertinius. He had to visit Lemnos, there to liberate the city of Hephastia, then Thasos, and finally Ainos and Maroneia on the coast of Thrace.¹¹ These journeys will have taken some time, and it seems best to allow a month at least, perhaps more, for both P. Lentulus and Stertinius to do their work and accomplish their travels. They will thus have left Corinth in August rather than September.¹²

⁷ Pol. 18.48.10; Livy 33.35.12.

⁸ Pol. 18.48.1-3; Livy 33.35.1-3 (translated from Polybios). Walbank, *Philip V*, 324, claims that the meeting at Corinth broke up 'shortly before the autumn equinox', but his reference (Pol. 18.48.3-5) has no indication of the timing. The Aitolian meeting at Thermos which Cn. Lentulus attended was the regular League meeting, at the equinox, so the Corinth meeting must have ended some considerable time earlier, at least a month, I would think, to give Lentulus time to see Philip first, then get to Thermos, and to have time spare, just in case. This would put the ending of the Corinth meeting into late August.

⁹ Pol. 18.48.2; Livy 33.35.2.

¹⁰ Pol. 18.48.3 and 50.2; Livy 33.35.2 and 33.39.2.

¹¹ Pol. 18.48.2; Livy 33.35.2.

¹² It is generally assumed that the conference at Lysimacheia took place in October, which is Holleaux's conclusion, accepted by Walbank (*Philip V*, 325), but not by Leuze ('Die Feldzüge Antiochos des Grosse nach Kleinasien und Thrakien', *Hermes* 18, 1923, 187-229 and 241-267, at 203-204). The date is obtained by calculation of the likely time needed for the various tasks noted by Polybios and Livy, as I have done, but reaching October depends on assuming that the commissioners all departed from Corinth at the same time. This is an inference from the wording of Polybios, but he could simply be listing the moves without dating them.

Villius, Terentius and P. Lentulus were the commissioners who were to meet Antiochos, in accordance with the arrangement made with Lysias and Hegesianax at Corinth in July.¹³ But they were not to be the only envoys. The Senate was also sending its own envoy. The arrangements for the meeting with the king had thus been reported to the Senate, presumably in early July, as soon as they had been made (or even earlier, if there had been preliminary and informal discussions before the formal meeting at the Isthmia, which is very likely). Since it was known that Antiochos was on campaign—the date of the meeting will have been arranged at Corinth—the Senate knew that there was time for its own envoy to reach Lysimacheia before the meeting began. And since he was directly instructed by the Senate for this purpose, he at once became the senior member of the delegation. The Senate chose L. Cornelius Lentulus as its envoy. He was the brother of Cn. Lentulus, who had interviewed Philip, and a cousin of P. Lentulus Caudinus, the commissioner to Barygia.

L. Lentulus' instructions, as summarised by Polybios, were to arrange a peace between Antiochos and Ptolemy.¹⁴ Since there was no existing dispute between Rome and the Seleukid state, the choice of instructions presumably harked back to the original embassy of Nero, Tuditanus, and Lepidus back in 200. Lentulus, in fact, paid no attention to these instructions (if they really are as Polybios states). He raised the issue only as one of a whole series of other points. By putting itself forward as a mediator, of course, the Senate was proposing to interest itself in a conflict in which it had no standing, and from which it had been rebuffed once already, four years before.

Separating those heading for the Aegean from Cn. Lentulus frees them from this late start; the Lysimacheia conference can then be dated rather earlier, late September instead of October.

Only five of the commissioners are assigned tasks in Polybios and Livy. Where the others went, if they went anywhere, is not known. Broughton (*MRR* 1.337–338) included M. Caecilius Metellus as a commissioner on the strength of an inscription in which he was honoured by the *koinon* of the Thessalians; if this is correct then this was where he went, to supervise the setting up of a new government in Thessaly after Philip's withdrawal. But where two other consulars, P. Aelius Paetus and P. Sulpicius Galba Maximus, went is quite unknown, and this is important, for these two men were the real political heavyweights of the commission. Walbank, *Comm. Pol.*, 2.621, suggests that they were present at Lysimacheia, but there is no evidence for this.

¹³ Pol. 18.47.3.

¹⁴ Pol. 18.50.1; Livy 33.39.1.

However, there was purpose in its persistence. If its mediation was accepted, Rome as a state could then pretend to a supervisory position with regard to both warring powers. Thus it was not peace in the east which was the Senate's real concern, rather it was a diplomatic success. Also, of course, the problems of Egypt were such that it must have seemed that Antiochos might well take it upon himself to intervene at Alexandria after all. That was still a prospect to chill Roman hearts, and was a development which was to be headed off if at all possible.¹⁵

All these Roman envoys had the time to spend on their journeys and tasks because Antiochos was conducting a long campaign in Thrace. It is a commentary on the poverty of our sources for this king, who was the most important ruler in the Hellenistic world between the Successors of Alexander and Julius Caesar, that we have to depend on hints and conjectures by three historians for this campaign. None of these historians were his contemporaries, and none of them were really interested in him or his work. The campaign was one of his most important, and one which is often thought to have led directly to his downfall at Roman hands. Livy, for example, for all his repetition of the supposed Roman demand that the king stay out of 'Europe', shows no interest in Antiochos' activity in Thrace. Nevertheless, enough hints do exist to allow the outline of Antiochos' work in the north to emerge.¹⁶

The first item is the notice that the Senate's envoy L. Lentulus, travelling separately from the other envoys, headed directly for a meeting with the king. The others took their time, no doubt because they knew that the king was on campaign, and that the meeting had already been arranged to take place at Lysimacheia when the king had finished.¹⁷ But L. Lentulus landed at Selymbria,¹⁸ eighty miles east of Lysimacheia, on the north coast of the Propontis. His only possible reason for this is to try to reach the king, and this means

¹⁵ Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 118, claims this is a decision to support Ptolemy, and that it was a new decision. But there is little in this which differs from the embassy of 200. Support for Ptolemy is only implied, and in neither case was the support more than vocal.

¹⁶ For the full argument concerning this subject see J. D. Grainger, 'Antiochos III in Thrace', *Historia* 15, 1996, 329-343.

¹⁷ This again suggests that a date for the meeting had been arranged. L. Lentulus, instructed by the Senate, was not bound by the arrangement made at Corinth.

¹⁸ Pol. 18.49.2; Livy 33.39.1.

that the king was on campaign well inside Thrace. It must be presumed that L. Lentulus had stopped in the Hellespont on his way, and had been directed on to Selymbria; he is unlikely to have hit on such a destination by accident. Thus it may be concluded that it was the nearest port to Antiochos' camp, so far as was known at Lysimacheia. But Lentulus failed in his attempt to reach the king, and had to travel back to Lysimacheia,¹⁹ which must mean that Antiochos was well away from the Propontis coast, so that it was quicker for Lentulus to sail back to Lysimacheia than to travel overland to meet him. It also means, of course, that Selymbria was in Antiochos' hands.

Appian provides the next clue. In his brief summary of Antiochos' activity in Thrace²⁰—the only summary we have, since neither Livy nor Polybios provide one—he reports three particular items of information: that Antiochos was allied with the Byzantines; that he made another alliance with the Galatians 'by gifts and fear', and had also recruited troops from them; and that he freed the Greek cities from intimidation. This last can only have been intimidation by the local Thracians, and may refer to the Greek cities of the Chersonese, which he had already rescued. It can also be applied to the cities along the north Propontis coast, including Selymbria, and those of the Thracian coast of the Black Sea, such as Apollonia and Mesembria, and perhaps Odessos and Kallatis as well.²¹

Antiochos' regular method in his campaigns, as I have noted already, was to locate an ally in rear of his enemy so that the enemy could be the more easily despatched. Since he was rescuing Greek cities from the Thracians, it was the Thracians who were the enemy, and the Greek cities will have been contacted beforehand, but they were not his only allies in this case. Certainly Byzantion became an ally, since it was one of the Greek cities which were under threat, but, as Appian says, it was also contacted and made an ally because of its position on the Bosporos, 'the outlet of the Euxine'. Antiochos

¹⁹ Livy 33.39.2.

²⁰ App. *Syr.* 6.

²¹ Apollonia had an old Seleukid connection, evidenced by its coins (J. Youroukova, 'La présence des monnaies de bronze des premiers Séleucides en Thrace: leur importance historique', *Studia P. Naster Oblata* 1, Louvain 1982, 115–126, and A. Stepanova, 'Observations sur la monnaie de bronze d'Apollonios du Pont', *Thracia Pontica* 2, 1985, 272–285. The very name of the city would attract the king of a dynasty which claimed descent from the god Apollo.

could only put a value on Byzantion for such a reason if he had needed to use the Bosporos waterway, and this suggests that part of his fleet was operating in the Black Sea, which again implies an alliance with such places as Apollonia and Mesembria.

But none of these Greek cities was particularly powerful, and none was really in a position to threaten the Thracians, either alone or even in coalition with other cities. In fact, the reverse was the case, and it was the power of the Thracians, and their intimidatory methods, which had made them the enemy of the cities and of the king. The cities therefore were useful principally as fortified beachheads, and they could perhaps supply some manpower, but they were not the allies the king needed since they could not provide a real threat to the enemy. However, Appian clearly indicates the ally Antiochos did choose: the Galatians.

The Galatians had reached Thrace at the same time as they invaded Macedon and Greece, in 280. Repelled from both of those latter places, some had crossed into Asia and eventually settled in eastern Phrygia, which became Galatia; and one group remained in Thrace and settled there. Thereafter for some decades a Galatian kingdom, called the 'kingdom of Tyllis',²² had lived by raiding and terrorising the surrounding lands, the prime targets being the rich Greek coastal cities. Byzantion had been mulcted of up to eighty talents at a time,²³ and one of the Galatian kings acquired enough power, or notoriety, to be included in Polybios' history.²⁴ But this kingdom had collapsed some years before Antiochos' expedition, as a result of a rebellion of the Thracians.²⁵ This was the event, no doubt greeted with relief and pleasure by the cities at first, which had loosed the Thracians, who had proved to be every bit as violent and extortionate as the Galatians, as the scattered survivors of ruined Lysimacheia could testify.

The kingdom had vanished, but the Keltic people who composed it had not, even though Polybios claimed that they had been exterminated;²⁶ fifty years after Antiochos' time a strong concentration of

²² M. Domaradzki, 'L'État des Keltes en Thrace avec capitale Tyllis et en Asie-Mineure-Galatia', *Pulpuđeva* 3, 1980, 52-56.

²³ Pol. 4.46.3-4.

²⁴ Pol. 8.22.1.

²⁵ Pol. 5.46.4.

²⁶ Ibid.

Kelts, called the Scordisci, formed a powerful tribal state, located astride the Danube north of Serdica.²⁷ This tribe proved to be a major problem for the Roman governors of Macedonia after the destruction and annexation of that kingdom. At least one ancient source explicitly connects the Scordisci with the former Tyllis kingdom,²⁸ and unless one assumes that the Kelts of Tyllis were totally exterminated and that within fifty years another Keltic population had arrived to live in more or less the same place, this seems the common sense solution.²⁹

It was these Kelts who in 196 were Antiochos' allies against the Thracians. Note the strategy of this campaign: from his firm base in the Chersonese, Antiochos made alliances with the Galatians, to the west of the Thracians, with the Byzantines, Perinthos³⁰ and Selymbria and probably with other Greek cities on the Pontic coast; his navy controlled the Hellespont and the Propontis, and had access to the Bosphoros and the Black Sea by the agreement with the Byzantines, and so he could land troops at any convenient point on all those coasts. The Thracians were thus surrounded, and could be harassed into submission by the army Antiochos took with him into their territory. Note also the success of Antiochos as a diplomat: he had persuaded into his alliance two groups, the Kelts and the Greeks, who had been sworn enemies for eighty years until relatively recently. This is also a measure of the threat posed by the Thracians to both of them, but the persuasiveness of Antiochos is not to be underestimated; the Greeks could well have held aloof, fairly safe behind their walls, and the Byzantines in particular were notoriously independent-minded.³¹

²⁷ V. Zirra, 'Le problème des Celtes dans l'espace du Bas-Danube', *Thraco-Dacia* 1, 1976, 175–182; F. Papazoglu, *The Central Balkan Tribes in pre-Roman Times* (trans. M. Stansfield-Pohovic), Amsterdam 1978, 271–391; J. Todorovic, *Kelti u jugoistocnoj Evropi*, Belgrade 1968 (English summary at 161–190); B. Jovanovic, 'The Scordisci and their Art', *Alba Regia* 14, 1975, 167–171.

²⁸ Athenaios 6.234b.

²⁹ It is probable that one group at least managed to escape eastwards: the tribe of the Aegosages were settled by Attalos I in the Troad in 218, which is roughly the time that the kingdom collapsed; they had crossed the Hellespont a few years before. In their new home they resumed their predatory habits until destroyed by Prusias of Bithynia. The irony is, of course, that it was Prusias' ancestor Zipoetes, the first king of the Bithynians, who transported the Galatians into Asia Minor in the first place, in 278.

³⁰ Ma, *Antiochos and the Cities*, doc. 35.

³¹ The city remained so until it defied Septimius Severus in a famous siege in

This first campaign, in 196, was only partially successful, and had to be repeated later, but it did at least provide security for the cities of the Chersonese and for the Greek cities of the coasts. These included Ainos and Maroneia, the two cities of Thrace to which the Roman commissioner L. Stertinius had been sent. These places had not been on the original senatorial list of cities to be freed,³² but they were presumably added by the commissioners when it became clear that Antiochos was active in the area. The two cities had been Ptolemy's before Philip took them in 200³³—but they had been under Antiochos II's control back in his time in Thrace, about 250.³⁴ That is to say, everyone had a claim to these unfortunate places, including the Thracians. It is significant that the Romans should attend to them; it is also significant that Antiochos did not. Like Bargylia they will have had a Macedonian garrison, and that seems to have been enough to deter Antiochos, for he clearly had no wish to become entangled in disputes with either Philip or Rome, as his careful attitude to the Karian cities had shown. In fact, of course, the continuing 'freedom' and well-being of the two cities was wholly dependent on the success of Antiochos' attempt to control inland Thrace. Liberation by Rome, which had no intention of leaving troops in the cities to protect them, could well leave them dangerously exposed to Thracian attack. They were safe only so long as Antiochos maintained a military presence either in Thrace or, later, in the cities themselves.³⁵

Antiochos' campaign will have been watched with care by Philip V. He had already lost control of the Hellespont and its cities, so recently gained, of his Karian conquests, and then of Ainos and

A.D. 192, which drew forcible attention to the advantages of the site; a century and a third later it became Constantinople.

³² Pol. 18.44.3–4; they could be included in the further clause at 45.3, but this is a decision by the commissioners, interpreting the *senatus consultum*, and seems to apply to Asia, not Thrace. It is quite likely that Ainos and Maroneia had been forgotten; it was to be a fate they suffered more than once in these years; cf. also Livy 33.30.3–4 and 31.4.

³³ Livy 31.16.4–5; Ainos was betrayed to Philip by Kallimedes, the Ptolemaic governor.

³⁴ He was fighting inland at Kypsela (Polyainos 4.16) and held the Chersonese; it is highly likely that he had control also of the two coastal cities, all the more so since Ptolemy III seized them in the 240s.

³⁵ When Antiochos' troops were expelled in 188, Rome withdrew, and Philip was prevented from controlling them: later in 188 it was already possible for a large and victorious Roman army to be ambushed by the Thracians near the cities.

Maroneia, and now he found a new and powerful neighbour looming close to him; and this happened just at the time when his own military and naval power was being seriously restricted by his recent defeat. By the peace terms he was supposed to have an army of no more than 5,000 soldiers, and no elephants, and he had been ordered to surrender the ships of his navy so that his fleet was to be reduced to six ships.³⁶ No doubt these terms could be, and were, ignored in practice, but there was no evading the point that he was seriously weakened.

Further, it will not have escaped the attention of both Philip and the Roman commissioners that Antiochos' justification for his work was 'restoration'; he was claiming that he was simply putting back together the kingdom he should have inherited.³⁷ This was his purpose in defeating Egypt, in his operations in Asia and in the east, and in Thrace. It could also be adduced as a justification for a claim to the kingdom of Macedon. The founder of his dynasty, Seleukos Nikator, had been briefly king of Macedon for the last few months of his life between his conquest of Lysimachos and his own death.³⁸ When murdered—near Lysimacheia—Seleukos had been on his way to Macedon to take up his kingly duties there. He had been married for some years to Stratonike, the daughter of Philip V's ancestor Demetrios I Poliorketes, and Antiochos himself was a descendant of Demetrios just as was Philip; and Philip's father and grandfather had been married to Seleukid princesses.³⁹ All this could easily be construed and proclaimed as giving Antiochos a claim to Macedon, if he chose to proclaim it. The new and powerful Seleukid presence on his eastern border, together with Antiochos' predilection for aggression under the cloak of family piety, gave Philip a clear cause for

³⁶ Pol. 18.44.6; Livy 33.30.5–6.

³⁷ There is needless legalistic argument over whether Seleukos I should be reckoned a king of Macedon; his own view would be clear: having eliminated Lysimachos, Seleukos was the inheritor of his whole kingdom.

³⁸ Pol. 18.51.3–5; Livy 33.40.4–5; these are superficially justifications for his conquest of Thrace, which is what Livy says, but Polybios goes further, and refers to 'the whole of Lysimachos' kingdom'.

³⁹ Antigonos II Gonatos had married Phila, the daughter of Seleukos I and Stratonike (who was Antigonos' own sister); Antigonos' son Demetrios II was married to Stratonike, the daughter of Antiochos I and Stratonike; these relationships were almost as incestuous as those achieved by the Ptolemies. Demetrios II's marriage was infertile, but the second Stratonike was Philip's stepmother, in a way, and Antiochos III was her grand-nephew.

concern. It is no surprise that he so quickly agreed when the Roman commissioner Cn. Lentulus recommended that he at once approach the Senate for a treaty of alliance.⁴⁰ In his weakened and defeated state, he clearly needed a protector. With his son and heir, Demetrios, a hostage in Roman hands (and he had no other legitimate heir), and with his kingdom largely disarmed, he was now wholly dependent on Rome. He no doubt made clear to Cn. Lentulus, and to Flamininus, who hardly needed to be told, that Antiochos was seen as a threat to Macedon, but that Macedon could do nothing about it alone for the present. Philip, of course, was astute enough, as he proved later, to exploit his apparently perilous situation to extract concessions from Rome, but this required a degree of hostility between Rome and Antiochos to be effective. Since this did not yet exist, his only recourse was an alliance with, and protection by, Rome.

The Roman envoys who had been sent to meet Antiochos gradually converged on Lysimacheia. P. Lentulus, having freed Bargylia of its Macedonian garrison (or at least so one must assume)⁴¹ sailed north. Villius and Terentius had waited on Thasos for some time, and they sailed on to Lysimacheia from there. L. Lentulus, having failed to meet Antiochos at Selymbria, returned from there to Lysimacheia. Although the others may have known of the existence of this senatorial envoy, this would seem to have been the first time they had all met, since the meeting with the king had been organised. L. Lentulus had instructions direct from the Senate, whereas the others were there by arrangement with Flamininus as proconsul, so he took precedence, and in fact it was he who did all the talking, or so it would seem.

The Romans all gathered at Lysimacheia before Antiochos arrived and they will have been able to confer, to sort out their pecking order, and to make their own arrangements, briefing each other on recent events, and on the attitude of the Senate. They also had made other preparations, as it transpired later. Antiochos arrived, according to Livy, 'a few days' after the Romans.⁴² No more than 'a few

⁴⁰ Livy 33.35.3-7.

⁴¹ At the risk of pedantry, I might point out that we are told, by both Polybios and Livy, that P. Lentulus went to Bargylia (Pol. 18.48.1; Livy 33.35.2), and that he came from there to Lysimacheia (Pol. 18.50.2; Livy 33.39.2), but nothing of what he did there. It is only an assumption that he succeeded in removing Philip's garrison from the city. Plut. *Flam.* 12.1 does say he was sent to set the cities free.

⁴² Livy 33.39.2; this may be a misunderstanding of Polybios' words at 18.50.3.

days' more seems to be necessary for the actual conference, but at the end of that time—which in total cannot have been much more than, say, ten days—the Romans were able to introduce envoys from Lampsakos and Smyrna,⁴³ the cities which were already known to have appealed to Rome against Antiochos' aggressions.

The envoys from Lampsakos might have arrived during the period of the conference, since their city was close by, but the envoys of Smyrna had to come from a considerable distance, and their arrival must have been arranged some time before the conference began, before, indeed, Antiochos had arrived at Lysimacheia. Their joint appearance just at that time, and their introduction to the meeting by L. Lentulus, shows that they had been brought to Lysimacheia at Roman instigation, and had been coached by them. This arrangement was thus made during the period when the king was still on campaign. There was plenty of time for it, and there were plenty of Roman commissioners available to do the job of recruitment and coaching. It was thus a tactic prepared by the commissioners, and not by the senatorial envoy L. Lentulus, since he did not have had time to arrange it. Unless another, unnamed, commissioner was involved, P. Lentulus is the most likely man to have collected the Smyrnaean envoy, Koiranos, on his way from Bargylia to Lysimacheia, while Villius and Terentius, from their base at Thasos, would have had time to contact Lampsakos and arrange for that city's envoys, Parmenion and Pythodoros, to attend. If this is so, of course, it means that this was all decided by the commissioners before they left Corinth, and so Flamininus was probably involved. This, therefore, was one of the matters L. Lentulus will have needed to be briefed about in the short time between his and the king's arrival at Lysimacheia.⁴⁴

When Antiochos arrived at Lysimacheia, therefore, he was entering into a negotiation for which much preparation had been made by the Romans. However, he himself was not wholly unprepared. He had the reports of his two envoys, Hegesianax and Lysias. These men had been his envoys to Flamininus at Corinth. They were thus fully aware of the pressures on Flamininus, and of the work of the

⁴³ Pol. 18.52.1–5; Livy omits this incident.

⁴⁴ It may be pointed out that it is perhaps likely that the initiative for using the cities' representatives may well have come from Rome, since it was to that city that the cities had sent envoys.

commissioners in interpreting and implementing the peace terms. It has been assumed, from Polybios' placing of the sentence reporting their presence at Lysimacheia,⁴⁵ that they arrived there at the same time as the Roman envoys. From that it has been conjectured that they had been on a diplomatic tour of Greece.⁴⁶ But Polybios' sentence can be read in another way, that Hegesianax and Lysias arrived at Lysimacheia with the king, that is, from Thrace. To assume that they had toured Greece on a diplomatic fishing expedition is to ignore the fact that their primary mission was to act as envoys of the king to Flamininus. After the meeting at Corinth, during which the conference was arranged, they would need to reach the king at once, and this is in fact what Polybios says in that context.⁴⁷ They had, therefore, returned to Lysimacheia and then travelled on to the king's camp in Thrace, where they briefed him on the talks with the Romans; they may also have known of the special mission of L. Lentulus. All this is, of course, what one would expect them to do. Then they returned to Lysimacheia with the king in time for the conference.

The idea of a process of diplomatic contact in Greece by Antiochos' envoys is only acceptable if the idea of the inevitability of a war between Rome and Antiochos becomes the primary means of interpretation of these difficult matters. Then, with that at the forefront of the mind, it is reasonable to assume that both sides were planning for the war from the first and that Antiochos would conduct his affairs in such a way as to recruit allies for the future. Yet, except for the reports of the speech supposed to have been made by Flamininus at Corinth to Hegesianax and Lysias, there is no direct evidence of any hostility between the two powers at this point. Tension, yes. Wariness, of course. Disputes and disagreements and apprehensions, no doubt. But the prospect of a war is nowhere visible, and it must not be assumed.

⁴⁵ Pol. 18.50.4; their presence is not mentioned by Livy.

⁴⁶ Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 119, echoed by Walbank, *Comm. Pol.*, 2.621. There is no evidence for this. Badian bases his conjecture on the length of time since Hegesianax and Lysias had left Corinth, but we don't know when that was. It is surely more likely that they stuck with the Romans, to whom, after all, they had been sent, and who had the real power in Greece, than went wandering about looking for allies, and so annoying the Romans.

⁴⁷ Pol. 18.47.4.

The explanation for this absence of warmongering, if one is necessary, is straightforward, if the context is considered. Antiochos, after all, was already at war with Ptolemy V, and had just mounted a substantial campaign into Thrace. He could see the difficulties the Romans were having in Greece, difficulties which in some ways mirrored his own in Asia. He had no reason to fear an attack, since the Roman forces in Greece had their hands full in simply keeping control there in the face of the hostility of the Aitolians, the restlessness of Nabis of Sparta, and the recently powerful enmity of Philip. They would not wish to take on another enemy, and certainly not one which was the greatest kingdom in the known world, controlling an empire several times larger than their own, while they were still so deeply involved in these troubles in Greece. For either state to be actively considering war would be quite remarkably reckless, and neither side was that. The Romans had been fighting Hellenistic states for eighty years, and Antiochos had been king for thirty; both had enough experience of defeats and difficulties to make them cautious.

Antiochos therefore had been able to discuss the forthcoming conference with his main advisers. He also received, about this time, news of the negotiations which an envoy of his—perhaps the man called Eukles of Rhodes who is known to have been involved later⁴⁸—had been conducting with the Ptolemaic government. The *coup d'état* which had been mounted by Aristomenes in the autumn of 197 in Alexandria against the Aitolian mercenary commander Skopas had cleared away a disruptive and expensive element in the city and the government circle. It had then been followed by the ceremony of the king's coming-of-age, the *anakleretia*, in November.⁴⁹

These proceedings were necessary to begin the process of bringing order to the internal condition of Egypt. By 197, the rebellion in the south of the country had been going on for ten years. Progress in suppressing it was slow, perhaps even non-existent—it lasted another ten years, not being finally suppressed till 187 or 186⁵⁰—and it had

⁴⁸ Hieron., *In Dan.* 3.11.17; cf. E. Olshausen, *Prosopographie des hellenistischen Königs-gesandten, I: von Triparadisos bis Pydna*, Louvain 1974, 134.

⁴⁹ Pol. 18.53.1–59.9; for the dating cf. Walbank, *Comm. Pol.* II, 623–624.

⁵⁰ M. Alliot, 'La Fin de la Résistance Égyptienne dans sud sous Épiphané', *REA*, 54, 1952, 18–26, and K. Vandorpe, 'The Chronology of the Reigns of Hurganophor and Chaonnophris', *Chronique d'Égypte*, 71, 1986, 294–302.

finally dawned on the Ptolemaic central government that some reform of the government system was required in order for the Egyptian peasantry to be persuaded to support the government, or at least to cease to defy it.⁵¹ This also followed the conclusion of peace in Greece, one result of which was that it was no longer possible for the Ptolemaic government to involve Rome in its difficulties, which had been attempted more than once in the last few years. This in turn meant the possibility of their being exposed to the full force of Antiochos' power with no possible shield. Therefore, some internal reform, coupled with serious negotiations for peace with Antiochos, was the programme of the new regime. In a royal minority, reform is always difficult, since the central government is weak, and any attempt will be seen as a party measure by a regent and used by his rivals to attack him. Hence the *anakleretia*, which would permit the king's ministers to institute reform in the king's name and so with less difficulty. The Rosetta Stone records, in Greek and, significantly, in two Egyptian scripts, part of the fruits of this process of reform.⁵²

But peace was also necessary, since warfare is expensive and taxation was the main grievance, so that meant that peace with Antiochos had to be concluded. Again the declaration of the king's majority permitted the negotiators to act with rather greater authority, and it also put the king himself on the scales: his marriage was one of the elements available for negotiation in the treaty.

It is evident from what Antiochos is quoted as saying at the Lysimacheia conference in September 196, that these negotiations had reached such a stage by that time that a conclusion was in sight. It also appears that the Romans had no knowledge of this. In an autocracy, of course, which is what both the Seleukid and Ptolemaic kingdoms were, such negotiations can be kept very quiet. The full attention of the Roman Senate had been on Greece, when they were not watching the situation in Cisalpine Gaul or Spain, or, indeed, in Italy, and the Romans in Greece had manifold problems to cope with, as well as having to watch Antiochos' own movements. But the negotiations with the Ptolemaic government had not yet been

⁵¹ C. Préaux, 'Esquisse d'une histoire des révolutions Égyptiennes', *Chronique d'Égypte* 21, 1936, 522–552, at 529–531.

⁵² *OGIS* 90.

completed. Since Antiochos and his army were busy in Asia and in Thrace all through 197 and in 196 until September, there was actually rather less pressure on Ptolemy's ministers to reach an agreement than there had been earlier. There were now fewer possessions for them to lose, so Antiochos' pressure could be said to have relaxed. Regular reports on the progress or otherwise of the discussions will have been sent to Antiochos, and his authorisation for any concessions will have been required. No wonder progress was slow. One of these reports had presumably reached Antiochos when he returned to Lysimacheia in September 196; no actual report of this survives, but the conference with the Romans was important enough for him to have given instructions for this in advance, and it seems safe to assume it. But, even if a conclusion was in sight, it had not yet been reached. He was still at war with Ptolemy.

The conference with the Romans is reported by Polybios, who is the source for Livy's slightly different version,⁵³ and for the shorter versions of Diodoros and Appian.⁵⁴ All have details unique to themselves, and the temptation is strong to add in these extras to Polybios' account, and to treat his as the basic datum. Yet this will not work, because Polybios' version is suspect in itself. It is essential, in understanding this conference, to jettison the rhetorical flourishes and the editorial comments of these historians, and this is a particular fault of the two larger accounts, those of Polybios and Livy. A common element in all these versions is that the Romans are said to have uttered threats to the king. Also the accounts were written in the knowledge that this conference was succeeded, albeit four years later, by a war which Rome provoked. It is better, therefore, to discount the threats as well.⁵⁵

Polybios is, however, the basic source, as well as the earliest, written within two or three decades of the conference. This does not mean

⁵³ Pol. 18.50.4–52.5; Livy 33.39.3–41.4; Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.322–326, and Walbank, *Comm. Pol.* 2.620–623, point out the differences, which tend to be blamed on differences in the Mss.

⁵⁴ Diod. 28.12; App. *Syr.* 2–3; neither of these adds anything to the two main accounts.

⁵⁵ Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 119–121, accepts the accounts in Livy and Polybios at their face value, despite their implausibilities; but then he had already decided that 'the Senate's envoys and Flamininus had openly embarked on 'cold war' at Corinth (119)—though there was no envoy of the Senate at Corinth; other accounts, mainly based on Badian's version, are by Errington, *CAH* (2) 275 and Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.158–161; Bevan, *House*, 2.49–52, more or less accepts Livy.

that Polybios is a *primary* source, only that he had an opportunity to learn what went on from contemporaries. Yet there is little sign that he did so, for he quotes no source. The main account consists of two speeches, one by L. Lentulus, and one by the king, in reported speech. But it is clear from Polybios' preliminary remarks that this is a wholly inadequate account of what went on at the conference. And the reported speeches themselves bear little or no resemblance to what was actually said. Not only do the two speeches have no relation to each other, they have no relation to what happened after the conference.

It is first necessary to consider the form of the meeting, and sort out what actually happened. When all the parties had reached Lysimacheia, 'a few days' were spent in informal meetings and discussions held in private, about which no information at all is provided.⁵⁶ Yet these meetings are clearly important since it was there, and not in the public session which took place later, that the two sides explored the each other's positions. Such discussions did not necessarily bear too much relation to the open and official meeting held later. Polybios reports that these private meetings were held in a friendly spirit, which suggests a sensible and civilised atmosphere in which any disagreements and differences could be aired frankly. Similarly the topics on which both sides were agreed could be identified, and these were subjects which would not need to be discussed further, and would not arise in the public discussions.

There were a large number of topics which one would expect to arise in these talks, many of which are simply not mentioned in any of the accounts. It would be surprising if there was not a report by the commissioners among the Romans—Villius, Terentius, and P. Lentulus—on their work towards the pacification of Greece. P. Lentulus could report on the political situation in Karia, and his (presumed) success in removing the Macedonian garrison from Bargylia; Villius and Terentius can be expected to have pointed out that the same had been done at Ainos and Maroneia by Stertinius; the implication—and it may well have been stated aloud—was that these places were now under Roman protection, and the Romans will surely have wanted this to be clearly stated. Since the matter was not discussed in the open session, Antiochos had obviously accepted

⁵⁶ Pol. 18.50.4; Livy 33.39.3.

that. Some airing of Roman worries about Nabis of Sparta can be expected, and perhaps those over the Aitolians as well. On Antiochos' side an explanation of the scope of his work in Thrace was to be expected, and a discussion of his policy towards Philip and Eumenes, both of whom were his neighbours and both of whom had ties to Rome. All these were problems which *should* have arisen in the negotiations, but which are not reported to have been mentioned in the public meeting. It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that these are the topics which had already been aired in the private meetings, and on which broad agreement, or at least understanding, had been reached; that is, each side had reassured the other that the policies being pursued in these matters did not arouse misgivings. So Antiochos could assure the Romans that he had no objections to the suppression of Nabis, and could allay any suspicions which the Romans entertained that he had any intention of suppressing Eumenes; the Romans could show that they understood his work in Thrace and that they had no objections to it. These matters were, of course, those which had already been aired at Corinth.

These conjectures are not simply based on the fact that no discussions were recorded. Instead their basis is the record of what actually happened in the years immediately following the conference. The public meeting is portrayed in Polybios (and also in Livy, all the more so) as a theatre of disagreement and threat, but such threats were not followed up. Further, the area of disagreement, as revealed in the reported official conference, was not really very large, particularly when the range of subjects on which they *could* have disagreed is remembered.

These informal discussions were followed by an official meeting. The difference is presumably that an official record was produced, and presumably published in some form. For the Romans this will have been a report to the Senate by L. Lentulus, and a copy to Flamininus in Greece. For Antiochos, no immediate publication would be needed, but a record would certainly be kept in his archives. It is presumably these records which are the basis of Polybios' account of what when on. But we do not have a transcript of the meeting, only doctored versions produced later as justifications for earlier policy. It was in the Senate's interest to seem to be belligerent in the defence of the Greek states; it was in Antiochos' interest to seem to be the victim of Roman aggression. As a result, the accounts of the official meeting are to be treated with considerable scepticism.

In the person of L. Lentulus, for the Senate, the Roman side is said to make a series of complaints: that Antiochos was profiting from their exertions in the war with Philip by snapping up places he had held; that Antiochos should give up the lands he had taken from Ptolemy; that he should not threaten the remaining autonomous cities; finally Lentulus is said to have wondered what Antiochos was doing campaigning in Europe, which, he implied, was the Romans' sphere of interest.⁵⁷

This collection of complaints makes little sense as it stands. The Roman Senate had no standing in the war between Antiochos and Ptolemy, and had long accepted that; so issuing a demand that Antiochos withdraw from his captures could only provoke derision, and so weaken the rest of their argument. Those captures did not consist only of a few cities on the western coast of Asia Minor and in Thrace, nor even only of those on the south coast or Asia Minor. The main prize Antiochos had won was Koile Syria, including Phoenicia, which he and his predecessors had been trying to gain for more than a century. Lentulus (and the Senate) cannot have been ignorant of this. No Roman senator in 196 could possibly have demanded that Antiochos give up this conquest. To have done so would be to provoke an instant disruption of the talks.

Then the demand that Antiochos withdraw from places which he had captured or which had joined him, but which had been occupied by Philip beforehand, was similarly nonsensical, since in every case Philip's troops had been removed or had removed themselves before Antiochos and his forces arrived. When Antiochos made agreements with Iasos and Euromos those cities were free agents, and Antiochos had shown that, while he might exert pressure on such places, he was not prepared to resort to naked force to bring them into his system.⁵⁸ Only one Greek city had been in Philip's hands but had been captured by force by Antiochos—Stratonikeia—but this had been taken for the benefit of Rhodes, a Roman ally, which had itself participated in the capture, after its previous attempt had been unsuccessful. None of the cities of the Hellespont had had

⁵⁷ Pol. 18.50.5–9; Livy 33.39.4–6; Polybios puts L. Lentulus forward as the spokesman, though Livy merely says it was what 'the Romans' demanded.

⁵⁸ *I. Iasos*, 4, might be interpreted as indicating that Philip's troops were in Iasos when Antiochos' forces arrived. If so, they only wanted to return to Macedon; there was no fighting, and the Iasians do not say that the king removed the Macedonians.

Macedonian forces in them when Antiochos arrived; only Madytos had even been threatened with attack, and even there the city had given in before fighting began. So the Roman demand makes no sense since it applied to no places. Further, such a demand by the Romans seemed to legitimise Philip's conquests by implying that the rightful ruler before the peace treaty was Philip, whereas this went against the Romans' stated reasons for 'liberating' them.

Then there was the form in which the demand was made, that Antiochos was profiting from Roman efforts. This was extremely offensive. If it was made in that way, it would have justified an immediate break in relations by the king. The questioning of Antiochos' motives in invading 'Europe' was equally offensive, since Antiochos must have explained his purposes already, both at the informal meeting at Lysimacheia, and earlier to Flamininus and the commissioners at Corinth.⁵⁹

These Roman demands, or terms, are so illogical, offensive and irrelevant, that strong doubts must arise as to whether they were ever made. If any Roman actually wanted to provoke a war with Antiochos, then stating such demands in such a way was an excellent way to go about it. But—apart from this passage and the similar one put into the mouth of Flamininus at Corinth—there is no evidence of such a desire on the part of any Roman at the time. The conclusion must be that the set of demands said to have been made by L. Lentulus were not actually made, but that they were invented afterwards as a supposed justification for the later Roman declaration of war on Antiochos. The apparent victory of Antiochos in the argument would thus be taken as an added insult to Roman forthrightness, by casuistical argumentativeness.

Or there is a second possibility. In Polybios (and Livy) these non-sensical demands are followed by a reported speech by Antiochos which sets out, rather well, to justify what he had been doing.⁶⁰ He is made to make a distinction between Asia, which was his, and Italy, which was Rome's. Thrace he said had been his family's in the past, and he was merely reclaiming it; by implication he left

⁵⁹ Livy then adds a series of rhetorical questions (33.39.7) to the account he has taken from Polybios, which only serve to confuse the issue further, since they make it seem as though the questions were being asked before the expedition into Europe had begun. They are best ignored.

⁶⁰ Pol. 18.51.1–10; Livy 33.40.1–6.

Greece to Rome, who had it anyway. In Livy's version he explains further that he was rebuilding Lysimacheia as a royal seat for Seleukos, his second son, who was to be set up in a kingdom of his own. As to the war with Ptolemy, he reported that he had been negotiating with Ptolemy for a treaty of friendship and for a marriage alliance. (He did not state that this had been decided, only that this was what he wished to come about.) The king's reply is so well argued—if the argument of hereditary possession is accepted as valid—that the suspicion arises that the preceding Roman demands, so rudely and offensively stated, were only listed in order that the king's reply should seem, by contrast, to be logical, sensible, and civilised. In other words, the possibility exists that Polybios' source was a Seleukid propaganda document, which was produced later, when the war had actually begun. It does not seem that the report of the conference can be seriously relied on as a source for what actually took place there.

There is, however, one item which fits the surrounding events and which appears relevant to the central situation. L. Lentulus is said to have asked Antiochos not to lay hands on the autonomous cities.⁶¹ None of these are specified, but, since Greece was already under Roman control in large part, and Asia mainly under Antiochos' control, it was not necessary to do so; the reference must be understood to apply to the cities Rome had just freed—Bargylia, Ainos and Maroneia—and those which recently had attempted to place themselves under the protection of Rome—Lampsakos and Smyrna. Antiochos' reply, as relayed by both historians, did not deal with it. Polybios, the only source to mention the issue, then has Lentulus introducing the envoys from Lampsakos and Smyrna. But Antiochos was made to refuse to listen to their 'harangue', and announced that he would accept Rhodian mediation, not Roman, over the issue of the two cities.⁶²

This is an incident which must have taken place, since it was a public event witnessed by others than the two sides. It also is the one item in the official meeting which has the air of a real diplomatic dispute about it. It may thus be taken to be the nub of the argument between Rome and Antiochos, the one major item which they had failed to resolve in the private meetings, and which L. Lentulus,

⁶¹ Pol. 18.50.7; omitted by Livy.

⁶² Pol. 18.52.1–5; omitted by Livy.

coached in this part of the dispute by his colleagues, tried to sort out by this new diplomatic move.

It is also the one item in the whole account which shows a truly diplomatic solution being arrived at. On the surface Antiochos is brusque and dismissive. In fact, his argument amounted to a face-saving gesture, for Rhodes was Rome's ally, and was also a power notoriously sensitive to the autonomy of cities in the Hellespont region—she had gone to war with Philip on this very issue—and at the same time was only technically a friend of Antiochos. By now it will have sunk in at Rhodes that the city's scope for expansion on the Asian mainland had ended. The result of Rhodian mediation in a dispute between King Antiochos and the two cities claiming autonomy from him could safely be predicted to favour the cities.⁶³

This issue was in fact the only one which existed as a dispute between Rome and Antiochos. Rome really had no quarrel over Antiochos' actions in Thrace, and accepted them without dispute in 196 and for several years more. The war between Antiochos and Ptolemy was not over, and negotiations for peace were continuing, but that was also the situation for the Romans in Greece, and neither side was interested in adding enemies and problems to those it already had. The conference at Lysimacheia had, in fact, cleared the air and all that was left unsettled was the status of Lampsakos and Smyrna. Antiochos had not in so many words accepted Roman suzerainty over them, but his actions implied that he did, or would do so, once the formality of the Rhodian mediation was gone through. Each city could have been taken by his army with ease, but neither was ever seriously attacked. No record of the Rhodian arbitration exists, and it probably never took place, but tacitly Antiochos had accepted Rome's position.

Thus the conference at Lysimacheia must be regarded as a minor diplomatic success for the Romans, with Antiochos gracefully giving

⁶³ Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations*, 215–218, notes that Rhodian negotiators had succeeded in disputes between Samos and Priene and in Crete. She also notes that a Rhodian, Eukles, negotiated the treaty with Ptolemy which ended the current Syrian War. But there is no indication that Eukles was acting as an arbitrator; more likely he was Antiochos' envoy. The fact that he came from Rhodes is irrelevant. The success of arbitrations between minor states such as Samos and Priene is not an indication that Rhodians were successful as arbitrators, for a successful arbitration required that the arbitrator be more powerful than the disputants.

up his claims to the two cities. They did not figure in any of the later talks until the war actually broke out, when Antiochos raised the issue again; the absence of the Rhodian arbitration meant the issue was still unsettled. At the same time, it was implicitly accepted at the conference that Rome had no objection to the conquest of Thrace by Antiochos. Again, this issue was later revived, by Rome, but since Antiochos conducted serious military campaigns in the area for several more years without any Roman reaction, it must be accepted that an agreement, informally reached in the preliminary discussions, had been made. The conference had thus had the beneficial effect of settling some issues, but it had also highlighted those matters which could not be immediately settled. It was thus the first of a series of attempts on both sides to reach an agreement over the division of the world. It is not surprising that there was no full agreement, but both sides could be encouraged that this remained possible.

CHAPTER FIVE

A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALLIANCE

The conference at Lysimacheia had ended with Antiochos' brusque dismissal of the stunt, arranged by the Romans, when the representatives of Lampsakos and Smyrna were brought in. This was not a collapse in the talks, or a rupture in relations, as the king's offer to accept Rhodian arbitration showed. On the whole, both principals could be moderately pleased with the results, for their differences had been shown to be concerned only with minor matters. Neither side had shown any interest in a serious quarrel, though these minor problems could fairly easily be developed into major disputes if either so wished. The situation remained in balance, with a general goodwill towards peace on both sides, but enough differences existed to allow either to find a colourable excuse for hostility if advantage could be gained in such a way.

Each side, however, had quite enough to concern it for the present. In Greece Flamininus' *imperium*, twice extended already, was renewed once again in the winter of 196/195, and he was told that the problem of Nabis of Sparta was also his to deal with.¹ In addition he had to conciliate the various Greek states, keeping a particularly wary eye on the Aitolian League, whose dislike of the peace terms was well known, and he had to prepare for the removal of the Roman troops back to Italy. Antiochos similarly had a number of longstanding problems which were not yet ready to be solved: Thrace would require considerably more work, the war with Ptolemy was not yet over, and until it was, there was always the possibility of more difficulties arising. And there were always problems to be dealt with in Asia Minor. The existence of these continuing problems for both principals may be adduced as one of the main reasons for the fact that the Lysimacheian conference ended as it did, without any serious disputes developing between them.

¹ Livy 33.43.6 and 45.3-4.

The conference ended about late September, or possibly early October.² For Antiochos, this was probably somewhat later than he had wished or intended. He had to return to Syria for the winter, and sailing there was the only practicable method. Yet late September was at the very end of the sailing season. October was not recommended, and only the most urgent voyages were undertaken after the end of that month.³ Since the Romans had had to wait for him before the conference began, it looks as though he had spent rather longer on the Thracian campaign than he originally intended.

Livy has a tale at this point. A rumour that Ptolemy V had died is said to have reached both sides at the conference, and he makes comic play with a description of both of them pretending they had not heard it, but both trying to get away.⁴ He conjures up a pretty comedy, but there is no real need to believe the story. Livy appears to have believed that the conference ended unsatisfactorily for Rome, and this story distracts attention from this, but Livy needs a reason for Antiochos sailing east so late in the season and this seems to supply a more dramatic reason than that he was simply a little behind schedule. The account in Appian, which may be based on Polybios' version, which no longer exists, is not presented as a comedy, nor is Antiochos said to be in a great hurry.⁵ The comic element in Livy is also part of the constant denigration of Antiochos in Livy's account of this whole period.⁶ If Appian reflects the tone of Polybios'

² The exact date is not clear, but time must be allowed for Antiochos to carry out several tasks at Lysimacheia and at Ephesos, and then to sail east. It seems unlikely that the conference lasted into October; if so Antiochos' decision to sail east was particularly foolhardy; Walbank, *Philip V*, 325, argues that the conference ended in October, discussing Holleaux, 'Recherches', 8-9; he bases his dating on the idea that the Corinth meeting ended not long before the equinox, but that depends too much on indefinite indications to be accepted.

³ Casson, *Ships and Seamanship*, 270-272.

⁴ Livy 33.41.1-3; Holleaux, 'Recherches', connected the story of trouble in Egypt with the downfall of Skopas, but this is now dated to 197; no comparable problem in Egyptian history suggests itself; but then rumours do not need factual foundations, only the requisite atmosphere.

⁵ App. *Syr.* 4.14; Antiochos is depicted as stopping at Ephesos for a meeting with Hannibal.

⁶ Other instances include the claim that the king's marriage to Euboia so distracted him that he neglected his duties (Livy 35.11.1-3), and the claim that he broke down when told of his eldest son's death (Livy 35.15.3-8). The denigration appears to date from after the battle of Magnesia. It is all to be seen in the light of Rome's later experiences with eastern threats—Mithradates and Kleopatra, particularly, but also perhaps Sulla.

account, then Livy's version suggests the Roman wartime propaganda. This belittlement is actually a sign of the great threat which Antiochos was eventually felt to have posed to Rome in these years, though this, again, is reading history backwards. It is one more element in the historiographical tradition which has to be borne in mind in studying these events.

The conference ended with the partial agreements, the rumour of Ptolemy's death arrived, but Antiochos took time to make his arrangements for the winter in the Aegean. His second son Seleukos was left to hold the fort at Lysimacheia,⁷ no doubt with good professional administrators to help him—he was no more than twenty years old, after all. The army Antiochos had brought to the west the year before was also to remain,⁸ and no doubt it assisted in the continuing reconstruction of the city, while at the same time holding down the Thracians by its presence at Lysimacheia and in garrisons in the conquered land. The fleet was to return to Syria, with at least part of the army, though some of the ships were no doubt left at the Hellespont and at Ephesos, if only to maintain a Seleukid maritime presence in the area. Many of these ships had been contributed by the maritime cities of Syria and Phoenicia. They had been away from home for two summers by now, and their crews, who, unlike the soldiers, were conscripts and not professionals, will have been eager to return.

The route Antiochos took on his way back to Syria is credible enough: first to Ephesos, where he stopped to transact business, then to Patara, the new naval base in Lykia which he had acquired the year before, at which point the rumour of Ptolemy's death was contradicted. His intention now is said to have been to invade the Ptolemaic island of Cyprus.⁹ Events prevented this, if it was ever intended. The next stage of the voyage was past the island and cape of Chelidoniai and into the gulf of Pamphylia. A delay then followed when the rowers of the fleet mutinied at the anchorage off the Eurymedon river.¹⁰ Why this should be is not stated, but it may be the lateness of the season which bothered them. When the mutiny was over—after an indeterminate period—the voyage continued until

⁷ Livy 33.41.4, fulfilling his stated intention at 40.6.

⁸ Livy 33.41.4.

⁹ Livy 33.41.6; App. *Syr*, 4; Livy is less specific than Appian.

¹⁰ Livy 33.41.6.

a storm caused a shipwreck, which gave Livy the chance for a purple passage of death and destruction.¹¹

The quantity of damage to the fleet is unknown, but Livy states quite categorically that it was the casualties, among both ships and soldiers, which prevented Antiochos from invading Cyprus as he is said to have intended.¹² The problem is that the scene of the shipwreck, off the mouth of the Saros river in Kilikia, implies that any such intention had already been abandoned before the storm, for the estuary of the Saros is well to the *east* of Cyprus: that is, the fleet, still intact, had already sailed well past the island before it was caught by the storm.

It is this item which casts doubt on Livy's story. If the intention had been to invade Cyprus, using the fleet and the troops on board at this time, the route should have been to sail south from Anemurion, the point of the Asian mainland closest to Cyprus. It is possible that the intention did exist, but that it already been abandoned before Anemurion because of the delay caused by the mutiny in Pamphylian waters. Further, Livy says the army had been left in Thrace, yet he speaks of large numbers of casualties among the soldiers of the fleet in the storm. Certainly the fleet can be expected to have carried a substantial number of troops, and, if the invasion of Cyprus had really been planned, Antiochos would need a good-sized army for the task; yet the force left with Seleukos is said to be 'the army', and this must mean by far the greater part of the soldiers. There is clearly something wrong with Livy's account in all this, and it seems likely that the storm allowed him the opportunity to kill off another rumour, which was that the fleet had been intended to invade Cyprus. The report of the intention, however, is all of a piece with the image of the aggressive king.

One item which Livy mentions, almost in passing, however, is clearly authentic: apparently from Ephesos, when he stopped there briefly on his way to Syria, Antiochos sent envoys west across the Aegean to Flamininus.¹³ It has been supposed that a later notice records their arrival next spring, and that all Antiochos was doing was announcing his intention of sending envoys later.¹⁴ This seems

¹¹ Livy 33.41.7-8.

¹² Livy 33.41.9.

¹³ Livy 33.41.5.

¹⁴ So Holleaux, *Études* V, 164 n. 3, presuming that Livy made a mistake and

a particularly pointless embassy, in that case—sending an envoy to say he would send an envoy—for he could have announced his intention while still at Lysimacheia. Livy is quite definite that envoys were sent from Ephesos in October of 196. That they took six months to cross the Aegean is unlikely, to say the least, so there were, in fact, two sets of envoys, six months apart, one in October, the other in the spring of 195. But to accept that the two notices record two separate sets of envoys sent by Antiochos involves another problem, for one must expect that Flamininus will have replied to the first envoys before the second set were despatched. Thus, the acceptance of Livy's two notices means also postulating a Roman embassy sent by Flamininus which he fails to mention. Further, Livy gives no real indication of what was discussed in either case, other than a vague proposal for an alliance which is said to have been made by the second set of envoys sent by Antiochos.

Two other remarks by Livy, however, make it clear that his tally of envoys is incomplete. He casually reports that, in 195, Villius, one of the commissioners, had just returned from a visit to Antiochos,¹⁵ though he had not noted when he was sent. Unless Livy has made a mistake—an all too likely occurrence—this must mean that there is yet another embassy of Romans to Antiochos which Livy does not mention. It is clearly unsafe to rely on Livy to have mentioned all such embassies, and therefore the main obstacle to developing a new theory of such embassies is removed.

It can be accepted that Antiochos sent envoys to Flamininus in October 196 from Ephesos. This embassy will have been replied to by Flamininus during the winter. This would be expected as a matter of courtesy, but it also happens that there was a suitable occasion for it, and that came when Flamininus heard that his *imperium* was to be renewed for another year. This news reached him probably in December. Flamininus' messenger would have to go to Syria, where Antiochos was wintering, unless Seleukos at Lysimacheia was used as a postman. Antiochos thereupon sent a second embassy to Greece, from Syria, proposing an alliance. This was the embassy mentioned by Livy in the spring of 195. Flamininus referred the

that Antiochos merely expressed an intention to send an embassy next year. But Livy is quite clear, and gives a sensible reason for the embassy. The spring embassy is at Livy 34.25.2.

¹⁵ Livy 34.33.12.

envoys on to Rome, for an alliance between Rome and Antiochos could only be decided in the Senate. There is no reason to assume that this was the only matter the envoys were to discuss. This sequence does suggest that the proposed alliance, far from coming out of the blue, as Livy seems to imply, was in reality the culmination of a process of discussion conducted by the king and the proconsul by way of these envoys. But it is perhaps also possible to make suggestions as to other topics which will have been discussed by the envoys.

The sequence in October 196 was thus as follows: at the end of the conference at Lysimacheia, the Roman envoys left the city, taking with them their version of what had happened, and what they understood to have been agreed and what they had disagreed about. They will have reported to Flamininus, but they went on to Rome.¹⁶ After making his arrangements for Thrace for the winter, Antiochos then sailed south, on his way to Syria, stopping at Ephesos.¹⁷ There he decided to send his own envoys, but to Flamininus only. Livy says that Antiochos' message was that he would do nothing to 'modify their alliance', and he adds an editorial comment that this was 'with a view to creating confidence'.¹⁸ This, in fact, may well be a good reason, since it was clear to all that Flamininus, with his unprecedentedly long period in office, was a man to cultivate. The main message is clearly desperately badly summarised—for no 'alliance' existed to be modified—but it may be understood to imply that Antiochos was suggesting a process of consultation between the two of them.

One may assume he had three topics in mind for discussion: his own version of the results of the conference; the arrangements he had made in Thrace; and an advance notice of his intention to return next year. Livy says nothing about this agenda, so it is necessary to look at what happened next year to retroject such speculations. In the spring Antiochos returned to take up the command of his forces in Thrace again;¹⁹ more or less at the same time Flamininus declared

¹⁶ Livy 33.44.6; they are in Rome after the assignment of provinces for 195, which took place, it seems, in December.

¹⁷ App. *Syr.* 4, describes a meeting between Antiochos and Hannibal at Ephesos, but this seems to be misplaced, since Hannibal's flight from Carthage does not seem to have taken place until the next year.

¹⁸ Livy 33.41.5.

¹⁹ Livy 34.33.12.

war on Nabis of Sparta,²⁰ a war which took some months to win. If he had had any apprehensions as to Antiochos' intentions Flamininus would not have become involved in the Spartan war, since this would be an ideal opportunity for Antiochos to exercise his usual strategy of having an enemy distracted by a threat to his rear while he attacked. Further, since Flamininus was seriously considering war with Nabis at least from December of 196, when the Senate referred the matter to him,²¹ it follows that reassurance had already been provided by Antiochos—and that Flamininus accepted that reassurance.

The envoys sent from Ephesos by Antiochos were answered, it has to be presumed, by Roman envoys sent from Greece during the winter. Since they will have been sent under the authority of Flamininus as proconsul, there was little point in sending them before he knew of the extension of his *imperium*, news of which reached him in December, along with the Senate's authority to tackle the problem of Nabis. Indeed, the extension of his *imperium* would be a courteous piece of news to transmit to Antiochos, and a good excuse for an embassy, which could inform the king that the Nabis-problem was about to be dealt with. If objection to this notion is raised on the grounds of the difficulty of winter journeys, it is to be noted that the news of the extension of the *imperium* had already crossed the Adriatic in December (and the Lysimacheian envoys had done so in, probably, November), and that that sea is no more difficult than the Aegean. Anyway, if necessary and if time permitted, the envoys of Flamininus could travel by land, through Macedon and Asia Minor, with the only sea-crossing being at the Hellespont. Such a journey would certainly take time, but there is sufficient time between October and March for a journey from Ephesos to Greece (Antiochos' first embassy), from Greece to Antioch (Flamininus' reply), and from Antioch to Greece (Antiochos' second embassy), particularly since all these envoys would be afforded the very best of attention and the speediest transport by the Seleukid authorities.

Thus the embassy from the king which Flamininus saw in the spring at Corinth was one which had been sent in reply to that presumed Roman winter embassy. The envoy is said to have brought a proposal for an alliance.²² It has been supposed that this was an

²⁰ Livy 34.32.6–34.7

²¹ Livy 33.43.6 and 45.3.

²² Livy 34.25.2–3.

alliance against Nabis,²³ but Antiochos had no standing in the quarrel with Nabis, which was a matter for the Romans and the Greeks of the Peloponnese. Flamininus is said to have referred the envoy on to Rome: and this also implies that more was involved than the problem of Nabis. In fact Antiochos was surely proposing a full alliance of equals between himself and the Roman Republic.²⁴

There is no evidence that the envoys went on to Rome at this point. Quite likely their instructions allowed them only to go to Flamininus, and they would need to return to the king if the proposed alliance was acceptable to the proconsul. It is to be noted that Flamininus did not reject the suggestion. If the interpretation of events given here is correct, he was at this point friendly towards Antiochos. Indeed, the very fact that the king approached Flamininus with the suggestion for the alliance suggests that the two had struck up friendly relations, even at their mutual distance, and despite the fact that they had not met in person. It would also be courteous for Flamininus to send an envoy of his own to the king to explain the situation with regard to the alliance proposed, and perhaps to suggest suitable ways of approaching the Senate. For an alliance between Rome and the Seleukid king was fundamentally a very different matter than any alliance either of them had previously contracted. This must be an alliance of equals: all their earlier and existing alliances had been, in effect, with subordinates, or certainly with less powerful states.²⁵ The danger was therefore that Antiochos' suggestion would be interpreted in this way, and that he would be treated as a subordinate. Hence the need for great care in approaching the Senate; hence also, perhaps, the advisability of consulting Flamininus first.

It is, of course, more than likely that this second embassy of Antiochos had other matters to discuss besides the proposed alliance. Livy's summaries of such events are all too brief, and conjecture must be resorted to, based on the political situation and the plans of each party. The arrival of the king in the west once more and his plans for Thrace would be one topic; an enquiry as to Flamininus'

²³ This is the suggestion of De Sanctis, *Storia*, 4.1, 125, but not generally accepted; Livy's words do not even imply that meaning.

²⁴ Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.89, dismisses the idea of an alliance; this item is ignored by Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos'.

²⁵ The dispute with Aitolia was at bottom a problem of this sort: Rome insisted on treating the league as a subordinate ally; the Aitolians required to be treated as equals.

precise intentions towards Nabis would be another. Mutual reassurances were no doubt exchanged. And a new Roman envoy was sent to the king, in the person of P. Villius Tappulus, with the reply concerning the proposed alliance, and the information about the war with Nabis.

Much of the last paragraph is, of course, conjecture, but in fact we do have evidence of the embassy of Villius, for he is recorded, during the summer of 195, as *returning* from his visit to Antiochos.²⁶ He brought news of the second expedition by the king into Thrace, and Livy imposes his usual interpretation on this, that it was a hostile act of Antiochos towards Rome.²⁷ If so, no-one in Rome noticed at the time, nor in Greece. Above all, Flamininus continued with his Spartan war, to a negotiated conclusion. Later the Senate decided to evacuate its troops from Greece, even though Antiochos' interest in Thrace had not decreased. This policy was the recommendation of Flamininus, who must have been convinced at that point that the Seleukid campaign in Thrace was no threat to anyone, except, of course, the Thracians.

So we must accept that one of the results of the conference at Lysimacheia was the frequent exchange of envoys between Antiochos and Flamininus. At least three embassies are recorded in the nine months after the conference ended, and another can be reasonably postulated. The reason for all this ambassadorial activity was that each man was concerned to keep the other informed of his policies and intentions, particularly in terms of their wars, in order to avoid the known dangers of misunderstanding and the subsequent escalation of problems. They succeeded in smothering the problem of the free cities of Asia, and perhaps in deterring those states in Greece who were unhappy over Rome's settlement there from doing anything drastic. Certainly the Aitolians, the most dissatisfied (apart, presumably, from Philip of Macedon) had subsided from the initial state of antagonism after the conclusion of the peace treaty. Partly this must be due to the need to send envoys to Rome, but it was also

²⁶ Livy 34.33.12.

²⁷ Livy 34.33.12–14; Livy in fact reports these suspicions of hostility by Antiochos when he is reporting what Flamininus said that Villius had said, and at the time Flamininus was arguing for the conclusion of a negotiated peace with Nabis. In such circumstances this is not evidence for either Antiochos' hostility or Villius' words—nor for Flamininus' actual beliefs for that matter.

due to the lack of encouragement from any potential ally, such as Antiochos.

The war with Nabis proved to be one of the touchstones of the post-peace-treaty period, but to appreciate its significance in the diplomacy of the time it is first necessary to consider Antiochos' moves during the winter following the conference at Lysimacheia. For the alliance proposal he made to Flamininus was only one of a whole series of such diplomatic moves.

The negotiations which had been conducted with the Ptolemaic court were finalised during the winter, and a peace treaty was drawn up.²⁸ Ratification would take place when one of its main clauses, the betrothal of Ptolemy V and Antiochos' daughter Kleopatra, whom the Alexandrians nicknamed Syra, was converted into marriage. The precise terms are, as so often, barely known otherwise. The transfer of conquered Ptolemaic territory in Syria, Kilikia, western Asia Minor and the Straits to Antiochos will have been confirmed, but it appears that there were also conditions by which part of the tax product of Syria was attached to Kleopatra Syra as a dowry. This is only known from a brief notice in Josephos, which is clearly distorted.²⁹ The dowry would be for Kleopatra's lifetime only, and did not imply the ownership of any of Syria by anyone but the Seleukid state—that is, the king. Later Ptolemies used this clause as a lever to lay claims to the land,³⁰ but it is quite unbelievable that Antiochos III would, after all his exertions in gaining Syria, ever permit any wording which might be construed as implying Ptolemaic ownership, or even possession, or even the shadow of a claim. Perhaps it was this clause which was one of the reasons for the lengthy negotiations for the peace treaty.

The effect of such an assignment of taxes was to provide Kleopatra with an income, a substantial, queenly income, which was independent of her husband and his court. The reason for this is not far to seek. The Ptolemaic court was a hotbed of intrigue, whose practitioners did not refrain from various types of murder. Ptolemy V's mother had been murdered in the course of the intrigues,³¹ and several ministers had paid for their intrigues with their lives in the last

²⁸ Hieron., *In Dan.* 11.17 (= *FGrH* 260 F 46).

²⁹ Josephos, *AJ* 12.154–155; *App. Syr.* 5.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Death of Arsinoe: *Pol.* 15.25.3–3.

few years.³² Another aspect of Kleopatra's financial independence would be that her support for peaceful policies could thereby be guaranteed. Peace treaties between kings expired on the death of one of the parties. Antiochos III had been able to mount a second attempt to conquer Syria after his first failed because his first treaty, with Ptolemy IV, expired when he died. But now Antiochos was much the older of the two kings, and it could be expected that he would die first. This clause in the treaty may well have been an attempt to prolong the life of the treaty beyond the time of his own death. And certainly it proved to be the case that this treaty lasted beyond the deaths of both principals—in 187 in the case of Antiochos, in 180 in that of Ptolemy, and was only broken in the next Ptolemaic minority, when the king's ministers fell back into intrigue again, and after Kleopatra Syria was dead.

The treaty was nevertheless agreed, negotiated by one of Antiochos' Friends, Eukles of Rhodes,³³ and included the betrothal of Kleopatra to Ptolemy, though the marriage did not take place for another two years, presumably because Kleopatra was thought to be too young. In the same season, the winter of 196/195, the king's eldest son Antiochos, who had been joint-king with his father for many years, and is called, by modern historians, 'the Younger', to help distinguish him from his father, was married to his own sister Laodike.³⁴ This match was presumably intended to strengthen the dynasty. This degree of relationship in a royal marriage had until then been the preserve of the Ptolemies,³⁵ though both the Antigonids and the Seleukids had come close,³⁶ the coincidence in time of the marriage with the peace treaty and the betrothal of Kleopatra (Laodike's

³² Skopas the Aitolian, for example: Pol. 18.53.1–45.12.

³³ Rawlings 'Antiochos . . . and Rhodes', 15–16, assumes Eukles to be operating as a Rhodian mediator, as does Ager *Interstate Arbitrations*, 217; there is no evidence for this other than his city of origin; Antiochos III employed men of any and all Greek origins: Aitolians, Macedonians, Byzantines, and other Rhodians (e.g., Polyxenidas, his fleet commander). Eukles was surely working for Antiochos, and with the status, at least, of royal Friend.

³⁴ App. Syr. 4.

³⁵ Begun by the marriage of Ptolemy II with his full sister, the great Arsinoe, who had also been previously married to her half-brother Ptolemy Keraunos; neither marriage was fertile. The next example was the marriage of Ptolemy V's parents Ptolemy IV and the murdered Arsinoe (III), which was fertile. It was scarcely a common occurrence in the dynasty, so far.

³⁶ See Chapter 4, note 38; among the Seleukids the nearest relationship so far was Antiochos III's own marriage to his first cousin Laodike.

younger sister) may not be accidental: the transfer of supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean from the failing Ptolemies to the obviously successful Seleukids is in a sense symbolised by the transfer of their marital practices.

Antiochos had another daughter, Antiochis. Probably younger than Laodike, she was still old enough to be considered marriageable, and so in her early teens, perhaps the second daughter, with Kleopatra the youngest. Another diplomatic move made in this busy winter was the king's offer of Antiochis to the new king of Pergamon, Eumenes II, as his bride.³⁷ The diplomatic intention here was to produce a situation which was the equivalent of the old alliance of Antiochos and Eumenes' father Attalos, since such a marriage would imply that Eumenes was allied to Antiochos as his subordinate. The date of the offer of this daughter is not known precisely, but it was after autumn 197, when Eumenes succeeded this father, and before 189, when Eumenes claimed credit before the Senate for rejecting the proposed alliance. Appian mentions the proposal in a list of events, but his list is not in chronological order.³⁸ The most convincing date is soon after Antiochos' return to Asia from Syria in the spring of 195. Two of his daughters were now married or betrothed, and negotiations for the next marriage could begin. It may be that the betrothal of Kleopatra made that of Antiochis the more urgent: she would be expected to be married before the youngest girl.³⁹

³⁷ Pol. 21.20.8 (not in Livy). As Walbank *Comm. Pol.* 3.113 notes, the date of the offer is not mentioned. E. Leuze, 'Die Feldzüge Antiochos' des Grossen nach Kleinasien und Thrakien', *Hermes* 18, 1923, 187–229 and 241–287, suggested 192–191; Hansen, *Attalids* 76–77, opted for 193, but by then Eumenes was openly on Rome's side; the marriage-alliance suggestion fits better at the moment when Eumenes was clearly alliance-free; it implied, of course, not merely an alliance, but protection as well.

³⁸ App. *Syr.* 5.

³⁹ The order of birth of the three girls is not known, but has to be conjectured. It is assumed that Laodike, named for her mother, is the eldest; so Antiochis, named for her father, will be next. The third would normally receive the name Stratonike, but the last woman of that name in the dynasty, the divorced wife of Demetrios II of Macedon, had led a rebellion against Antiochos III's father, and the name does not appear in the family again. Kleopatra on the other hand, had a neutral but Macedonian ring to it, the last one being the sister of Alexander the Great. So, if Kleopatra was the youngest, she was presumably betrothed to Ptolemy V because they were closest in age (he was born in 210); with Laodike's marriage in the same year, that left the middle girl unbetrothed; hence the offer to Eumenes at this time; cf. Schmitt, *Untersuchungen*.

Eumenes was thus now presented with the need to make the basic decision of his reign: to ally with Antiochos, which would bring security but supervision, or to reject that alliance, and to attempt to gain the alliance of Rome, though that was an uncertain prospect, as Attalos had discovered. His decision was made the more difficult by the knowledge that Rome was hoping and intending to withdraw militarily from Greece. But Rome's withdrawal would be only military, not political, and its influence would continue, and for Eumenes that could well be sufficient.

Antiochos would clearly not expect an instant answer to his proposal, but he would certainly expect negotiations to be pursued during the summer, while he was on campaign in Thrace. This is why the Spartan war is important in the context of Romano-Seleukid relations, for it gave Eumenes, among others, the opportunity to align himself with Rome, and to forge an alliance-in-arms which would provide him with the right of access to the Senate, and a diplomatic connection to rival that of Antiochos with Rome. It would not provide him with military protection, since Rome intended to withdraw its troops, but it would certainly allow him to operate independently of Antiochos. His father had succeeded in elbowing for himself a certain room for manoeuvre by similar means, particularly by taking advantage of Antiochos' absences on distant campaigns. But Antiochos was all too close now, and distant absences were from now on unlikely. Also by his manifest reluctance to become too involved on the Greek mainland Attalos had found that Rome's interest was not seriously engaged in his own Asian problems. Eumenes was much more enthusiastically involved in the Greek problems from the start, since only a clear decision one way or another was now acceptable. The room for manoeuvre which Attalos had enjoyed no longer existed.⁴⁰

These diplomatic and military moves by Antiochos will have provided more than enough material for the various Roman and Seleukid envoys and embassies between October 196 and the summer of 195.

⁴⁰ Neither McShane, *Foreign Policy*, nor Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, pay much attention to the Nabis war; the former, on p. 139, claims, rather implausibly, that the war with Sparta demonstrates that Eumenes was attached to the idea of Greek freedom. Hansen, *Attalids*, 72–73, notes that Eumenes was participating expressly to gain Roman support in Asia.

All were sensible moves from the king's point of view, but the accumulation of moves could well be given a different construction should anyone wish to do so. The peace with Ptolemy removed a major distraction from Antiochos' southern flank, and would permit him to thin out the military garrison of Palestine, and thus to increase his strength elsewhere, as for example in Asia and Thrace. It also provided an acceptable legal support for his acquisitions in Asia, and removed the excuse Rome had used twice already for an attempt at interference in the eastern Mediterranean. The marriage of Antiochos the Younger and Laodike, while clearly aimed at strengthening the dynasty, was also a political move designed to emphasise the paramount position which the Seleukid dynasty had now gained in the east, the only truly independent successor to Alexander's empire; this could be seen as a threat by everyone else, including Philip of Macedon, to whose territory Antiochos could lay claim, and Rome and her Greek satellites. One of the ideological suits in the Seleukid locker was the heritage of Alexander, which was by now understood to be an aim at world-conquest. Alexander had controlled Greece through his Hellenic League, just the means which Flamininus was using at that very time. The proposed marriage-alliance with Eumenes would bring under Antiochos' control and supervision an awkward member of his family of kingdoms, and would remove a dynasty which had pretensions to a city-protecting role to rival that of both Rome and Antiochos from the diplomatic stakes, and would neutralise an old ally of Rome. It may also be seen as Antiochos' putting into practice the world-division he suggested at Lysimacheia. Pergamon, Eumenes' capital, had been a stronghold of Lysimachos, whose kingdom fell to Antiochos' ancestor Seleukos I by conquest. Seleukos had accepted Eumenes' ancestor as his subordinate ally. Antiochos could thus claim to be restoring his ancestral kingdom by reviving the old alliance, and implementing the division of the civilised world he had suggested—just as Flamininus might be interpreted as doing by squashing Nabis.

At the same time, Antiochos' various diplomatic moves could be given an anti-Roman slant without too much difficulty. A suggestion of an aim at world-rule by the king, as inheritor of Alexander's presumed aims, was one accusation. Even if that was not accepted—and some Romans, made paranoid by memories of Hannibal's invasion and ravaging, and by Philip V's opportunistic declaration of war in

215, would certainly accept the worst construction—Antiochos' moves could be made to seem as though he was clearing the decks in anticipation of a storm to come. And his army was being kept sharp, his navy too, by the Thracian campaign. And then, in the autumn of 195, Hannibal fled from Carthage to Antiochos' court, where he was welcomed.⁴¹

The policy pursued by Flamininus in the same period (after the Macedonian peace treaty, during the autumn and winter of 196 and into the spring of 195) was similarly designed to tidy up the political situation in the Roman area. In this he was faithfully reflecting the general senatorial policy of the time, though with his own particular preoccupations. He has been described as a philhellene, which, despite the elder Cato, is a fair description of most of the Roman ruling class at that time. He has also been described as a practitioner of *Realpolitik*,⁴² by which appears to be meant his use of a certain ruthlessness and a lack of abstract principle in the conduct of political affairs. Again, there seems nothing exceptional in him in such a guise: the Roman nobility rarely displayed any other principles than the normal human ones of survival, greed, and the pursuit of pleasure, which may well be thought of as *Realpolitik*. They had been notably successful at this in the previous twenty years, since the nadir of Cannae.

So, after the Macedonian war ended, Flamininus' intentions were so to arrange matters in Greece that the area would remain amenable to Rome's distant control for the foreseeable future. This required the emplacement of friendly governments in all the states in such a way that they could then remain in power without the necessity of a constant supporting Roman presence. It also required the removal of irritants which might develop into major problems, and the settlement of any complaints which could not be dealt with in Greece and by the Greeks themselves.

The major irritant was Nabis of Sparta. His power at home was based on the men who had benefitted from his revolution, in particular from the redistribution of land to break up the large estates.⁴³

⁴¹ Livy 33.49.5–7; Diod. 28.10; Justin 31.2.5; App. *Syr.* 4, misdates the arrival at Ephesos.

⁴² E. Badian, *Flamininus, Philhellene and Realpolitik*, Cincinnati 1970.

⁴³ Pol 13.6–8; this is not the place to discuss Nabis' tyranny, but it was clearly potent and successful as a regime.

This policy had been applied to Argos when he had gained control of that city from Philip V in 197,⁴⁴ and it was not challenged by Flamininus when Nabis had switched to the Roman alliance soon after. It *was* disputed by the Achaian League, which wanted to have Argos back as a member, and which at the same time feared the internal consequences of the attraction of Nabis' revolution for its own poorer citizens.⁴⁵ Once the major threat of Philip was removed, also, Flamininus could be clearly seen as an enemy of that revolution, and the firm friend of oligarchy. When the Senate passed the problem of Nabis back to him in December, it was a signal that Nabis' days were numbered.

The whole situation, however, was complex. If Nabis was not dealt with, Achaia might join the Aitolians in expressing discontent with the peace settlement; it was not beyond a possibility that these two might join with Philip in opposing Rome. Neither liked Philip much, but he might seem less dangerous than Rome. On the other hand, if Nabis' power was destroyed there would be no reason for the Achaians to cleave to the Roman alliance any longer. Policy therefore dictated that Nabis be reduced in power but not eliminated; it also dictated that the oligarchic system of government, which was common by this time in Greece, be firmly attached to the Roman interest. There was a certain urgency involved, since the other key to the whole situation lay with the Aitolians. They had been persuaded to send envoys to Rome to discuss the peace treaty, and until those envoys returned with the Senate's answer the Aitolians could be held in suspense. The answer they received in Rome could certainly be delayed—and no doubt Flamininus had arranged for this—but when they received it, they would scarcely be satisfied, since it was clear that the Senate would not go any distance to accommodate them. So Nabis had to be dealt with as quickly as possible, and certainly before the Aitolians could come out in his favour.

Flamininus therefore persuaded a meeting of the allied Congress in the winter of 196/195 to declare war on Nabis and Sparta.⁴⁶ Contingents were requisitioned from all members in proportion to

⁴⁴ Livy 32.38.8–9.

⁴⁵ For an appreciation of the Achaian attitude, as mediated by the Achaian Polybios, see the summary of Errington, *Philopoemen*, 67–68.

⁴⁶ Livy 34.22.4–24.6.

their power. While awaiting their arrival he moved his own Roman army, which was camped for the winter at Elateia in Phokis, towards Argos.⁴⁷ The removal of that city from Nabis' control was the ostensible aim of the war. A purge there by Nabis' governor kept it firmly under his control;⁴⁸ in Sparta also a purge was necessary to keep the revolution in power.⁴⁹ The result was to solidify support for Nabis' regime, so that neither city seemed an easy target. After a look at Argos, Flamininus headed into Lakonia.⁵⁰ Nabis had a force of 10,000 Spartans, had hired 3,000 mercenaries, and had also summoned a contingent of 1,000 Cretans.⁵¹ He eventually also received 3,000 reinforcements from Argos, giving him a maximum of 17,000 men, a substantial army. Flamininus, however, had more than double that number, most of them Roman, but also including 1,500 Macedonians sent by Philip, 400 Thessalians sent by the new league and a contingent of 11,000 Achaïans.⁵² Spartan exiles flocked to join the invasion,⁵³ but other allied states' contingents were small, or replaced the provision of soldiers by the provision of supplies. All the contingents which were listed had a direct and particular interest in helping Flamininus: Philip clearly hoped to have the peace terms eased by co-operation with Rome; the Thessalians were threatened by Aitolian ambitions to recover control of several of their cities, and of course, they could see Philip looming over them still, so the Roman alliance was their one salvation; the Achaïans were looking to receive Argos once more into their league, if not more,⁵⁴ and the Spartan exiles wanted to overthrow Nabis and achieve power at home. The other Greek states had no real interest in the war, once it became clear that Flamininus was a supporter of oligarchies: the Athenian delegate at the Congress had been fiery in his denunciation of Nabis,⁵⁵ but Athens is not recorded as having sent any troops.

⁴⁷ Livy 34.25.1 and 3.

⁴⁸ Livy 34.25.7-12.

⁴⁹ Livy 34.27.3-9.

⁵⁰ Livy 34.26.9 and 28.1.

⁵¹ Livy 34.37.2.

⁵² Livy 34.25.4 and 26.10; the Roman forces were two legions plus Italian allies, perhaps 25,000 men.

⁵³ Livy 34.26.12-14.

⁵⁴ Plut. *Flam.* 13.1, clearly based on an Achaïan version of the causes of the war, in which Nabis appeared in the worst guise.

⁵⁵ Livy 34.23.2-5.

Sparta had a sea coast, and Nabis had a small fleet. So here was the opportunity for two other powers to become involved. Flamininus' brother Lucius commanded the Roman fleet, based at Leukas in the Ionian Islands, and he brought no less than forty ships to blockade the Lakonian coast. He was joined by eighteen Rhodian ships, and by ten ships from King Eumenes, who also sent thirty *lembi* and other small ships, basing himself at first in the Kyklades, where Andros, of course, was part of his inheritance.⁵⁶ These two contingents took part, with the Roman fleet, in the attack on the Lakonian port of Gytheion,⁵⁷ and Eumenes and the Rhodian commander Sosilas were both present at the negotiations which ended with Nabis' acceptance of defeat.⁵⁸ He was stripped of his coastal towns, which had been captured by the Roman fleet, gave up control of Argos, and had to pay a massive indemnity.⁵⁹

This war, brief though it was,⁶⁰ defined several issues more clearly and aligned a number of undecided states one way or another. Flamininus' decision to reduce Nabis' power by removing territory from him and by imposing the crushing indemnity was a clear statement of Rome's preference for stable oligarchies ruling in the Greek cities, and he spent some time during the rest of the year ensuring that the message was clearly perceived and understood and acted on in the other states.⁶¹ By reducing Nabis' power, and by transferring Argos to the Achaian League, that league's power was also significantly enhanced, yet by leaving Nabis in place, and his revolution in Sparta untouched, Flamininus was ensuring that Achaia would still adhere to the Roman alliance. Even much reduced, Nabis

⁵⁶ Livy 34.26.11.

⁵⁷ Livy 34.29.4; Thiel, *Studies*, 224–225, 252–253.

⁵⁸ Livy 34.30.7; Eumenes commemorated his 'victory' at Pergamon with a statue to Athena Nikephoros (*I Perg.* 60 (= Ditt. *Syll.* (3) 595a)). His participation is only briefly noted by modern historians, mainly by Hansen, *Attalids*, 70–71.

⁵⁹ Livy 34.35.1–11; The indemnity was 500 talents, an enormous sum for such a small state: 100 immediately and then 50 per year for eight years. Was this intended to cripple the state, or create unpopularity for Nabis, or perhaps give an excuse for a later attack if and when Nabis defaulted?

⁶⁰ Short accounts are in Walbank, *Philip V*, 188, Errington, *Philopoemen*, 88–89, and P. Cartledge and A. Spawforth, *Hellenistic and Roman Sparta*, London 1989, 75–76.

⁶¹ Livy 34.48.2, is euphemistic, and does not name any particular cities, but his meaning is quite clear; Plut. *Flam.* 13.3 attributes the decision to leave Nabis in power to Flamininus' wish to avoid involving the rest of the Spartans in a disaster, which is saying, in other words, that Nabis needed to be perceived as a threat.

remained a potent threat to his neighbours. Flamininus had thus very largely maintained the isolation of the Aitolians, who had not taken part in the war, and whose only possible friend in Greece was now Nabis; but an alliance with Nabis would automatically create hostility in every other Greek state, particularly since oligarchies were now universal, so they in turn would look to Rome. All this was carefully calculated with the intention of ensuring *Roman* power, though the slogan was *Greek* freedom.

It was a defining moment in the Aegean as well. The Rhodians contributed a well-calculated force whose size would leave the Romans doing most of the fighting. This would confirm their alliance with Rome, but would also show that their recent friendship with Antiochos had not changed things. But the most important decision was that of Eumenes. The opportunity to assist the Romans arose at about the same time that he had been invited to ally himself in a marriage treaty with Antiochos, and Eumenes' decision in favour of assisting Rome was an implicit rejection of the Seleukid proposal, even though that rejection was not made public until much later in the year.

Eumenes was not bound to assist Flamininus. He was not a member of the Hellenic League, and his father's policy had usually been to wait for a time, presumably to allow his intervention to become the more valuable, before involving himself in any of Rome's wars. Attalos had also tended to pull out of such wars fairly soon. Eumenes was thus under no obligation to join in the attack on Nabis, who was scarcely any threat to him, no matter how the various Greek states regarded him. Nabis' fleet, and his interest in the affairs of Crete, that source of piracy and mercenaries, may well account for Rhodian interest, but these were not matters of any real concern to the Pergamene kingdom. On the other hand, Eumenes, by providing substantial assistance to Rome, and commanding that assistance in person, was in effect making his choice between an alliance with Rome, which he knew was keen to get out of Greece, and Antiochos, who was his closest neighbour. When Antiochos returned from the Thracian campaign in the late summer or autumn, the decision by Eumenes was finalised when he rejected the marriage proposal.

Antiochos made the best of it by offering Antiochis to the Kapadokian king Ariarathes III, who accepted.⁶² At least Eumenes did

⁶² Diod. 31.19.7; App. *Syr.* 5; Bevan, *House*, 60, has assumed that Antiochis was

not rub salt in the wound by marrying elsewhere right away. But this north-western corner of Asia Minor was an obvious weakness in Antiochos' state-system. Eumenes and the two recalcitrant cities of the Asian coast which had defied him were the only states between Macedon and India which had refused to become included in his system of alliances. The system consisted of his own directly-ruled kingdom, which was surrounded by kingdoms and cities which had accepted his suzerainty. It had a direct counterpart in Rome's system, which consisted of concentric rings of Roman territory, allied territory, and subordinate states and tribes.

The weakness with both of these systems was that there were always undigested powers on the fringes of each grouping who had no wish to be other than independent. Eumenes, Rhodes, Lampsakos, and Smyrna were Antiochos' problems; for Rome there were Aitolia, Nabis, Macedon, Carthage, and Achaia. But for the brutal power of Rome's military might there would be others. In addition, Rome had two barbarian frontiers in full flame, in Spain and Cisalpine Gaul, whose peoples had no more wish to be forcibly civilised than the Aitolians had any wish to be under distant Roman control. Antiochos had his own barbarian frontiers as well, in Thrace, with the Pisidians in Asia, and in Iran, but none of them were as formidable as those which were troubling the Romans. Which is all to say that neither of these systems was complete in itself, and both has several areas of instability within them.

The wars which were fought and/or concluded between 202 and 196 had thus left the Mediterranean world in a quite new situation, where there were only two great powers, who between them had established their supremacy over all the other states within their reach. This new political system was still in the process of being organised, but it had clear elements of potential stability about it, if it was given enough time to settle down. Neither of the great powers—Rome and the Seleukid kingdom—had shown any real interest in further expansion towards the other, or at each other's expense. Each had quite enough problems to keep it busy for several years without encroaching on the other's sphere. The tentative Roman probe towards Asia at the conference at Lysimacheia had been neatly

not the daughter offered to Eumenes, but this involves accepting Appian, who clearly has matters back to front, and leaving Antiochos with an unmarried daughter, who then promptly vanishes.

deflected by Antiochos by his arbitration offer, and Antiochos' own campaigns into Thrace had not evoked anything other than watchful interest by Rome. The dialogue which had developed between Antiochos and Flamininus had laid the basis for a period of co-operation, and had produced Antiochos' proposal for an alliance between the two powers. This situation could well have been the basis for a future stable dichotomy, which would establish joint control by the two great powers over all the rest. As it happened, there were too many unsolved problems besetting both sides for this alliance to be acceptable to either, and too many of these problems were geographically close to the rival great power, thus inviting interference.

Above all, the smaller powers which lay geographically between the two giants were distinctly unhappy about the new situation. Antiochos had already had to deal with the cities of Lampsakos and Smyrna by threatening, and then ignoring them; now Eumenes had rejected his proposed alliance, and in doing so had exposed a weakness, for by refusing to renew his father's arrangements he represented a successful resignation from Antiochos' system. Ptolemaic Egypt could not be expected to acquiesce for long in its reduced circumstances, and was poised uncomfortably between the two giants, about to be allied by the marriage treaty to Antiochos, and already courting Roman support.

For Rome the situation was infinitely more difficult even than this: Italy was surrounded by defeated and resentful powers: Carthage, Macedon, Illyria, Aitolia, Nabis of Sparta, Achaia, Syracuse, the Gallic and Spanish tribes. Some of these were openly hostile, some were theoretically allied to Rome, but all of them were restive, and all hankered for independence. In many cases this independence was only recently lost, and perhaps it was not realised just how restrictive a Roman alliance would be. What was more, this spirit of disaffection extended well into Italy, where the Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, and the cities of Tarentum and Capua—to name no others—were all recently subjugated rebels, who could be expected to seize any real chance of independence which was offered; and in Etruria there was trouble of some sort even in 196/195.⁶³ All this could not be anything but distinctly disturbing to the Senate.

⁶³ Livy 33.36.1–3.

To all these lesser powers, nostalgic for real independence or hungering for revenge, subordination to one of the great powers meant that the natural way out of their situation was to appeal to the other great power. Ptolemaic Egypt had hoped for Roman help in the war against Antiochos, but had not got it; Lampsakos and Smyrna had tried an appeal to Rome, with moderately satisfactory results for the moment, though their future independence was not guaranteed; Eumenes and Rhodes had made it their business to help Flamininus, conspicuously and publicly, even ostentatiously, in his Spartan difficulty. Philip of Macedon had done the same, for his own reasons: Antiochos' work in Thrace must have bothered him, and helping Rome might get his peace terms relaxed. On the other side, Nabis seems to have conjured up the prospect of help from Antiochos to bolster the resistance of his people;⁶⁴ he may even have sent an appeal to his fellow king, but without success. And when Antiochos came out of Thrace again in the autumn of 195, he received the news that Hannibal of Carthage had come to his kingdom, ostensibly fleeing from his ungrateful city, but possibly with other purposes in mind.

⁶⁴ Villius is said to have raised the spectre of an alliance of Antiochos and Nabis when he returned from his embassy to Antiochos (Livy 34.33.12), and Nabis himself is said to have suggested it (Livy 34.37.5); neither of these is evidence that Antiochos intended to intervene.

CHAPTER SIX

NEGOTIATIONS AT ROME

Hannibal, one of history's great failures, had been driven from Italy, defeated in Africa, and his flight from his home city in 195 marked him also as a failed politician in Carthage after the peace. He had arrived in the city from Italy as a stranger, and his assumption of authority had not been a wholly popular move with those who believed such a position should be their own. There had always been a faction in the city which had been anti-Barkid, and which had thus at various times been anti-imperialist, anti-war, or pro-Roman. By 195, Hannibal had made himself sufficiently disliked to fear for his life, and he fled Africa in a prepared ship, as he had fled Italy.¹

For a man such as Hannibal there was now only one place to go. The whole of the western Mediterranean, all of Greece, and Egypt were subject to, or friendly towards, Rome, and so were closed to him. Only the Seleukid empire could provide him with a refuge, and this was all the more suitable since Carthage's home city was Tyre, one of Antiochos III's recent conquests. He was the most famous Phoenician of his time; Tyre was a natural refuge for him, where he would be welcomed. Extradition thence, no matter what Antiochos' power or Rome's insistence, would be effectively impossible.

It is important to note that Hannibal was not harried out of Carthage by Rome: he fled the city because he was in danger from his fellow-citizens. He had been in power in some way in Carthage ever since his return from Italy in 203, and at any time since the peace treaty Rome could have exerted such pressure on the city that he would have had to leave. Of course, the Senate kept a watch on

¹ Livy 33.45.6–49.7, probably based on Polybios, whose account is lost; also dealt with in varied detail by Nepos, *Hannibal*, 7, App. *Syr.* 4, Justin 31.1.7–2.8, Zon. 9.18.11–12, Valerius Maximus 4.1.6; all books on Hannibal and Carthage deal with the episode, notably O. Meltzer, *Geschichte der Karthager*, vol. 3 (by U. Kahrstedt), Berlin 1913, 584–588, E. Groag, *Hannibal als Politiker*, Vienna 1929, 119–123, B. H. Warmington, *Carthage*, London 1969, 224–225, G. Ch. and C. Picard, *Carthage*, New York 1968, 272–279.

him and his city; it would have been astonishing if it had been otherwise, given the history of relations between the two states. It was a contingency which will have been in Hannibal's mind constantly. So when the Senate was appealed to by his domestic enemies, and a senatorial commission came to investigate, he assumed, not unreasonably, that it was aimed at him. His getaway was so well planned that it is obvious that he was already prepared to leave, and that the commission's arrival was only the trigger for his flight. The *reason* for his leaving, however, was Carthaginian internal politics, not Roman pressure. The senatorial commission stated that its task was to mediate over the question of the boundary between Carthage and Masinissa's kingdom.² Apart from Hannibal's assumption that he was threatened, there is no evidence that this is not the case, though this is the interpretation of these events which Livy has relayed, apparently out of Polybios.

Livy, or Polybios, is also guilty of imposing his own interpretation on the meeting which took place between Hannibal and King Antiochos. From Tyre, Hannibal went by sea to Antioch (presumably by way of Seleukeia-in-Pieria), where he met the younger Antiochos, the newly married eldest son of Antiochos III, joint king with his father, who was presiding at the games of Apollo in the sanctuary of Daphne.³ The speed of this move is not so great as Livy suggests. Hannibal spent 'a brief stay' at Tyre. During that time he will have made enquiries of Antiochos the Younger as to whether he would be welcome at the court. The younger king was obviously able to make that decision, but he at once sent Hannibal on to his father, the senior king, whom he found at Ephesos.⁴ This puts the meeting in the autumn of 195, after Antiochos' second campaign into Thrace, which will have occupied the campaigning season until September, and also after the victory of the Romans and their allies against Nabis. Livy is quite factual in his account as far as the meeting at Ephesos, but then he inserts editorial comment, suggesting that Hannibal's arrival was the decisive event in pushing Antiochos into a decision to go to war with Rome.⁵ For this he produces no evidence, not does he explain why in that case the war did not occur

² Livy 33.47.9.

³ This puts Hannibal's flight definitely in 195; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 1.335.

⁴ Livy 33.49.5-8.

⁵ Livy 33.49.8.

for three more years; indeed, the clear implication of later events is that Hannibal had little or no effect on the king's political thinking, or on his plans.

Nor is it legitimate to use Hannibal's presence in the east as evidence that Rome was suddenly more predisposed to war with Antiochos than before.⁶ If he was an element in the matter it was only a minor one. That fact is that Rome's situation was complex and difficult, and Hannibal's movements, while of interest, showed no serious anti-Roman purpose. He is said, by Livy, to have taken a vow of hatred for Rome as a child, but this vow is clearly an invention, either by Hannibal himself, or by a historian.⁷

Rome's problems were numerous, varied, and very difficult, and they stemmed from the extraordinary constitution she had saddled herself with, from the awkward organisation she had imposed on Italy, and from the aftermath of her victory over Carthage and its allies in the last few years. It is out of these problems, as they were tackled, with or without success, that Rome forged the new empire which controlled the western Mediterranean over the next half century. And it was in contemplating those problems that the Roman Senate eventually reached the conclusion that it was necessary to go to war with Antiochos. The evidence suggests that it was Rome which was the aggressor, using a version of the technique already employed to force Philip V to war. Antiochos, to be sure, was not

⁶ The reaction in Rome to Hannibal's flight and his arrival with Antiochos can hardly be known, since Livy does not say anything about it. The flight took place in the summer, before the Daphne Games, which were in August, and the news of his flight will have reached Rome, perhaps even before Hannibal reached Tyre. His arrival in Antiochos' kingdom will have become known in Rome by August, even if his reception at Ephesos was not known until September. It has been suggested (Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 116) that all this was a factor in the election of Scipio Africanus to a second consulship. This is very likely, but when 'the first hysteria' (Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 126—but there is no evidence for any hysteria) was over, it was clear that nothing had really changed, and there was still a substantial Roman army in Greece, between Hannibal and Italy. Also, since the elections took place in November, any 'hysteria' will have died down well beforehand. Africanus' election was only marginally assisted by Hannibal's movements, if at all.

⁷ Livy 35.19.3–6, supposedly Hannibal's own account of his vow of hatred for Rome, enforced by his father, Hamilkar Barca. There seems little or no reason to accept this as true, or even to accept that Hannibal said it. The whole episode is nonsense, designed to transfer the responsibility for the wars which Rome waged on to her enemies; it is a *Roman* story.

innocent in the matter, though, had it been his decision, it is probable that there would not have been a war between them.

It has to be remembered that all through the 190s the men in office in Rome were those who had fought in the great war against Carthage; even those who had been too young to have fought had grown up in the fraught atmosphere of that war. For fifteen years a Carthaginian army had marched about Italy, and in that time, three Carthaginian invasions of Italy had taken place. The war had also involved invasions by Gauls from the north, and rebellions by the peoples of large parts of Italy; even some of the old Roman colonies—cities inhabited by citizens of Rome—had gone on a tax strike. And, after Carthage was finally beaten, during the 190s there had been wars in Greece, in Cisalpine Gaul, and in Spain, all of which were largely continuations of the Hannibalic war. In 201 a Roman colony in Cisalpine Gaul which had held out all through Hannibal's war fell to the local Gauls; in 195 the consul M. Porcius Cato had to begin his war in Spain at the very northeastern tip of the Roman province. The relations of the Roman Republic and the Seleukid kingdom must not be seen in isolation; they were part of the continuing problem of Rome and its ambitions.

There was, therefore, not surprisingly, a continuing fear in Rome of another attack. The harsh treatment meted out to Italian rebels provided a suitable ground for new rebellions, but these would only break out if some sort of outside support could be provided. One of these rebels had been the great city of Tarentum, Greek Taras, a colony of Sparta; no doubt there was sympathy there for the plight of Nabis and his people, under attack by Roman soldiers, led by the man who had been governor of Tarentum after its recovery from rebel and Carthaginian control.⁸ A slave rising in Etruria⁹ was a symptom of the same social problem which had fuelled Nabis' revolution in Sparta, which had been exported by him with success to Argos, and which had frightened the Achaian League. Rome's solution to this 'social problem' was to support oligarchies and to encourage them to keep the lid on any unrest. As a solution it had little effect other than to ensure the continuation of the problem.

⁸ Livy 29.13.6; Plut., *Flam.*, 1.4; cf. E. Badian, 'The Family and Early Career of T. Quinctius Flaminius', *JRS* 61, 1971, 102–118.

⁹ Livy 33.36.1.

The Roman Republic's government, in other words, was beset by a sea of troubles of whose end there was no sign. Wars in Gaul and Spain, actual and potential rebellions in Italy, social unrest in Italy and Greece: in the 190s, as in the preceding decades, these problems seemed endemic, never ending, and even greater in scale than before. And, after the experience of the Hannibalic war, it took no imagination at all to envisage an alliance of all these enemies and potential rebels with a powerful outside king. After all, Hannibal had invaded Italy with a Spanish army, was there reinforced by Gauls, made an alliance with Philip V, was reinforced and supplied from Africa, and stimulated rebellions in half of Italy. It could clearly happen again.

This may be what has recently been called 'defensive imperialism', the principle of fearing attack and therefore attacking first, and which has been somewhat reduced in credibility recently.¹⁰ The emphasis is now on the notion that Rome was an inherently aggressive society, dominated by an aristocracy which was conditioned to war by its own values.¹¹ Both of these interpretations are acceptable in part, and may well be useful in interpreting the Roman republican period as a whole, but are not much help in studying fairly short periods of historical time, such as the decade under consideration in this book. To describe as 'aggression' the Roman policy towards Antiochos III would be easy, but thoroughly misleading; it is far less definite that that, much more nuanced. The aftermath of the appalling experience of the Hannibalic war is the ideal setting for a defensive aggressiveness, an attitude wholly understandable when faced by the unpleasantly aggressive behaviour of Philip V, and perhaps still more when faced by the sheer power at the command of Antiochos III. But the idea that the Roman aristocrats who ruled the republic in the Senate and conducted its wars were inherently attached to war and aggression does not wholly fit with the subtlety, cunning, and wiliness of such men as Flaminius and Scipio Africanus, though their use of ruthlessness when they felt it was required would support the notion. But then all commanders and politicians, if successful, are ruthless at times.

¹⁰ J. Linderski, 'Si vis pacem, para bellum': Concepts of Defensive Imperialism' in W. V. Harris (ed.), *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome, Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome*, 29, Rome 1984, 133-164.

¹¹ W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, Oxford 1985, 10-40.

Roman nerves in the 190s were thus rubbed raw and the Senate was liable to react to perceived threats, but the arrival of Hannibal at Antiochos' court was only a minor addition to the multifarious Roman concerns.¹² He arrived late in 195, during which year Flamininus had subdued Nabis, and while the oligarchies of Greece were being encouraged to entrench themselves, no doubt relieved at Nabis' reduction. The lack of Roman concern over Hannibal's arrival in the east is shown by the decision of the Senate, made in December, that the evacuation of Roman troops from Greece should go ahead as planned.¹³ The timing is important, for there was clearly plenty of time for the news of Hannibal's flight from Africa and arrival at Ephesos to have reached Rome, and yet it had no effect on the Senate's decision. The fact that Antiochos returned to Syria in the autumn will also have been reported to Rome, and will have further relaxed any anxieties. It is also worth noting that the king's campaign in Thrace had had no effect on Rome's conduct in 195, any more than it had in the year before.

The campaigning season of 194 was used by Antiochos to undertake a third Thracian campaign. Of this no details are known. Indeed, it is not even certain that he did campaign there, though if he did not, we do not know where he was, and it would be the first campaigning season in thirty years when he was not busy somewhere. Even if he did not campaign there, his army remained in Thrace, as it had been for three years, to the number of perhaps twenty thousand soldiers.

At the same time Flamininus was removing the Roman forces from Greece. In the spring he held a meeting of the Greek allies at Akrokorinth, which was followed by the Roman garrison marching out.¹⁴ He evacuated the Euboian garrisons and that at Demetrias,¹⁵ and then marched ostentatiously through Thessaly and Epeiros to embark at Oricum.¹⁶ All this was accompanied by meetings held in various Greek cities, at which Flamininus ensured that the message

¹² Appian's wording suggests that Hannibal was given a public welcome by Antiochos, of notable magnificence (*Syr*, 4).

¹³ Livy 34.43.8; Diod. 28.13; Justin 31.3.2.

¹⁴ Livy 34.48.3–50.8.

¹⁵ Livy 34.41.1–4.

¹⁶ Livy 34.50.10–11. 52.1–2.

was delivered that Rome's interest remained in maintaining the oligarchies.¹⁷ No one in Greece was to be left in any doubt: the Roman military evacuation did not mean that there was also an evacuation of Roman interest in Greece; it was made quite clear that Rome's interests must be paramount in any future decisions.

These events in the summer of 194 meant that, by these actions of Rome, the possibility that a collision should take place between Rome and Antiochos was even further removed. And yet by the autumn a high-powered embassy was organised by Antiochos to go to Rome to discuss mutual problems, and the atmosphere of crisis and imminent war became steadily worse over the next year. The problem is to discover what had happened to provoke this crisis, which had not existed during the summer of 194.

It cannot be the influence of Hannibal, for he had been with Antiochos for a year by the time the rupture became imminent. It cannot be Antiochos' own activities, since in the summer of 194 he was in all likelihood doing exactly the same as he had for the previous two years: he campaigned in Thrace (and if he was not there, he was doing nothing threatening to Rome). He was no more a threat to the Roman position in Greece and the Balkans in 194 than he had been earlier—except that his position in Thrace was now much firmer (he did not need to campaign there in 193).¹⁸ It was not, therefore, anything that Antiochos had done or was doing.

By contrast, Rome's evacuation of Greece amounted to a major geopolitical change: Antiochos was firmly, and apparently durably, established in Thrace; Rome's position in Greece, so recently a military one, now depended on influence, not direct force, on treaties and oligarchs, not armies. And Greece was unstable. There were enemies of the Roman settlement in several areas: Nabis in Sparta had been reduced in strength, but not eliminated; the Aitolians in Central Greece were openly hostile, and had refused absolutely to put themselves in a position where Rome could exercise any control over them; in the north there was Philip V, like Nabis reduced but not crushed. Without the presence of Roman soldiers, the whole scheme which Flamininus had constructed began at once to look

¹⁷ E.g., in Thessaly: Livy 34.51.4–52.1. This is what is also implied by his visits to Corinth, Elateia, Demetrias, Oreus, Chalkis, and Epeiros.

¹⁸ He campaigned in Pisidia, for which there may be particular reasons: see Chapter 7.

very rickety. The presence of a tried and tested, numerous and victorious, Seleukid army in Thrace took on a much more ominous aspect without a counter-balancing Roman army in Greece. Philip and Antiochos had co-operated ten years before to carve up the lands of Ptolemy between them; they could clearly do the same again, with the Roman territories in Greece in their sights; Aitolia and Sparta had often been allies in the past, and Nabis had taken Philip's side in the recent war, and had publicly invoked the name of Antiochos as well. It really took very little imagination to construct an alliance of these four: and they were also the four most militant states in the east.

There is no reason why Antiochos could not see all this as well as any Roman senator. To him the removal of the Roman soldiers meant a power vacuum on his western border, yet at the same time he could recognise in it a facsimile of his own system: a core territory surrounded by dependant lands. There is equally little doubt: Antiochos was not seriously tempted by the vulnerability of Greece. He may have finished with Thrace, at least for the moment, but there were plenty of other problems inside his empire which would keep him busy—next year he attended to the problem of the Pisidians, and there were always parts of Iran which needed attention. So the crisis of autumn 194 was not caused by something Antiochos was doing, nor by the Roman evacuation of Greece, for these had occurred earlier, though the absence of the Roman army from Greece was clearly somewhat destabilising. The crisis in Roman-Seleukid relations, therefore, had its origin elsewhere than Greece or the east.

When he chose his envoys in the autumn of 194 Antiochos was not apprehensive of any crisis, and Livy's account of events shows that they were unprepared for the hostility of their reception. The envoys were part of the continuation of discussions he had been holding with Flaminius over the past two years. Now that Flaminius was no longer in Greece, Antiochos' envoys had to go direct to Rome. By the time they arrived, however, the atmosphere was hostile. The change in relations, the crisis which led to war, thus began in Rome.

It is, perhaps, therefore, as a sign that his work in Thrace was completed that Antiochos sent a new embassy to Rome in the autumn of 194. He chose two men, high officials of his government. Menippos was a Macedonian, possibly a former officer of Philip V, and certainly a man used to army command, as he later showed. He was

prominent in Antiochos' service for several more years. Hegesianax, the former envoy to Flamininus at Corinth in 196, came from Alexandria Troas, a city later at odds with Antiochos. He was an historian, and as such an accomplished orator; a story of him refusing to join in a Macedonian folk-dance with the king at court suggests his independence of mind (and also the easy atmosphere of the court). Both of these men were obviously familiar with the situation in Asia and in Greece, and knew Antiochos' intentions.¹⁹ They appear to have arrived in Rome not long after Flamininus' elaborate, three-day triumph, which took place after his return to Italy with the last of the troops at the end of the summer of 194. However, the formal reception of the envoys by the Senate did not take place until after the elections and the installation of the new magistrates, and until after the new consuls had gone off to their provinces. In this year the consuls took office on November 4.²⁰ The envoys will thus have been in Rome for some time before their audience, and in Italy for even longer.²¹ They will have been able to gauge to some degree the temper of the Romans, the senators in particular, but also the general populace. It is inconceivable also that they will not have had informal discussions on their mission before their audience in the Senate.

Another who will have had discussions on the situation in the east was Flamininus. He had been away from Rome for years, and no matter how well he had succeeded in keeping in touch by letter and messenger, and through visitors, he was inevitably out of touch with the general atmosphere, and many of the details will have been new to him. Above all, it will have been a shock to him to immerse him-

¹⁹ See, for sources, Grainger, *Prosopography*, 105 (Menippos) 91, (Hegesianax). App. Syr. 6 adds Lysias as a third envoy; this is usually regarded as a mistake (Lysias had accompanied Hegesianax to Corinth in 196) and certainly he is not recorded as speaking at Rome. His presence cannot be wholly ruled out, however, particularly as the Roman embassy which went to visit Antiochos next year also consisted of three envoys, and in many ways there seems to have been a deliberate effort on both sides to ensure parity between the two sets.

²⁰ Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 2.26.

²¹ It is not reasonable to expect that the envoys had only just arrived when they were received in the Senate. I assume they were sent by Antiochos after the Thracian campaign, which presumably ended about September. October will have been busy in Rome, with the elections and the provincial allocations; the envoys will have seen the Senate in formal session in mid-November, therefore, and may well have been in Rome for at least a month by then.

self once more in the senatorial system, with its banter and direct criticism, after years of acting the proconsul in Greece. He had been dealing on terms of equality with kings. Philip had been king since Flamininus was born, Nabis since he had held public office; above all, he had corresponded with the Great King of the East, and had established a working relationship with him, a relationship based to a degree on mutual trust and on the regular exchange of information on each other's intentions. He had become dangerously detached from Roman opinion, and particularly from the general atmosphere of paranoia. His return to Rome, that is, forced him to an abrupt adjustment. He could no longer act as an intermediary between Rome and the Seleukid king, interpreting each to the other. Now he must, if he was to survive in the febrile atmosphere of Roman politics, re-adopt Roman attitudes and drop the superior attitude he had necessarily adopted in dealing with the Greeks.

Both Flamininus and the Seleukid envoys will therefore have had to go through something of a learning process in the last months of 194. The envoys will have found that, as is to be expected in an oligarchy, the Senate was divided into factions. Modern historians have detected three main groups; a Scipionic set led by Africanus, a group referred to as 'Fulvian', and a third group led by Flamininus. In addition, there was a large number of uncommitted senators, but who were usually content to follow the lead of the main protagonists.²² The envoys will have discovered—if they did not already know—that the rivalry between Africanus and Flamininus in part revolved around the question of leaving or removing the Roman garrisons in Greece, and that Flamininus had won that argument when the Senate agreed to withdraw them. But Africanus had won a second consulship in the very year in which the envoys reached Rome and the very year of the withdrawal of the soldiers; in part his electoral victory was his due, the requisite ten-year interval having elapsed since his first consulship, but in part also it was a reaction

²² The standard accounts are Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 97–127 for this period; U. Schlag, *Regnum in Senatu*, Stuttgart, 1958, 115–129; J. Briscoe, 'Flamininus and Roman Politics, 200–189 B.C.', *Latomus*, 1972, 22–53; E. Badian, *Flamininus, Philhellene and Realpolitik*, Cincinnati, 1970. For a study of the aristocracy as a whole, on a statistical basis which reveals the large number of senators not accounted for by the usual research methods, K. Hopkins and G. Burton, 'Political Succession in the late Republic (249–50 B.C.)', in K. Hopkins, *Death and Renewal, Sociological Studies in Roman History* 2, Cambridge 1983, 31–119.

against Flamininus and his policies. Africanus was of the opinion that Antiochos was a danger to Rome.²³

Just how much of Roman political practice, factions and rivalries was understood in Greece and the Hellenistic kingdoms is not known.²⁴ It would undoubtedly take some time for them to become familiar with all the nuances. Philip, the Aitolians, the Athenians, the Attalids, the Rhodians, had probably made it their business to understand the system: they had been in contact with it for a full generation now and may be assumed to have developed a fair understanding of how it worked. But Antiochos' contacts were very recent: he had first met Roman magistrates as recently as the year 200, only six years before, and since then most of his contacts had been with Flamininus, not with the Senate as a whole and directly. The visit of the envoys in late 194 was only the second substantial embassy from the king to the city of Rome. He and they will, of course, have been more or less familiar with the type of government the Senate represented—an oligarchy—for this was the common system in the Greek and Asian cities, but nothing in Antiochos' court will have prepared them for the intensity of politics in republican Rome, which resulted from the sheer power involved. For a time the envoys were surely floundering. However, they were intelligent men, and will have found their feet quickly enough, though it would take more than a visit of some months to appreciate the finer details.

For Flamininus, the two other senatorial factions were serious rivals, liable to ally against him. To maintain his power and influence, he would need to join with one of them. This would probably bring the uncommitted to his support. He was reminded also that Rome saw other problems besides Greece as pressing: Cisalpina and Spain, for two; perhaps they seemed a good deal more pressing than before now that the troops, and Flamininus himself, were home from Greece. And at the same time, the removal of the soldiers made the conduct of control by diplomacy and persuasion all the more necessary. This, of course, is what Flamininus had tried to do even when he had an army under his hand, but even then it had not been easy.

²³ Livy 34.42.3; Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 115–118, and id., *Scipio Africanus*, 191–194.

²⁴ For a review of recent thinking on the subject, which can stand as a useful outsider's view, cf. F. G. B. Millar, 'The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic', *JRS* 74, 1984, 1–19, which reveals the intricacy and complexity of the system as it had developed by this time.

Now it was something the whole Senate as a body must learn to do. And for the present the senators did not know how to. It is not surprising that there were problems, and a reaction against the evacuation policy is only to be expected. To men habituated to military solutions to political problems, the new system was daunting.

What had changed, in other words, was two things: the new appreciation in Rome was that the new Greek clients were vulnerable, and, now that the Roman army was removed it was more obvious than ever, that the strongest and most vigorous of the Greek states disliked the settlement Flamininus had constructed; and second, the re-adoption by Flamininus on his return to Rome, of the general attitude of the Roman senators to the problems of the east. The arrival of Antiochos' envoys, in the midst of these realisations and adjustments, unexpectedly provided a focus. It seems that there was some question that the Senate might refuse to ratify Flamininus' arrangements in Greece. At least Livy implies as much, when he says that Flamininus introduced the various envoys from Greece as a preliminary to the vote on ratification.²⁵ The problem with this is that Livy then moves on to the discussions with Hegesianax and Menippos, and forgets how he introduced the topic. There is no clear statement in his account that Flamininus' *acta* were ratified. This, of course, may simply be Livy's artistry getting in the way of his research, in that when he organised his material and provided the necessary linking passages he had found no need to mention the ratification, but it may also be a genuine record of how Flamininus operated: it has a distinct similarity to the theatricality of the meeting at the Isthmia, and of his announcement there of a freed Greece. If it was a deliberately stage-managed ploy to enhance his prestige, it probably failed: it was not the sort of thing the Senate would like.

Flamininus had undoubtedly built up a pool of resentment by his arrogance in the east, which, with all his achievements, will have also become evident at Rome. Yet he was still the expert on the problems of the east, and had been Antiochos' principal diplomatic contact so far. The consul Scipio Africanus agitated for Macedonia as his consular province at the distribution in late 195, claiming that Antiochos was a threat.²⁶ The real reason was a perceived challenge

²⁵ Livy 34.57.1–2.

²⁶ Livy 34.43.4–5; Plut. *Cato Maior* 11, and Nepos, *Cato*, 2, say he asked for Spain; in this, Livy is to be preferred.

to his prestige from Flamininus, and the fact that the Senate denied him Macedonia as his province cannot have mollified him. In doing so, of course, the Senate stated plainly that no threat from Antiochos was perceived in late 195. Yet Antiochos' power was all too obvious now that no other competing great power remained. Africanus was in fact only voicing what must have been in many senators' minds.

During 194, while Flamininus was collecting up his troops and stamping his and Rome's oligarchic preconceptions on the Greek states, the Senate voted to found a series of colonies along the southern Italian coasts.²⁷ These were small places, in most cases having only three hundred Roman citizens as their nucleus, but since the colonists were to be Roman and the places were on the coast it has been supposed that the unstated reason for their foundation at this time was as a coastal defence against the perceived threat of a landing by Antiochos' troops.²⁸ Yet in geopolitical terms this makes little sense. If Antiochos was going to land in Italy, he would do so as close to Greece as possible, that is, in the heel of Italy, or the 'instep'. The obvious first target would be either Tarentum, recently rebellious, recently reconquered, and, with only a relatively small Roman garrison, offering a possible quick victory, or Brundisium, a Latin colony and the major Roman military port for the east. Yet the new colonies are well distant from this vulnerable area. Five of the eight were planted along the west coast, from the Bay of Naples south to Buxentum. Two were in the toe of Italy: Tempa was on the west coast, Croton on the south. The eighth was at Sipontum, under the spur on the east coast, well to the north of Brundisium. The geographical distribution of these new colonies shows that they have no relevance to any possible attack from the east; whatever the reason for their foundation, relations with Antiochos are not it.

When Hegesianax and Menippos were introduced to the Senate by the praetor C. Scribonius, along with all the other envoys from Greece,²⁹ therefore, they were already aware that their task had become difficult. Their instructions from the king were to build on

²⁷ Livy 34.45.2-5.

²⁸ E.g., Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 193; E. T. Salmon, *Roman Colonisation*, London 1969, chapter 6. The fact that several of these colonies could not recruit even 300 Romans is another indication of the lack of seriousness with which they were founded—and could 300 men be a serious obstacle to a landing by a Seleukid army?

²⁹ Livy 34.57.3.

his status as a friend of Rome and develop an alliance,³⁰ which is exactly the same policy as he was pursuing the year before with Flaminius. To Antiochos, therefore, this embassy was a continuation of this previous efforts, and a response to Flaminius' message the year before that he must address the Senate on the subject of an alliance.³¹ Antiochos' purpose in this was presumably defensive. With Rome as an ally, and Thrace under his control, he would not need to concern himself with Greece. He would then be able to turn elsewhere. It must have seemed to him a sensible move for both parties, for it would provide a reassurance to the Romans that he had no further interest in Greek affairs, and that therefore their position there was safe. The alliance would be a mutual guarantee of each other's positions.

Since the embassy failed it is evident that Antiochos misjudged the situation at Rome. This is not his fault, since his knowledge of that situation was largely refracted through his earlier contacts with Flaminius. The result was that Hegesianax and Menippos, bound by their instructions, were somewhat adrift. Their one port of entry into the world of Roman politics, Flaminius, turned out to be quite unreliable. To safeguard his own position in Rome, Flaminius had to adopt the more stringent attitudes of his critics; and the easiest of these to adopt was one of hostility towards the Great King of the East. This would spike his domestic opponents' guns, and allow his own acts to be ratified.

After being introduced to the Senate, Hegesianax and Menippos were then given an audience in advance of all other envoys, correctly, since they were the representatives of the Great King. They were then referred to a senatorial committee of Flaminius and the ten commissioners who had gone to Greece to implement the peace treaty, and that committee was given full powers to negotiate an agreement.³² This must have seemed to the envoys all reasonable enough. It is difficult to say just how much the envoys understood Flaminius' change of heart, but they must have known something of it. The Senate as a whole surely realised that he had become

³⁰ Livy 34.57.6; this is universally ignored by those who discuss the meeting, preoccupied as they usually are by the interplay of Roman politics, but it is of the essence.

³¹ Livy 34.25.3-4.

³² Livy 34.57.4-6.

hostile to the king, or he would not have been allowed to take the lead in the negotiations. Yet he was not wholly trusted, and was hedged about by the ten commissioners, some of whom were his seniors in both rank and experience, and some of whom were inimical to him and his general policy.

Once again, we have to consider the account which Livy provides. It consists of a combination of reported discussion and of actual speeches by Flaminius. It is a good deal more dramatic in composition than usual, and has been described in terms which imply unusual accuracy by Polybios.³³ But the account is not by Polybios, but Livy, and the speeches in particular are suspect as usual. It is, and it must be seen as, a deliberate literary composition, rather than as a well-researched piece of history, one which is designed to paint the Roman case in as good a light as possible and to put Antiochos' case in a bad light. Above all, it will be necessary to consider what happened as a result of the conference so as to throw light on what was decided.

Menippos is said to have taken the lead in the discussion, though this may merely be Livy's (or Polybios') shorthand. Livy summarised Menippos' position by having him describe three types of treaty: by a victor on a defeated enemy, by equals after a drawn war, and between friends who have been always at peace. In the speech Antiochos is described as a friend of Rome, and the request is that he be made an equal ally, no terms and conditions being imposed.³⁴ This, since it takes up the request made earlier by Antiochos³⁵ is probably accurate, though the legalistic definitions may be Livian elaborations.³⁶ Flaminius is then made to reply that Rome indeed insisted on clear terms: a separation between Roman Europe and Seleukid Asia.³⁷ This, be it noted, is the first time he can have made such a distinction. Hegesianax' reply was to protest that Antiochos was entitled to Thrace both by inheritance and by his recent con-

³³ Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 126; he refers to Polybios as if he were the author; this, of course, may well be true, but the words on the page are actually Livy's. Brief accounts by Appian (*Syr*, 6) and Diodoros (38.15) do not add to Livy's more expansive account; Polybios is the basis of Livy and Diodoros; cf. J. Briscoe, 'Flaminius and Roman Politics, 200-189 B.C.', *Latomus* 21, 1972, 22-53 at 34-36.

³⁴ Livy 34.57.6-10.

³⁵ Livy 34.25.3.

³⁶ Cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.138, for discussion and references.

³⁷ Livy 34.58.1-3.

quest and present occupation, while Rome had no claim to any of the cities of Asia, and he repeated the king's desire for friendship.³⁸ This combination of claims—exactly those which had emerged from the conference at Lysimacheia and had been left unsettled—was dangerous, since it by implication denied Rome's position in Greece, which was sanctioned neither by inheritance nor by occupation. No doubt it was not so intended, and was, in fact, the same argument the king had been putting forward for thirty years in his claims for various bits of land. It may, however, have been the trigger for the next stage, for, to make his first statement valid, Flamininus had to shift his ground. Therefore, his answer was to emphasise the Roman policy of the liberation of the Greeks, and to state that this also should apply to the Greek cities of Asia, which was an extension of the original policy and he specifically mentioned the cities of 'Aiolis and Ionia': at the same time he pointed out that Seleukid rule in all the areas under dispute had been intermittent.³⁹

This, despite the instinctive suspicion with which one must look at this account, may fairly well summarise the course of the negotiations. One would imagine the whole process took rather longer than Livy suggests, perhaps several days and several meetings rather than the apparent hour or so he appears to imply. Progress towards an agreement can only be described as minimal. Neither side had seriously moved from its initial position. And yet the impartial observer can see the outline of a possible deal: Thrace for the Asian cities. This could be interpreted in two ways: either, if Antiochos wished to remain in control in Thrace he should admit Roman authority in certain Greek cities in 'Aiolis and Ionia', which would include the defiant cities of Smyrna and Lampsakos; or Rome would abandon the Asian cities in exchange for Antiochos' evacuation of Thrace.

Neither solution would be easy for either party to accept. Antiochos had spent three years beating down resistance in Thrace, a longer period than he had spent dealing with any comparable area except Egypt and Asia Minor. To expect him to give up such a conquest was scarcely reasonable. Hegesianax is made to emphasise Antiochos' work at Lysimacheia—rescuing the city and its people, rebuilding

³⁸ Livy 34.58.4–7.

³⁹ Livy 34.58.8–13; modern accounts include Badian 'Rome and Antiochos', 126, Will, *Hist. Pol.* 2.166–167, Errington, *CAH* (2), 278–279, Bevan, *House*, 2.57–59, Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 626–629.

the place, and all at considerable expense—so much so that it looks very much as though this city, and therefore the Chersonese and control of the Straits as well, was not negotiable under any circumstances. Yet if the price of holding on to Thrace was to have Rome established along the Asian coast, this in turn might be too high for Antiochos to accept. For Rome's claim was based not on conquest and physical possession, but on the ideology of liberation. Thus, if Rome could establish itself in Smyrna, Lampsakos, Alexandria Troas, and perhaps other cities in the name of the freedom of the Greeks, this may well have a powerful effect on the neighbouring cities. Further down the coast was Rhodes, another Greek city which made a virtue of flaunting its independence, and which had spread its influence all over the Aegean and into the Propontis and the Black Sea. It would not be difficult to portray the cities which were under Antiochos' influence and control as his subjects rather than his allies, and the prospect of liberty is infinitely intoxicating to those who conceive that they do not have it. The idea of liberty radiating from these liberated cities into the surrounding Greek *poleis* would be continually unsettling; it might almost be worth giving up Thrace to have such a nuisance deflected.

On the other hand, Hegesianax and Menippos could see that the temper of the Senate was such that it was unlikely to agree to any surrender, and the fact that the Asian cities had appealed for protection to the Senate was a potent device. It appealed both to the Flamininans and their philhellenism and their propaganda of liberation, and to the senators who did not like the evacuation of Greece. Memories of another city, the Spanish Saguntum, which had appealed to Rome against oppression by Hannibal, and had gone down to destruction, perhaps also stirred. Scipio Africanus' warnings of the threat from the east were recent.

So if Antiochos gave up Thrace in exchange for the Asian cities he could still find that the propaganda of city-liberation was unsettling his lands, for Rome would still dominate Greece, just across the Aegean. Indeed, it might turn out that the presence of the Seleukid empire along the Asian coast could be a potent means of keeping the Greeks in Rome's camp. A steady diet of scare stories of the straits into which the Asian cities had fallen could tranquillise Greek restlessness, and leave such proud cities as Athens and Thebes, even Sparta, much more amenable to Roman domination, 'for fear of something worse'. And then there was the problem of

Eumenes. A Roman presence in Smyrna and Alexandria Thoa, old Attalid friends, plus an alliance between Rome and Eumenes, would bring enemy military power deep into Asia Minor. Even if the Senate ratified such an exchange, it was still a standing invitation to the Senate to interfere in Antiochos' lands.

So the apparent bargains which seemed to underline the negotiations in Rome were not bargains at all, they were really suggestions for Antiochos to withdraw from Thrace without any compensating gain. Menippos and Hegesianax obviously saw this quite clearly. They were also informed, equally clearly, that whatever their mission was, for the Roman negotiators there was no question of an alliance of equals. Having discussed the issues with Flamininus, the two envoys, as Livy puts it, 'hesitated'.⁴⁰ Into this pause there entered P. Sulpicius Galba. His intervention has all the appearance of a genuine event, whereas Livy's account of the previous discussions looks more like a formalisation of a much more untidy and long-drawn-out process. And yet Galba is portrayed as acting as an old-fashioned blunt Roman, which is hardly in character, for this was a man who had coped with all the difficulties of Greek diplomacy and touchiness for several years during the First Roman War with Macedon, and again almost continuously since 200, first as consul, then as legate, and finally as peace commissioner. If he really spoke and acted in the way Livy describes he did so quite deliberately, in order to make a point. He broke into the discussion with a blunt and brutal demand that the envoys choose between Flamininus' options.⁴¹ It was, of course, as all the Romans must have known, no choice at all. It was, quite certainly, a rejection of what Menippos in his opening speech (as composed by Livy) had requested, an alliance of equals. It was even, if not in so many words, a rejection of Antiochos' status as a Roman friend.

It was Menippos who is said to have replied to Galba's rude demand by stating just as bluntly what was equally obvious to all present: that the envoys had no powers to negotiate away any of

⁴⁰ Livy 34.59.1; whether this was a real 'hesitation', or merely Livy's (or perhaps Polybios') dramatisation, is not known, but 'hesitation' in a diplomatic negotiation might mean anything. Livy's version of Flamininus' previous speech would cause anyone on the receiving end to 'hesitate', since it appeared distinctly threatening. It was, of course, a bluff, since, whatever else he could do, Flamininus could not commit Rome to war, which is how his words sounded.

⁴¹ Livy 34.59.1-2.

Antiochos' lands.⁴² It was a good put-down, and a reminder that they had come to Rome in friendship, not as suppliants or as defeated enemies.⁴³ It also marked the end of any possible negotiations, for the moment.

'The next day', as Livy puts it, Flamininus reported back to the Senate, having taken care that all the Greek envoys currently in the city were also present to hear the verdict. Livy's version of his report ignored what the king's envoys had wanted—an alliance—and merely summarised the rival 'demands', in this way emphasising the disagreements and ignoring the potential that existed for an agreement. He carefully placed the area of conflict in the ideological area of the 'liberation' of the cities. He invoked the war against Macedon, and so claimed to equate Philip with Antiochos.⁴⁴

If this is a correct summary, it suggests that Flamininus had carried his fellow committee members with him; since they were either his friends or members of factions whose preferred policy was more militaristic, this is not surprising. Yet it was a travesty of what had taken place, and cannot be accurate. If he had really said this, it would have provoked an immediate protest by Menippos and Hegesianax. Yet Livy shows no sign of any protest.

More likely it was a report of Flamininus' subsequent recommendations, made when the envoys were not present. Flamininus cannot possibly have failed to report what Antiochos' envoys had really come to Rome for and what they had clearly stated more than once what they wanted: an alliance. Livy does claim that Menippos 'begged' that time be taken to consider and to allow them to return to report to the king.⁴⁵ Clearly 'begged' is Livy's interpretation, and Menippos' reply to Flamininus' comments has been edited out: for if there was ever an occasion for a speech in reply it was now, and it must be presumed that Menippos took it. Yet he only 'begs' for time.

The implication of the account of Menippos' reply is that he feared an immediate declaration of war.⁴⁶ But an immediate break with

⁴² Livy 34.59.2.

⁴³ App. *Syr.* 6, puts it in a nutshell: 'Yours are not the exhortations of friends, but resemble orders given by victors to the vanquished'.

⁴⁴ Livy 34.59.4–5.

⁴⁵ Livy 34.59.6–7.

⁴⁶ Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.141; Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 126–127: 'it was clear that peace now hung by a thread', a formulation needlessly dramatic, and disproved by the negotiations of the next years.

Antiochos was not justified, and Flamininus and the Senate had no intention of going so far. No preparations had been made for war, and Flamininus had only been mandated to negotiate. It follows that, whatever interpretation Livy chose to put on these negotiations, the prospect of war was never present, nor was there any intention to go to war. It is not believable that the Senate would delegate such power to a committee. Nor is it realistic to believe that the Seleukid envoys actually apprehended a declaration of war. Yet this was the second time negotiations between Rome and Antiochos had failed over the same issues, and the possibility of war now clearly existed.

Menippos said he would report back to the king.⁴⁷ The Senate in turn appointed three of its own members as envoys to the king.⁴⁸ This was the correct diplomatic procedure: the visit of the king's envoys to Rome was succeeded by a visit of Roman envoys to the king. The diplomatic niceties were being observed. By the king's envoys were in no doubt that the diplomatic situation was now very different. This was signified by the composition of the embassy sent to the king. The leader was P. Sulpicius Galba Maximus, the blunt intervener, twice consul, proconsul in Greece from 210 to 206 and commander there in 200, legate and commissioner in Greece, a man of power and authority, and probably the senior living consular. He was accompanied by P. Villius Tappulus, the only member of the embassy to have met Antiochos, which he had done several times, a man of flexibility and considerable experience in Greece, where he had also been commanding consul and proconsul, legate and commissioner. He is said, by Livy, to have warned Flamininus that Antiochos' operations in Thrace were a danger to the Romans in Greece;⁴⁹ if this is a correct report (and Flamininus had ignored it at the time), it puts Villius on Galba's wavelength, and suggests that Roman nervousness at Antiochos' activities was deeper than Flamininus had thought at the time. The third envoy is said to have been P. Aelius Paetus, consul in 201 and censor in 199, a man who had had a meteoric rise, holding one office or another every year from 204.⁵⁰ However, he is never mentioned again as participating in the

⁴⁷ Livy 34.59.6–7.

⁴⁸ Livy 34.59.8.

⁴⁹ Livy 34.57.12.

⁵⁰ Aedile in 204 (with Villius), praetor in 203, *magister equitum* in 202, consul in 201, censor in 199, legate in 196–195 and again in 193–192; cf. Broughton, *MRR* 1.307, 311, 316, 319, 327, 337 and 348, and 3.2.

embassy, and it is a puzzle where he got to.⁵¹ All these men had been commissioners in Greece in 196–195, all three were very able men, and all had a superabundance of experience of both Roman and Greek affairs. They were also men of independent judgment. The Senate was no longer taking Flamininus' word for eastern affairs.

These men had, as was to be expected in the Roman oligarchy, plenty of connections through the senatorial political groups. Aelius had been identified with the 'Servilian' group:⁵² he had been *magister equitum* in the brief dictatorship of C. Servilius Geminus in 201. On the other hand, he had shared his censorship in 199 with Scipio Africanus, while his brother Sextus was consul in 198 with Flamininus, and censor in 194 with C. Cornelius Cethegus, all of which rather implies an alliance with both groups when necessary. Galba's seniority made him a party by himself. Villius and Aelius had shared their consulships with the brothers Cn. and L. Cornelius Lentulus, both of whom had been members of the 196 commission in Greece, and were members of another influential clan. These connections were by no means tight or inflexible, rather they meant that the three envoys were widely acceptable to numerous senators as likely to represent the Senate's views to the king accurately—perhaps more accurately than Flamininus might have done. The choice of these men as envoys was a good sign that war was not regarded as inevitable by the Senate as a whole.

⁵¹ It is very odd that Antiochos' embassy has two men in Livy, but three in Appian, while the Roman embassy begins with three men, but is functionally reduced to two by the time it reaches the east. One might suspect some sort of manipulation going on.

⁵² Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 80–81.

CHAPTER SEVEN

NEGOTIATIONS IN ASIA

Hegesianax and Menippos had at least one other task when in Rome: Menippos was charged by the city of Teos with a request for recognition as *asylos* by the Senate, and he succeeded in obtaining from M. Valerius Messala, the peregrine praetor for 193, a document recognising this.¹ The cross-currents in this are interesting: Antiochos' envoy was acting as agent for a city in the king's sphere, and Rome was granting its request; as a result the city's autonomy was enhanced. It seems that Antiochos had no objection to a procedure which, on the face of it, intruded some Roman influence into a city he would have regarded as his own. But then Antiochos had already himself guaranteed Teos' freedom;² the *asylia* agreement was thus only icing on the cake.

There may have been other tasks for the envoys, but there was nothing which need delay their return to Asia, and it may be assumed that they went at once, as soon as their meeting with the Senate was concluded. It was by now late November and the sailing season was theoretically over, but the exact end was always variable, and even in winter it was always possible to cross the seas in emergencies. By any definition, for Antiochos the news of the treatment of his envoys by the Senate should have constituted, if not an emergency, then at the least a matter of great urgency. It must therefore be assumed that the envoys reached Asia at the latest by January, from where they would need to travel on to Syria to see the king. They also brought news that the Roman envoys were to follow. The Romans did not travel during the winter, for they did not reach Asia until well into the spring,³ so Antiochos would know he had some months to prepare.

¹ Ditt. *Syll.* (3) 601 (= Austin 157).

² P. Herrmann, 'Antiochos der Grosse und Teos', *Anadolu* 9, 1965 (= Austin 151).

³ Livy 35.13.6; they arrived after Antiochos had begun his campaign in Pisidia, which will not have been earlier than March.

He had spent the winter, as usual, in Syria. The major event was the final sealing of the peace with Ptolemy by the marriage of Antiochos' daughter Kleopatra to the young Ptolemy V.⁴ The groom was only sixteen, his bride perhaps a few years older, and the marriage had thus been delayed until he reached the end of childhood. The marriage appears to have been successful in personal terms, and in political terms it sealed the peace by making Ptolemy Antiochos' son-in-law. This was not wholly an alliance, and Kleopatra seems to have identified herself with Egypt more than with her father's lands, but the Ptolemaic kingdom was in no condition to resume a full-scale war with Antiochos; and the family connection does seem to have limited the scope for quarrels. It may be significant that the ceremony took place at Raphia. This was, no doubt, more or less the border of the two kingdoms, but it was also the scene of the great battle in 217 when Ptolemy's father had beaten Antiochos. It could be seen as a symbol of the replacement of enmity by unity. On the other hand, since Ptolemy, as the bridegroom, will have had the choosing of the site, maybe it was designed as a reminder of the Ptolemaic victory. Symbols, like swords, may cut both ways. The recovery of their lost lands was as much an aim by the Ptolemaic government as their gain had been for the Seleukids, and a close watch was kept on events in the Aegean over the next years. Meanwhile the Egyptian revolt in the south had been contained, even if it cannot yet be said to be drawing to an end: it was to take several more years to extinguish it entirely.

The marriage, however, could go some way to reassure Antiochos that his southern flank was more or less secure for the immediate future. It had been arranged, and presumably the precise date had been set, some time earlier, and it cannot be directly connected with the developing events at Rome. Nevertheless it fitted in well, and Antiochos' other measures taken during this winter strongly imply that he had fully appreciated the report of his envoys, and that he was preparing the ground for the next stage. Livy makes a point of noting that Antiochos travelled from Syria to Asia before the end of the winter.⁵ From Ephesos he sent his eldest son, king Antiochos the Younger, back to Syria.⁶ This appears to have been the normal

⁴ Livy 35.13.4; App. *Syr.* 5.

⁵ Livy 35.13.5.

⁶ *Ibid.*

arrangement: one of the kings was usually at the capital, Antioch, or at least in the Syrian area, from where a general oversight of the whole of the kingdom could be kept up—as had been the situation, of course, when Hannibal arrived.

Antiochos' second son, Seleukos, was presumably employed as his viceroy in Thrace, where Antiochos had already claimed that Lysimacheia had been restored for him to use as his capital.⁷ Another daughter, the Laodike who was married to his eldest son, was appointed as chief priestess for her mother's cult in Media and the east, according to a decree dated to March of 193.⁸ This was presumably arranged in the winter before the king set out for Ephesos. The use being made of the children of the king, as marriage partners, as sub-kings and joint-kings, and as chiefs of royal cults, is a sign of the trust Antiochos placed in his family; and it was going some way to converting the monarchy into a type of collective kingship, an unusual practice in a time when giving power to anyone other than the king tended to lead him into rebellion.⁹ It is perhaps a sign that the Seleukid kingdom was too big for one man to manage, and perhaps also of the deepening of the royal administration.

At Ephesos Antiochos will have met Hannibal, who appears to have been living there privately.¹⁰ Livy claims that Hannibal had, in their original meeting, persuaded the king to prepare for war with Rome,¹¹ but this is not generally accepted, since Antiochos did not actually make any preparations. On the other hand, it was after this that Hannibal sent an envoy of his own, Ariston of Tyre, to Carthage, with the intention of stirring up the city. This is recounted by Livy as though it was a joint scheme of Hannibal and Antiochos, and directed against Rome.¹² In fact, he provides no evidence other than

⁷ Pol 18.51.8; App. *Syr.* 26; Livy 33.40.6.

⁸ L. Robert, 'Inscriptions Séléucides de Phrygie et d'Iran', *Hellenica* 7, 1949, 5–22 (= Austin 158). Robert suggested a dynastic crisis at this time, but it is difficult to see it. On the other hand, Antiochos married again next year, and monogamy was normal Seleukid practice; it would seem therefore that Laodike died in 193 or 192.

⁹ Examples are numerous; in Antiochos' own experience there were Molon and Akhaios; he had fought against Euthydemos of Baktria, who had gained his kingship by rebellion; the Egyptian native kingdom had begun when military training had allowed Egyptians to meet Greeks on equal terms; and, of course, Nabis.

¹⁰ So it would appear from Hannibal's original meeting with Antiochos the previous year at Ephesos, and the fact that he was still there in 193 (Livy 33.49.7 and 35.14.2).

¹¹ Livy 34.60.1–6; this is a rumour at Rome, not a believable plan.

¹² Livy 34.61.1–2; App. *Syr.* 8.

that Hannibal was intriguing to return to his home city. There is no need to assume any involvement in this by Antiochos, any more than we need to accept that Hannibal had persuaded him to war. Antiochos would, no doubt, have been pleased if Hannibal had been able to return to power in Carthage, if for no other reason than it would have a useful distracting effect on Rome, but if he could be seen to have actually promoted such a development, which would clearly be an interference in Rome's sphere, it would be a direct contradiction of the policy he had attempted to pursue in all his negotiations with Rome.¹³

The intrigues of Ariston may thus be taken to be a private venture of Hannibal's, probably without the knowledge or consent of Antiochos. Ariston is said to have invoked Antiochos' name in his discussions in Carthage, but that is not evidence that Antiochos was actually involved. Nabis had done the same.¹⁴ Ariston came up against much resistance in his attempts to create a political space at Carthage which Hannibal could fill. His presence and his mission therefore became known as a result, and he was challenged to explain himself before the city's senate, and to account for his contacts with the supporters of Hannibal. He could not do either, but confessed his guilt by his actions. Having been detected, he fled.¹⁵

These journeys and intrigues took time, and the precise dating is not clear. Livy places them all in 193, after Antiochos had returned to Asia, but he could be, as elsewhere, summarising events over a longer period. Hannibal had arrived in the east in 195. He clearly wished to go back to Carthage eventually, and equally clearly he hoped for support in this from Antiochos. He did not get it, but it

¹³ Hannibal is credited with a plan to invade Italy with 10,000 men (App. *Syr.* 7), or 100 ships, 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry (Justin 31.3.8), which is so ridiculous that it could not possibly be a serious idea—or Hannibal had lost touch with reality. In actuality this 'plan' is no doubt a Roman concoction. The numbers are just the sort of thing which would be invented to impress an audience ignorant of military reality.

¹⁴ The use of Antiochos' name by such men is a sign that it was well recognised in the Mediterranean world that the only possible rival to Rome was Antiochos; it was also a sign that the general perception was that this rivalry was liable to develop into warfare. For many such people, particularly in the Roman sphere, such a war would be seen as an opportunity.

¹⁵ Livy 34.61.4–16; the very suggestion of Hannibal's return had also provoked Masinissa, Carthage's greedy neighbour, into seizing some Carthaginian land (34.62.2–3); here was the other side of the Roman system, for many of her clients were only too eager to act as watchdogs on Rome's behalf.

will have taken him some time to realise this, which probably accounts for most of 194. Spring 193 seems therefore the best time for Ariston's despatch from Ephesos to his intrigues in Carthage. His failure will have been known by the summer.

However, it was still Antiochos the Great who took the major decisions, which is the significance of his early move in 193 from Syria to Asia. It is perhaps also significant that he then campaigned into Pisidia. For the past three summers Thrace had been his area of action. It always had been a land very difficult to conquer, and even more difficult for a conqueror to hold. Darius the Great, Philip II, Lysimachos, the Kelts, had all overrun it, and in each case after a fairly short time the Thracians had recovered their independence. Three years of campaigning by Antiochos would not necessarily have fastened his rule on the land with any degree of certainty of permanence. In the event his rule was so brief that no archaeological trace has yet been found though an inscription recording his alliance with Perinthos has recently been discovered.¹⁶

The Pisidians were equally, or even more, difficult for a conqueror. Every ruler of Asia campaigned against them, and none, until Rome, controlled them more than briefly. Antiochos, on the other hand, had ruled in Asia for nearly twenty years, and had ignored them. They were clearly not a priority, nor indeed much of a problem. The Seleukid state had ringed them round with a series of fortified cities—Seleukeia-Sidera, Apamea-Kelainai, Laodikeia-Katakekaumene and others—which seem to have been successful in containing their attacks towards the north. This had been helped by the practice of the Ptolemies in recruiting Pisidians into their army, through their control of the Pamphylian cities.¹⁷ Since 197, however, when Antiochos occupied and controlled Pamphylia, the Ptolemies had been unable to do this, and all the cities, north and south of the Pisidians, had been Antiochos' responsibility. It may be that a campaign was now necessary to remind the Pisidians that the change of ruler did not provide them with a licence to raid. To a degree, this idea—for which I must say there is no direct evidence—gains some support

¹⁶ I have no doubt that archaeological traces could be found if looked for. The inscription is published by Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, doc. 35.

¹⁷ M. Launey, *Recherches sur les Armées Hellénistiques*, 2nd ed., Paris 1987, 471–476; Antiochos also recruited Pisidians, and had a contingent in his army at Magnesia (Livy 37.40.14).

from Livy's remark that it was the Pisidians in the area of the city of Side who were the objects of Antiochos' attention.¹⁸ He was therefore based in Pamphylia, a location which would also allow him to reinforce his authority over the old cities of that area.¹⁹

Successful political leaders are frequently economical with their actions, whereby one act on their part will perform more than one function. So a campaign in Pisidia would be a useful reminder to the Pisidians of the king's power; but a campaign in *southern* Pisidia would do that *and* it would permit Antiochos to fasten his control the more firmly on Pamphylia, an area which had been Ptolemaic for a very long time. It may also be that he had yet another purpose. By *not* campaigning in Thrace, Antiochos would relax the pressure which was perceived at Rome. His envoys will have reported to him in the winter that the disagreement with Rome was centring on the question of the boundary between their respective spheres of control and influence. A new campaign into Thrace in 193 would be seen, by the Romans who were thinking seriously of war, as a provocation—whether it was so intended or not. A campaign in Pisidia, on the other hand, was one which was designed at least in part to protect a group of Greek cities. This was precisely the professed policy of Rome, as demonstrated in the grant of *asylia* to Teos, for example. Antiochos was showing that neither Rome nor the Asian cities had anything to fear from him.

In the same period—the winter of 194/193—the Roman settlement of Greece came under test. The last Roman soldiers had left in late summer/early autumn of 194, and the three powers which were notably dissatisfied with the settlement had to decide if they were going to attempt to disrupt the new order. The Macedonian king was constrained by the fact that his son Demetrios was a hostage in Italy, and he was encouraged during the winter by a hint that Demetrios might be allowed home, by another hint that he might be permitted to recover the city of Demetrias and Thessalian Magnesia, and, more concretely, by having the outstanding part of his tribute remitted.²⁰ Perhaps more important than all these together was his

¹⁸ Livy 35.13.5.

¹⁹ A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, 2nd ed., Oxford 1971, 128, suggests that the objects of Antiochos' attention from Side were the Etenneis, a Pisidian sub-group north of that city.

²⁰ Livy 35.31.5; Diod. 28.15.

signature on the peace treaty, binding him in his honour to maintain the peace.

Philip was the defeated enemy, of course, and these carrots and sticks could be used upon him with some effect. Nabis of Sparta, another defeated enemy, had provided no such hostages, though he did now owe a heavy (for Sparta) indemnity, and he was perhaps less committed to peace with his neighbours. He had deliberately been left in power, and remained locally strong, as a balance for the Achaian League in the Peloponnese. But his defeat was recent, his propaganda was most attractive to the Greek poor, and his optimism was clearly unquenchable. Yet only when he was given the strongest of hints of support from the third of the dissatisfied states did he move openly to reassert his power.

This third state was Aitolia, and was the most awkward for the Romans to cope with, for it had been an independent ally in two wars against Macedon, and was not constrained by any treaty. There was thus no method of control the Romans could use other than by issuing persuasions and threats, neither of which would have much effect on the Aitolians, other than to convince them of Roman weakness, or to stiffen their anger. They were, therefore, the key to the situation in Greece. Philip had clearly decided to accept his fate, at least for the moment, and Nabis was not powerful enough to do other than make small local waves by himself. But the Aitolian League was the strongest state in Greece south of Macedon—or even all Greece, given the now-disarmed condition of Macedon in the new order. If Aitolia moved, others probably would.

It was presumably this consideration, together with what they had learned in Rome from discussions which they will surely have had with other Greek envoys,²¹ which lay behind the decision of Antiochos' envoys to break their journey home at Delphi. At least, we know that one of the envoys, Hegesianax, was honoured as *proxenos* at Delphi during 193;²² whether Menippos was with him is not known.

²¹ The Seleukid envoys had been in Rome for several months, and so had envoys from most Greek states. It cannot be believed that they all ignored each other, and one would expect that the more wary of the Greeks would make contact with the envoys of the Seleukid king, even if no agreements were reached. In the winter of 192, when he invaded Greece, Antiochos contacted men in several cities; it may be that this was the occasion when their names were put down in his book.

²² Ditt. *Syll.* (3) 585, line 40.

It may be that they separated, with Menippos either going on to Syria as quickly as possible, or to other places (Macedon, perhaps?), while Hegesianax called in at Delphi. On the whole, it seems likely that if Menippos had been at Delphi he would have been honoured there also, and the news he carried was surely important enough to hurry him onward without delay.

So we may accept that Hegesianax was probably alone at Delphi. The next question is two-fold: did he stop off there on instructions from Antiochos, and did he go to other places and peoples as well? It seems likely, from the order in which they are said to have spoken at Rome, that Menippos was the senior of the two, so if anyone had to report in to the king quickly, it was he. The outcome of the talks in Rome could not have been predicted, and the result was certainly unexpected. Antiochos, an optimistic type, will have hoped for a favourable result: that is, an alliance. If that had been the result, no contact will have been necessary with the Aitolians, nor would it have been prudent or diplomatic, since the conclusion of an alliance with Rome would have been a clear signal to Rome that the Aitolians were Rome's own problem. But the outcome of the talks had been most unhappy for the envoys and for their king. In that case the search for friends for Antiochos would become a priority, and the Aitolians were an obvious target, indeed, *the* obvious target. It thus would seem that Hegesianax' visit to Delphi was something which was decided on by the envoys after the end of the talks at Rome, in the winter of 194/193, as they set off home.

Hegesianax' visit was not secret, though Livy, and so probably Polybios, did not record it—it is fair to assume that Livy could have made a conspiratorial point of it. Hegesianax went to Delphi no doubt with the intention of visiting the temple of Apollo. Apollo was the ancestor of the Seleukid family,²³ in the royal propaganda which had been put about for the past century; the shrine at Daphne by Antioch was Apollo's;²⁴ his temple at Didyma by Miletos in Asia had been well-favoured by various Seleukid kings;²⁵ Apollo at Delos

²³ Cf. Grainger, *Prosopography*, 798; an hereditary birthmark carried by the kings was said to show an anchor, one of Apollo's signs; the anchor appeared as a type on Seleukid coins.

²⁴ Pliny, *NH* 5.79; Welles, *RC* 44.

²⁵ Grainger, *Prosopography*, 711–712.

had received several royal gifts.²⁶ This, however, was the first time any official of the Seleukid kingdom had paid a visit to Apollo at Delphi—so far as we know, of course—and the kings had few contacts there.²⁷ This is distinctly odd, of course, given that Delphi was the most prestigious Apollo-temple in the Greek world, and was, indeed, perhaps the most notable temple of all. One can only assume that the decision was political. Delphi had been under effective Aitolian control for almost a century, and royal patronage of the temple would imply friendly contacts with the Aitolian League. But Aitolia and Macedon were, at least from c. 250, opposed to each other, and the Seleukids were usually friendly with, or allied to, the Macedonian kings. Hence, perhaps, the apparent shunning of Delphi.

But by 193 the Aitolians were becoming ever more obviously at enmity with Rome. Philip of Macedon was now scarcely a Seleukid friend, after being left to fend for himself against Rome while Antiochos mopped up fragments of the old Ptolemaic realm, including several cities which Philip had conquered only to abandon when his war with Rome began. And Philip was clearly not at all interested in resuming that war. If this was not clear during 194, the concessions to him given by the Senate late in that year will have persuaded Antiochos that Philip was at best a neutral in any quarrel between him and Rome. And if Philip was unavailable as an ally, the Aitolians were the only possible alternative.

All this will have become perfectly obvious to Hegesianax and Menippos while in Rome. If they were important and resourceful enough to be employed on such a mission as the one to the Senate, they were fully capable of indulging in such exploratory investigations as unofficial contacts with the Aitolians. Again, there is no evidence of this contact, but it is not credible that Hegesianax, a prominent historian as well as the envoy of the Great King, should visit Delphi and be honoured there as a *proxenos*, and not meet prominent Aitolians; and, if he met them, he will have discussed political affairs with them.

²⁶ Ditt. *Syll.* (3) 588; a gift of Seleukos I; Menippos put up a statue of Antiochos III at the sanctuary (*OGIS* 219), but unfortunately the date is not known.

²⁷ *OGIS* 228 is a reply by Seleukos II asking for recognition of the *asylia* he has granted to Smyrna; this is hardly enthusiastic contact between the king and the sanctuary.

These Aitolians will have included the current *strategos* of the league, Thoas of Trichonos, his brother Dikaiarchos, who was the previous *strategos*, and the current *hipparchos*, Nikandros, also of Trichonos. They may also have included previous *strategoi*, such as Alexandros son of Nikias, Alexamenos, and Damokritos son of Stratagos, all of Kalydon. Also politically active was Phaineas of Arsinoe, who was to be the next *strategos*. Between them these men counted nine of the last eleven holders of the office of *strategos*, and the next two.²⁸ If Hegesianax met any prominent Aitolians, he would meet some of these men, and in his conversations he would be able to gauge with some accuracy the likely policy of the league in the near future.²⁹

What he could tell them in return is less clear. He would be able to report in some detail what had happened in Rome, since that was, or soon would be, more or less public knowledge, and the Aitolians will have had a representative in the city. But Hegesianax, in the new situation as it was since the Roman meeting, could not speak for his king. He would now be able, however, to carry back to Antiochos a clear and up-to-date account of the policy of the league, and of the attitudes of its leading political men.

Such a meeting can only have encouraged the Aitolians. Hegesianax could not really need to say anything definite or positive in his conversations with them; the fact that he was there, in Delphi, in Aitolia, meeting these men, was encouragement enough. The Aitolians knew that Antiochos and Rome had reached, or were approaching, a crisis point in their mutual relations. It was therefore in Aitolian interests to aggravate that crisis, since only by enlisting a great power on their side could the Aitolians hope to win from Rome what they considered to be their just reward. This did not necessarily mean war; it would suffice for Rome to meet Aitolia's demands in some way, and this could easily be done by negotiation. Since Rome had evacuated its soldiers from Greece, the city was therefore presumably intending to rely in the future on diplomacy for its means of control; it followed that Rome must be amenable to persuasion, to the righting of wrongs, and to the adjusting of boundaries. The Aitolians laboured under a sense of having been wrongly treated in

²⁸ Cf. the list by G. Klaffenbach in *IG IX*, 1.1i and evidence on xxxvii–xxxviii; the careers of these men are detailed in Grainger, *Aitolian Prosopographical Studies*.

²⁹ Grainger, *League of the Aitolians*, chapter 19, for a discussion of the league's situation.

the peace process, and certainly looked to expanding their boundaries, and for this Rome would need to be persuaded. The Aitolian policy was sensible.

It depended, of course, as all diplomacy does, on the exertion of power. Aitolia's own power alone was obviously not sufficient to counterbalance Rome's, as had been proved during the peace process, and so allies were needed. At the regular *Panaitolika* meeting in March, which was held in 193 at Naupaktos, Thoas proposed that Aitolia should seek allies.³⁰ He was, thus, carefully developing the backing of the Aitolian electorate, the people-in-arms, for this policy. Holding the meeting in Naupaktos, close to the centre of the league, would ensure that attendance was high, particularly so since it will have been well known that a crisis impended.³¹ The policy was not, be it noted, necessarily belligerent, but it *was* a diplomatic preparation in case of war. Three envoys were chosen and despatched. To Philip went the *hipparchos* in office, Nikandros of Trichonos; to Nabis went Damokritos, who had been *strategos* six years before, and was to be *strategos* again next year; to Antiochos went Dikaiarchos, the brother of the current *strategos*, and who had been *strategos* himself the year before.³² There could be no clearer indication of the seriousness of Aitolian proposals than the high status of these envoys, backed by a plebiscite of the Aitolian assembly.

It is one thing to propose a policy, but it is a different thing entirely to put it into action. None of the three men to whom the envoys were sent reacted in the way that the Aitolians had hoped. Livy describes the message given by Nikandros to King Philip in curious terms, as though Nikandros was deliberately attempting to dissuade the king from the alliance: the tone has been described as 'tactless' by dwelling on Philip's losses, the renown of Hannibal, and the need to wait for Antiochos before declaring his hostility to Rome.³³

³⁰ Livy 35.12.3-5; this, as Badian says ('Rome and Antiochos', 138, note 84) must be the spring meeting; there is no reason for the Aitolians to have a special meeting.

³¹ The autumn meeting, as its name, *Thermika*, shows, was always held at the temple at Thermos; the spring meeting, the *Panaitolika*, was movable, tending to oscillate between east and west. Holding the meeting in Naupaktos meant that men from all the towns and cities of the west, by far the most numerous in population and the keenest on participation in league affairs, could attend.

³² Livy 35.12.6.

³³ Livy 35.12.10-15; Walbank, *Philip V*, 193.

This was scarcely persuasive, and one wonders if it is not in fact a rhetorical invention by Livy (or Polybios), particularly since Nikandros is said to have made the outbreak of war conditional on the arrival of Antiochos in Greece.³⁴ This is actually what happened, of course, but there had been no suggestion of this so far—except in this case. One might postulate a secret agreement with Hegesianax, but such ideas are dangerous to suppose. It is easier to assume a bit of *ex post facto* composition by one of the historians.

Whatever Nikandros said, he was unsuccessful in persuading Philip to join the Aitolians in opposition to the Romans, for Nikandros was competing with the recent conciliatory gestures from Rome. For the present, Philip could gain more from Rome by collaboration than he could by hostility. One doubts very much if Nikandros anticipated any other outcome. Philip's recent experiences scarcely encouraged him to contemplate another war with Rome, and he had been fighting the Aitolians on and off for most of his reign. There was very little to tempt him to ally with them. The Aitolians' main grievance, after all, was that they had not received what they considered to be an adequate share of the booty after the last war against Philip. Given this background, the very fact of the visit and appeal of Nikandros should have made Philip more receptive. But he was never a particularly long thinker in political matters; the Roman gestures of conciliation were well judged in this respect, and kept him quiet.

Nabis, by contrast, was all too eager. Damokritos' visit—he is said, by Livy, to have dwelt on Nabis' losses,³⁵ as Nikandros did on Philip's—was what Nabis had looked for before. He had fought hard enough in the previous Roman war to keep his position in Sparta, but it had been clear then that he could scarcely prevail alone. Now he was assured of one ally at least, and perhaps more—for Damokritos, again like Nikandros, is said to have held out the prospect of Antiochos joining in. This, of course, was something Nabis had already hoped for, so Damokritos was rowing with the tide here. Nabis began his own intrigues at once, among the towns along the Aegean coast, of which he had been deprived after the last war, including Gytheion. His agents contacted their friends and concerted plans, and a programme of murders eliminated enemies.³⁶ This will all have taken

³⁴ Livy 35.12.13.

³⁵ Livy 35.12.7–9.

³⁶ Livy 35.13.1.

some time, but word reached the Achaian League's officials, who attempted to bring Nabis to heel by threatening him with Rome.³⁷ (Thus the two local enemies threatened each other with their more powerful superiors, neither having any authority to do so.) This may have been the trigger for open hostilities, a sign that Nabis' intentions had been discovered. By the autumn he was conducting a siege of Gytheion, and the Achaians sent some reinforcements into the town. They also complained to Rome.³⁸ Nabis had jumped the gun, but this is always a danger when allies plot, for each has his own agenda which the others ignore at their peril. Nabis, by opening hostilities, presumably hoped that Aitolia and Antiochos would join in; Aitolia, however, was not prepared to move without help from Philip or Antiochos, or both. Philip preserved his silence, which was, in effect, a refusal. So all rested on the response of Antiochos.

The campaign into Pisidia had begun, according to Livy, at the beginning of spring,³⁹ which must mean March in that area. This was before the three Roman envoys reached Asia, for, unlike that of Menippos in the winter, their journey was not especially urgent. Further, they had been instructed to see Eumenes of Pergamon as well.⁴⁰ Not only that, but their journey will have been by way of Greece, and they will have picked up news there. The resolutions of the Aitolian assembly at Naupaktos were passed in March (the meeting took place at the equinox), and, even if they had not heard the result while in Greece, the news will have quickly reached them in Asia. The stakes were clearly higher now, and it will have made sense for them to wait to see what responses there were from the three men targeted by the Aitolian envoys. They must, for example, have reached Asia at much the same time as Dikaiarchos, the Aitolian envoy to Antiochos.

A discussion with Eumenes would also allow the Roman envoys to survey the situation in Asia from his point of view. The Aitolian moves had in fact shifted the action forward, and the envoys were now looking not merely to a negotiation with Antiochos, but also to the recruitment of allies for the conflict which now appeared imminent. This had, of course, been inherent in the situation when the

³⁷ Livy 35.13.2-3.

³⁸ Livy 35.13.3.

³⁹ Livy 35.15.5.

⁴⁰ Livy 35.13.6.

Senate made its considered moves to encourage Philip to remain in his collaborationist mode, but the Aitolians had now deliberately made the choice which Philip had before him more precise. By rejecting the Aitolians' invitation he was placing himself on the Roman side of the divide; Nabis was doing the opposite, and was thus provoking the Achaians to shift towards Rome. The Roman envoys, whose experience of Greek affairs meant that they could read the situation better than most observers, may well have been willing to wait until Philip or Nabis made an open move before seeing Antiochos. And Antiochos had co-operated in this by removing himself to the campaign in Pisidia.

The Aitolian envoy Dikaiarchos no doubt reached Asia before the Roman envoys, and since they went first to Pergamon, he will have been able to see Antiochos first, either on his campaign in Pisidia, or at Apameia-Kelainai where he was later. Dikaiarchos' diplomatic task was even more awkward than that of Nikandros, which was hopeless, or of Damokritos, which was too easy. He had to persuade Antiochos to declare war when he manifestly had no wish to do so. He does not seem to have made any attempt at persuasion. Instead he described the forces which the Aitolians would put in the field, and he claimed that the defeat of Philip had really been the Aitolians' work, and that the Roman's selfishness had made the Aitolians angry. He claimed—Livy says it was a deliberate lie—that Nabis and Philip were ready to join in. This was not necessarily a lie: in the case of Nabis it was in fact quite true; no doubt Philip would join in if he thought he would benefit.⁴¹

Antiochos' reply is not known, but it will have been useful information for him to know that Nabis was certainly anti-Roman, that Aitolia was making preparations, and that it was thought that Philip was disaffected. But there was nothing new in all this. He cannot also have been ignorant of the military strength of the Aitolians, nor of the responsibility for the result of Kynoskephalai. Since Dikaiarchos had exaggerated the Aitolian participation at the battle it is probable that he exaggerated the size of the Aitolian forces also. None of this can have been very persuasive to Antiochos. Whatever answer he gave to the Aitolian envoy it was neither a rebuff nor an enthusiastic agreement. As any good diplomat would do in such a situa-

⁴¹ Livy 35.12.15–18.

tion, he will have given a reply which neither encouraged nor discouraged the Aitolians. They were now a shot in his locker, for use if necessary.

The Roman envoys landed in Asia at Elaia, the port developed by the Attalids as their naval base, then went up to Pergamon itself.⁴² Livy explains Eumenes' policy as one of unrelenting hostility towards Antiochos, founded on Eumenes' desire to take over Seleukid territory.⁴³ It is more likely that the hostility lay in the fear that Antiochos would deprive Eumenes of his own territory. Eumenes had made his decisive choice the year before when he came to the help of Rome in the war with Nabis, and when he had rejected Antiochos' offer of his daughter in marriage. Now it was in Eumenes' interest to encourage Rome towards a war with Antiochos. It was, however, by no means certain that if Rome won Eumenes would be given former Seleukid territory. It is true that Rome had shown no wish to expand its own lands east of the Illyrian coast, but that could change. So the main part of Eumenes' policy could only be the hope for a Roman alliance which would give him protection. Territory might also come, but survival in the face of Seleukid power—which all but surrounded the Attalid lands—was the priority. Eumenes is said to have made the point that, given the choice, he would much prefer to be a Roman ally than a Seleukid creature.⁴⁴ This is likely to have impressed the envoys, who were not used to such manful declarations of loyalty, particularly from Greek rulers. It was also another nudge towards war, since Antiochos would see himself deprived of a former ally, a clear blow to his prestige.

Of the three Romans, Aelius Paetus is not mentioned at all after the notice of the appointment of the embassy, so much so that some have doubted his actual presence. Assuming he was part of the embassy—and it would be unusual for the Senate to send out only two envoys—what he was doing is a matter only for speculation. But one cannot avoid wondering if he was somewhere in Greece, attempting to counteract the influence of the Aitolians, or perhaps merely assessing the Greek situation.

⁴² Livy 35.13.6; accounts of this embassy are in Bevan, *House*, 2.61–63; Will, *Hist. Pol.* 2.167–168; Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 629–631.

⁴³ Livy 35.13.7–8.

⁴⁴ Livy 35.13.9.

At Pergamon Sulpicius Galba fell ill.⁴⁵ This left Villius alone to go on to discuss matters with Antiochos. But it also left Galba in Pergamon, and thus able to continue the discussions with Eumenes, while Villius just happened to be the member of the embassy who had met Antiochos most often. One may conclude that Galba's illness may well have been largely, if not wholly, diplomatic.

But Antiochos was off fighting the Pisidians, and Villius had to wait. He went first to Ephesos, leaving Galba in Pergamon. At Ephesos Villius is said to have met Hannibal,⁴⁶ which would be quite likely if both men—both of them distinguished foreign visitors—were in the city at the same time. Livy's interpretation is that Villius was attempting to undermine Hannibal's influence with Antiochos by frequent friendly meetings.⁴⁷ However, since the only evidence of that influence is in Livy's interpretation, this may be disregarded. (So may the apochryphal story of Scipio Africanus' meeting with Hannibal;⁴⁸ Africanus was in Italy and Africa this year, not Asia.)

Villius then travelled inland to Apameia Kelainai, the place at which Antiochos had indicated they should meet. Livy's interpretation of events is again unacceptable, for he strongly implies that the arrival of Villius caused the king to turn away from his work and hurry to meet the Roman.⁴⁹ Since Villius had to travel two hundred miles from Ephesos to Apameia, it follows that Antiochos, as the host, set the place and time of the meeting, and arrived in his own time. No doubt preliminary messages had been exchanged beforehand.

Nothing is known of the content of the meeting, which may have been purely formal. Livy says that the same positions were taken up

⁴⁵ Livy 35.14.1.

⁴⁶ Livy 35.14.1–2.

⁴⁷ Livy 35.14.4; Scullard's account of all this (in *Scipio Africanus*, 197) is a travesty, full of errors.

⁴⁸ Livy 35.14.5–12; M. Holleaux, 'L'Entretien de Scipio Africanus et d'Hannibal à Ephèse', *Hermes* 48, 1913, 75–98 (= *Études* 5, 184–207) effectively demolished this story, but his conclusion that Africanus did visit the east in that year is unproven; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.166. The only ancient text to be explicit is Zonaras' abridgement of Dio Cassius (9.18.12–13), but this is scarcely a reliable basis. Two inscriptions from Delos are both undated (Ditt. *Syll.* (3) and *I. Delos* 442 B, line 100) and cannot even imply a visit to the east in 193. U. Schlag, *Regnum in Senatu*, Stuttgart, 1958, 132–134, makes various suggestions, and Scullard, *Scipio Africanus*, 198 and note 163, rather desparately tries to support Holleaux's 'brilliant hypothesis', but the evidence is not good enough. The basis of the story of Africanus' meeting with Hannibal is clearly Villius' meeting.

⁴⁹ Livy 35.15.1.

as in the negotiations at Rome. This may be true, or it may be Livy's way of saying he did not know what happened. If it is accurate, it means that Villius was making demands and threats, which is not very likely, particularly since the next set of talks seem to have more or less ignored these previous positions. Or, perhaps, and perhaps more likely, the two men simply reviewed what had happened in Rome, with the intention of going on from there. With only one of the Roman envoys present, the probability is that this was regarded by all as only a preliminary meeting. But the meeting was interrupted by the news of the death in Syria of the king's eldest son, the younger Antiochos.⁵⁰ The king would need to attend to all sorts of tasks as a result, tasks more urgent than talks with a single Roman envoy—the stability of his kingdom was at risk, as always when a king died.⁵¹ Villius returned to Pergamon, according to Livy because of the court mourning,⁵² more likely to report on the situation, and on his talks, to Galba. It seems that arrangements had been made to continue the discussions at Ephesos, and Antiochos went there to brief his chosen delegate, the minister Minnio.⁵³ The Roman envoys were then invited to Ephesos—or they arrived by prearrangement, more likely. Galba had recovered.⁵⁴

The pattern of meetings which were now held at Ephesos exactly mirrors the conduct of the negotiations which had taken place at Rome at the end of the previous year. First was the introduction of the visiting envoys to the host. Then came the delegation by the host of the detailed negotiations to a subordinate; at Rome this was

⁵⁰ Livy 35.15.2.

⁵¹ Livy provided a quite remarkably unpleasant depiction of intrigue and suspicion at the king's court as a result of the death of the young Antiochos. The purpose of this passage can only be to denigrate Antiochos III, just as the nonsense Livy was later to write about his later marriage at Euboea was similarly intended. Both have too often been taken seriously. Neither are convincing. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.167 comments on Livy's style here; on the credibility, cf. Schmitt, *Untersuchungen*, 18–19.

⁵² Livy 35.15.6.

⁵³ Livy 35.15.7. Minnio has never been heard of before, though Livy ranks him as First Friend, but it may be relevant that the name appears only in Ephesos, Magnesia-on-Maiandros, and Teos, where three examples of about this date are known (Grainger, *Prosopography*, 106 and 470). It is hardly possible to prove, given the lack of detail on such men, but it may well be that Antiochos was choosing his advisers from men with local knowledge; note also the employment of Hegesianax of Alexandreia Troas, and of Menippos, probably from Macedon.

⁵⁴ Livy 35.16.1.

Flamininus and the commissioners, at Ephesos it was Minnio, presumably not alone, but Livy never refers to any others. This sequence was, no doubt, quite deliberate on the king's part. He was demonstrating his clear knowledge of the procedures which had been undergone in Rome, and was showing also that he regarded the two sets of negotiations as being of equal validity, just as he and Rome were the two great powers left in the world.

Antiochos' policy had been, until it met the road block of the Senate's negative response to his last embassy, to develop an alliance between his kingdom and the Roman confederacy on the basis of equality. Implicitly the Roman Senate's response had been to deny that equality. By his conduct of these negotiations, Antiochos was proclaiming both the reality of that equality and the continuation of his chosen policy, and so he was rejecting the threats which had been apprehended at Rome. In the background was his tactful campaign in Pisidia rather than into Thrace again. Everything was being done on Antiochos' side to establish his status, and to mollify the Roman jitters.

The various movements of the envoys are of some importance since they give some indication that some considerable time passed between the landing of the envoys at Elaia and the beginning of the substantive discussions at Ephesos. It is clear that none of the participants was in any hurry. If a war really should result—and after the Roman meeting it had emerged as a possibility—both sides were interested in demonstrating that they had done all they could to avoid it. Neither great power was as yet properly balanced for an armed conflict. A Roman commission headed by Scipio Africanus was currently investigating the situation in Carthage, where Ariston's intrigues had partly destabilised the anti-Barcid regime in power there. Warfare continued in Cisalpina and in Spain. The situation in Greece remained volatile; it might clarify with time, or it might develop into an open conflict. Antiochos' main concern now was to ensure the stability of his own kingdom after the blow he had suffered in his son's death. The younger Antiochos had been sent east to govern; new arrangements were now necessary. So it was in the interests of both parties to spin out the preparations for the meetings until some of these problems were resolved. It may be assumed therefore that the meeting at Ephesos did not taken place until the summer was well advanced, perhaps not until July. The Roman

envoys did not get home until November,⁵⁵ so it could even be later than that.

The meeting is summarised by Livy in the usual form of a pair of speeches, one by Minnio, one by Galba, which can scarcely represent accurately what went on. After all the journeying and preparation, there were surely fairly detailed negotiations which would have lasted for some time, several days at least. Minnio is said to have drawn an unfavourable comparison between the Roman treatment of Greek cities in Italy and Sicily, and those subject to Antiochos.⁵⁶ Galba repudiated the comparison and pointed to the generous Roman treatment of Greek cities in Greece.⁵⁷ He did the same as the Roman envoys had at Lysimacheia, by bringing in representatives of cities to complain about the government of Antiochos. Who these cities were is not stated, though they are said to have been present in 'great numbers', and to have been coached in their statements by Eumenes. The absence of identification makes their protests less than convincing. It seems that this time they were allowed to talk themselves out.⁵⁸

In other words, Livy asks us to believe that what happened at Ephesos was a more or less exact repetition of what had happened at Lysimacheia, even down to the content of the speeches. This cannot be the whole story. The world had moved on in the previous three years. Only if there was no intention of bringing negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion, by reaching some sort of an agreement, would such repetition be indulged in. And the evidence is that Antiochos at least wanted to reach an agreement. Furthermore, Livy's own evidence in his desperately brief account of the Roman envoys' report to the Senate argues that this sterile repetition did not take place.⁵⁹ And again, the cities whose representatives are said to have been introduced by Galba are not specified, but Minnio is said to

⁵⁵ They were still awaited after the elections (in November), and the allocation of provinces: Livy 35.20.14; their return is noted at 35.22.1.

⁵⁶ Livy 35.16.2-6.

⁵⁷ Livy 35.16.7-13.

⁵⁸ Livy 35.17.1-2; on this see also Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*, 50-52.

⁵⁹ Livy 35.22.1-2; their report, according to Livy, was mainly about Nabis; as a report this is nonsense, but his summary, that no case for war existed, demonstrates Antiochos' pacific intentions, as seen by these envoys. If it really did concentrate on Nabis, is this evidence of what Aelius Paetus had been doing?

have concentrated on Smyrna, Lampsakos, and those of 'Aiolis and Ionia'.⁶⁰ But many of the cities of Aiolis were subject to Eumenes in the same way that Karian and Ionian cities were subject to Antiochos—or, as Minnio said, Syracuse and Naples and other Italian cities were subject to Rome. In Galba's reply the specific cities which Livy later thought were the cause of the war, Smyrna, Lampsakos and Alexandreia Troas, were not mentioned, though the 'Asian' cities subject to Antiochos were.

There is an alternative account, usually discounted because it is in Appian, but which contains certain elements which may indicate that a real negotiation took place, with concessions handed out by each side. The problem is that Appian's summary is so brief that it is scarcely worthy of the name, though it may, like Livy's be a rewritten version of Polybios' account, which gives it a certain authority. Appian reports that Antiochos made an offer, to leave free and independent three named cities—Rhodes, Kyzikos, and Byzantion—and 'the other Greeks of Asia', but that he would hold on to the 'Aioliens and Ionians'.⁶¹

This collection of names is distinctly odd, for the three named cities have not been mentioned before in any of these negotiations. But they appear to be carefully chosen. All three were large, important and unambiguously independent states. Of them, Byzantion and Rhodes had treaty-relations on a basis of equality with the king, while Kyzikos had an old relationship with the Attalids, again on a basis of equality, and may well have had a similar relationship with Antiochos. Antiochos was here giving up nothing here, but was indicating a willingness to bargain. This is the significance of the other, non-specific, references to 'other' cities and to the 'Aioliens and Ionians'. 'Other' cities was a nice and vague expression, and almost invited the Romans to fill in the gap with their own suggestions, which no doubt the king expected would be Smyrna and Lampsakos, at least. And the references to Aioliens and Ionians were an echo, no doubt a deliberate one, of what Flamininus had suggested at Rome, and which had been repeated by Minnio. This laid down the limits to his concessions.

⁶⁰ Livy 35.16.5.

⁶¹ App. *Syr.* 12; Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 138, note 78, suggests that this 'may well be true, at least in outline'.

Appian's report of the meeting at Ephesos meshes much better with the evidence for the negotiations at Rome than does Livy's account. It seems to show a process of bargaining under way, a process which was taking place in a very leisurely fashion, neither side showing any sense of crisis or urgency, and each side making sensible efforts to understand the other's position. The result was that Antiochos, in effect, accepted the offer of supremacy in Asia which had been made at Rome, but the absence of any reference to Thrace showed that he was reserving that for later talks. Meanwhile both sides were getting down to detail on the question of the cities. Yet nothing was finalised as yet.

While in Asia, the Roman envoys had also been using their eyes. They could find no evidence of any preparations by Antiochos which would suggest that he planned a war in Greece, still less in Italy, and this was what they reported when they finally reached Rome.⁶² Their location in Ephesos is significant in this, for Ephesos was the king's naval headquarters, and he would need an armada to carry his soldiers into Greece, and still more so if his target was Italy. His army was split between three areas: Pisidia, where it was deeply involved in a campaign which Antiochos could scarcely abandon half finished; Thrace, where a substantial garrison would be needed for some years; and Syria, which was always vulnerable to a Ptolemaic revenge attack. In such a huge empire, of course, a large army could be assembled, given time, and the envoys could find no evidence of mobilisation in western Asia. Villius had been as far as Apameia-Kelainai, along the main route to the west, which troops would need to use to march to the coast. He had seen no signs of such troops. Similarly, they could find no evidence of diplomatic preparations in Greece, which would, they assumed, be necessary before any campaign could begin. Their report to the Senate said much about Nabis, which suggests that they had made some fairly detailed investigations there.

In Greece, the activities of the Aitolians were relevant above all others. The rebuff which Nikandros had suffered from Philip was surely known, since it was in Philip's interest to publicise his 'loyalty' to Rome; the disturbing activities of Nabis were by no means secret, as the envoys' report showed. Yet there was no sign the envoys could

⁶² Livy 35.22.1.

see that any of this had had any effect on Antiochos' policy. The death of the young King Antiochos had shown them that the priority of the older king was not war with Rome or expansion into Greece, but stability inside his own kingdom. The transfer of Seleukos, Antiochos' second son, from his base at Lysimacheia, which took place about the second half of the year,⁶³ also relaxed the pressure in Thrace.

Livy depicts Antiochos as calling a 'council regarding the Roman war' as soon as the Roman envoys left for home.⁶⁴ A meeting of his council, that is, an *ad hoc* group of Friends and advisers, is very likely in the circumstances. A discussion on the outcome of the various talks, which would range over the whole problem of Greece, is the least that is to be expected. But it was not a 'council of war', nor were war plans discussed. There is no sign for the next year that Antiochos had any intention of going to war with Rome, nor did the Aitolians get any hint of encouragement in their anti-Roman stance. It is relevant that the only detailed speeches Livy produces are by Alexander of Akarnania, a mercenary commander, whose contribution showed no more than wishful thinking,⁶⁵ and by Hannibal, depicted as not being present at the council but also as speaking at it, who told an irrelevant tale of his childhood, which is probably a Roman invention.⁶⁶ That is to say, Livy's evidence for the war-planning he claims took place is not credible.⁶⁷ It can be accepted that there were arguments in the council as to Roman intentions, and that some members present were in favour of war, while others were convinced of Roman peaceful intentions. This is in the nature of councils. The same division of opinion existed in the Roman Senate. The decision, as is clear from the result, was that peace still existed and could be maintained into the future.

⁶³ He was named as joint-king by October 189, which is the earliest date of their joint appearance in a Babylonian dating-formula (R. A. Parker and W. H. Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology 626 B.C.-A.D. 45*, 3rd ed., Providence R.I. 1956, 22); it is clear from Livy's references during the war that Seleukos was acting as his father's deputy in Asia, and in an independent command.

⁶⁴ Livy 35.17.3-19.7; cf. Bevan, *House*, 63-64.

⁶⁵ Livy 35.18.1-8.

⁶⁶ Livy 35.19.1-6; see note 7 of this chapter.

⁶⁷ Livy concluded his account of the council by saying that it was decided that 'war should be begun' (35.19.7), yet nothing happened for well over twelve months. This is sheer deception, or carelessness, on his part.

CHAPTER EIGHT

AITOLIAN DECISIONS

The net result of the visits of Antiochos' envoys to Rome and Rome's embassy to Antiochos was a continuation of indecision on both sides, but the Roman Senate had clearly signalled its suspicions of Antiochos. On the other hand, everything Antiochos himself had done and said had been conciliatory. The suspicions and pressure had all been from Rome's side. Nevertheless this is as far as it had gone. The exchanges of embassies had been carefully organised so as to investigate complaints about each other, and the overall impression is that the outlines of an agreement now existed. The reluctance of both sides to get involved in a war is manifest. Antiochos had been pressing for an alliance; Rome was reluctant to agree, but both sides were clear on what the problems between them were.¹

The two great powers might well be reluctant to go to war, but the decision was not wholly up to them. There were all too many of the allies of each side more interested in provoking a war than in avoiding one. Philip's decision for neutrality was in fact one which favoured Rome, and Rome showed itself grateful and generous in response; but without the crisis and the subsequent war Philip would have no more leverage; it was thus in his interest to foment trouble. The Aitolians were the one Greek state which was not allied to anyone; their extreme dissatisfaction was well known; without a war they would get no improvement in the peace terms they had so disliked; their envoys were, it seems, prepared to lie, and, as the sequel showed, commit murder, in order to provoke a war. Nabis had jumped eagerly at the chance to upset the peace settlement he had been forced to accept. The Achaian League was as ambitious for territory as Aitolia; in the event the league was so determined to drag Rome into war that it declared war on Antiochos before anyone else.² Eumenes must

¹ Thus it will be seen that I disagree with Badian's conclusion that 'both sides were victims of their own policies' ('Rome and Antiochos', 134); it seems to me that both were quite clear-eyed about the whole matter.

² Livy 35.50.2.

have been very concerned at the prospect of being left to Antiochos' tender mercies by the Romans, to such a degree that he made an extravagant and unexpected declaration of loyalty and did his best to sow discord between Roman and Seleukid negotiators at Ephesos.³ Ptolemaic Egypt repeatedly sent envoys to Rome to offer help in every problem Rome faced in the eastern Mediterranean, help which Rome must have known was effectively non-existent, given the defeats the Ptolemies had suffered, and the continuation of the southern rebellion; the only reason for such transparently worthless 'offers' was to drag Rome into a war from which the Ptolemaic government could hope to benefit.⁴ On Antiochos' side the allies were fewer, but Hannibal was clearly anxious to see Rome involved in a war, even discounting the silly plans he is credited with; his reasons can only be to get back to power in Carthage, and perhaps to resume the war he had waged in Italy.

Almost every minor state of any power in the Mediterranean area thought it could benefit from a war between Rome and the Seleukid king. For Rome, in particular, this was serious pressure, since the system of states the republic had organised in Greece was predicated on diplomatic dialogue, and in such a situation both sides must hear what the other is saying. The unanimity was difficult to ignore, though it could be resisted. Yet such unanimity might in fact be the product of signals out of Rome. The Greek envoys in Rome at the end of 194 saw—they literally were witnesses to it—the dispute between Flamininus and his committee and Menippos and Hegesianax.⁵ The tale of the meeting having arrived home, any Greek state with a complaint would be encouraged to voice it, in the belief that Rome wanted to hear hostility to the Seleukid king.

The Roman ambassadors to Antiochos did not get back to Rome until after the elections, which took place in November 193.⁶ At that time, the Senate had to cope with the certainty of war in Spain and the likelihood of fighting in Cisalpine Gaul, and now with the possibility of war in Greece. In addition, there were the new colonies on the Italian coasts, and the need to maintain the city's naval strength. Spain was easy to deal with: simply leave the magistrates

³ Livy 35.13.7–10.

⁴ Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 97–110.

⁵ Livy 34.59.4.

⁶ Livy 35.22.1.

there for another year with their old armies. Cisalpine Gaul would almost certainly receive the attention of one of the new consuls, with the army already there. This would let the other consul attend to Antiochos, if it became necessary. He was not named as an enemy, though the Senate agreed that the consul should be prepared to serve outside Italy.⁷

In fact, this logical scheme was only achieved after first thoughts had been rejected. The four praetors had been allowed to draw lots for their provinces: the peregrine jurisdiction, Sicily, Sardinia, the two Spains. Second thoughts deleted the Spains in favour of the fleet, which was assigned to A. Atilius Serranus, and the Bruttii, which went to M. Baebius Tamphilus. Also the two consuls were at first assigned Italy as their jurisdiction, but this was then changed to Cisalpine Gaul for L. Quinctius Flamininus, while Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus was left with the vague assignment to any province outside Italy where a problem might arise.⁸

Because war did eventually break out with Antiochos, these arrangements have been seen in that light. Domitius' emergency province is assumed to be the new war with Antiochos, which is supposed to have been expected; the fleet—an order was made to build thirty quinqueremes and to man them with naval allies⁹—is assumed to have been prepared for war in Asia; Baebius' presence in the land of the Bruttii with an army of two legions and 15,000 Italian allied infantry and 500 Italian allied cavalry—a total force of at least 25,000 foot and 1,000 horse—is supposed to be a preparation for the invasion of Greece which eventually took place.¹⁰

There are, however, alternative explanations for all this. The fleet, for example, is much more likely to be intended to cope with the problem of Nabis, which had been simmering all through the winter, and which was an actual, not a possible, crisis; the new construction which was ordered is best seen as a measure designed to replace

⁷ Livy 35.20.2–3.

⁸ Livy 35.20.7–12; Livy mixes up the names at one point: Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 2.175.

⁹ Livy 35.20.12.

¹⁰ This army eventually was the main force which fought Antiochos, first in Greece and then in Asia, commanded successively by the praetor M. Baebius Tamphilus, the consul M^p. Acilius Glabrio and the consul L. Cornelius Scipio. Its size is quite clear and must be emphasised, for there has been considerable confusion over it. But Livy is quite clear at this point. See also Appendix 1.

worn-out ships with new ones, a process necessary by now since the ships built early in the Hannibalic War were wearing out and needed replacing. A fleet of the size indicated—25 ships¹¹—would not be strong enough to take on Antiochos' fleet, if that was mobilised, for he could gather a hundred ships, as he had in 197, and perhaps more by now. The army placed under Baebius in Bruttium, however, cannot have been designated to deal with Nabis, for which it was too large, nor as a preparation for war with Antiochos, for it was too small for that task. It was perhaps about right for a war with Aitolia, but it had become clear during 193 that a war with Aitolia alone was unlikely. So the army was too small for that as well.

At the same time, locating in Bruttium an army which was supposed to have been designed for a war in Greece does not make much sense. The normal port for the east was Brundisium, for that provided the shortest sea crossing, which allowed a landing to take place in Roman territory; there was a string of ports along the Illyrian coast, from Dyrrhachium to Kerkyra, where a landing could be made in friendly territory. An army stationed in Bruttium but intended for Greece would have to march at least a hundred miles before embarking, and probably more. In other words, if Baebius' army was intended for Greece it should have been sent to Apulia.

But Bruttium, during the year just ending, had been the scene of the foundation of Roman colonies. No less than three had been projected, at Croton, Buxentum and Tempsa,¹² and two Latin colonies were planned.¹³ Buxentum, in fact, had been planned already in 197¹⁴ but had apparently not got started. The Roman colonies were each for only 300 men, but the Latin colonies, both on the sites of wrecked Greek cities (Vibo at Hipponum, Copia at Thurii) were much larger, Vibo for 4,000 men, Copia for 3,300, and they took longer to found, Copia in 193 and Vibo in 192. Buxentum was in the former territory of the Lucani, but the other four were all in Bruttium. Planting colonies in these areas was a new attempt to establish firm Roman control there. The Brutii had been loyal to

¹¹ Livy does not state the number of vessels allocated to Atilius, but he appeared in Greece next year with 25; cf. Thiel, *Studies*, 259.

¹² Livy 34.42.6 and 45.1 (Buxentum); 34.45.4 (Croton and Tempsa).

¹³ Livy 34.43.1–2; one was to be 'among the Brutii', the other 'among Thurii', but Thurii was evidently in Brutian territory.

¹⁴ Livy 32.29.4.

Hannibal for longer than another Italian people, and the Lucani had been severely punished for their enmity. Much of the lands of both had been confiscated in consequence, which simultaneously provided land for endowing the colonies, and provided continued fuel for resentment. Constant Roman supervision was thus required. It is thus an excellent reason for stationing two legions and their Italian auxiliaries in that same territory. 25,000 well-armed troops could deter the stirrings of any rebellion, and they would also provide plenty of manual labour for the new colonies in their first year. This interpretation is supported by the fact that when Baebius' army was ordered to Greece next year, it was immediately replaced by another army of much the same strength.¹⁵

The dispositions of Roman magistrates and armies, therefore, do not provide any support to the theory that the Senate either expected or intended war against Antiochos in 192. Such measures as were taken can be explained in other ways. Only in the additional, but separate, order to the praetor A. Atilius Serranus at Rome to have thirty new quinqueremes built, and meanwhile to make other available ships ready for sea is such support visible.¹⁶ These ships were from the fleet maintained at Rome, and were to be manned by sailors recruited from the naval allies and to have 3,000 soldiers attached. And this force was specifically assigned to help deal with Nabis. It was quite inadequate for any conflict with Antiochos. It follows, given that the Senate had a clear idea of Antiochos' military and naval strength, that these preparations had nothing to do with Antiochos. That is, at the time these provinces were allocated and forces ordered to be prepared, in late 193, no war with Antiochos was contemplated at Rome.

Livy's account of events in Italy at this time is unusually difficult to sort out in terms of sequence and time. He gathers together the items about magistrates, armies and ships, all of which may be dated to November 193. Then he collects the prodigies, no doubt those which had occurred in the past year, and for which a *supplicatio* was held by the consul L. Quinctius Flamininus before he went to his province. Then he recounts a victory by Quinctius' predecessor, Q. Minucius Thermus, over the Ligurians, which took place 'before the

¹⁵ Livy 35.61.7.

¹⁶ Livy 35.20.12, substituting Atilius' name for Baebius'.

consul . . . arrived in his province'. And then, 'about the same time', the envoys who had been sent to Antiochos arrived back in Rome.¹⁷ Since both consuls were still in the city, this seems to refer to a vague period between the elections and the consuls' departure, but after the allocation of the provinces. It was certainly in the winter: the envoys had clearly not hurried home.

The reason became clear when they reported. In tones of obvious disappointment Livy merely summarises their report to the Senate as not indicating any cause for war, except against Nabis. The envoys had collected information about the Spartan situation—even if one of their number had not actually deliberately done so. They reported that it was a situation which required Roman intervention.¹⁸

Also in Rome, and reporting to the Senate, were envoys from the Achaian League. They complained about Nabis, and their words reinforced those of the two (or three) Roman envoys.¹⁹ In form, of course, Nabis' conduct was not a challenge to Rome, since the places he was destabilising and attacking, the Lakonian ports and Gytheion, were attached in a sort of protectorate to Achaia.²⁰ The Aitolians had pointed this out to him in the original message brought by Damokritos.²¹ Nabis agreed and felt no inhibitions about his conduct. The Achaians complained to him, and had gone to the extent of putting a reinforcement for the garrison into Gytheion.²² Nabis was supposed to be besieging the place, but this was presumably more in the nature of a blockade than an active attack, particularly during the winter.

At a deeper level, of course, Nabis was challenging Rome. Achaia had acquired its role as protecting power by assignment from Rome, and if Nabis succeeded in his endeavour, it would be the first brick removed from Rome's Greek construction. Flamininus had deliberately organised Greece so that balances were struck between ancient

¹⁷ Successively these notices are: Livy 35.20.2–21.1; 21.2–6; 21.7–11; 22.1.

¹⁸ Livy 35.22.1–2.

¹⁹ Livy 35.13.3; this embassy was sent, according to Errington, *Philopoemen*, 93, after 'the end of October', so it will have been seen by the Senate after the elections, and therefore at much the same time as the envoys to Antiochos returned.

²⁰ Since these cities had been separated from Sparta by Roman action, they theoretically stood in the same relationship to Rome as Nabis himself, but Livy (35.13.2) says their protection had been assigned to Achaia; cf. Errington, *Philopoemen*, 88–89, Walbank, *Philip V*, 188.

²¹ Livy 35.12.7.

²² Livy 35.13.2–3.

enemies; in the Peloponnese this was to be maintained between Sparta and Achaia, between Sparta and Messenia, and between Messenia and Achaia. Nabis had proved himself fully capable of taking on either of these old foes, and had been reduced accordingly. Now, with only a small encouragement from Aitolia, he was proving himself fully capable of rising once more.

Achaia had known full well that what Nabis was doing was a challenge both to itself and to Rome. The minimum measures had been taken to prevent the situation in the Peloponnese from getting out of hand, and the whole problem was referred at once to Rome. Hence the Achaian envoys were already in the city when Sulpicius Galba and Villius Tappulus returned. The Roman envoys certainly agreed with the Achaians and alerted the Senate, where the matter was taken sufficiently seriously to prompt action, but not with such a sense of urgency that the action should take place at once—though it was still midwinter, which would delay any military or naval response. The praetor A. Atilius Serranus had already been instructed to reinforce the navy with thirty new ships; now he was further instructed to sail to Greece with twenty-five ships, presumably from the fleet already in being and manned.²³ But since it was still winter, he would not be able to sail for several months.

So any immediate action would have to be undertaken by the Achaians. They showed their full appreciation of the role of Rome by delaying their own decision for war until their envoys returned from the city. By that time also a group of Romans had arrived to see what was going on, and to supervise what was to be done. The leader of the group was T. Quinctius Flamininus himself, reasonably enough, for it was his settlement that was being threatened. He had with him P. Villius Tappulus, his old colleague, a man fully alert to the complexities of the whole Greek and Asian situation. The other two envoys were a third consular, Cn. Servilius Caepio, consul in 203 (and so the senior of the three consulars present), and Cn. Octavius, who had been praetor with Caepio in 205, but had not reached the consulate; he had been one of the founders of the Roman colony at Croton a year earlier.²⁴

The power of this delegation is a clear sign that the Senate was fully aware that more was at stake than the fate of a few towns on

²³ Livy 35.20.12–14; on the question of numbers of ships, cf. Thiel, *Studies*, 259.

²⁴ Livy 35.23.5 (the commissioners); 34.45.5 (Croton triumphvirs).

the rocky Lakonian coast. The involvement of the Aitolians in rousing Nabis to action was certainly public knowledge, as was the fact that other Aitolian envoys had been sent to Philip and Antiochos, though the failure of these was probably also known. The appointment of the four to Greece was one of the measures being taken by the Senate in response to a series of rumours which spread through Rome during the winter. They included one of those rumours whose apparent concreteness conceals its totally unlikely content, yet whose clear unlikeliness argues for its credibility: that Antiochos would move to Aitolia, and then send a fleet to Sicily. Where he would get the ships from, where his soldiers would come from, what they would do in Sicily, why he should bother with Sicily in the first place, were all aspects which were completely ignored by the story. The Senate, not taken in, took minimal measures: twenty ships were to go to Sicily, commanded by L. Oppius Salinator,²⁵ and M. Baebius Tamphilus was ordered to march his army from Bruttium to Brundisium; in addition, a defence force of 12,000 infantry and 400 cavalry was authorised to be recruited to man the coast facing Greece, and the four envoys were sent to Greece itself.²⁶

These measures were not serious preparations for war. Baebius' army was still not big enough to tackle the Aitolians and the army of the Seleukid kingdom together, and the Aitolians alone were not going to declare war on Rome. Twenty ships sent to Sicily would not achieve much if a real invasion took place—they would either be in the wrong place or be overwhelmed. The force of 12,000 infantry and 400 cavalry supposed to man the coast was ludicrously small when the length of that coast—well over a thousand miles from Rhegion to the new colony at Sipontum—is considered. And if Sicily was threatened, why was Baebius' army being marched away from Bruttium eastwards? These military measures suggest strongly that the Senate was not seriously apprehensive about an invasion, and was instituting cosmetic measures for the sake of quieting the rumours.

²⁵ Oppius had been plebeian aedile the previous year (Livy 35.23.7); he had been one of the tribunes who had intervened in the allocation of provinces in 197, and had thus been in part instrumental in persuading the Senate to prorogue Flamininus' command in Greece (Livy 32.28.3). His appointment to the Sicilian fleet was clearly unusual and may be attributed in part to the fact that L. Flamininus was currently consul. Oppius was to be praetor next year (Livy 35.24.6).

²⁶ Livy 35.23.5–10.

On the other hand, under cover of these rumours, and of the crisis over Nabis, the Roman republic had succeeded in moving substantial forces into forward positions. Baebius' two legions and Italian auxiliaries would, when the sailing season began, be in a position to reach Epeiros within a few days, if that was necessary; Atilius would have a useful fleet of quinqueremes in Peloponnesian waters, and an immediate reserve of twenty more would be available in Sicilian waters; an extra force equivalent to two legions (the 12,000 defence force along the coast) would be in position in southern Italy when the spring arrived. And there was now present in Greece, the crucial sector, a high-powered and experienced diplomatic mission. Its purpose was theoretically to help Achaia with the problem of Nabis, but it was also actually available to prepare the way for any possible Roman intervention.

The source of the rumours which propelled these actions is thus of some interest. Livy describes them as 'anonymous and groundless',²⁷ but they must have started somewhere. Since they were groundless, and since they circulated at Rome, their authors were Roman. Inevitably one is driven to the conclusion that they originated in the play of politics in the city. Two years before, Scipio Africanus as consul had argued that Antiochos, with Hannibal at his side, was dangerous, and he had wanted Macedonia as his province with the Roman forces in Greece under his command. He had failed to persuade the Senate then, which had instead accepted Flaminius' proposal that the soldiers be brought home. Two years on and in the elections for consuls for 193/192 the contest for the patrician place had been hard-fought between Africanus' cousin P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, who had been a praetor during Africanus' consulship in 194, and Flaminius' brother Lucius, praetor as long ago as 199 and commander of the fleet for several years in the Greek campaign, and thus long overdue for a consulship. The election results, which saw L. Flaminius chosen, could be seen as a defeat for Africanus' group. The plebeian place also went to a man who might be seen as an opponent of Scipio, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, but then there had been three other candidates, all of whom seem to have been Scipio supporters, and who were thus appealing to the same supporters and so had split that vote.²⁸

²⁷ Livy 35.23.2.

²⁸ Elections: Livy 35.10.1-11, emphasising the rivalry between Cn. Scipio and T. Flaminius; cf. also Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 122-123, Briscoe, 'Flaminius', 48-49.

One result of this election will have been the inclusion of T. Flamininus among the envoys sent to Greece (and the appointment of Oppius to command the small fleet off Sicily). But another result may well have been the rumours which moved the Senate to its precautionary actions. In 194 Africanus had failed to persuade the Senate by open and reasoned argument that Antiochos was dangerous. There is no reason to believe he had changed his mind on this, but with two consuls inimical to him and his policies he had no handle on direct power. It seems a suspicious coincidence, therefore, that it should be just at that time that the rumours developed. They were, I suggest, part of Africanus' campaign, a campaign of rumour and scare tactics.

The result was that the Senate was moved in the direction Africanus wished it to go, though only in the way of preparation, not action. However, such was the croneyism in the Senate that the election of Scipio Nasica could not be delayed much longer. L. Flamininus was a disreputable character, and he comprehensively wrecked his reputation during his consulship, something which would, illogically but understandably, reflect on the policy advocated by his brother in Greece. Nasica was a stern and upright Roman, of great gifts, and with a notable record in Spain;²⁹ he could expect his turn in office next year.

Nevertheless, the various movements of troops and ships were only precautions; no doubt the Senate was well able to distinguish rumour from reality. There had been no decision for war with Antiochos. The only movement of real military significance was that of Atilius and his fleet to the Peloponnese, and he took so long to get there—he did not reach the area of warfare until the summer of 192³⁰—that the Senate clearly hoped that the crisis over Nabis would be

²⁹ Emphasised by Livy 35.10.5 and 9.

³⁰ Livy 35.37.3; cf. Errington, *Philopoimen*, 94. Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 309, thinks he had arrived earlier, but had refrained from action (Zon. 9.19 says he did nothing) because Flamininus told him to wait. Errington, however, is following Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 128–129, in assuming that all this was actually a set of moves in the 'cold war' between Roman and Antiochos. There is no doubt that the relationship between the two great powers was in Roman minds at this time, and that the need to deal with Nabis would usefully eliminate a potential problem if a conflict with Antiochos arrived, but for it to be a 'cold war' some evidence is needed that Antiochos was involved in Greece at the time. Of this there is only the visit of Hegesianax to Delphi in 193, not a very convincing degree of involvement.

resolved without the need to involve Roman ships and soldiers. And, as it happened, this was how it turned out—but by then other events had overtaken the Senate's original intentions.

Both the Senate and Antiochos were convinced that the embassy of Galba and his colleagues had removed the heat from their relationship which had been injected by the failure of the embassy of Menippos and Hegesianax. The rumours of the winter in Rome were largely refuted by the repeated investigations by official commissions, and the Senate obviously set more store by the latter, in particular by Galba's assurance that there was no sign in Asia that Antiochos was preparing for war.³¹

So Roman attention was concentrated on Greece. The sending of T. Flamininus and his colleagues there was a clear signal that the enforcement of the peace terms so recently worked out and ratified was the Senate's intention. That meant that no Roman garrisons were to be placed in Greece. The rumours about Antiochos had not pushed the Senate to war, or even to detailed preparations for it. But things had clearly gone wrong in Greece. Flamininus and his three fellow commissioners were firemen, sent to control the fire which was threatening to break out there.

Flamininus went to the Peloponnese first. It was here that the settlement of 194 was in most peril. The Achaian League was seriously apprehensive about Nabis, and wished for Roman support in dealing with him. The Achaian *strategos*, Philopoimen, waited for Flamininus to arrive and consult before taking action. Flamininus did not oblige by suggesting action: he hoped for the restoration of the former settlement. The Achaians, by contrast, wanted the suppression of Nabis as a step towards the Achaian ambition to unite the whole Peloponnese into their league. So Philopoimen persuaded the Achaians to declare war on Sparta.³²

Flamininus, no doubt accompanied by the other envoys—Livy makes no mention of the others, except for Villius, once—moved on to other places in a swift tour, first to Athens, where he persuaded the city to send envoys to attend the Aitolians at the spring *Panaitolika*,

³¹ Livy 35.22.1–2.

³² Livy 35.25.3–10; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 305–306; Errington, *Philopoimen*, 95–99; this was the start of personal hostility between Flamininus and Philopoimen (Errington, *Philopoimen*, 99).

which was due to be held late in March;³³ then the Romans went to Chalkis, one of the former 'Fetters' of Greece, where the government was one which Flamininus had himself installed less than two years before, and which was accordingly less than firmly founded; Flamininus' presence would help to reassure the leaders of the new regime and it seems there was a purge soon after his visit.³⁴ The same purpose was no doubt evident in his visit to the Thessalians, and then he went on to the city of Demetrias, another of the former Fetters.³⁵ Here the situation was especially fragile.

The controlling group in Demetrias, forming the council of the Magnetes, had become anti-Roman. The original governing group was surely pro-Roman, since it had been in effect appointed by Flamininus two years earlier when he withdrew the Roman garrison. But the sudden development of Roman favours for Philip V in the recent past had produced a rumour that Demetrias would be handed back to Macedon.³⁶ No doubt there was a substantial pro-Macedonian party in the city, which was, after all, a foundation of the Antigonid king Demetrios Poliorketes, and had been under Macedonian control since then. If the Romans were no longer to be physically present in the city, therefore, the choice of foreign policy for the city rulers lay between favouring Philip and favouring Aitolia. The governing group, anti-Macedonian by definition, had become anti-Roman because it seemed that Rome had become pro-Philip; the anti-Romans thus became pro-Aitolian.

The chief magistrate, the Magnetarch, was a man called Eurylochos, who was now the leader of the pro-Aitolians. Flamininus was unable to state definitively that the city would not be handed over to Philip.³⁷ This was a result of his reduction in status from proconsul to envoy, but the Demetrians perhaps did not fully appreciate the restriction in his authority which this implied. But he did demonstrate his power

³³ Livy 35.31.3 and 32.7.

³⁴ Livy 35.31.3; at 37.4 there is a reference to a man being driven into exile at this time. This has been taken to imply that the Romans installed a whole new regime (Walbank, *Philip V*, 145), repeated in Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2, 190) but only one man seems to be involved: a purge is perhaps more likely than a *coup*.

³⁵ Livy 35.31.3.

³⁶ Livy 35.31.3-6.

³⁷ Livy 35.31.7-13; Walbank, *Philip V*, 195; Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 130; the question was, of course, impossible to answer, along the lines of 'Have you stopped beating your wife yet?'. This was, presumably quite deliberate; no wonder Flamininus lost his temper.

when Eurylochos loudly complained that Rome still pulled the strings. Since this had been the whole object of the peace settlement from Rome's point of view, Flamininus was not really entitled to complain. Instead he lost his temper at the bare-faced truth being stated, and Eurylochos prudently fled. His rival Zeno became the Roman favourite; and thereby the accuracy of Eurylochos' complaint was fully revealed.³⁸

Eurylochos fled to Aitolia, and it was in that direction that everyone was now turning, for the spring *Panaitolika* meeting was due on March 21. This meeting had full powers of peace and war, though this was not the meeting at which new magistrates were elected. As an assembly it consisted of a meeting of all adult males who could reach the meeting place, that is to say, it was an assembly of the Aitolian army, since, if it decided on war, this would begin at once. Hence the attention everyone gave it. Eurylochos was there, no doubt emphasising his harsh treatment at Roman hands and spreading the news of Flamininus' arrogance; and his treatment certainly exposed the reality behind the Roman rhetoric of 'liberation'. Athenian envoys were also going to the meeting, prompted by Flamininus. And an envoy had also arrived from Antiochos.³⁹

As so often, the activities of Antiochos at this crucial time have to be reconstructed from scattered and oblique references. His envoy was, once again, Menippos, and he is said to have described the forces which the king had gathered, infantry, cavalry, elephants, and gold. In fact, of course, this was no more than the normal Hellenistic royal army, and, considering Livy carefully, it is not wholly clear that it was Menippos who originated this description. He was accompanied to Aitolia by Thoas, the Aitolian who had been the league *strategos* until the previous September. The excited account of the Seleukid army in Livy is attributed to both men.⁴⁰

Thoas had clearly been sent to Antiochos in order to continue the pressure on him begun the previous spring by Dikaiarchos, and which had made no obvious impression. Thoas' embassy is not described in any source, but it was obviously somewhat more successful than that of Dikaiarchos, since Menippos had arrived, the first official envoy from the king to the league. Dikaiarchos' mission

³⁸ Livy 35.31.14–31.1.

³⁹ Cf. Grainger, *League of the Aitolians*, 431–432.

⁴⁰ Livy 35.32.3–4.

had been to try to bring Antiochos into an alliance with Aitolia (supposed to be joined also by Nabis and Philip), but Antiochos, with the Roman envoys on his doorstep, had been evasive. Yet he will not have given a definite refusal—good diplomatists never do—and Thoas' mission was clearly intended to be more persuasive. He will have gone to Asia some time after ceasing to be *strategos* (which office he held until late September 193), and he returned, with Menippos, before the *Panaitolika* in March 192. It is unlikely that Thoas spent all the winter in Asia, and it was normal for Antiochos to spend the winter months in Syria, if not further east, and this was all the more necessary now that his eldest son was dead. Antiochos and Thoas thus no doubt met in Asia, and probably in the spring. The conference between the two men need not have lasted for more than a few days early in March. Antiochos' response to the meeting was to send Menippos to address the Aitolian assembly.

This was obviously a long way short of the response Thoas and his group wanted. Yet it was a major step for Antiochos. The unofficial visit to Delphi of Hegesianax in early 193 is the first contact of any sort between Aitolia and Antiochos which can be discerned; the visit of Dikaiarchos to Antiochos later in the year is the first official contact, at least that was known of—and there is no indication of any earlier contacts.⁴¹ Menippos' visit to the *Panaitolika* was thus the first official embassy of a Seleukid king to the Aitolian League. Yet this was not a promise of anything other than an exchange of envoys, and Menippos did not bring anything with him other than friendly words. Even in Livy's paraphrase, Menippos' speech was notably unspecific, apparently dwelling on what might have happened in the past if things had been different.⁴² He in fact threw the ball back into the Aitolians' court, pointing out that it was up to them to take action, not the king.

In fact, as appears from another brief notice, Antiochos' army had been gathered, not for an intervention in Greece, but for another

⁴¹ There are official contacts, in the form of *proxenos*-agreements, between Aitolians and men of the cities of Antiochos' kingdom, and there are plenty of Aitolians employed by Antiochos in his army; the two were not ignorant of each other, but formal diplomatic contacts are not attested before 193; Grainger, *Aitolian Prosopographical Studies*, 61–68.

⁴² Livy 35.32.8–11; another Livian speech, not to be taken as more than a summary, probably inaccurate.

campaign in Thrace.⁴³ This prompted Eumenes of Pergamon to send his brother Attalos to Rome to report this to the Senate.⁴⁴ He arrived later in the spring, and so Antiochos had crossed into Thrace in March or so, as is to be expected, perhaps soon after his meeting with Thoas. But the news will have reached the Aitolians much sooner; in fact Antiochos' plans were surely known to Menippos, who would be under no obligation of secrecy. It is therefore not surprising that Menippos made no promises of assistance to Aitolia, nor that the Aitolian assembly pronounced a decision on war. Instead a double-barrelled resolution was agreed: an invitation to Antiochos to 'liberate Greece' was combined with another invitation to him to arbitrate the dispute between the Aitolians and Rome.⁴⁵

As Livy perceived, the first half of this pair of resolutions was a deliberate insult to Rome, which had already carried through a 'liberation' of Greece. Apart from the insult, however—and Romans must have been used to Aitolian insults by now—it had no immediate effect, since Antiochos was on campaign in Thrace. There was no possibility of him responding to the invitation for several months at the least and perhaps not for a year.⁴⁶ The invitation to arbitrate, however, was a more subtle ploy. Aitolia had been an independent ally of Rome in two wars, and, although treated by the Romans as a subordinate, the league had always behaved in an independent manner. The source of Aitolia's discontent, indeed, was precisely that the Roman peace settlement in Greece had not fully taken account of Aitolia's rights and expectations as an independent state. The invitation to arbitrate was thus one which was intended to compel Rome to re-negotiate that peace settlement. That the settlement had involved an intricate balancing act between many parties in Greece was certainly fully appreciated by the Aitolians, but that was exactly what

⁴³ Livy 35.37.7; this is not a wholly reliable notice, since it is a report by Livy of a comment by an Aitolian to Nabis; the possibilities of distortion, inaccuracy, exaggeration, and downright falsehood are numerous. Yet after three years' campaigning in 196–194, Antiochos had not visited Thrace the previous year; the new province may well have become restless and in need of attention; it is thus credible and may be accepted. The fact that Alexamenos, the Aitolian, uses the information to suggest that Antiochos was coming to Greece, perhaps lends a certain distorted credibility to the notice.

⁴⁴ Livy 35.23.10.

⁴⁵ Livy 35.33.8; this is not included in the 'cases' in Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations*.

⁴⁶ For this reason it is *not*, as Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 2, 194, claims, 'a virtual declaration of war'.

made it something which the Romans could not possibly agree to change. To do so would be to antagonise just about every other state in Greece, from Macedon to Messenia, and could only encourage those who were Rome's enemies. Above all, it would require a radical change in Rome's attitude to Philip, and would mean the replacement of Macedon by Aitolia as the paramount Greek power—and Aitolia would still be an independent state, owing no obligation to Rome. Yet if Rome refused to accept arbitration it also risked antagonising Antiochos. The invitation to arbitrate was thus another Aitolian ploy to gather the anti-Roman Greek—including the Seleukid kingdom—states into its own alliance.

The Athenian envoys to the *Panaitolika* ignored all this, but did speak for those other Greek states who were quite satisfied with the peace settlement as it was. They warned the Aitolians against hasty decisions, very liable to be taken by an assembly meeting at such infrequent intervals, and recommended that the Aitolians at least hear what the Romans had to say.⁴⁷ The assembly rejected this,⁴⁸ but, presumably after the assembly had dispersed—without any declaration of war—the Aitolian council decided to hear Flamininus after all.⁴⁹ As will become evident later, there was a division among the Aitolians as to the best policy, and here is an indication of it.

This was all reported to the Roman envoys by the Athenians when they returned home after the *Panaitolika*. Flamininus decided to go to the meeting of the council, but only after some hesitation.⁵⁰ If he did not go, the Aitolians would be annoyed, quite rightly; the council had, after all, defied a vote of the assembly to invite him. This in turn suggested that his audience would be somewhat more sympathetic than the assembly, though that was not saying much. Also, if he stayed away, he would be admitting the justice of the Aitolians' claims, since by failing to argue his case he would hand a vital debating point to them, a factor of some importance in a culture which set much store by public debate. On the other hand, if he did go to the meeting, he would need to be able to put a good case, and

⁴⁷ Livy 35.32.12–14.

⁴⁸ Livy 35.33.1.

⁴⁹ Ibid.; the 'chiefs', as Livy calls them—presumably the officials in office—were evidently able to ignore a vote of the assembly, which requires the assembly to have dispersed.

⁵⁰ Livy 35.33.2–3.

this, as it proved, he could not do. But, on balance, it was better to go than not.

As it happened, all Flamininus could do was claim that the Aitolians were Roman allies, which was not the case, and so recommend that they submit their grievances to the Senate through an embassy to Rome.⁵¹ To do this, of course, would be for the Aitolians to admit that they really were Rome's subject allies, as Flamininus had claimed, and anyway they had tried this approach before, with no result. Flamininus then gave a generalised warning of the costs of war, the sort of thing diplomats say when they can find nothing germane to say. It was then that, on the proposal of Thoas, the council adopted the resolutions of invitation to Antiochos, which had clearly been prepared and discussed beforehand. They were to some extent a relief to Flamininus, who might have expected an immediate declaration of war. They were also to a degree a disappointment to the Aitolian group which was in favour of war. But the Aitolians could not move or act alone, since they needed the assistance of Seleukid power if they were to challenge Rome. This had been the aim of Aitolian policy for the past year. So the invitations were compromises, worked out by the Aitolian council when it had become clear that Antiochos was not available, at least not immediately, and proposed by the leader of the war-party, Thoas. The disappointment made the Aitolian *strategos* Damokritos angry, and he was rude to Flamininus, threatening to dictate peace on the banks of the Tiber.⁵² In the circumstances, it was a ludicrously hollow threat.

Nevertheless, the Roman envoys could be in no doubt that the Aitolians were spoiling for a fight, if they could gather allies. Menippos had in fact challenged them to make the first move in the war, though without specifically promising anything if they did.⁵³ Flamininus returned quickly to Corinth after his attendance at the Aitolian meeting.⁵⁴ No doubt he communicated the substance of what had happened to the Senate, and then set about making his own preparations in case the crisis developed into an open conflict. For the possibility of continuing peace still existed. No irrevocable moves had been made. Antiochos could not do anything for some months, since he

⁵¹ Livy 35.33.5-6.

⁵² Livy 35.33.10.

⁵³ Livy 35.32.10.

⁵⁴ Livy 35.34.1.

was busy in Thrace, and that might mean that he could do nothing until next year, depending on how late it was when he finished there. So if the Aitolians could be foiled of their purpose during the summer, they were unlikely to go to war during the current year; and if they did go it alone, they could be dealt with. A whole campaigning season without any fighting would thus give the Senate time to prepare, and at the end, say in October, matters might be so tied up in the Roman interest in Greece that the Aitolians would see that it was hopeless to try anything. At the same time, if a war with Antiochos did develop, or one with Aitolia, or with both, the Roman preparations would not be wasted, for these preparations would consist of recruiting allies, confirming friends, deterring potential enemies—and bringing forces across the sea. And once a Roman army was in Greece Aitolia could be dealt with alone. But it all depended on no movement by Antiochos before the Romans were ready.

One of the problems which needed to be sorted out quickly was the war between Achaia and Sparta. Achaia had declared war against Flamininus' advice, but on the recommendation of the *strategos* Philopoimen. An attempt to relieve Gytheion by sea failed in a humiliating fashion, and Philopoimen then led Achaia's army in an invasion of Lakonia. Nabis nevertheless succeeded in taking Gytheion, the siege of which the invasion had been intended to relieve. Philopoimen led the Achaians into an ambush, from which he successfully extricated them, but then, at last, defeated Nabis by raiding his camp. Nabis drew his army into the city of Sparta and, holding on to Gytheion as well, stood a siege.⁵⁵

During all the time Flamininus and the Romans were dealing with problems in central Greece, the siege of Sparta was continuing. In effect, Philopoimen had failed in his attempt to defeat—or conquer—Sparta before the Romans could intervene. Part of the cost of this had been a growing estrangement between Flamininus and Philopoimen. A possible future cost was the complete alienation of Achaia from Rome. It was quite possible that, unless the fighting was brought to an end, Achaia might join with Aitolia. For Achaia, like Aitolia, had no formal ties with Rome, either of alliance or clientship; yet Sparta did have a treaty relationship with Rome, and thus Rome was in the position of Nabis' patron, liable to provide support and assistance.

⁵⁵ Livy 35.25.12–30.12; Plut. *Philop.* 14.4–7.

So when, about the end of March or early in April, Flamininus and the Romans returned to Corinth, he set about right away to end the fighting. Philopoimen had already been warned, indirectly, of the likelihood of this, by the arrival at his camp, even before the siege began, of the 'leading men' of the Epeirote and Akarnanian Leagues.⁵⁶ They apparently brought no troops, so their presence was political and diplomatic, and the only reason for their intervention was to restrain Philopoimen before he made a further attack on Lakonia. Both of these leagues were Roman allies, and both had old ties of alliance with Achaia as well, dating back to the Symmarchy developed by Antigonos Doson thirty years before, and neither had any friendly feelings towards Aitolia; in fact Akarnania might be described as Aitolia's traditional enemy. Their influence was nil at this juncture, and Philopoimen went on with his war, but they will have served to warn him of the Roman displeasure, and perhaps they were able to indicate to him the wider context of his war.

Being stuck in a siege of Sparta, therefore, was for the Achaians a disaster, and the sign that they had not won the war; indeed, having failed to hold Gytheion, they could be said to have lost it, at least so far. Accordingly, Philopoimen, who will have been informed on a regular basis of the events at Demetrias and at the *Panaitolika*, withdrew his army from Lakonia about the end of March,⁵⁷ just about the time that Flamininus returned to Corinth. So Flamininus found the war in abeyance. He had no wish to remove Nabis, who formed, as had just been proved, a useful counterweight to the Achaians. The slow approach of Atilius' Roman fleet—taking an unconscionable time over its voyage, but surely Flamininus will have had some idea of its progress—was another pressure, for its arrival would compel the Romans to attack Nabis. So Flamininus intervened and persuaded Nabis to sign a truce;⁵⁸ he then told Philopoimen that a truce existed. In his patronal situation with regard to Nabis, he could insist that the fighting should now stop. Nabis, the winner, was no doubt happy to agree, and to keep his grip on Gytheion and the seaward towns he had seized. On a personal level, this confirmed the enmity which existed between Flamininus and Philopoimen,

⁵⁶ Livy 35.27.11.

⁵⁷ Livy 35.30.13.

⁵⁸ Plut. *Philop.*, 15; Paus. 8.50.10; Livy does not mention the truce; cf. Errington, *Philopoimen*, 106.

and this was made worse by public praises heaped on the latter as a victorious Greek commander, by implication placing the two men on the same level. Flamininus was not pleased, quite rightly. It was the second insult he had received from the *strategos* of a Greek League in a fortnight.⁵⁹

The Aitolians meanwhile were planning their move which was designed to convince Antiochos that they were openly anti-Roman, and thus bring him to Greece with his army. Yet they did not wish to go to the extent of actually declaring war, since that would expose them to the full weight of Rome's enmity without the guarantee of any support. So their plans took on the same colouring as those implemented by Nabis in the previous autumn: *coups d'état* in target cities, and assassinations. In a sense Flamininus had shown them the way by sponsoring the *coup* at Demetrias, and earlier, by imposing pro-Roman oligarchies all through central Greece. The Aitolian plan was to target three places: Demetrias, Chalkis, and Sparta.⁶⁰ The aim was to win over all three to the Aitolian cause, and the ultimate intention surely was to persuade other areas of Greece to swing over to the Aitolian side; the secondary targets will have been Thessaly, Boiotia, and Athens, where the pro-Roman regimes all faced anti-Roman oppositions. Hopes may also have been held for Philip, and later events suggest that Epeiros and Akarnania might well have been contacted.⁶¹

The attempt on Demetrias was successful. The Aitolian *hipparchos* Diokles went there with a force of Aitolian cavalry, the ground in the city having been prepared already by the followers of the exiled Eurylochos, who publicly lamented his absence and campaigned for his recall. Diokles got his horsemen into the city on the pretext of escorting Eurylochos home; they seized the city gates, brought Eurylochos to the *agora* and made him the centre of attention, and meanwhile their soldiers were seizing the main centres, while the Demetrians were distracted. Then those opposing leaders who could be found were killed; the whole process demonstrated that Eurylochos' exile had been fully justified.⁶²

⁵⁹ Plut., *Philop.*, 15.1, and *Flam.*, 13.2-3; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 313-314; Errington, *Philopoemen*, 106-108.

⁶⁰ Livy 35.34.4-5.

⁶¹ For all this, cf. Grainger, *League of the Aitolians*, 436-442.

⁶² Livy 35.34.6-11.

Only a hundred miles south of Demetrias, Thoas took charge of the attempt on Chalkis in Euboia. There again there was a group of exiles, driven out at the time of Flamininus' intervention a couple of months earlier. Thoas contrived a complicated scheme involving no less than three different groups converging on the city, and hoped in addition that their arrival would be a surprise. The leading exile, Euthymides,⁶³ was to post himself just across the Euripos at Salganeus; Herodoros, a wealthy merchant originally from Kios on the Propontis, was to command a fleet of thirty ships with six hundred soldiers, stationed at Atalante island, thirty miles north up the Euripos strait; Thoas with 1,600 troops was to march, rather too openly for a secret approach, through Boiotia to meet Euthymides at Salganeus. Inevitably the Chalkidian leaders Mikythio and Xenokleides heard that something was up, and called in troops from their allies at Eretria and Karystos, also on Euboia. These garrisoned Chalkis itself while the two Chalkidian leaders took the levy of the city to face Thoas and Euthymides. This put the centre of events at Salganeus, a well-fortified outpost of the city on the Boiotian side of the Euripos. Thoas had no wish to fight, and did not have enough troops to defeat the city levy, ensconced behind its fortifications; Euthymides' support in the city was shown to be minimal—not surprisingly, since his supporters were either conscripted into the city levy, or intimidated by the allied garrison—and no-one gave the signal to Herodoros' fleet. After a brief altercation, Thoas led his men home.⁶⁴

Not only had the Chalkidians heard of Thoas' intentions before he arrived, but word had also reached Flamininus at Corinth; Aitolian security in this case was clearly very bad, which is hardly surprising given all the fuss Thoas was making. Flamininus sailed to the Euripos, to discover that the immediate crisis at Chalkis was over. There he met King Eumenes, who was presumably on the same mission, and there they heard of the *coup* at Demetrias. Eumenes put five hundred troops into Chalkis to 'protect' the city's liberty, and sailed on to Athens, where his presence no doubt helped to hold the city for a time.⁶⁵

⁶³ 'Euthymidas' in Livy (35.37.4), but as Briscoe *Comm. Livy*, 200, points out he was presumably 'Euthymides', Chalkidians speaking with an Ionic accent.

⁶⁴ Livy 35.37.4–38.14; for Salganeus cf. S. C. Bakhuizen, *Salganeus and the Fortifications on its Mountains, Chalcidian Studies II*, Groningen 1970, which contributes substantially to the understanding of events at Chalkis in these years.

⁶⁵ Livy 35.39.1–2.

Flamininus made an attempt to recover Demetrias. Rather than go to the city himself, where his presence, as he must have known, would only be incendiary, Villius went, in a quinquereme. But even this display of Roman power had no effect. Flamininus had clearly hoped that Villius in the harbour would attract enough attention for a force under Eunomos, the *strategos* of the Thessalian League, to reach the city, and presumably capture it by a *coup de main*, in the same way that Diokles had done so recently. Certainly Villius attracted attention by holding a shouted dialogue with Eurylochos, the one in his ship, the other on the quay. But Eunomos' troops could not enter, and when Villius sailed away, the Thessalians were dismissed to their homes. At least the Thessalians seemed to be safe for Rome.⁶⁶

The third Aitolian *coup* attempt was aimed at Sparta. It was commanded by Alexamenos, a Kalydonian like the current *strategos* Damokritos, and a man who had been *strategos* himself in 197/196, when the peace which the Aitolians so disliked had been worked out. He was given a thousand Aitolian soldiers and sent to seize Sparta; he also had thirty cavalrymen who were given special secret instructions by Damokritos. The arrival of this force was welcomed by Nabis, who assumed that his Aitolian alliance held, and that these were reinforcements intended to bolster his regime. But Aitolian policy had changed. Nabis' state of suspended war with Achaia was as disturbing to the Aitolians as it was to everyone else. If he was eliminated, it might be possible for Aitolia to bring Achaia round to the anti-Roman side: Achaia was clearly a more valuable ally than the tyrannical revolutionary Nabis; also the bad feeling between Philopoiemen and Flamininus must have been common knowledge in Greece by this time, and it may have seemed that Achaia was almost as disenchanting with Rome as Aitolia had become. And the only thing preventing Achaia from showing what the Aitolians presumed were the true Achaian (anti-Roman) feelings was enmity from Nabis. So, after a period of ostensible friendship designed to lull Nabis' suspicions, the thirty troopers assassinated the Spartan king.⁶⁷

Needless to say, the actual deed was easily accomplished compared with controlling the consequences. First, the murderers were attacked by the Spartans, who were loyal to Nabis after years of

⁶⁶ Livy 35.39.3–8.

⁶⁷ Livy 35.35.1–19.

purges of his opponents. Then the Aitolians began looting in the palace and the city. This distracted them from establishing a new government, which should have been their priority. The Spartans brought out a boy of the royal family called, by Livy, 'Lakonikos', which may not be his real name but may have been adopted for patriotic reasons; it was certainly a rallying point. Under this banner, they turned on their tormentors. The Aitolians had scattered throughout the city and were all killed or driven out; Alexamenos in the palace was killed; those Aitolians who had been expelled rallied, but were then defeated; those who escaped beyond the Spartan borders were captured and sold by Sparta's neighbours. All this provided splendid material for Greek moralisers.⁶⁸

The Aitolian plot had failed; it then went even further wrong. As had been indicated by the reception the fleeing Aitolians got when they crossed the border into the lands of the Achaian League, the Achaian response was instinctively anti-Aitolian. Philopoimen immediately intervened at Sparta. He arrived with an armed force, and persuaded an assembly of leading men to agree to Sparta's entry into the Achaian League. This was not at all what the Aitolians had wanted, for the net result was that their possible friends in the Peloponnese were now reduced to just Elis and Messenia. The Achaians could have no interest in fighting the Romans now. Further the praetor Atilius arrived off Gytheion with the Roman fleet at the same time.

This is extraordinary timing, so much so that mere coincidence can surely be ruled out. Livy claims that he 'chanced' to arrive at that time, but to do so the fleet will have had to have been fairly close by already. In theory, Atilius had been on his way since the spring; it was now about June; it did not take three months to make the voyage from Rome to Gytheion. It has been suggested that Flamininus held Atilius back⁶⁹ which is certainly possible, though whether he could *order* such a thing to a praetor in office is not certain. But Atilius must have been only a few days' sail from Gytheion when the assassination of Nabis took place, and was therefore close enough to arrive in the emergency.

⁶⁸ Livy 35.35.1-10.

⁶⁹ Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 309-311, not accepted by Errington, *Philopoimen*, 94-96.

Perhaps it was the complex politics which kept Atilius away. Nabis was a Roman client, being attacked by the Achaian League, a Roman friend, but independent. In this situation, Rome should, if anything, have been on Nabis' side. So when Nabis captured Gytheion, there was little Atilius' fleet could do. The arrival of Aitolian soldiers will have alerted him to the possibility of a Spartan defection, but without a specific political move by Nabis, Atilius, again, could do nothing. Nabis' assassination, however, left Sparta unattached, and Atilius could now move. But he was not as close as Philopoimen, whose home was in Megalopolis, no more than a day's hard ride from Sparta city. So by the time Atilius 'chanced' to arrive off the south coast, he found that Philopoimen had bounced the Spartan leaders into their new membership of the Achaian League. Since Rome's connection had been with Nabis, not Sparta, Nabis' death had severed the connection; Atilius had no grounds for complaint.

The net result of all this activity since the early spring had been to enhance the power of the Aitolian League by the acquisition of Demetrias, to enhance the power of the Achaian League by the acquisition of Sparta, and to demonstrate to all that the settlement of Greece by the Romans in 196 was very unstable. Flamininus and the Romans, however, could agree that instability was not necessarily inherent in the situation, but was to be explained as the result of the Aitolians' deliberately undermining it. And the Aitolians were only able to do that because they felt they had the friendship and support, potential or actual, of the Great King of the East, Antiochos III. By the late summer of 192, the changes in Greece had settled into the new pattern, again one which was inherently unstable, and one which was only temporarily acceptable to the Romans. The Aitolian acquisition of Demetrias could not be accepted by Rome under any circumstances, and would be a very acceptable cause of war. The Achaian control of Sparta was not something with which Rome was happy either. Nabis had been an embarrassing client and Flamininus was surely glad to be rid of him. The change in Sparta's political alignment, therefore, was not something to go to war over, so long as Achaia lined itself up with the Roman side. In other words, Sparta had become a useful item of blackmail. If Achaia wanted to keep Sparta, it would have to ally with Rome, which would put Rome in control.

This uneasy stalemate could only be resolved by outside intervention, which meant by a Roman army, or by Seleukid intervention

from Asia. At Rome there had arrived a long series of messengers, mainly no doubt from Flamininus, but also from Eumenes, all providing disturbing news.⁷⁰ The fact that Antiochos was campaigning again in Thrace when that had been one of the strongest objections the Romans had to his activities can only have seemed to be a repudiation of the apparent peacefulness of the previous year, and, in the suspicious atmosphere produced by the winter rumours, it might be deemed to be a deliberately provocative action. The Aitolian invitation to Antiochos to liberate Greece was insulting to any Roman familiar with events in the last few years. Aitolian *coups* and attempted *coups* may well have seemed more dangerous than they actually were. All these were unpleasant and indicative of Aitolian enmity and apparent liaison with Antiochos, yet were not causes for war. The seizure of Demetrias, however, was a direct challenge to the peace only recently ratified by the Senate.

These events had taken place in the spring and early summer; the seizure of Demetrias probably occurred in late April or perhaps early May. The news will have reached Rome in June. It followed the arrival of Attalos, King Eumenes' brother, who came with the news of Antiochos' move into Thrace.⁷¹ And it was followed by the further news, which perhaps did not arrive until July or maybe August, of the events at Sparta. The chronology here is somewhat uncertain, but the end of the siege of Sparta came later than the Aitolian *Panaitolika* meeting, so about the end of March. Flamininus' truce followed, and then after some time, the Aitolian assassination of Nabis was followed again by Philopoimen's own *coup*, and the union of Sparta with Achaia. It does not seem that these events can have taken less than three months, and perhaps more, and so that the union will have taken place in June or thereabouts. The news of this will thus have reached Rome about the end of July or early in August.

All this is admittedly conjectural, but some final event must have provoked the Senate to its unusual next action, which was to recall one of the consuls from the campaign in Cisalpine Gaul to hold the elections for 192/191 early.⁷² Again, exactly what this means—how

⁷⁰ Livy 35.24.1.

⁷¹ Livy 35.23.10.

⁷² Livy 35.24.1–3.

much earlier than usual was it?—is not clear, but it was certainly well before the end of the sailing season, for as soon as the elections were over, the praetor M. Baebius Tamphilus was ordered to take his force, which was now concentrated in the area of Brundisium, across to Apollonia in Illyria.⁷³ So the elections probably took place in September. And this means that in all likelihood the event which finally decided the Senate to take these emergency measures was Philopoimen's *coup* at Sparta.⁷⁴

Baebius' troops were shipped across in September/October, and were accommodated in the area of Apollonia and Epeiros. They had not been sent there in response to any action by Antiochos, nor to the Aitolians' seizure of Demetrias, but both of these would soon provide the reasons for their presence east of the Adriatic. If Baebius' move had really been ordered in response to events in the Peloponnese, then the enemy the Senate had in mind was presumably Achaia. Or maybe the Senate, bombarded all year by disturbing news from Greece, decided to move the troops as a precaution, just to lend weight to Flamininus' attempts to control the situation. And that had to be done before the autumn storms. September would be about the latest time.

But placing 25,000 troops⁷⁵ in Illyria provided a most useful weapon in the Senate's hand, one several weeks closer to any possible action. In fact, having taken these emergency measures, the Senate then had to wait until the end of October or early November to decide what else to do. The Ides of March fell on November 5 in that year, and provinces would need to be allocated before that date. For the consuls the decision was easy: Italy for one of them; the other to go where the Senate should decide; so if a consul was needed in

⁷³ Baebius had been ordered to march to Brundisium at the time of the rumour in the winter, with instructions to cross to 'Macedonia' if the situation required (Livy 35.23.5); he had clearly not moved from Brundisium by the time of the elections, and was then ordered to cross to Apollonia (Livy 35.24.7). Presumably the ending of the rumours had allowed the Senate to cancel the contingency orders, but Baebius' troops had stayed at Brundisium.

⁷⁴ It cannot have been the seizure of Demetrias, which the Senate will have known about much earlier.

⁷⁵ Exactly how many troops Baebius took across the sea is a problem. There seems to me to be no reason to suppose he took fewer than he commanded; that is, two Roman legions, 15,000 Italian infantry, and 800 Italian cavalry. That is what his instructions said (Livy 35.24.7—'all his forces'), and there seems no reason to doubt Livy here. See Appendix 1.

the east, one was available.⁷⁶ But such an allocation makes it clear that no war was yet decided upon. One was surely contemplated, but the enemy was uncertain. The consul who had conducted the elections, L. Quinctius Flaminius was authorised to begin recruiting 10,000 infantry and 700 cavalry for his successor.⁷⁷ One praetor was to have the Bruttians—left uncontrolled since Baebius had left—as his province, with two legions, 20,000 Italian infantry, and 800 cavalry as his command,⁷⁸ serving no doubt both as a protection for the new colonies there and as a reserve for the east should they be needed. Another praetor was to have the fleet, for which fifty new quinqueremes had been ordered.⁷⁹

So everyone in Rome waited for Antiochos. The Senate was not finally decided on war, but had made substantial preparations for it, with perhaps 50,000 soldiers and 75 quinqueremes available for use on the next campaigning season. This was still not a large enough force to take on both the Aitolians and the Seleukid army if they were united, but it was certainly enough to deter any attack on Italy, which was what had been feared and was even threatened, if Damokritos' angry words to Flaminius after the *Panaitolika* could be taken seriously.

Antiochos' decision was therefore to be the crucial one. Rome feared a war, but was clearly determined not to be the one who actually began it.⁸⁰ Even the Aitolian seizure of Demetrias had not brought a declaration, though the Senate must have known of it since June at the latest. From Rome it would seem that the situation in Greece was still unclear, and the Senate was no doubt being urged in different directions by various authorities. In fact, of course, everyone was waiting for Antiochos.

⁷⁶ Livy 35.41.3; Livy claims that 'everyone knew' that the undetermined province was really the war with Antiochos, which is not to say that this was what the Senate intended; taken at its obvious sense, this means that the Senate was keeping its options open.

⁷⁷ Livy 35.41.4–5.

⁷⁸ Livy 35.41.6.

⁷⁹ Livy 35.41.6 (the praetor), 24.8 (the ships); Thiel, *Studies*, 264, thinks these included the thirty ordered earlier (at 30.12).

⁸⁰ The Senate's reluctance was no doubt in part due to the wars Rome was waging elsewhere, and to the fact that Antiochos had given no cause. The difficulties involved in beginning the Macedonian war in 200 were also surely in senators' minds.

He had campaigned in Thrace since the spring. His previous campaigns there had lasted until September, and this one probably took as long. On his return he made further attempts to persuade three Asian coastal cities, Smyrna, Lampsakos, and, this time, Alexandria Troas as well, to accept his protection.⁸¹ It is not clear what was actually happening, for Livy's words are ambiguous, but one cannot conclude that Antiochos was attacking the cities. If he could enfold these cities into his system, then Rome would have no potential footing in his sphere, and his negotiating position would be all the stronger, just as his manifest control over Thrace was a clear demonstration of his power in that province. These moves therefore seem to imply that Antiochos during the autumn of 192 was anticipating further negotiations with Rome. In this light the sending of Menippos to the Aitolian assembly in the spring was one sign to Rome that he knew full well that Aitolia was not a Roman ally or satellite—he had been careful to contact no other Greek state, any and all of whom might be considered to be in such a relationship with Rome.

The news that the Aitolians had taken over Demetrias came to him by Thoas, who travelled to Asia. This news will have arrived in the middle of the year, say May or June, and was no doubt transmitted to him in Thrace. Antiochos was interested, but he was not swept off his feet, as Livy suggests.⁸² The king was in the middle of his Thracian campaign at the time, and would scarcely break off at the news of a *coup* in a single Greek city, even one as important as Demetrias. In fact, he did nothing about it for several months. The Aitolian invitations to him to liberate Greece and to arbitrate between Rome and Aitolia were, as he surely knew, intended to force him to overthrow the Roman settlement of Greece, and this would necessarily involve him in a war with Rome. This was something he wished to avoid, and he had consistently shown this in all his negotiations with Rome over the past decade. He was a friend of Rome, and he had negotiated repeatedly to solve the relatively minor areas of dispute which lay between them. In particular, Antiochos had scrupulously refrained from interfering in Greece, despite the turbulence of the area, which had presented numerous opportunities in the past few years. He must have felt that his good faith towards Rome and towards the Roman control of Greece had been fully demonstrated. He had had amicable relations with Flamininus in the

⁸¹ Livy 35.42.3.

⁸² Livy 35.42.4–5.

past, and with Villius, another of the Roman envoys. He had convinced even the crusty old-Roman Galba of his pacific intentions.

In the meantime news arrived of the events of the spring and summer, in total suggesting that the whole Roman scheme in Greece was tottering. It was being shored up here and there by the actions of Flamininus, but the situation, as everyone realised, was fragile. On consideration, the seizure of Demetrias by the Aitolians was decisive, not in itself, but because it had provoked no Roman response. This was a vital city, one of the Fetters of Greece, and one which had been set up as an independent state by deliberate Roman action. Now it had fallen to the state which had argued against the Roman peace settlement—and Rome had done nothing other than send Villius in a ship to ask the people to desist. Add to this the situation in the Peloponnese, where the Achaian League was also defying Rome over Sparta, and not a great deal seemed to be left of the Roman settlement.

It was in the light of all this that Antiochos decided to accept the Aitolians' invitation. The seizure of Demetrias had taken place in the spring, Spartan independence was extinguished in the summer. By the autumn, when Antiochos emerged from Thrace, Rome had done nothing about either situation. To an objective view, Rome had given up in Greece in the face of these decisive blows at the system it had erected so recently. The division of opinion at Rome over the east had been reported to him by his envoys; it seems that those who wanted nothing to do with it was in the ascendant: Flamininus was apparently getting no support. So Antiochos took the decision to move to Greece, specifically to Aitolian territory, in order to liberate Greece, which is to say he would bring its various communities into his protection, a measure which obviously, given recent disturbances, needed garrisons to enforce it. His intention was to stabilise the land, and to expand his authority. Rome's scheme was not working; perhaps his scheme would. And, so as not to alarm anyone, specifically not to alarm Rome, he took only a nominal force, just 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and six elephants, transported in a fleet which consisted mainly of transport ships.⁸³

Antiochos sailed to Greece with the intention of liberating and pacifying it. Needless to say the Romans did not see it that way. At the same time, Baebius was transporting his army to Illyria.

⁸³ Livy 35.43.2–3 and 6.

CHAPTER NINE

ANTIOCHOS IN GREECE: LANDING

The force which King Antiochos took to Greece has provoked surprise and derision by its small size.¹ Yet Antiochos must be presumed to have known what he was doing, and to have chosen deliberately and with forethought that precise force. To deride his expedition as inadequate, therefore, is to fail to understand his purpose, is in fact to beg the whole question. Since no ancient source explains that purpose, derision is both easy and is an evasion of the historian's duty. It behoves a historian to account for the king's actions, not avoid any explanation by merely assuming that the project was doomed from the start because the Romans always won.

The king had, of course, been 'invited' to Greece by the Aitolians, but for two specific purposes: to 'liberate' Greece, and to arbitrate the dispute between the Aitolian League and the Roman Republic. There is, however, no indication that he had accepted those invitations; he had certainly not leapt to cross the sea as soon as they were received, for he had spent the summer in Thrace, and even after completing his campaign there, he had attended to the three Asian cities first. Perhaps a month elapsed between the end of the Thracian campaign for the year, and the Aegean crossing. When he arrived in Greece those invitations were six months old, and could be considered obsolete at least.

Further, the condition of Greece had changed quite markedly since the spring, when the invitations were issued. The Aitolian *coups* had been attempted, and had succeeded only at Demetrias. The failures had also put many others on the alert. Indeed, in the Peloponnese all chance of recruiting Nabis and Sparta had failed with the city's union with Achaia. And in Aitolia the elections at the *Thermika* of

¹ Beginning with Livy 35.43.6 (who probably based himself on Polybios, though derision was not necessarily Polybios' attitude). Bar Kochva, *Seleukid Army*, 15-17 believed the force was in fact larger. Even if he is correct, the extra troops can only have been a few thousand, and the essential point, that Antiochos brought only a small army with him, is not altered.

September 192 had resulted in a change in the party in office with the election of Phaineas of Arsinoe as *strategos* of the League.²

Phaineas is well documented, for an Aitolian. He had been a prominent politician for almost two decades. He was *grammateus* of the league in 207/206, when Dorimachos was *strategos*, and Alexander of Kalydon *hipparchos*.³ This was the last year of the previous Macedonian war—the ‘first’ Macedonian war to the Romans (or rather their historians) but the third or fourth to the Aitolians—and it was the year in which the Aitolians decided they would break the alliance with Rome and make a separate peace with Philip, a decision Phaineas must have participated in taking. He was *hipparchos* two years later, in 205/204, when Skopas was *strategos* for the third time, and Thoas was *grammateus*.⁴ Dorimachos was Skopas’ brother, and these two and Thoas all came from the same town, Trichonos. They, with Dikaiarchos, were the leaders of what may be termed the bellicose party among the Aitolians. Dorimachos and Skopas had been moving spirits in the resistance of the Aitolians to attack by the Symmarchy, the Macedonian-inspired alliance under Philip, as long ago as 220–217.⁵ Skopas had been the mercenary commander in charge of the Ptolemaic army which had fought, and lost to, Antiochos III at the battle of Panion in 200.⁶ He was now dead in the failed *coup* at Alexandria,⁷ and Thoas and Dikaiarchos were now the leaders of the bellicose tendency.

Phaineas had been *strategos* for the first time in 198/197,⁸ the year of Kynoskephalai, at which battle the Aitolians took an honourable part. He thus knew Flaminius well, and had disputed with him over the rewards the Aitolians felt were their due after the defeat of Philip.⁹ His apparent association with the bellicose party in the past did not mean, however, that he would necessarily pursue the same policy in his second term as *strategos*. It was evident already in the *Panaitolika* at Naupaktos in the spring of 192 that the Aitolians

² Livy 35.44.1.

³ G. Klaffenbach in *IG IX.1.1* and xxxi–xxxii; Grainger, *Aitolian Prosopographical Studies*, 266.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I and xxxii.

⁵ Pol. 4.5.1–6.8, for example.

⁶ Pol. 16.39.3.

⁷ Pol. 18.54.5.

⁸ Livy 32.32.11.

⁹ Pol. 18.38.1–9; Livy 33.13.1–13.

were by no means united in the policy they hoped to implement¹⁰—any more than any other state would be—and when Antiochos actually arrived in October, these divisions emerged into the open once more. In fact, they had probably done so in September at the *Thermika*. The previous three *strategoi*, Dikaiarchos, Thoas, and Damokritos (in office 195/194 to 193/192) had been of the bellicose persuasion, wishing to emphasise the independence of the league, and to go it alone in their foreign policy. But this policy had failed badly when put into effect: Chalkis and Sparta had become hostile, Demetrias was scarcely a full-hearted member of the league, and no other Greek state had joined the Aitolians.

The election of Phaineas, therefore, represented a change in policy by the league, away from the Rome-baiting of Damokritos and Thoas, and towards a more conciliatory stance. Yet this was not a policy of surrender to Rome; independence of action was still the aim of the league, but the election of Phaineas was a signal that the league was not intent on a sudden all-out war with Rome. For Antiochos the election of Phaineas as *strategos* of the league, which took place in September, as the king was emerging from his Thracian campaign, was a sign that it was safer for him to go to Greece, since his arrival would now no longer be seen as a deliberate step towards war.

The king's progress across the Aegean was as careful and deliberate as had been his decision to undertake the expedition. Beginning in the Hellespont, presumably at Lysimacheia, since he had just emerged from Thrace, he went first to Ilion to sacrifice to Athene ('Minerva', according to Livy).¹¹ This, of course, is the same place at which Alexander sacrificed on his way east, and where Xerxes sacrificed on his way west, and the reference to Antiochos' sacrifice is presumably designed to remind Livy's readers of either or both of these great bringers-of-war. The contrast between the small force of Antiochos and the great armies of these kings was also obvious, and no doubt intended to denigrate Antiochos again. It is also designed to be contrasted with the similar sacrifice by Scipio Africanus two years later.¹²

¹⁰ The decision of the Aitolian 'chiefs' to hear Flamininus despite the assembly's prohibition shows this (Livy 35.33.1).

¹¹ Livy 35.43.3.

¹² Livy 37.9.7.

Livy is able, presumably from Polybios, to provide a detailed itinerary for the king's journey across the Aegean. The first stage was from the Hellespont to Imbros, which was presumably the rendezvous for the ships which were gathered from various ports; Skiathos was the rendezvous for the next stage, which may imply that the ships sailed independently from Imbros. He had forty warships (*tectae*) and sixty 'open ships' (*apertae*) with him and was accompanied by two hundred cargo vessels, carrying supplies and military equipment.¹³ Antiochos' 10,000 infantry would need over a hundred ships, perhaps 120, for their transport, his cavalry would need another twenty, and the six elephants perhaps a ship each.¹⁴ If the warships were not carrying troops, other than the standard supply of marines, this would account for the majority of the rest: 150 or so out of 260; the remainder would be those carrying supplies and military equipment, of which the supplies would clearly only last a relatively brief time. Some of the cargo vessels will also have been private ships, tagging along on speculation.

Having re-collected at Skiathos, the fleet sailed to Pteleon, at the mouth of the Gulf of Pagasai, where, obviously by pre-arrangement, the king was met by Eurylochos, the restored Magnetarch of Demetrias, and the other leading Magnesians. The fleet collected these men and sailed north to Demetrias, where the ships were harboured and the men and animals landed. A camp was established not far from the city, but it is notable that even the landing took place outside the city itself.¹⁵

If Eurylochos and his men knew that Antiochos was on his way, the news will have reached other parts of Greece as well. The Aitolians had convened a meeting of their council at Lamia, at the head of the Malian gulf, presumably in order to co-ordinate actions with the king as soon as possible. Antiochos, having seen to the landing of his forces, sailed on to the meeting, going ashore at Phalara, on the north coast of the Gulf, the nearest port to Lamia. His arrival

¹³ Livy 35.43.3-4.

¹⁴ Antiochos' ships were of trireme size; assuming the *tectae* carried only a few soldiers, the 10,000 infantry would be carried at less than 100 per ship (Thucydides 6.43 suggests a capacity of 85 men per ship); the cavalry would be carried at 30 per ship, which is 17 ships at least. These are minima; cf. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship*, 93.

¹⁵ Livy 35.43.4-6; cf. Bevan, *House*, 2.69-70, a romantic account.

was the occasion for celebrations, not surprisingly. The Aitolian council had just reconfirmed its original decrees of invitation, and it would seem that the popular view was that Antiochos had arrived as an ally and protector of the league.¹⁶

The king spoke to the council. Livy's account, as usual, cannot be accepted as it stands.¹⁷ It is unlikely that Antiochos should apologise with his first words, but it *is* likely that the king was concerned to direct Aitolian hopes away from the idea that he had arrived with the intention of waging a great war of liberation against Rome, which would, of course, include the conquest of places the Aitolians claimed. This is confirmed by the fact that as soon as he finished the council fell into a dispute over the next move. Thoas wanted to bounce the king into war right away,¹⁸ assuming that he would no longer be interested in such a proceeding next year, or perhaps recognising that Antiochos' enormous responsibilities would mean that he would in all likelihood have to be elsewhere by the spring. Phaineas stuck to the terms of the invitation by which Antiochos had been recruited, as an arbitrator with Rome,¹⁹ assuming the latter would be more amenable to persuasion when the Aitolians were backed by the Seleukid potential.

Livy claims that Thoas won the argument, and that Antiochos' appointment as '*imperator*', or, as Appian has it, '*strategos autokrator*', was a sign of this.²⁰ This, however, was only an honorary position, without real authority, and had been held by Attalos I in 209,²¹ without notable effect. It is not a sign that Thoas' arguments had prevailed. Nor is there any evidence that Antiochos ever had any control over the disposition of Aitolian forces. Indeed, the idea that the Aitolians would give any non-Aitolian such power is to misjudge all Aitolian history, which was predicated on Aitolian independence as the whole aim of the league's existence. It is better to fix attention on the actual events which followed the council meeting.

A committee of the Aitolian council, called the *apokletoi*, had been appointed to advise the king. The rest of the council dispersed. The

¹⁶ Livy 35.43.7–9.

¹⁷ Livy 35.44.2–7; cf. Bevan, *House*, 2.70–71.

¹⁸ Livy 35.45.5–8.

¹⁹ Livy 35.45.2–4.

²⁰ Livy 35.45.9; App. *Syr.* 46, though he has the timing wrong.

²¹ Livy 27.29.10.

king discussed the next move with the *apokletoi*, and it was determined to investigate the possibility of succeeding at Chalkis where Thoas had failed.²² This must, therefore, be the initiative of the party of Phaineas, attempting to complete the work Thoas had bungled. It would have the simultaneous purpose of providing the king with a base closer to central Greece, humiliating Thoas, and apparently doing the work which Thoas and his party recommended. It was not a deliberate move for war with Rome. If Rome would not react to the earlier attempt by the Aitolians alone on the city, nor to the seizure of Demetrias,²³ it may have been argued that they would not react now, and anyway the king was operating as an Aitolian official. Certainly this naive argument was the sort of thing the Aitolians were capable of. It was, of course, self-delusion.

The king collected a thousand of his soldiers, who marched to Chaeroneia, in Boiotia, where they were joined by a force of Aitolians.²⁴ This group is of unknown size, but is described by Livy as 'a few', which would seem to mean very many less than the king's thousand. From Chaironeia the joint forces marched to the coast, where they boarded ten of the king's ships which had come from Demetrias.²⁵ This, it may be noted, was only a third of the force Thoas had used. In addition there was no attempt at surprise, and no conspiracy was hatched with exiles or with subversives from within the city.

The king's force encamped at Salganeus, just across the Euripos from Chalkis.²⁶ The whole process was clearly very speedy, perhaps less than a week from the decision at Lamia. Chalkis was no longer garrisoned by Eumenes' troops, and the threat appeared to be so minimal, or the king's arrival was so sudden, that the Chalkidian leaders did not feel the need, or did not have time, to ask for the reinforcements from Eretria and Karystos which had saved them in the earlier attempt. On the other hand, the absence of exiles with Antiochos probably allowed them to man the Salganeus defences

²² Livy 35.46.1-3; Pol. 20.1.

²³ It is not known exactly when the Aitolians and Antiochos heard of the landing of the Roman army at Apollonia.

²⁴ Livy 35.46.3-4.

²⁵ Livy 35.46.3; Livy implies that Chaeroneia is on the coast; the port of embarkation was perhaps Opous. The number of ships simultaneously confirms the capacity of 100 men carried per ship (note 13), and the fact that Livy's 'few' Aitolians means less than a hundred.

²⁶ Livy 35.46.4.

without a serious fear of internal subversion: Antiochos looked like a normal foreign threat, and a small one at that.

The Aitolian leaders who were with the king, but not Antiochos himself, met Mikythio, one of the successful defenders against Thoas' attack, with a Chalkidian delegation for discussions. The Aitolian request was for Chalkis not to renounce the Roman alliance, but to join with the league and the king in a new alliance. Here is another attempt, presumably by Antiochos, to avoid a Roman war. The idea of a city such as Chalkis being in good relations with both great powers is a concept which was inherent in the king's request for an alliance with Rome. It was, of course, scarcely practical in the light of the events at Demetrias, and of the earlier Aitolian attempt at Chalkis, but Antiochos may have been hoping that his restraint—in the small size of the forces he had brought with him, and in his political moves—would persuade the Chalkidians, and through them also impress the Romans with Flamininus, who were still in Greece.

The speeches which Livy composed involved a dialectical discussion on liberation, but the nub of the matter was a direct refusal by the Chalkidians, wrapped up in a diplomatic comment that they would do nothing without authorisation by the Romans. Mikythio, if he really said the things Livy records, admitted the Aitolian argument that the city was not free, but he was also making it clear that he preferred the Roman type of liberation to that of Antiochos and the Aitolians.²⁷

Antiochos himself was not involved in these discussions. His presence with the ships had added weight to the Aitolians' arguments, but with no result. This was clearly not an attempt to capture Chalkis, nor was it a warlike expedition. The number of Seleukid troops with the king was little more than a royal guard. Even Livy's account of the discussion at the harbour of Chalkis shows that there was no intention of using force on this occasion, but rather that the aim was to persuade the Chalkidians to join the new alliance—just as Antiochos had been recently trying to persuade Smyrna and Lampsakos and Alexandria Troas to do the same. The Aitolians were even made to say that there would be no garrison in the city; in other words, the same terms were offered as those of the Romans.

²⁷ Livy 35.46.5–13.

Yet it is clear from what happened next that the party in control in Chalkis had been frightened. They had held on in the face of Thoas' relatively large force by calling in help from other cities, and then from King Eumenes; this small, rather unthreatening, argumentative, force now provoked the same reaction, but after the event, not before. It may be assumed, as with every other Greek state, that internal politics was polarised around the question of accepting or rejecting the Roman alliance. The terms offered by the Aitolians, and by implication, by Antiochos, had been the same as those supposedly implemented by the Romans—but the Roman terms had been maintained only by armed intervention from outside. Thus the party of Mikythio and Xenokleides was only precariously in control of the city, and will have assumed that the failure of the latest attempt to capture the city would be followed by an armed attack. Once again they sent at once for armed assistance.²⁸

The Aitolian peace party, if Phaineas' group may be so designated, still held the reins of the Aitolian government, and since Antiochos' policy was to avoid war with Rome if he could, they were able to agree that the Chalkidian policy should be tried again on other states.²⁹ This time the objects of their attention were those states thought to be especially disenchanted with Rome.

There were, in fact, not all that many states to choose from. In the north, Thessaly had already declared its pro-Roman alignment at the time of the first Aitolian attempt on Demetrias by participating in the attempted counter-*coup* designed to overthrow Eurylochos' regime, and Philip of Macedon was determinedly fence-sitting. An attempt at persuading either of these was so likely to be fruitless that it was probably never attempted. The only areas available were therefore those to the south and west of Aitolia: Boiotia, Athens, the Achaian League, Elis, Messene, Akarnania, and Epeiros. Of these Elis was a traditional Aitolian ally, and Akarnania an equally traditional enemy, and these two, and Messene, were scarcely of sufficient political weight to be considered serious powers. Boiotia was equally weak, and divided internally, yet its geographical position made it important. The news of the enmity between Flaminius and Philopoimen of the Achaian League made that state another main target.

²⁸ This follows from the fact that Mikythio and Xenokleides were at Aigion a little later: Livy 35.50.8–10.

²⁹ Livy 35.47.1–2.

Athens was also approached. Another small state, Athamania, in the highlands north of Aitolia, was also contacted, through the brother-in-law of the joint-king, but this was a minor matter.³⁰ As Livy recognised, the most important prize was Achaia.

Livy constructs one of his sets of speeches at this point, pitting Flamininus against the king's ambassador and the Aitolian envoy Archidamos in rival appeals to the Achaian assembly at Aigion.³¹ How much accuracy there is in these speeches is impossible to say, but the Aitolian's speech at least rings true, for he asked that the Achaians remain at peace, and bitterly criticised the ingratitude of the Romans—a neat warning to the Achaians that they could expect no rewards if they joined the Roman side.³²

The king's envoy is made to boast of his master's power, and the extent of his dominions, which was perhaps both unnecessary and tactless, and thus seems unlikely to have been said, but he is also made to suggest that the Achaians remain at peace.³³ This was a feasible policy, for the Achaian League was not attached to Rome by any ties of alliance.³⁴ It must have been clear to the two envoys, from the fact that Flamininus was present in person, and that he was obviously in good aura with the Achaians, that they were unlikely to succeed in gaining an alliance with the league, if that is in fact what they were charged to seek. Hence perhaps their more limited request, that Achaia remain neutral.

Flamininus, however, had attended because he had already discussed matters with the Achaian leaders.³⁵ The current Achaian *strategos*, Diophanes, had succeeded Philopoimen in September, and was apparently in agreement with Philopoimen's policy.³⁶ The Achaians had decided before the meeting that they would not merely align themselves with Rome, but it would take active measures against the Aitolian-Seleukid intrigues. They were perhaps the more easily con-

³⁰ Livy 35.47.2–8.

³¹ Livy 35.48.1–49.13.

³² Livy 35.48.10–13.

³³ Livy 35.48.8–9.

³⁴ E. Badian, 'The Treaty between Rome and the Achaean League', *JRS* 42, 1952, 76–81; Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 326–327.

³⁵ Flamininus was clearly already at Aigion when the envoys arrived, and he will therefore have discussed matters in advance of the meeting; cf. Errington, *Philopoemen*, 113.

³⁶ Errington, *Philopoemen*, 113, note 1, disagreeing with Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 323, and de Sanctis, *Storia*, 4.1.169.

vinced by the presence at Aigion of Mikythio and Xenokleides of Chalkis before the meeting. They had clearly moved quickly after the meeting with the Aitolian envoys at Chalkis. They had come to see Flamininus—who had saved them earlier in the year—to request armed help, both as a means of controlling their city and as a means of defending it—even though it had not been attacked, and no enemy had menaced it.³⁷ It had been a contingent of Pergamene troops which had calmed things down in the spring, and now they were asking for this ploy to be repeated.

In addition, news had arrived of intrigues at Athens, where an agitation was being mounted by a man called Apollodoros, with the object of repelling Roman attentions and bringing the city into the Seleukid-Aitolian alliance.³⁸ He planted the seeds of dissension in receptive ground, for it had been in Athens that the pro-Seleukid Chalkidian Euthymides had lived at the time when Thoas was threatening his home city.³⁹ The matter was serious enough in November for Flamininus to be contacted at Aigion by the governing group in Athens, which was apparently led by Leon of Aixone, a fairly well-known man.⁴⁰ It follows from this that neither party in the city was apparently able to prevail, though it seems that each was able to frustrate the other. Given that Leon's party formed the controlling group in the city, this suggests considerable strength on Apollodoros' side.⁴¹

Flamininus spoke in reply to the speeches of the two envoys at Aigion, when he could be confident since he had already persuaded the leaders of the Achaians to support him. As soon as the envoys had been heard and dismissed, the council agreed with Flamininus to send a detachment of five hundred troops to Chalkis with Xenokleides, and another five hundred to Peiraios to provide tangible support to the pro-Roman group in Athens.⁴² A further contingent of

³⁷ Livy 35.50.10.

³⁸ Livy 35.50.4; Apollodoros is not otherwise known.

³⁹ Livy 35.37.6.

⁴⁰ Livy 35.50.4; references to Leon are noted by Walbank, *Comm. Pol.* 3.131; cf. also S. V. Tracy, 'Inscriptones Deliacae: IG XI 713 and IG XI 1056', *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung*, 1992, 303–314, at 310.

⁴¹ For an overview of Athens' relations with the Selukids, cf. C. Habicht, 'Athen und die Seleukiden', *Chiron* 19, 1989, 7–26, and, for this episode, id., *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, trans. D. L. Schneider, Cambridge, Mass., 1997, 204–208; also, briefly, C. Mosse, *Athens in Decline 404–86 B.C.*, London 1973, 140, and W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, London 1911, 282–284.

⁴² Livy 35.50.3.

troops from King Eumenes was also on its way to Chalkis, and Flamininus had also conjured up a detachment of five hundred Roman soldiers who were to be sent under Mikythio to help garrison Chalkis.⁴³

In addition to this, the Achaian council declared that a treaty of alliance existed between the league and Rome. It was as part of the provisions of this treaty—which must have been negotiated with Flamininus, who in turn must have had some special powers to conclude such an alliance—that Achaian troops went to Athens and Chalkis.

This was not quite a warlike action. It was a repetition on a larger scale of the moves made in the spring, to ensure the failure of Thoas' move against Chalkis, and it did not imply any opening of hostilities.⁴⁴ King Antiochos had been very careful to bring a fairly unthreatening force with him to Demetrias, and most of that force had remained encamped close to that city ever since, except for the token force of a thousand men which accompanied him to Chalkis. It may be significant that it was a force of a thousand which was sent by the allies to Chalkis, exactly the same force as that accompanying the king; the 'few' Aitolians were perhaps then seen as equivalent to Eumenes' contribution. Nor had the Aitolians attacked anyone, not at least since the king arrived. Both sides were in fact using diplomacy to advance their cause, at Chalkis, at Athens, at Aigion, and the troop movements were intended to back up their diplomacy. Similarly Flamininus had been moving about Greece shoring up his system for the past six months, and the Roman Republic had been just as careful as Antiochos to avoid any direct act of hostility.

Antiochos' policy, that is to say, remained an extension of that which he had been pursuing since the start of his diplomatic contacts with Rome: to extract from Rome a formal recognition of his position as an equal, and a recognition of his territories; an alliance was his preference, but anything short of that which was a clear agreement between the two great powers would suffice. He was in Greece as an ally of Aitolia, which had no formal relations with Rome, and so his arrival could not be used by Rome as an excuse

⁴³ Livy 35.50.6.

⁴⁴ The existence of the Achaian-Roman treaty is thus not the equivalent of a declaration of war, as Badian, 'Treaty' (note 34), 78, claims, followed by Errington, *Philopoemen*, 114.

for war. His forces had even camped *outside* Demetrias, which was the one place in Greece whose status had been changed (apart from the embarrassing Sparta, of course) and which might thus be used as an occasion for war. Antiochos' small force could not under any circumstances be regarded as a threat by anyone in Greece. His diplomacy had either been open, as in sending envoys to the Achaian League, which, like Aitolia, had had no formal relations with Rome at that point, or covert, as in the intrigues at Athens which was a near-legitimate tactic, one which was well practiced also by Rome. There was nothing in all this to provide Rome with an excuse for war, yet it must be said that Rome could scarcely be pleased at the prospect of the king coming to filch its allies. True, he had not yet done that, but the move against Chalkis was clearly an attempt to do so.

In the process, of course, Antiochos was demonstrating that the Roman system of 'liberation' which had been put into effect by Flamininus was so badly built that it was in danger of collapse already. It had been designed to operate without a Roman presence in Greece, yet Flamininus had had to intervene at Chalkis and at Demetrias in the spring, and now he could only hold Athens and Chalkis by installing garrisons; Demetrias, despite his activities, had fallen away; Sparta, once its king had been murdered, had fallen easily into Achaian hands, despite its clear dependence on Rome. It had not taken much pressure to produce this state of imminent over-all collapse.

Yet the fact remained that Flamininus had been able to hold the line all through 192. Only Demetrias had been lost. Chalkis, Athens, Thessaly, were all still his; Sparta's absorption in Achaia was at least in formal terms voluntary. Aitolia was hostile, but there was nothing new in that. And Flamininus now had a more substantial backing, for Baebius' Roman army had crossed the Adriatic during the late autumn and was now encamped in the area of Apollonia, even as the discussions went on at Aigion. It is probable that it was from this force that the detachment of five hundred men who were sent to Chalkis had come (unless they had been sent from the fleet, still at Gytheion—or indeed unless they were the legates' own body-guard).⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Thiel, *Studies*, 288, claims them for the fleet, but Baebius' army could more

The army at Apollonia was that which M. Baebius Tamphilus had brought over on orders of the Senate. He had commanded two legions with Italian allies in Bruttium, which had been marched to Brundisium last winter, and crossed the sea in September or October.⁴⁶ In addition L. Quinctius Flaminius, one of the consuls in office until November, had recruited an extra ten thousand men for service in Greece if that became necessary.⁴⁷ Despite all this detail, the exact number of troops Baebius brought with him is disputed, with estimates starting at 2,000 and climbing upwards.⁴⁸ But 2,000 is far too few, since he was able to detach that many during the winter to serve in Thessaly under Claudius Pulcher, and if the 500 sent towards Chalkis were originally his, one must think in terms of a minimum of at least a legion. But there seems no real reason to believe he had less than the full force he had commanded all along, two legions with allies, perhaps twenty-five thousand men. If he could detach 2,500 (or only 2,000) he must have commanded several times that, since no commander would detach all his force under subordinate; a detachment implies a larger force from which it has been detached. If he had only 5,000, say, he would scarcely have divided his force in two and sent half into action under someone else's command. Therefore, it follows that Baebius remained at Apollonia in command of the bulk of his force, as a commander should, while the 2,000 under Pulcher went on detachment. It follows that his force was very much larger than Pulcher's, which means that he had his full original force, since there is no indication of it being further divided (see also Appendix 1).

That this substantial force—fully equal to that which Antiochos had under his immediate command plus the Aitolian levy—was in Greece was no doubt fully known to the Achaian leaders when their council voted to declare an alliance with Rome. Flaminius undoubtedly will have been informed as rapidly as possible of Baebius' move, and the five hundred Roman soldiers he sent towards Chalkis under Mikythio were an earnest of Rome's intention to uphold the system

easily spare men, being larger. The fleet, on the other hand, had been in the south in the summer. It scarcely matters, of course, but it is interesting that they had not been mentioned before, or used earlier. They must have been ashore for some time, and at Aigion or nearby when the decision was taken to use them at Chalkis.

⁴⁶ See Appendix 1 for all this, and references.

⁴⁷ Livy 35.41.4–5.

⁴⁸ Livy 35.50.5; Pol. 20.2.

of domination-without-garrisons which was under threat. The Achaians, therefore, knew full well they were not heading into any immediate danger. With a large Roman force in Epeiros, neither Antiochos nor the Aitolians were going to commit any forces to a fight in southern Greece. The declaration of an alliance by the Achaians was thus also an assertion of independence. To wait for a Roman lead was to surrender the initiative. What the Aitolians were doing by allying with Antiochos, the Achaians were doing by their Roman alliance. Both leagues were trying to preserve their freedom; neither looked for 'liberation'.

Antiochos was finding progress in Greece a difficult matter. Chalkis had refused his ally's importunities; his appeal to Achaia had produced a shift towards Rome rather than the hoped-for declaration of neutrality. And this news was accompanied by worse, presumably sent by his own envoy and by the Aitolian Archidamos, that Achaian, Roman and Pergamene troops were being sent to Athens and Chalkis. On top of this the approach he made to Boiotia was as unsuccessful as all the rest. The Boiotians required that Antiochos visit them personally. This may have been Boiotian annoyance at the fact that Seleukid and Aitolian troops had marched through Boiotia in the attempt on Chalkis, and no doubt they had done so without bothering to ask permission, but it was probably in the main the same sort of situation as at Athens, with pro- and anti-Roman factions more or less in balance, and therefore unable to reach a decision without a push from outside. Flamininus had had to carry through a *coup* in Thebes before he could concentrate on defeating Philip, and there had been more trouble in 196, with anti-Roman sentiment strong in the area. Such divisions do not go away. Presumably the Boiotians did not expect the king to accept the invitation, but if he did he would be accompanied by a force of soldiers whose presence would provide the excuse for giving in to his demands, as to *force majeure*. The Boiotian leadership was not notably strong or resolute.⁴⁹

The news of the approach of the Achaian troops meant that Antiochos now had to make a quick decision about Chalkis. Once those troops were in the city, it would be effectively out of his reach. At the same time, it was clear that something decisive must be done

⁴⁹ The point is made by Pol. 18.43.1–13 in the context of 196.

to convince the waverers in Greece to come off the fence onto his side. Antiochos now sent out a force of 3,000 soldiers under Menippos on board the whole fleet, which was commanded by Polyxenidos of Rhodes. They were to sail to Salganeus, the fortress opposite Chalkis. From there they would be able to block the approaches to the city, while the fleet could patrol the long Euripos to prevent crossing into Euboia elsewhere. The rest of the Seleukid force present, 6,000 men (the camp was presumably to be held by the remaining thousand) were to march under Antiochos' own command a little later.⁵⁰

The Achaians, under the command of, or perhaps led by, the Chalkidian Xenokleides, together with a contingent of Pergamene troops collected on the way, reached Chalkis first,⁵¹ and entered the city before Menippos and Polyxenidas could prevent them, but Menippos' force reached Salganeus and camped before the walls, in a place called the Hermaion, no doubt a shrine. He was thus in time to prevent the crossing of the second force, the detachment of Roman troops with Mikythio. They had almost reached Aulis, five miles south of Salganeus, when they realised that the crossing was blocked, and turned back to camp at Delion, another temple area. The aim of Mikythio and the Romans was now to cross from there to Euboia, but they would need to wait for shipping to reach them. Their presence became known to Menippos, who saw no reason why yet another force should be allowed to reinforce a declared enemy. He brought up his men speedily and attacked by surprise. Livy's account of the innocent unsuspecting Romans cut down while wandering about and sightseeing at the temple, and while in the sacred temple grounds, may be dismissed as a fantasy. The fact is they were keeping a slack guard, almost in the presence of an enemy force, and deserved all they got. (Maybe they had not realised they were in danger of attack, but in that case why had they turned back at Aulis?) Perhaps half were killed, fifty were captured, and the rest ran away and got into the Salganeus fortifications from where they were able to get across the Euripos and into the city. Mikythio, their commander, also escaped.⁵²

⁵⁰ Livy 35.50.6–7.

⁵¹ Livy 35.50.8.

⁵² Livy 35.50.9–51.4; Diod. 29.1.

Menippos had acted quickly and decisively, and presumably in accordance with his instructions. Yet it is a strange event, even so. Until this point, no hostilities had taken place, and both Antiochos and Flamininus had manoeuvred very carefully in order to avoid any fighting. Antiochos had tried to *persuade* Chalkis, and had not pressed the point when refused. Flamininus had tried to hold his position, and had not resorted to violence when defied. And now suddenly, Seleukid troops had attacked Roman soldiers.

Arguments that the fighting was inevitable beg the question. Of course, if more and more soldiers are packed into a small area, fighting is very likely, and in and about Chalkis there were Seleukid, Aitolian, Achaian, Pergamene, and Roman detachments, not to mention Chalkidian, Karystian, Eretrian, and maybe even Boiotian soldiers. (After all, the fighting took place in neutral Boiotia.) But soldiers act under discipline, and responsibility for the fighting must rest, therefore, with their immediate commanders, in this case with Menippos and Mikythio.

If Menippos is correctly identified with the man of that name who was in Philip V's service in Euboia in 209–208, he had transferred into Antiochos' service later, and one reason for this could be a dislike of Philip's later policy of accommodating with Rome. Mikythio of Chalkis was clearly under threat at home from his political opponents, and his policy had now failed twice, since he had now for the second time had to call in foreign troops to maintain his position. Each commander may well, therefore, have been in the grip of his political emotions: Menippos by a hatred of Rome, Mikythio in fear of failure. Neither of these explanations is very well-founded, but something of this sort is needed to account for the events at Delion: that is, the fighting may have begun because it was in the interests of, or at the wish of, the two commanders, both of whom were briefly in a position to make a decisive move in the policy being pursued by their respective superiors.

The fighting at Delion made actual war between Rome and the Seleukid kingdom certain, if any single event did. The irony is, though, that the Roman Senate had already resolved to go to war, before the killing at Delion occurred (see next chapter). And meanwhile, Antiochos now had the chance to seize Chalkis. Soon after the fighting, the king arrived with his main force from Demetrias, to which had been added a small Aitolian detachment, made up of

those soldiers who were available at Lamia when he marched through the town.⁵³ The fact that the Aitolians were not mobilised is as clear an indication as any that they and Antiochos were pursuing a policy of diplomatic persuasion and not one of war. If war had been determined on, the Aitolians of all people should have been prepared. When he reached the shore across from Chalkis, therefore, the king had about ten thousand men, a formidable force to bring against a smallish city, even one as well fortified as a Fetter of Greece. Further, the city, as everywhere else in Greece, was internally divided. Clearly one of the reasons for calling in an Achaian garrison was because Mikythio and Xenokleides were apprehensive about their ability to keep control in the city. Now that the Roman detachment had been destroyed and the city faced a large Seleukid army, commanded by one of the great generals of the day, who was well practiced in siege warfare, a king who had been winning battles and capturing cities for thirty years, the anti-Roman faction was encouraged.

The king sent envoys into the city, both from himself and from the Aitolians. By offering the same agreement as before—liberation, no garrison, alliance—he gained his way, and the city gates were opened. It seems that the foreign contingents, Achaians, Attalids, and Romans, had all been posted into the Salganeus fort, so that only citizens were in the city, to which Antiochos and the Aitolians had access by ship. It was all done in a fairly civilised manner, and the pro-Romans, including Mikythio and Xenokleides, were allowed to leave unharmed.⁵⁴ The Achaian-Pergamene garrison held out in Salganeus, and the surviving Romans had occupied a subsidiary fort there. Neither detachment was prepared to fight, however, now that the city had defected behind them. The Achaians and Pergamenes are stated by Livy to have bargained their way home, in the normal mercenary way. He says the Romans, who cannot have been more than a couple of hundred in number, were besieged ‘by land and sea’, and were menaced by siege engines, but this is mere nonsense. After all, he had said earlier that only ‘a very few’ escaped from the fighting at Delion. Antiochos did not have time to bring up siege engines, nor the need. The Romans, that is, also gave in, and marched away.⁵⁵

⁵³ Livy 35.50.7 and 51.6.

⁵⁴ Livy 35.51.6.

⁵⁵ Livy 35.51.4 and 7–9; Bevan, *House*, 73–75.

CHAPTER TEN

ANTIOCHOS IN GREECE: SUCCESSES

The Roman Senate declared war on Antiochos directly after the consuls for 191 took office, in early November 192.¹ This also involved a war with Aitolia, lumped in with the king as one of those who followed him. This declaration took place probably before the destruction of the Roman detachment at Delion—and certainly before that event was known at Rome—and indeed it is probably also before the news of Antiochos' arrival in Greece was even known in Italy. The reasons given for the declaration of war were that the Aitolians had seized Demetrias, menaced Chalkis, and invited Antiochos to 'Europe' 'to make war upon the Roman people'.

The Senate's information was thus months old. All these deeds by the Aitolians had taken place in the spring, and it seems that anything else the Senate had heard was ignored. They had no notion whether or not Antiochos had responded, they ignored the failure of Thoas' attempt at Chalkis—which should have been reassuring to them, and which was surely known in Rome by November—and they did not know that Antiochos had finally seized that city. Events at Sparta, where a Roman subject-king had been murdered by the Aitolians—a good cause for war if one was being sought—were totally ignored. Above all, all the misdeeds complained of in the justification for war were perpetrated by the Aitolians, yet war was declared on Antiochos as well.

This must be explained. It is possible that Livy has it wrong, that something has dropped out of his account, but this seems unlikely—the rest of this section has only minor textual problems²—and his sources seem to be both detailed and accurate at this point, so far as can be judged.³ So if the historian has provided an accurate

¹ Livy 36.1.5–6; Errington, *CAH* (2), 282–283 has the timing of events wholly wrong; no other moderns considers the timing a problem.

² Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 2.218–219.

³ Livy 36.3.7–12; this is directed, in fact, at the *fetiales*, who were asked to rule on the etiquette of the declaration of war.

summary, the reason for the odd wording must lie with the situation in the Senate and the city during the autumn of 192.

The Senate had got itself into a situation where it had made substantial military and diplomatic moves before the declaration, which gave it a powerful local position in Greece. There was, in September or October, the move of Baebius' army to Apollonia, so when the war came Rome already had a strong military presence close to the theatre of war. Similarly a fleet of Roman warships was already in Greek waters, ostensibly sent to cope with Nabis, but twenty-four Roman quinqueremes was a surprisingly powerful force to deal with Nabis' fleet of three aged ships. And on the spot in Greece since the spring was the delegation of four legates led by T. Flamininus. Livy's attention is fixed on Flamininus, but the other three were also surely active at this time. Even if they failed to hold the former allies of Rome to their alliances, these men could provide accurate information about the political situation, in Greece and the east, both to the Senate and to Baebius and his successor in the north. If it is the case that the Roman troops sent by Flamininus to help at Chalkis came from Baebius' force, the two men were in communication as soon as Baebius crossed the water—as must be expected anyway.

The net result of these individual moves was to put Rome into a situation in Greece whereby the Senate's declaration of war on Antiochos and Aitolia could be followed by almost immediate activity by her forces. It does not seem likely that all these moves were part of a predetermined plan of action, to produce a war declaration on Antiochos behind a smoke screen of plausible other reasons, but the precautions had certainly developed into an advantageous situation for Rome.

At Rome this situation was surely fully appreciated. The news of the Aitolian moves in the spring, coming after the rumours and excitements of the winter, appear to have persuaded the Senate that a war was going to begin sooner or later. This conviction was behind the early elections, the movement of Baebius' troops to Illyria, and the determination of the consular provinces which took place early also. It follows that the Senate had come to the conclusion that the

The declaration was an official document, and if Livy himself did not have access to it, Polybios will have, and it was Polybios' practice to look such things up if he could.

next consuls would in all probability have to conduct a war in the east, and that this would take place in the campaigning season of 191. Hence the declaration of war in November 192, to give legal cover for the military preparations carried out during the winter. When it came to the formal legalities at Rome—the preliminary sacrifices, the solicitation of a favourable vote in the assembly, the allocation of provinces, the consultation with the college of *fetiales* as to the correct procedure for notifying the enemy of the declaration of war—all these went ahead smoothly, in contrast to the messy process of declaring war on Philip of Macedon eight years before.

This smooth process implies good organisation and good planning. This is further suggested by the series of measures enacted by the Senate immediately the declaration of war was determined on. The provinces for the consuls were to be Italy and Greece, as already decided, and the consul who was to go to Greece was given reinforcements to increase the army already there, and legates to assist him. The consul for Italy was given an army, and a second army, already existing, was to be held in reserve. The army in Bruttium was assigned to a praetor who was now given the task of defending the Apulian coast, and in particular the ports of Tarentum and Brundisium. The coast of Sicily was to be defended also, part of it by the praetor for Sicily, the rest by the praetor for the Sicilian fleet. Food supplies were to be organised from Sicily and Sardinia, and further supplies were to be purchased at Carthage and in Numidia. The praetor assigned to the fleet, C. Livius Salinator, was to collect thirty more ships, sail to Greece as soon as possible to relieve Atilius, and take over the fleet which was already there; and more ships were to be made ready at Rome, as a reserve. The other Roman wars were to be maintained, but no more: Spain received only a small draft of soldiers, no more than a thousand being Roman citizens; the consul for Italy was to continue the war in Cisalpine Gaul, but with only half the force that was being used the year before.⁴

It was perhaps less planned that Greece should be allotted to the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio instead of his colleague P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica.⁵ Glabrio had been praetor five years before, and had failed to be elected consul the year before, when L. Flamininus won. He

⁴ Livy 36.2.6–3.1.

⁵ Livy 36.2.2.

was a *novus homo*, a long-time supporter of Scipio Africanus, and his election, along with Nasica, Africanus' first cousin, was another clear indication that the Senate had determined that there should be a war in the east. Livy reports that L. Flamininus was detailed to go to Greece as the consul's legate, but this did not happen.⁶ Instead M. Porcius Cato and L. Valerius Flaccus, two other consulars, later appear as legates, without any notice of their appointment.⁷ L. Flamininus' reputation was not of the best. It would appear that the Senate was induced to change its collective mind, perhaps on the urging of Glabrio himself.

This is all clear enough, a good example of Roman practice, with the added detail of Glabrio's enquiry of the *fetiales* as to the correct procedure for declaring war. There is, however, a contradiction in Livy between his statement that Rome declared war on 'King Antiochos and those who followed his path'⁸ and the professed causes of that war, which were detailed in the reply by the *fetiales*, that the Aitolians had seized Demetrias, menaced Chalkis and invited Antiochos to 'Europe'.⁹ So the *fetiales* spoke of war on the Aitolians, whereas Livy speaks of war on Antiochos. Further, it is noticeable that Glabrio's province was 'Greece', not Asia, so the war was planned to be waged in Greece, with the Aitolians the enemy. It is the paraphrase of the fetial reply which appears the more convincing as a report of what was said; the declaration of war on 'Antiochos and those who followed his path', or 'those who were under his authority'¹⁰ is therefore likely to be Livy's summary. He knew that the war was eventually

⁶ Livy 36.1.8; it is supposed that this may be a mistake for his brother, already in Greece, but this can only be a guess; it could be that the Senate changed its mind. To have both brothers in Greece, both of them ex-consuls with extensive experience in Greece on land and sea might significantly weaken the authority of Glabrio as commanding consul, and might prevent any rethinking of Flamininus' original settlement; cf. Sage's note 4, page 156 of volume 10 of the Loeb edition of Livy.

⁷ Livy 36.17.1; they are described as military tribunes by Cicero, *De Senectute*, 36, Plut., *Cato Maior* 12.1, and App. *Syr.* 18, which is perhaps the *function* they performed at Thermopylai; they could, of course, as consulars, be used as legates as well, as Cato clearly was in Achaia; cf. A. E. Astin, *Cato the Censor*, 56; Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 124, note 3.

⁸ Livy 36.1.5.

⁹ Livy 36.3.10-13.

¹⁰ Livy 36.2.2; this is clearly no more than an alternative to the original formations. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.219 describes them both as 'probably pseudo-formulas invented by L. or one of his predecessors'.

to be fought against Antiochos, so he adapted the full formula of declaration to reflect this. The other evidence is that it was the Aitolians who were the first target, with the aim of restructuring the Roman settlement of Greece. The declaration of war on Antiochos, therefore, was a formal gesture only.

In the careful diplomacy of both Rome and the king in the preceding years, each had advanced with great care, avoiding any moves which made war certain. But by the summer of 192 the Senate could see that it would be necessary to remake the Greek settlement, where the disturbers were the Achaians and the Aitolians. The Spartan union with Achaia had put Achaia firmly into the Roman camp, since if they were not they were liable to lose Sparta. The Aitolians, on the other hand, had proved obdurate, and by their actions—Demetrias, Chalkis—had gone too far. They had also invited Antiochos to Greece, which, so far as the Senate knew, was still only a possibility. So, while the war on Aitolia was seen as a necessity, that on Antiochos might still be avoidable. That Antiochos was included is thus best seen as another step in the diplomatic minuet. In the same way Antiochos' deliberately small expeditionary force is best seen as carefully non-threatening.

Glabrio was sent to fight the Aitolians, and this is in fact what he did, for, having brushed aside Antiochos' army at Thermopylai, he then marched into Aitolia. The Senate's intention was thus to do no more than deter Antiochos from moving into Greece, for the declaration of war would only become operative if he went to Greece, to which Glabrio was restricted. The Senate's latest information, in November, was that Antiochos was still in Asia. In fact, of course, he had crossed to Greece two or three weeks earlier. The events of the next month—the attack on Chalkis, the conference at Aigion, the destruction of the Roman force at Delion—therefore wrecked the Senate's careful scheme by making a full scale war on Antiochos essential for Roman prestige. Had Antiochos stayed in Asia over the winter, the Roman army would have moved against Aitolia and the Roman declaration of war on Antiochos would have remained a formality. It could then have been negotiated away if Antiochos had agreed to the Roman suzerainty over the three Asian cities.

The Roman declaration of war on Antiochos may thus be seen as precautionary, to cover the possibility that the king had actually accepted the Aitolian invitation. Rome saw Greece as within its sphere, and Antiochos' landing could be seen as an act of war, just

as were Aitolia's interferences. Whether the Roman scheme would have worked is not, of course, knowable, but if the news of the allocation of provinces, the arrival of Baebius' army and the declaration of war had reached him in Asia before he set off for Europe, he would have known full well that Rome had not given up on Greece. It was the impression that it *had* given up which had brought him to the point of decision for launching his expedition.

It can be seen that both sides ended up fighting each other because each misunderstood the other's actions and aims, a problem exacerbated by the slow communications they had to endure, made even worse than normal by the winter season, when the decisive moves were made. Just when Antiochos heard of Rome's declaration of war is not known, but he would have been in little doubt when he heard that the Roman detachment was to be sent to help defend Chalkis; the fight at Delion will have removed any final doubts.

The reluctance of both sides to become involved in war is manifest. Both had wished all along that their mutual disputes could be sorted out peacefully, yet when war began it was over the same issues which had been in dispute from the beginning: the Asian cities. They had tried discussing the problem, and ignoring it, but it would not go away. A fight over it was the only option left, unless one side would give way. But the prestige attached to their status as great powers did not permit them to give way, for the issue affected the whole Roman position in Greece, and the whole Seleukid position in Asia. If either lost control in their area, the loser would cease to be a great power. The problem was probably worse for Rome, whose political system was the more precarious, and this is obviously one of the reasons that the declaration of war came from there rather than from Antiochos, but, as the result showed, if Antiochos lost, he would also lose great power status.

The strains in the Roman polity are evident in some of the reactions to the war preparations, and in some omissions and details. The republic was declaring war on the one other great power in the world, an empire which now stretched from Greece to the borders of India, under a well-proved king with a substantial military reputation, who commanded an army of great size and military professionalism, and which had been fighting continuously for thirty years, frequently victoriously. It was an army of great adaptability, composed of a wide variety of soldiers and units, and capable of

undertaking campaigns in all types of terrain.¹¹ Yet, faced with this formidable power, the Senate decreed the raising of only 6,600 extra troops—which were to be sent to Spain, that graveyard of Italian soldiers.¹² The reason becomes clear when the attempt was made to man more ships: eight of the Roman maritime colonies along the Tyrrhenian Sea coast protested against their men being called up for service.¹³ These colonies were spread along the Latin and Campanian coasts from Castrum Novum to Sinuessa, and some of them had protested before against being drafted for army service.¹⁴ Combine these two elements with the permission granted to the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio that he could use five thousand troops from non-Italian allies,¹⁵ and the clear impression emerges that Rome was reaching the limit of its manpower resources.¹⁶ It is calculated that twelve legions were embodied in 192, that one more was added in 191, and that in the latter year also there were 30,000 men with the fleet; the total of men from Italy under arms in 191 is put at a little over 200,000, with a rise to about 212,000 in 190. This puts the manpower requirements at 'much the same peak as in the gravest crisis of' the Hannibalic War—exactly the point at which those self-same colonies had protested at army service.¹⁷

Glabrio would thus have to fight his war with the forces already allotted and without the prospect of reinforcements other than those he could recruit in Greece. Baebius' army would be the heart of Glabrio's force. It had reached Apollonia in Illyria in time to take up winter quarters there, a post from which the commander could discover what was going on in Greece. He would need to contact Flaminius and his fellow commissioners, locate his allies, consult

¹¹ See the discussions of the various campaigns in Bar Kochva, *Seleukid Army*, part II.

¹² Livy 36.2.8–9.

¹³ Livy 36.3.4–6.

¹⁴ Livy 27.9.7–10.10.

¹⁵ Livy 36.1.8; not a grant to Glabrio, but a provision made before the provinces were allotted; they could only be Greek and/or Macedonian.

¹⁶ A. J. Toynbee, *Hannibal's Legacy*, vol. 2, Oxford 1965, 87–100 for an extended discussion of all this.

¹⁷ A. Afzelius, *Die Römische Kriegsmacht Waren der aneinandersehung mit den Hellenistischen Grossmächten*, Aarhus, 1944, 34–89 (reprinted New York, 1974); P. A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–A.D. 14*, Oxford 1971, 422–426 and 666–671; Toynbee (note 16), vol. 2, 45–57 and table IV, 652–653.

King Philip, and perhaps wait for the arrival of the new consul. No doubt the news that Antiochos had reached Greece gave him pause also.

Antiochos' diplomatic efforts to recruit friends in Greece had not been restricted to the embassies to Achaia and Boiotia and the *coup* at Chalkis. He had sent out envoys also to Elis in the Peloponnese and to Epeiros. The Eleians had the problem that they were now menaced by Achaia, and, through an envoy called Kallistratos, they asked for assistance from the king in defending themselves: they were sent a thousand men, under the command of Euphanes of Crete, but who the soldiers were is not clear.¹⁸ Elis was an old ally of Aitolia, and Aitolian troops would be the obvious men to send; on the other hand, putting a Cretan mercenary in command implies that they were Seleukid soldiers, since Aitolians would be commanded by an Aitolian. So they were probably men sent from Antiochos' own small force.¹⁹

The result of the contact with Epeiros was the arrival of Charops of Epeiros, the dominant political figure in the Epeirote League.²⁰ He hedged about joining in with Aitolia and Antiochos.²¹ He must have known of the landing of Roman troops on his northern borders, and it is past belief that he did not mention their presence to the king. It is the obvious explanation for his hesitation, since if he allied with Antiochos his homeland would be in instant danger of invasion by the Roman army. Like the Eleians, Charops wanted protection before committing his state to Antiochos. This Antiochos could not provide, at least not right away, and apparently the Aitolians were also unable to do so. But contact with Charops was not cut off, and Antiochos promised to send more envoys to Epeiros. Maybe the Aitolians were reluctant to move north, since this might provoke a Roman attack.

These two episodes are significant, however, for both Elis and Epeiros had been Roman allies in the recent past. Charops might have been chary of any anti-Roman commitments when a Roman army was on his northern border, but Kallistratos and the Eleians

¹⁸ Livy 36.5.2-3; Pol. 20.3 and 5.7.

¹⁹ M. Launey, *Recherches sur les Armées Hellenistiques*, 2nd ed., Paris 1987, 266.

²⁰ P. Cabanes, *L'Épire de la mort de Pyrrhos à la conquête Romaine (272-267)*, Paris 1976, 280-281; Oost, *Roman Policy*, 59-60.

²¹ Livy 36.5.3-8; Pol. 20.3-4.

were not so inhibited. They obviously felt under threat from Achaia,²² and since Achaia was now a Roman ally, the only protection available was from Aitolia or Antiochos. For Rome both contacts were distinctly disturbing, and demonstrated yet again the extreme fragility of the Roman system in Greece as constructed by Flamininus. It is clear that, so long as the Romans did not intervene, Antiochos would be able to re-organise Greece to his satisfaction. The size of his force had been well calculated.

The *coup* at Chalkis had given Antiochos a new base, more strategically useful than Demetrias, since it put him closer to the affairs of central and southern Greece; it also put some distance between him and the Aitolians, which could be diplomatically useful. Demetrias was a somewhat provocative place for him to hold, since Philip V hankered after it, and it was clearly an object of Roman solicitude. He moved away from the city, but left a garrison there. At Chalkis Antiochos could be closer to any developments at Athens, and he could certainly affect matters in Boiotia better than from Demetrias. The council of the Boiotian League had challenged him to put his request for an alliance in person to them; Antiochos now did so, and they unenthusiastically accepted the suggestion²³ of an alliance with both Romans and himself. Here Antiochos, after the killing at Delion, is shown to be trying to maintain his original policy, his aim still being to achieve a settlement with Rome. The fighting at Delion was clearly something he did not consider decisive in having broken the peace. That he was still pursuing this policy as late as November or December, when he was aware of the presence of a Roman army in Epeiros, is a sign of his basically pacific intention.

The adhesion of Boiotia was crucial to his further progress, since that meant he had gained control of a third of Greece. From the city of Demetrias, with the territory of Magnesia, to the northern border of Attika, he controlled the coast of the Aegean, including all the island of Euboia. Boiotia, Phokis, and Aitolia were his allies, as was Athamania, which placed the western boundary of his and his allies' lands on the borders of Akarnania and Epeiros. In the south he had the alliance of Elis, and, it seems, the friendship of Messenia.²⁴ The only states outside his system were Attika and Achaia

²² Errington, *Philopoemen*, 115.

²³ Livy 36.6.3-5; Pol. 20.7.5.

²⁴ Such is the conjecture of C. A. Roebuck, *A History of Messenia*, Chicago 1941, 95.

to the south, neither of them very powerful, Thessaly and Macedon in the north, and Akarnania and Epeiros in the west. Truly the Roman system was without resilience.

Whether the alternative system of Antiochos, so far only half-constructed, would have been any improvement on the Roman is difficult to say. He had made alliances with Aitolia and Boiotia, had persuaded Chalkis and the other Euboian cities to submit on unknown terms, and had contacted others. But only Aitolia had volunteered its support, and Aitolia was only interested in gaining support in its dispute with Rome—and so far it had contributed little or nothing to Antiochos' work. And Aitolia was insistent on its independence. Antiochos, on the other hand, was only in Greece for half a year, which is scarcely long enough to accomplish much, though even in that time he found enmity coming at him from several directions. To maintain his control of the peninsula he would need to subdue these enemies, exactly as Flamininus had done; but this was not something to be accomplished quickly. Even without Roman opposition Antiochos would clearly have been occupied in Greece for years.

The social and economic condition of Greece at the time of Antiochos' expedition is usually thought to have been particularly dire; that is to say, the 'class divisions' between 'rich' and 'poor' are interpreted as being extreme, distress among the latter worse than usual, and the never-ending problem of debt is described as being very difficult.²⁵ While all this is no doubt true enough, the evidence that the situation was worse than usual is not all that convincing. What is clear, however, is that for a discussion of Antiochos' expedition the whole subject is irrelevant. There is no evidence that Antiochos ever contemplated exploiting such conditions to advance his cause in Greece, and not much that he was even expected to be interested.²⁶ If the agitation promoted by Apollodoros in Athens had a class element involved in it this was nipped in the bud by the prompt action of Leon of Aixone in prosecuting Apollodoros in

²⁵ W. W. Tarn and G. T. Griffith, *Hellenistic Civilisation*, 3rd ed., London 1952, 122–124, for a summary; A. Fuks, 'Patterns and Types of Social-Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century BC', *Ancient Society* 5, 1974, 51–81 (and in *Social Conflict in Ancient Greece*, London 1984, 9–39).

²⁶ D. Mendels, 'The Attitude of Antiochos III towards the Class Struggle in Greece (192–191 B.C.)', *Rivista Storia dell'Antiquità*, 8, 1978, 27–38.

the courts and driving him into exile.²⁷ This does not sound much like a revolutionary situation. And anyway Antiochos does not seem to have been involved—though his presence was clearly exploited. The oligarchies emplaced by Flamininus as a device for ensuring Roman control were generally respected by Antiochos. After all, his one major ally, Aitolia, was as oligarchical a state as any in the rest in Greece, and had no wish to promote a social revolution. And the one active revolutionary, Nabis, though he had invoked Antiochos' name in his support at one time, had received absolutely no encouragement from the Seleukid king, nor had Antiochos shown any interest in his fate. There was no socio-economic dimension to Antiochos' activity in Greece.

He did, however, get married. After the capture and purging of Chalkis, he made the city his headquarters. One of the leading men of the city, Kleombrotos, had an eligible daughter, reputed beautiful, and a marriage was arranged.²⁸ The match made political sense, emphasising, as it seemed to do, the king's commitment to Greece.²⁹ It is not clear whether Laodike, the king's original wife, was alive or dead at this time.³⁰ If alive, one assumption might be that Antiochos

²⁷ Livy 36.5.4; Apollodoros is said to have bribed his supporters, which may be the normal calumny of Greek politics (Polybios, probably Livy's source here, did not like Athenians very much) or it could be a sign of the distress of exceptional poverty—or, of course, both.

²⁸ Livy 36.11.1–2; Athenaios 10.439 e–f (= Pol. 20.8.1–4).

²⁹ Antiochos III allowed, or encouraged, refugees from Euboia to settle in Antioch after the Roman war: Libanios, *Oratio* 11.119; Cretans and Aitolians arrived at the same time.

³⁰ Laodike is not recorded after 193 (Austin 158); she had been fairly prominent in the inscriptional evidence in the 190s, but a six-year gap in the record is not unusual, and nothing can be adduced from it. So she could still be alive in 192–191. Yet polygamy was not a Seleukid characteristic (though kings had been known to have concubines), and it seems likely that, given the regular denigration of the king in both Polybios and Livy, if Laodike had been alive at the time of the marriage to Euboia, a snide remark at least would have been made. It has been suggested that Laodike was divorced before the marriage with Euboia, or disgraced (L. Robert, 'Inscriptions Seleucide de Phrygie et d'Iran', *Hellenica* 7, 1949, 25–29, opted for disgrace; A. Aymard, 'Du nouveau sur Antiochos III d'après une inscription grecque d'Iran', *REA*, 51, 1949, 327–345, suggested divorce.) The basis is an inscription from Susa dated to 177/176 which seems to imply that Laodike was still alive at that date. But the inscription is very heavily restored in the version published by B. Haussoullier ('Inscription Grécque de Suse', W. H. Buckler and W. M. Calder (eds), *Anatolian Studies presented to Sir William Ramsay*, Manchester 1923, 187–193), and it is by no means clear either that the restoration is accurate or that the implication that she was still alive is acceptable. In the absence of a more positive indication I feel it best to presume that she was dead by the time of the new marriage.

intended to set up a second court in Greece with her as queen; if dead, the girl would be queen in the imperial court, an even more convincing attachment to Greece. To emphasise this the girl was given the throne name of Euboia, a constant reminder.

Livy's treatment of the wedding is more of his distortion. He claims that the celebrations took place at a time when Antiochos should have been busy, that they seriously undermined the effectiveness of his army, and even accuses him of drunkenness. Yet a fairly cursory examination of Livy's own account of events during the winter demonstrates that Antiochos and his army were busy and active right through until February, having been on campaign all summer. It is this sort of incompetent distortion which saps one's faith in Livy's account—at least of non-Roman events.

The precise dating of events during the winter is unknown, though all of them took place between October and April. Livy provides a sequence, but there are clearly some omissions from his account. His story of the king's debauchery at Chalkis is contradicted by all the work he got done in the winter season, but it is not clear that his sequence is necessarily correct. He omits, for example, Antiochos' sending envoys to Epeiros, but Charops' arrival was obviously in response to that. Similarly there is no mention of envoys being sent to two other states, both of them vital to the outcome of the expedition: Thessaly and Macedon.

Part of Thessaly was in the Aitolian League, but most of the land was now grouped into the League of the Thessalians, with its own annually elected *strategos* and *hipparchos*, and the usual federal institutions.³¹ After a century and a half under Macedonian monarchical rule, this league had recently been 'freed' by Flamininus. It was less than stable politically and could not always rely on the loyalty of its constituent members. It was, by the end of 192, boxed in on three sides by Antiochos' allies: the Magnesians and Demetrias along the Aegean coast, the Aitolians in the south, the Athamanian kingdom to the west; in the north was Macedon, whose king was only recently in control—and could be presumed to wish to return.

The Thessalian leaders were the men who had been installed by Flamininus in 196, and they had confirmed their allegiance to Rome and to Flamininus himself earlier in 192;³² a league force had attempted

³¹ J. A. O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, Oxford 1968, 199.

³² Livy 36.31.3.

to intervene in the spring crisis at Demetrias, but had been foiled by the speedier Aitolian moves.³³ Despite this apparent loyalty to Rome, this was clearly fertile ground for actions by Antiochos and the Aitolians. It was obviously a more complex problem than any so far tackled, partly because of the weakness of the league, and partly because of the longstanding Macedonian connection. After such a long association, sundered only recently by a defeat in war, there was undoubtedly plenty of sentiment in Thessaly in favour of King Philip. Under threat some Thessalians would automatically turn north for help. That same threat would also induce Philip to respond.

No indications survive, not even hints, that Antiochos had any communication with Philip during all his time in Greece. This is not to say that no messages were exchanged, for there were plenty of opportunities, quite apart from the fact that the Seleukid and Antigonid families had a century-long tradition of friendship and intermarriage. The two kings had negotiated successfully to partition the Ptolemaic lands ten years before; but now Philip was at best neutral, at worst he was already committed to Rome. The peace treaty between Philip and Rome prevented the king from fighting against Rome for the rest of his life. This was the convention among the kings, whose honour was involved in peace treaties. So Antiochos would be hoping that Philip would choose to be neutral, though he must have at least considered what he would do if the Macedonian army was thrown into the balance against him.

Philip's strategic situation was thoroughly unenviable by now. His defeat by Rome had forced a reduction of his army to about 5,000 men, and he had had to give up all his ships.³⁴ His kingdom was thus very vulnerable (though there were plenty of trained soldiers in the population who only required arms to become active defenders). Further he was now unpleasantly boxed in on three sides: Antiochos' conquest of Thrace had brought the great Seleukid kingdom onto his eastern border; in the west the Romans held Illyria and now had an army there too. To the south there the Aitolians, their ally Athamania, and the Thessalian League, recently deprived of Demetrias.

It followed that Thessaly, so recently part of Philip's kingdom, was a very sensitive area. If Rome wished to pull Philip into the war on the republic's side, Thessaly was the very place where he could be

³³ Livy 35.39.4 and 8.

³⁴ Pol. 18.44.6.

promised a reward. Rome had already given some indications that some concessions were possible: reducing Philip's indemnity payments, promising the early release of his hostage son and the rumour had floated that Demetrias might be returned to him.³⁵ And in fact Philip had already sent an embassy to Rome.

The Macedonian envoys promised, so Livy summarises, 'aid and money and grain',³⁶ which is a sign that the embassy was sent after the declaration of war and once it had become clear that the Senate was ordering supplies from all round the western Mediterranean.³⁷ The Senate, however, had other plans for Philip. He was thanked for the offer, but informed that he should instead put himself in a position to assist the consul Glabrio.³⁸ Now Glabrio had been given permission to make use of 5,000 non-Italian allied soldiers;³⁹ so when Philip's envoys promised to bring his army to assist in the war against Aitolia this was implicitly accepted.⁴⁰ The money and grain he had proposed to offer was not rejected, but it would clearly be needed once the Romans were present in the Balkans in their hungry numbers. Thus by, say, January, Philip was fully committed to the Roman side, no matter what Antiochos did in Thessaly, though Antiochos could not have known that, since all this happened at Rome, and probably even Philip did not know for a time.

Antiochos is depicted as holding a council of war at Demetrias,⁴¹ perhaps in January, not long after the Boiotians had accepted his alliance, and apparently some time before his marriage, which took place about the end of January, after the Thessaly campaign had finished.⁴² Attending the meeting were: the 'chiefs of the Aitolians', which must mean, at least, the *strategos* Phaineas and the *hipparchos* of the year, whose name is not known, and possibly the *apokletoi*, though their number is unlikely to have conduced to speedy and

³⁵ Livy 35.31.5 (Demetrios' return promised); he was not actually allowed to return until 191, after the immediate Greek crisis was over: Livy 36.35.13.

³⁶ Livy 36.4.1.

³⁷ The Senate had ordered up food supplies from Sicily and Sardinia by requisitioning extra taxes (Livy 36.2.12–13); a commission was also sent to Carthage and Masinissa to buy grain (Livy 36.3.1); all was to be delivered to Greece. The African replies are at 36.4.5–6.

³⁸ Livy 36.4.4.

³⁹ Livy 36.1.8.

⁴⁰ Livy 36.4.3.

⁴¹ Livy 36.6.6–8.1; App. *Syr.* 53–58; Justin 31.4.

⁴² So placed by Livy (36.11.1).

sensible decision-taking; King Amyntandros of Athamania; Antiochos himself; members of Antiochos' court are not mentioned as being present, but men such as Menippos must be presumed to have been there; the admiral Polyxenidas of Rhodes, who was sent on a mission immediately afterwards, and may be presumed to have been present; one would also expect Eurylochos the Magnetarch to be present, since the subject of the conference was Thessaly and he could be counted as a local expert, and he was, in effect, the host. Also said to be present was Hannibal.

The three sources for what happened in the council all emphasise Hannibal's presence, virtually to the exclusion of anything else, but all provide very different accounts of what he is supposed to have said. Some 'verbal correspondence' between the accounts in Livy and Appian has suggested that they have a common source in the lost version of Polybios,⁴³ which may be true. Yet this is not a convincing case for accepting either Hannibal's speech as a genuine record, or even as evidence for Hannibal's actual attendance at the council. The fact that three different accounts of the speech survive does suggest that it was a popular subject of the 'what if' school of essayists, and that several well-known versions of the sort of essay imagining what Hannibal would have said at such a meeting had survived. Plutarch has more than one example of the sort of thing in his collection of essays.⁴⁴

For the speech, in whatever version it exists, bears little or no relation to the subject of the council, which, as Livy points out, was the approach to be taken towards Thessaly.⁴⁵ But Hannibal is made to range over the whole Mediterranean in his speech, or, in Justin, to discuss the invasion of Italy. There is no evidence, apart from Hannibal's supposed speeches, that Antiochos ever intended the invasion of Italy. But the conference was actually discussing how to gain control of Thessaly, whether to approach by envoys first, or to go in with force, and whether to do so right away in the middle of winter, or wait until the spring.⁴⁶ It is the same argument which had divided the Aitolians all along, and which had surfaced in the meeting

⁴³ Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 2.229.

⁴⁴ Plut. 'On the Fortune of Alexander', *Mor* 326D *et seq.*; 'a stock subject for disputation', according to R. H. Barrow, *Plutarch and his Times*, London 1967, 121.

⁴⁵ Livy 36.6.8.

⁴⁶ Livy 36.6.9.

with the king at Lamia in October.⁴⁷ To all this Hannibal's speech had absolutely no relevance or connection; it must therefore be rejected as a true record, and may be assumed to be an academic compilation, perhaps even, as has been suggested, by Polybios himself, along the lines of 'this is what Hannibal would have said', or 'this is how Hannibal would have conducted the war'. There must also be strong doubts as to whether Hannibal himself was actually present at the meeting; his lack of knowledge of the subject—Thessaly—in comparison with everyone else present, surely made him redundant. But whether he was there or not, his speech, if he made one, was, as Livy points out, ignored.⁴⁸

The decisions of the conference were a compromise between the various options. The army of the Aitolians and that of Amyndros were to rendezvous with the Seleukid army in Europe at Pherai, ten miles from Antiochos' camp near Demetrias.⁴⁹ The muster of the Aitolians would take some time, and that of the Athamanians perhaps even longer, for both had some distance to travel, and the call to a muster in winter was perhaps a surprise. Livy makes Pherai the rendezvous, which is perhaps sensible for Antiochos' troops and the Aitolians, but one must doubt that the Athamanians were expected to travel so far, leaving their land unguarded; when they actually appeared in the campaign they operated close to their own land, and it would be sensible to assume that they mustered at home, and moved into action only when Antiochos' army, the main force involved, had attracted the full attention of the Thessalians.

While the muster was going on, envoys were to be sent to the Thessalians, whose council met at Larisa.⁵⁰ The rendezvous was a further compromise, for Pherai was a member of the Thessalian League, and would thus be menaced by a substantial army even as the diplomatic overtures were being made. The whole process was very similar to the method used by Antiochos at Chalkis, but enlarged to deal with a whole country. On a much longer time-scale, but perhaps more significant for the future, the admiral Polyxenidas was sent to Asia with a commission to collect more troops and ships.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Livy 35.44.1–45.9.

⁴⁸ Livy 36.8.1.

⁴⁹ Livy 36.8.2.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Livy 36.8.1.

Numbers are not mentioned, and these reinforcements are not recorded as ever having reached Greece, but Polyxenidas' mission is a clear sign that Antiochos now knew that he had to commit far more resources to Greece than he had originally intended, and that it was very likely that he would have to fight the Romans in the spring.

While waiting, Antiochos gave permission for the bones of those who fell at the battle of Kynoskephalai five years before to be interred in a burial mound.⁵² The battlefield was not far from Pherai—which had been Flamininus' base before the battle—and it seems that the bones of the Macedonian soldiers had not yet been collected and disposed of. With Antiochos was Philip of Megalopolis, the brother-in-law of King Amyndandros of Athamania, who had pretensions to the Macedonian throne.⁵³ It was this Philip's idea to inter the bones, and Antiochos gave permission. It turned out that this was just the excuse King Philip of Macedon needed to declare himself publicly on Rome's side, though this was something he had already done privately. He now publicly concerted plans with the *propraetor* Baebius. By proclaiming that the interment as a personal insult,⁵⁴ Philip was able to produce an internally acceptable reason for going into the war as an ally of his former enemy, whose soldiers had actually killed those men whose bones were now buried. For allying with Rome was perhaps not a very popular move with his own people. No doubt Philip also began gathering his army now; he is said to have suggested that Baebius move his men out of winter quarters.

The diplomatic approach by Antiochos to the Thessalians at Larisa produced a stalling response by the council there, who asked in a pained way why the king was making on war on them, but at the same time they sent a force to try to garrison Pherai before the fighting began.⁵⁵ This force, only five hundred strong, commanded by Hippolochos, was prevented from reaching the city by Antiochos' forces, who blocked all the approach roads. Hippolochos withdrew his force to garrison Skotussa instead,⁵⁶ and Antiochos turned on

⁵² Livy 36.8.3–5; Livy implies that Antiochos originated the idea, but this is obviously unlikely when he had Philip of Megalopolis nearby to suggest it; cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, 200.

⁵³ Livy 36.8.4; cf. also 35.47.7.

⁵⁴ Livy 36.8.6; it was also an indictment of Philip's neglect: he should have seen to the interment long since; no wonder he regarded it as an insult.

⁵⁵ Livy 36.9.1–3.

⁵⁶ Livy 36.9.3.

Pherai. He had proclaimed to the Thessalian envoys his intention to liberate Thessaly, and Pherai was the first city at which he could demonstrate that process.⁵⁷ The Pheraian leader was Pausanias, the man chosen by Flamininus to be the first Thessalian league *strategos* in 196:⁵⁸ a man less likely to accept Antiochos' version of liberation it would be difficult to find in Thessaly. Antiochos pleaded with him, but failed.⁵⁹ The surrounded city was then stormed, a process achieved very swiftly. Once the city walls had been pierced, even the acropolis was untenable. It would seem also that resistance by the citizens was not of the most determined. The city fell in a day, but without any sort of frightfulnesses—though Livy implies all sorts of unpleasant events, without being specific.⁶⁰

This opened the door into the rest of Thessaly. Sending a detachment of four thousand men against Skotussa, which surrendered at once, with Hippolochos and his Larisean garrison,⁶¹ Antiochos took the main army north-east to the centre of the country. Krannon fell as soon as he arrived, and sweeps to the west and north were sent out. One mopped up the cities of Kieron and Metropolis towards Athamania; King Amyntandros now brought his own forces to capture Pelinna, probably coming directly eastwards from his kingdom; Menippos took an Aitolian force northabout to take over much of the territory north of the Peneus, specifically the cities of Malloea and Pyretiai, and ravaged the lands of the Tripolis cities of Doliche, Axoros, and Pythaion, which brought Antiochos' authority to the slopes of Olympos, and to the southern border of Macedon.⁶² Just north of the Tripolis was the Volustana Pass, beyond which was the valley of the Haliakmon and Macedonia.

Meanwhile Antiochos with the main army, both his own forces and the rest of the Aitolians, advanced on Larisa, putting on a determined and disciplined show.⁶³ The city, which had supplied Hippolochos' detachment, was clearly the heart of the resistance to the

⁵⁷ Livy 36.9.4.

⁵⁸ Eusebius *Chron.*, 1.243.

⁵⁹ Livy 36.9.5–8.

⁶⁰ Livy 36.9.9–13, a tendentious account concealing the ease of the conquest. The speed of the conquest of Pherai is a mark of the capacity of the Seleukid army for such work: the continued defiance of the Asian cities is thus a clear sign that Antiochos never actually attacked them.

⁶¹ Livy 36.9.13–15.

⁶² Livy 36.10.1–5; cf. Bevan, *House*, 78–79.

⁶³ Livy 36.10.6.

Seleukid takeover. Besides the city itself there was a substantial plain surrounding it, and the middle valley of the Peneus, controlled by two forts, Atrax and Gortyne, which are specifically said not to have been captured by Antiochos' various forces. The fall of Larisa would put all of Thessaly and its governing league as much into Antiochos' control as was the Boiotian League; at the same time the failure to take the city would leave the essential centre of the league outside his control and so his liberation of Thessaly would be seen as the hollow pretence it really was.

All depended on speed and surprise and the demoralisation of the Thessalians consequent upon the rapid collapse of all their cities. Serious resistance and prolonged fighting would spoil the whole effect. It was winter, not the time for a prolonged campaign, still less for a siege, though Livy depicts an argument about this in the king's camp.⁶⁴ The news of the submission of Pharsalos, which completed Antiochos' control of the southern half of Thessaly, was momentarily encouraging.⁶⁵ But Larisa did not fall, and after only one day Antiochos withdrew.⁶⁶ His ally Amyntandros continued his own campaign in the west, taking a series of towns on the western border to add to his capture of Pelinna.⁶⁷ Antiochos had now extended his power from northern Thessaly to the borders of Attika, and from the Aegean coast to the edge of the Ionian Sea, all in three months.

⁶⁴ Livy 36.10.7–8.

⁶⁵ Livy 36.10.9.

⁶⁶ Livy 36.10.12.

⁶⁷ This follows from the cities which had to be retaken by Philip and Baebius in the spring (Livy 36.13.6).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

ANTIOCHOS IN GREECE: DEFEAT

While Antiochos was briefly contemplating an attack on Larisa, a small Roman force, 2,000 men in all, commanded by a military tribune, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, reached northern Thessaly by way of the Tempe pass. Pulcher had been sent ahead by the propraetor Baebius, by agreement with King Philip.¹ This agreement had been made some time earlier, and before Antiochos' campaign into Thessaly had begun, though not before it was expected. It did not take much strategic insight to see that, after the capitulation of the Boiotians, Thessaly would be the next place for Antiochos to move against.

Philip and Baebius met in Dassaretia, and agreed that the Roman force should march through Macedon. Even though Pulcher is said to have made forced marches, this journey (from Apollonia, not Dassaretia, and in winter) cannot have taken less than a fortnight, to which must be added time for Baebius to relay his orders (from Dassaretia to Apollonia) and for the soldiers to pack up their gear, and be supplied for the journey; three weeks would be a more likely minimum time. Antiochos had spent less than that, perhaps no more than ten days, in Thessaly. So the Roman march was agreed, even started, before the Seleukid advance northwards began.

This raises the question: what were the Romans about to do? Pulcher camped at Gonnos, and laid out a particularly large camp, which Livy supposes was intended to deceive Antiochos into believing that the whole Roman army was present.² There is, however, no indication that Antiochos was deceived—it would have taken only a brief reconnaissance to reveal the truth—nor even that he was actually aware of the arrival of this new force. He withdrew from Larisa because the city did not fall at once, because he was short of supplies, and because of winter weather.³

¹ Livy 36.10.10–11; Baebius' term as praetor had expired in November.

² Livy 36.10.11; no doubt this was part of the myth of this campaign, perhaps relayed through the Claudian family.

³ As Antiochos actually said (Livy 36.10.12).

So Pulcher had not been sent to scare Antiochos off. His force of 2,000 men would not accomplish that, even if he adopted the ruse of a large camp. Instead of accepting Livy's interpretation of Pulcher's actions, it is better to look at what he actually did. That is, he had been sent to do exactly what he did do: lay out a large camp, which was in preparation for the arrival of the slower-marching full army under Baebius' command. Pulcher must have been considerably surprised to discover that his 2,000 men were within twenty miles of five or ten times as many Seleukid and Aitolian soldiers. He very sensibly waited where he was until Antiochos had withdrawn, then came cautiously out of his camp to visit Larisa. Some at least of his troops were placed in that city;⁴ the rest no doubt remained in the camp. He made no attempt to dispute Seleukid/Aitolian control of any other place in Thessaly.

At long last, or so his soldiers must have thought, Antiochos put his army into winter quarters.⁵ The shortage of supplies which had cut short the Thessalian campaign was a warning, and it will have become clear by now that the Greek campaign was unlikely to be over quickly. Exactly when Antiochos learned that war had been declared on him by Rome is not clear. He may have assumed that such would be the result of the action at Delion in December, but that was not certain, and he had not behaved as though it was: the Roman troops had been under Chalkidian command there, and that could be excuse enough if Rome did not want war. He cannot have been too hopeful, though, and he was a realistic man, not given to flights of impracticality and wishful dreams—whence the mission of of admiral Polyxenidas to bring reinforcements from Asia.

The fetial priests at Rome had ruled that Antiochos did not need personally to be informed of the declaration of war, not even by way of the nearest Seleukid military post, since the Aitolian seizure of Demetrias had been located by the Senate as the actual outbreak of war.⁶ Nevertheless it is not credible that the word had not yet reached Antiochos by January. It is perhaps best to see the Thessalian campaign as one of his responses to the news; sending Polyxenidas

⁴ Livy 36.10.13–14.

⁵ Livy 36.11.3, with a tendentious interpretation again: why should the Seleukid army in its winter camps be described as 'easy living', when other armies are not? Bevan, *House*, 80, accepts Livy's story all too easily.

⁶ Livy 36.3.7–12.

across the Aegean in January with orders to prepare reinforcements for the next campaigning season would be another. And so winter quarters, for soldiers who had been more or less continuously campaigning since the previous spring, and would be so again soon enough in the coming spring, were essential.

The next campaigning season would clearly be as strenuous as the last. The troops, even the 'king's prefects', as Livy puts it, might be able to relax,⁷ but the king could not. Apart from getting married, Antiochos also made preparations for extending his authority over other areas of Greece. No doubt consultations took place with the Aitolians, for his next move was directed through Aitolia to the west. In many ways Antiochos was very much in the hands of the Aitolians, for their army, when mobilised, outnumbered the force he commanded in Greece. It is noticeable, for example, that the Aitolians only put any enthusiasm into moves which seemed likely to benefit them directly. So only a small contingent was present with Antiochos at the capture of Chalkis,⁸ and while an ambassador went to Aigion to discuss matters with the Achaian League, it was Antiochos who sent troops to defend Elis.⁹ It was Antiochos, again, who dealt with the Boiotians, but the Aitolians did participate with a considerable force in the Thessalian campaign,¹⁰ for it was here they expected to make gains. No Aitolians appear to have been involved in affairs at Athens, despite old connections between the city and the league. It is therefore not surprising that Antiochos' next move, at the beginning of spring¹¹ (early March, presumably) should be to the west, into Akarnania, which, even more than Macedon, might be described as Aitolia's traditional enemy.

⁷ Livy 36.11.2-5 makes a great thing of the supposed relaxation of discipline: Pol. 20.8.4 applies it only to the king, but claims he spent the whole winter celebrating; Diod. 29.2 follows Livy; none can be accepted as accurate.

⁸ Livy 35.50.7: 'a few'.

⁹ Livy 36.5.2-3.

¹⁰ Actual Aitolian numbers are never quoted, but the levy was summoned and may be assumed to have called up some thousands of men: Livy 36.8.2; 'Aitolians' are noted at Pherai (36.9.1) and at the end of the campaign at Larisa (36.10.12).

¹¹ The dating is indirect; Baebius set out from Apollonia at 'the beginning of spring', and reached Thessaly after Antiochos had crossed Greece and worked in Akarnania for some time; it seems fair to assume that Antiochos and Baebius set out at about the same time, with Antiochos perhaps the first. Note that in that case Antiochos' soldiers had been in their winter camps for no more than six or seven weeks at the most.

A separate war had been going on in and about the Ionian Sea. The political geography of the area was complicated. The cities of the Acheloos valley—Agrinion, Stratos, Oiniadai, Metropolis—were all members of the Aitolian League, even though they had originally been considered Akarnanian. The Akarnanian League now consisted of a group of small cities, of which Medeon and Thyrraeion were the main ones on the mainland, but which included the island and city of Leukas as well. North of the Ambrakian Gulf, the city of Ambrakia was a member of the Aitolian League, and beyond that were the lands of the Epeirote League. The string of islands along the coast were similarly various: Kerkyra was under Roman control, and was a winter base for the Roman fleet; Leukas was now part of the Akarnanian League; Kephallenia had been part of the Aitolian League for several decades, but it was also a base for pirates, lending an unpleasantly bad reputation to the league as a whole in that respect; Zakynthos, even more surprisingly, was part of the kingdom of Amyndros of Athamania, who had been given it by Philip V; perhaps with an ironical smile, Amyndros had made his brother-in-law Philip of Megalopolis the island's governor; but this Philip was now active on the Greek mainland, commanding a garrison in Thessaly (and annoying Philip V the while), and Zakynthos' governor was now Hierokles of Akragas, whose home city was now part of the Roman province of Sicily.¹²

Out of all this Antiochos could count on Zakynthos and Kephallenia as the territories of allies, along with Ambrakia as an Aitolian member, and the Epeirote League had indicated, through Charops, a certain interest in his friendship, but with Romans so close, could only be considered a neutral at best. The Akarnanian League, however, because of Antiochos' alliance with Aitolia, could be considered a potential enemy; it was also reckoned to be a Roman ally. Going further south, Elis in the north-west Peloponnese was Antiochos' ally, and had a garrison of his soldiers, and Messenia was tending towards friendship as well. The real motive for these Peloponnesian political attitudes was less amity towards Antiochos and Aitolia than enmity towards Achaia, which was suspected, correctly, of being ambitious to unite the whole Peloponnese. For the moment, therefore, it would suit Antiochos not to interfere in the south, where his

¹² Livy 36.31.10–12.

garrison in Elis had imposed a local balance of power and had checked any possible Achaian move. To the north, beyond Epeiros, was Roman territory, and the Roman army under Baebius' command, which had sent out the detachment to Thessaly under Claudius Pulcher. No doubt Antiochos now knew about Pulcher's camp, and its small garrison. He would thus be under no illusion that the Romans were intent on moving into Thessaly when the campaigning season began. This was obviously one of the main reasons for his move to the west, for success there might well compel the Romans to retreat back to Illyria.

The keys to the whole western area were two: control of Akarnania, and the Roman fleet, and these were interlinked. The fleet, under the command of A. Atilius Serranus, had been sent to Greece the year before to help deal with Nabis. After reaching Gytheion in summer 192, too late to have any effect on that war, the fleet then vanishes from our view until the spring of 191 when it was in Ionian Sea waters, specifically off Kephallenia.¹³ At least one Roman quinquereme was at Demetrias in the previous spring, when Villius had used it as his platform in his hopeless attempt to reverse Eurylochos' *coup* there.¹⁴ This ship, it has been suggested, was that which had transported the four legates to Greece in the spring;¹⁵ it was certainly operating under their orders at Demetrias. But no Roman naval activity is recorded against Antiochos in the Aegean, and it is probable that Atilius' whole fleet had been withdrawn to winter quarters before the sailing season closed. So far as Atilius was concerned his task was accomplished with the ending of the war with Nabis, and Sparta's union with Achaia. Winter quarters were probably at Kerkyra, or possibly Apollonia.¹⁶ The ships, indeed, may well have been used to help transport Baebius' army across the Adriatic to Apollonia in the previous October. Atilius expected to be relieved by his successor C. Livius Salinator in the spring, but, as it happened, Livius was held up by the dispute over service by the Roman

¹³ Livy 36.11.9.

¹⁴ Livy 35.39.5.

¹⁵ Thiel, *Studies*, 286; Thiel's suggestion of a skirmish between Roman and Seleukid ships at this time is no more than that, and there is no evidence for it.

¹⁶ There is no evidence either way on this, but it will have been one of these places.

citizens of the maritime colonies of Latium and Campania,¹⁷ and so it was Atilius who still commanded when the new sailing season approached.

Atilius was energised early. The new consul had left Rome early in January,¹⁸ and had ordered his troops to be ready to cross from Brundisium then, though he would scarcely bring his soldiers across before March. He was not present in Greece in late January, when the decision concerning the march of Pulcher's detachment through Macedon to Thessaly was taken by Baebius and King Philip without reference to the consul. But the news of Livius' problems and the delay in his crossing released Atilius. He sent a detachment of ships south to Kephallenia, the nearest enemy territory, under the command of A. Postumius,¹⁹ otherwise unknown. They were presumably present to suppress any naval—or piratical, as the Romans would say—activity by the Kephallenians which might interfere with the troop movements in the north, but they were also, as it happened, by chance able to interfere with Antiochos' plans for Akarnania.

The Akarnanians, unlike the Aitolians, had a naval tradition, and probably possessed some ships.²⁰ Add them to the ships of the Kephallenians, the Eleians, and the Zakynthians, and any which the Aitolians might have, and there was the nucleus of an Ionian Sea naval force which Antiochos could use. Also, control of Akarnania and Leukas would bring with it control of all the Ionian Sea coast from Ambrakia to Cape Tainaron; the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, Achaian League territory, would then be the only coastline at which the enemy—that is, the Roman—fleet, could call with safety. Ships required landing places every night, preferably, and the fewer

¹⁷ Livy 36.3.4–6; the delay lasted for some time, since the dispute had to be settled by the Senate; a month, perhaps.

¹⁸ Livy 36.3.14; Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 274–275 points to the chronological problem discovered by the record of the dedication of the temple of Magna Mater on 1 April 191 (= 1 December 192), when Glabrio is said to have left Rome to the war (Livy 36.36.3–4). It is certainly a problem, but without knowing more of Glabrio's movements at the time it is not possible to resolve it. The notice at 36.3.14 is specific that Glabrio left the city on the Nones of May (= 27 December), and there seems no reason to reject it.

¹⁹ Livy 36.11.9.

²⁰ Pol. 2.10.1; Akarnania provided seven ships, the Achaians ten, the Aitolians none, for an expedition to fight Illyrian raiders, but that had been in 229; several of the league's cities were ports so some sort of naval capability is likely, particularly when Kephallenian piracy was rife.

places that were available the more predictable the ships' movements would be. Third, the control of Akarnania, along with that of Aitolia and Athamania, would exert considerable pressure on the Epeirote League. The discussion with Charops had been continued by Antiochos' own embassy to Epeiros; if it had not already been sent, would certainly go there now, Antiochos' persuasions would be much strengthened by the news of the spread of his power into the west. The acquisition of Akarnania, in other words, might well counterbalance the pressure of the Roman army in the north. And if Epeiros could be persuaded to join Antiochos' alliance, pressure could immediately be applied to the Roman province of Illyria, and to the troops there. Thus the capture of all Akarnania was a major strategic object, one which could well affect the war's outcome.

In his usual way Antiochos had contacted a local supporter. This was a man called Mnasilochos, apparently from the city of Medeon, the main urban centre in Akarnania. Mnasilochos had been operating within the council of the Akarnanian League for some time, and so he had presumably been contacted by Antiochos early in the Greek expedition, perhaps at the time Charops of Epeiros was also contacted. Mnasilochos, whose adhesion to Antiochos had been, says Livy, 'purchased with many gifts',²¹ was a council member, and it seems that there was sufficient local sentiment in favour of the Seleukid connection for coins to be minted showing Seleukid symbols.²² The league *strategos* Klytos had been won round, the more easily in that he was also from Medeon.²³

The Akarnanians, however, were no more unanimous in their politics and their foreign affairs preferences than the people of any other Greek state. There were plenty of them who did not wish to become

²¹ Livy 36.11.8.

²² B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum*, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1911, 333–334, and W. Wroth, 'Greek Coins acquired by the British Museum in 1891', *Numismatic Chronicle* 12, 1892, 1–21, at 9–11 and plate I, no. 15. The Seleukid symbols of an anchor and elephant appear on these coins, which are of a different weight than usual for Akarnanian coins. The Akarnanian mint at this time appears to have been at Leukas, which was hostile to Antiochos, and this may be an explanation for this difference. On the other hand, it takes time to design and mint coins, and Antiochos was not in Akarnania more than two or three weeks at the most. Thus either the attribution to the year 191 is wrong, in which case the Seleukid symbols cannot be explained, or there had been a good deal of advance preparation for the campaign. On the whole, the second explanation is to be preferred, which means that the work had been done by Mnasimachos and Klytos.

²³ Livy 36.11.8.

involved, and there were others, especially at Leukas, who had a healthy respect for Roman power—Leukas was on the coast, and so vulnerable to the nearby fleet.²⁴ Further Mnasilochos and Klytos might speak for Medeon, but they did not have much influence on Thyrraeion, the other main city. In addition the Akarnanians had fought the Aitolians in the past, and several formerly Akarnanian cities were now in the Aitolian League. The whole issue was the subject of public debate, and it was argued out at a meeting of the council of the league. Mnasilochos proposed that the league levy be called out to defend the land against Antiochos and the Aitolians; this was in fact a ploy, and others were able to get this reduced to a reinforcement of five hundred men to be divided between Medeon and Thyrraeion.²⁵

With the ground thus prepared in advance during the winter, Antiochos set out in the spring to finish the job in person.²⁶ His army had first had to be gathered from its winter camps, which were no doubt scattered from Chalkis to Thessaly. Then he set it marching along the Spercheios valley from the Malian Gulf, to a rendezvous at Stratos, in the Acheloo valley, close to the Akarnanian border. They were commanded by Menippos once more, and by Alexander the Akarnanian, a soldier of fortune who had transferred his interest from Philip of Macedon to Antiochos two years or more before.²⁷ (Menippos was also by origin a Macedonian; these two may thus have been old colleagues.) Alexander was obviously given the post of commander because of his origin. The king travelled separately, first into Boiotia, where part of the army mustered at Chaironeia, then by way of Delphi—he sacrificed to his ancestor Apollo—and on to Naupaktos, to a conference with the Aitolians.²⁸ He rejoined the army at Stratos, and, having received a report from Mnasilochos, he sent envoys to Medeon.²⁹

²⁴ Livy 36.11.9; Leukas had been besieged and stormed by L. Flamininus in 197; cf. Oost, *Roman Policy*, 50–51.

²⁵ Livy 36.11.10–11; cf. Oost, *Roman Policy*, 60–62.

²⁶ Livy 36.11.5.

²⁷ Livy 36.11.6–8; for Alexander, cf. 35.18.1, and Grainger, *Prosopography*, 637; Briscoe *Comm. Livy*, 2.236 makes heavy weather of the route suggested, but from the Malian Gulf the quickest route, and the shortest march, to Stratos is by the Spercheios valley; beginning at the Malian Gulf implies a rendezvous for the dispersed forces, perhaps collecting Aitolians along the way.

²⁸ Livy 36.11.6–7.

²⁹ Livy 36.12.1.

The city assembly³⁰ discussed the city's response. Klytos finally, by appearing to favour neither side, got an agreement for a return embassy to the king. The selection of envoys was rigged to favour those who were pro-Antiochos—they were Klytos himself and Mnasilochos—then they delayed setting out, until Antiochos and his troops could be summoned. When he and they arrived the two 'envoys' were able to let him in, and when no massacre occurred, as had been predicted by Klytos' opponents, Antiochos was able both to calm the Medeonites into acceptance, and to achieve the allegiance of other Akarnanian towns.³¹

Thyrreion, however, was thereby warned. Mnasilochos was sent ahead, but was answered by a pledge of loyalty to Rome, and the shutting of the city gates.³² Given time, this could perhaps have been overcome, but Leukas had also to be taken and that was a more difficult matter, for it was separated from the mainland by a narrow sea-channel. In fact, Leukas received a visit, at about the same time that Mnasilochos was speaking to the Thyrreionites, from Cn. Octavius with a squadron of Roman ships.³³ Octavius was one of Flamininus' legatine colleagues, and had been a naval commander in Sicilian waters during the Hannibalic war. These legates had been very quiet during the winter, but had presumably remained in Achaian territory. Octavius is said to have been sent by Flamininus, which suggests that the legates had good information on Antiochos' movements and intentions. These two, and Villius, were experienced commanders, and could see the importance of Akarnania as clearly as could Antiochos, and the need to preserve the use of at least one port along that long coast—which meant Leukas. Octavius collected ships from Postumius at Kephallenia, and sailed to Leukas in time to persuade the city not to risk another Roman siege and capture—the city had been stormed by L. Flamininus in 197.³⁴ He also explained that the consul Glabrio had arrived in Illyria to take com-

³⁰ Not the assembly of the league, for later the league assembly has also to be consulted.

³¹ Livy 36.12.1–6; the other Akarnanians who submitted are not named; Thyrreion did *not* submit, nor did Leukas, so those who did may be supposed to have been in the southern and central parts, places such as Phoetiai, Rhynchos and Alyzia.

³² Livy 12.7–8.

³³ Livy 36.12.10.

³⁴ Livy 33.16–17.

mand. This also implied the arrival of still more troops and ships. The Leukadians gracefully welcomed the Romans.³⁵

Whether Octavius had exact information about the consul, or was only bluffing, is not known, but it is certain that if anyone in the area got to know quickly of Glabrio's arrival, it would be Postumius, and after him, Flamininus. Glabrio would ensure they were told; so probably Octavius learnt it when he met Postumius. It did not, however, necessarily affect Antiochos' activities. With the exception of the brief siege and storming of Pherai in January, the king had been very careful not to get involved in any action anywhere in Greece from which he could not quickly extricate himself and his forces. In Thessaly he had campaigned until he met a serious check and then had withdrawn; similarly in Akarnania, when the check came at Thyreion, combined with the decision of the Leukadians, this caused him at once to break off.³⁶ Yet the brief campaign still left him with at least half of Akarnania, as well as the allegiance of the current *strategos* of the league, Klytos.

Octavius' information on Glabrio could well have come from M. Porcius Cato, who was serving as a legate or a military tribune with the consular army. He and L. Valerius Flaccus, another consular, were appointed, it seems, in place of L. Quinctius Flamininus, the Senate's original choice.³⁷ While Flaccus remained with the main army, Cato was despatched on a more diplomatic mission. No doubt his main purpose was to establish contact with T. Flamininus and his fellow legates, but he was also to stiffen the spines of the Achaians and the Athenians, whose positions were somewhat precarious, with Antiochos apparently firmly established in Boiotia and Aitolia, just to their north.

Cato's journey is described by Plutarch, based on Cato's own account, as a mission to win over the cities of the northern Peloponnese, even though the three cities mentioned were already, as members of the Achaian League, at war with Antiochos.³⁸ Cato may have misunderstood the situation, or misled his readers, or perhaps Plutarch did not understand what Cato was saying.³⁹ The three cities in fact

³⁵ Livy 36.12.10–11.

³⁶ Livy 36.12.11.

³⁷ Broughton, *MRR* 1.354–355; A. E. Astin, *Cato the Censor*, Oxford, 1978, 56.

³⁸ Plut. *Cato Maior*, 12.4.

³⁹ Astin, *Cato* (note 37), 56–57.

describe his itinerary through Greece: he landed at Patrai, visited Aigion and Corinth, at one of which he will have conferred with Flamininus, then went on to Athens. He spoke to the assembly there, remarking, in the one sentence surviving from his speech, that Antiochos made war with pen and paper,⁴⁰ only a pardonable exaggeration. He then waited in Athens, seeing the sights.

The delay was no doubt because he could not join, or rejoin, Glabrio easily. While he was in Athens the Roman fleet under A. Atilius Serranus arrived, having circumnavigated the Peloponnese; one of the ships may in fact have transported Cato to Patrai in the first place. How Cato got from Athens to the army in Thessaly is a minor puzzle, but he was certainly there in April.⁴¹

Glabrio had ordered the muster of his army at Brundisium for 4 January. He did not cross to Illyria, however, until March. He brought with him more troops, 4,000 Roman and 6,000 Italian infantry, and 400 Italian cavalry, which had been recruited for him by L. Flamininus, the retiring consul, during the period between Glabrio's election and his installation.⁴² This gave him an army of over 36,000 men, a substantial force, but one only just sufficient to combat the combined forces of the states he would have to face. Antiochos' 10,000, plus the reinforcements he expected, plus the Aitolian levy (plus anything which could be gathered from the other Greeks) would be about the same number in total.

By the time Glabrio reached Illyria, Baebius had begun the year's campaign, when along with Philip he had marched into Thessaly, following the advance force he had despatched under Ap. Claudius Pulcher. Livy dates this move 'at the beginning of spring',⁴³ which will have been the same time Antiochos began his move westwards towards Akarnania. It is also presumably the approximate date of

⁴⁰ Plut. *Cato Maior*, 12.5-7; Pliny *NH* 29.14; J. Malcovati, *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*, Turin 1967, Cato, frag. 20.

⁴¹ Astin, *Cato* (note 37), 57, simply ignores this problem, leaving Cato in Athens at the end of one paragraph, and having him at Thermopylai in the middle of the next.

⁴² Recruitment: Livy 36.12.10; troops ordered to Brundisium: 36.3.14. The only reason there can have been for Glabrio to leave his crossing to Illyria until March was that he had troops with him. Had he been alone (or just with his staff) he could have risked the crossing earlier, but he did not dare risk the soldiers. See Appendix 1.

⁴³ Livy 36.13.2.

Glabrio's embarkation at Brundisium. Glabrio's arrival at Apollonia with his extra troops, soon after Baebius' forces had left to march across Macedon to Thessaly, together with the partial and simultaneous failure of Antiochos' work in Akarnania, would be quite enough to convince Charops and any other doubting Epeirotes that the Roman side was the one to join.

Baebius and Philip reached Thessaly separately. The Roman camp at Gonnos which had been prepared by Pulcher would be Baebius' first destination, passing to the east of Olympos, between the mountain and the sea; Philip, on the other hand, judging by his first moves, came south out of the Haliakmon valley, over the Volustana pass, and into the Tripolis, the area of Perrhaibia ravaged by Menippos two months before. He moved first against the city of Malloea, which resisted him, apparently without the benefit of a Seleukid garrison's stiffening of its citizens' resolve. Baebius will have moved from Gonnos down to Larisa, and then quickly took two places along the edge of the Larisan plain, Phakion and Phayttos. The approach to Larisa having been thus secured, he turned north, called at the Atrax fort and took Kyretiai and Erition. This cleared Perrhaibia except for Malloea which still resisted Philip. Baebius brought his army up, and, faced by the joint forces, the city now surrendered. But its long resistance had been a setback for Philip.⁴⁴

This cleared the northern part of Thessaly, to add to the area around Larisa which had never been under Antiochos' control. The next move suggests that some co-ordination with Glabrio's plans was involved. Glabrio's route would seem to have been from Apollonia, up the valley of Aoos (through Epeiros, that is, whose decision in favour of Rome is thereby confirmed) and over the Zygos pass into the Peneus valley.⁴⁵ This approach explains the next part of the campaign of Baebius and Philip, who together moved into the Peneus valley and progressively cleared out the garrisons stationed there by Amyndros of Athamania two months earlier.⁴⁶ Most of these were

⁴⁴ Livy 36.13.3; cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, 202–203.

⁴⁵ This route is not specified in Livy, but is the most direct one from Apollonia and the best explanation of Baebius' and Philip's actions; cf. Bequignon, *Valley du Spercheios*, 280–281; Hammond, *Epirus*, 623; Cabanes, *L'Épire*, 281.

⁴⁶ Livy 36.13.6–7; Walbank, *Philip V*, 202, note 4, suggests that some of these places had been held by Amyndros since 196 because they are not recorded as having been taken by him in 192/191; it is, as Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 239, says, 'more probable' that they were 'recent captures'.

in small towns and provided no resistance, until they came to Pellina. Here the commander of the garrison was Philip of Megalopolis, who was summoned to surrender but rudely refused to trust the word of Philip of Macedon. Tactfully, Baebius persuaded the king to go off to attack another town, Limnaion.⁴⁷

Glabrio now arrived with the cavalry of his army of reinforcements, having ridden on in advance of the slower-marching infantry, who were sent on to Larisa. He first joined Philip in front of Limnaion, and the increased size of the joint force—and perhaps the presence of a Roman commander—now persuaded the garrison to surrender. For the first time Seleukid soldiers were here encountered in joint-garrison with Athamanians. Glabrio and Philip then joined Baebius, who had tactfully not yet captured Pellina. Again the town gave in at the sight of the consul, first the Athamanian soldiers, then their commander Philip of Megalopolis; Philip of Macedon found his appearance as a prisoner richly amusing. The total of captives was now four thousand, the great majority of them Athamanians.⁴⁸ Antiochos had left only one garrison of his own soldiers in all this area, at Limnaion. The resistance to Philip had therefore come from the Thessalians themselves. The parties in power in these towns were thus clearly the anti-Macedonians, which is only to be expected after the Seleukid-Aitolian-Athamanian campaign; they were now replaced by those formerly in power, the pro-Romans. No doubt there were further rapid changes in governing personnel as the joint Roman-Macedonian advance went ahead.

This has all the appearance of a carefully planned campaign. It certainly had the strategic effect of bringing Antiochos back from Akarnania,⁴⁹ though he had achieved as much there as he could without setting sieges when the news of the invasion of Thessaly arrived. It was probably not much of a surprise, neither perhaps was the rapid collapse of his position there. It is noticeable that he had been fairly sparing with his own troops in all this activity; so far a thousand had been sent to Elis, some garrisons, probably small, were left in Akarnania, and one is recorded as having been captured at Limnaion. When Glabrio advanced again he faced three more Seleukid

⁴⁷ Livy 36.13.7–9.

⁴⁸ Livy 36.14.2–6.

⁴⁹ Livy 36.12.11.

garrisons, at Pharsalos, Skotusssa, and Pherai. When these were captured, a thousand of the men agreed to enlist with King Philip and so they were presumably mercenaries. Those who refused to enlist were disarmed and released to go to Demetrias.⁵⁰ These detachments and losses, however, were a considerable percentage of Antiochos' European force, which had been small to begin with.

The reason for the sparing use of his own soldiers is most easily attributed to the fact that he did not have many in the first place, and to scatter them about Greece in penny-packets would be to end up with none at all. But that is only a military reason, and if that had been all there was to it, no garrisons at all would have been sent out. The thousand men sent to Elis, for example, were militarily useless: the reason they were there, however, was politically very advantageous. And the political aspect of Antiochos' troop dispositions is worth noting. In Thessaly there was one small advanced garrison at Limnaion, and three in major cities at Pharsalos, Skotussa, and Pherai—plus, of course, a substantial force holding Demetrias. But there were few others. Their absence, and the lack of garrisons elsewhere, as in Boiotia and most of Euboia, was perhaps the result of Flamininus' Roman policy of evacuation. The Greeks had shown how glad they were to see the end of the Roman garrisons; by welcoming Antiochos, if that is not too strong a word for it, they were certainly not welcoming the return of foreign garrisons in their cities. Apart from the military considerations, the political necessity of conciliating the Greeks required that Antiochos be very delicate in his movements and the placements of his troops. And that, of course, meant that it was all too easy for the Romans to recover their losses.

Glabrio's progress through Thessaly was as easy as Antiochos' had been: the cities of the southern part of the country did not even have to be attacked. Kairion and Metropolis sent their submissions to the consul at Larisa, where he rested his forces and received the Roman and Italian infantry, who had taken longer to march from Apollonia than the cavalry. When he marched south again, Krannon, Skotussa, Pherai and Pharsalos gave in rapidly, as did Proerna (whose capture by Antiochos had not been mentioned).⁵¹ It is noticeable, however, that Glabrio made no attempt on Demetrias, though he

⁵⁰ Livy 36.14.11–12.

⁵¹ Livy 36.14.7, 10 and 12; Bevan, *House*, 82–83.

sent some of his disarmed Seleukid prisoners there. The city, one of Antiochos' main bases, and whose rulers had already defied a Roman summons, would require a siege, and Glabrio was no doubt just as unwilling as Antiochos to become involved in one, at least so early in the campaign.

The first serious resistance came soon after the surrender of Proerna. The road south from that city led uphill and through the wooded range of the '*mons Achaici*', which marked the old boundary between the Aitolian League and Thessaly. Bravely and foolhardily the soldiers of the next city along the route, Thaumakoi, the first the Romans had reached inside Aitolia, made some resistance, forming an ambush beside the road. Glabrio captured the city, then routed the ambushers: a victory of two legions against the citizens of one small city.⁵² But it was a clear portent for the Romans that the easy part of the campaign was over, and that the next stage was going to be much more difficult. The conquest of Aitolia would be a hard task, for the loyalty of its citizens to the league was intense.

Meanwhile Philip had another easy campaign. He released his Athamanian prisoners, having treated them generously, and then followed them home with his army. The evidence of defeat, the threat of invasion, the stories of good treatment, were all capped by the flight of King Amyndandros to take refuge in Aitolian Ambrakia. Without effort, and with no fighting, Athamania fell under Philip's control.⁵³ Now, if necessary, the road south into western Aitolia, a road which Philip had followed more than once in his wars with Aitolia in the past, was open.

Antiochos had meanwhile returned from Akarnania, with his army, and had gathered up his detached troops, including some reinforcements he had received.⁵⁴ He first went to Chalkis, his general headquarters, where no doubt the reports of the Roman and Macedonian advances came first. The Roman advance in Thessaly was clearly the most important immediate problem, so he ordered an

⁵² Livy 36.14.12-14.

⁵³ Livy 36.14.7-10.

⁵⁴ Livy 36.15.3; how many he had received is not known, but he still mustered 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, despite garrisons, detachments, and losses, which must have been several thousands: 1,000 in Elis, 1,000 enlisted with Philip, 3,000 at Demetrias, plus garrisons. It seems that he will have received almost as many reinforcements as his original force. A brief notice in Diod. (29.3) implies that more reinforcements were expected; App. *Syr.* 17 implies the same.

Aitolian muster at Lamia, and led his own forces there. He had ten thousand infantry and five hundred horse, plus his six elephants.⁵⁵ With an equal number of Aitolians, he would have enough to meet the consul on more or less equal terms. With a full Aitolian and Boiotian turnout he would probably outnumber the enemy force.

The Aitolians were in a quandary. Glabrio's army was approaching from the north, and in fact a detachment was able to ravage the fields of the Aitolian city of Hypata as soon as the initial resistance of the Thaumakians had been overcome.⁵⁶ At the same time Philip was moving into Athamania with dismaying ease. To the south Achaia was hostile, as was much of Akarnania in the west. All these areas and directions had to be watched, for all of them could be the source of an invasion of the Aitolian homeland. Philip had more than once in the past marched down the Acheloos valley from Athamania or Epeiros, and had twice sacked the federal sanctuary at Thermon by approaching that way. On another occasion he had brought an army from Achaia across the Corinthian Gulf to land near Naupaktos. Ninety years before, in an episode graven on Aitolian memories, the Gauls had come through Thessaly and had got into Aitolia from the north-east; they had, famously, been beaten away from Delphi, but one group had sacked the Aitolian city of Kallipolis.

The result of all these considerations was that Antiochos' call for a muster at Lamia met with only a minor response. It was not that the Aitolians would not fight;⁵⁷ rather was it that their history told them that to put all their troops into one army meant that many avenues of invasion of their land were then left uncovered. It turned out that they could only afford a contingent of four thousand men for Antiochos' muster, and this was what joined Antiochos at Lamia.⁵⁸

Lamia was a good choice to intercept an invasion from the north, but not with an army of perhaps no more than half the size of the invader's. To do so in such circumstances would be to invite a siege—and with Macedon and Thessaly finally under Glabrio's control, Lamia would be a trap. Antiochos, presumably in the knowledge

⁵⁵ Livy 36.15.1–4.

⁵⁶ Livy 36.14.15.

⁵⁷ Diod. 29.3 preserves something of the Seleukid response to the Aitolian problems.

⁵⁸ Livy 36.14.4, saying 'only the chiefs, with a few clients', met the king at Lamia—a meaningless statement in the Aitolian context; the actual number is revealed at 36.16.3; cf. Grainger, *League of the Aitolians*, 460.

that the other approaches to Aitolia were now guarded, withdrew from the city into the Thermopylai narrows. The Aitolian contingent with him was now divided into two groups, two thousand strong each, and put into garrison in the two Aitolian cities of Hypata and Herakleia, the first blocking the route into Aitolia along the Spercheios valley, the other helping to block the Thermopylai route. Antiochos occupied the narrowest part of the Thermopylai pass with his own forces, and ten thousand men were certainly enough to block the pass successfully against any assault even by superior numbers. The defensive wall which was already there was strengthened, the ditch cleaned out, and a new rampart added.⁵⁹

Glabrio, with his superior numbers, wanted a battle. He therefore set his troops to ravaging the lands of Hypata and Herakleia, hoping no doubt to provoke the Aitolians, and Antiochos, to come forward to defend these lands. Nothing happened; the Aitolians in the cities stayed put; Antiochos stayed put. So Glabrio moved forward into the pass, camping at the Hot Gates themselves, which are half way along the narrows, still well over a mile from Antiochos' wall, which was at the East Gate, the eastern end of the pass.⁶⁰

By moving thus, Glabrio had placed his army between the Seleukids at the East Gate and the Aitolians in Hypata and Herakleia. Therefore part at least of the Roman forces must have been stationed to mask Herakleia—Hypata was too far off to be a threat if it was still held.⁶¹ Antiochos was, however, worried about the likelihood of being out-flanked, for he could be sure that the Romans had been educated on the same subjects and stories as himself, and would know about by-passing Thermopylai. A message went to the Aitolians by a runner. After an argument, so Livy says, the Aitolians agreed to man three forts on the heights, with half of their men, leaving the original 2,000 in Herakleia.⁶²

Glabrio had no choice now but to attack. He also had no choice but to do what Antiochos required. He had got himself into a posi-

⁵⁹ Livy 36.15.6 and 16.1–4.

⁶⁰ Livy 36.16.4–5.

⁶¹ Livy 36.16.5, says the two groups of 2,000 Aitolians both went into Herakleia; this does not mean they abandoned Hypata, since the concentration of enemy forces at Thermopylai meant that the Aitolians could also concentrate in that area.

⁶² Livy 36.16.8–11; the location of the three forts is discussed by W. K. Pritchett, 'The battle of Thermopylai in 191 B.C.', *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, Berkeley, 1965, 71–82, and by Bar Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 160 and 260–261, note 4.

tion whereby the enemy was dictating his moves. He detached two groups of two thousand men, under his two ex-consul legates Flaccus and Cato, to attempt to clear the forts on the hills. At the same time, after a speech to his troops, he moved his main force forward to attack Antiochos' position.⁶³

Exactly how many men Glabrio still had under his command at this point is not at all clear. The best calculation gives him 36,700 troops, but that was at the start of the campaign, before the men were shipped to Greece, and it includes the men originally under Baebius' command. There had been casualties since, not so much by fighting, of which little had yet been done, but by disease and accident. Some men were undoubtedly sick, others had been detached into garrisons, still others were detached to mask places such as Demetrias. A probable total force of 30,000 may be assumed therefore at Thermopylai, as a maximum. Of these Glabrio had detached 4,000 for the outflanking moves, and probably an equal number were watching Herakleia. Then there were those left to guard the camp: also the cavalry (perhaps 2,000 men and horses) were next to useless in the pass, though they were used after the battle, and so were present at the fighting. Glabrio had perhaps no more than 18,000 men for the assault on Antiochos' position.⁶⁴ He thus outnumbered Antiochos by almost two to one.

But the size of Glabrio's preponderance in men was not important, since the narrowness of the pass discounted numbers. He will have known this—it was the whole point of the old story of the last stand of the small Spartan force of Leonidas against Xerxes' enormous hordes, after all—and it was the obvious reason why Antiochos had chosen his position. Antiochos was able to draw up his phalanx in front of the wall, with missile-throwing machines on the wall itself, firing over the heads of the men before it, light troops placed before the phalangites, the elephants to the left, and missile troops on the mountain slopes to the south, thrown forward to enfilade the Roman

⁶³ Livy 36.17.1–2; Glabrio's speech (Livy 36.17.2–6) may be conventional, as Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 245–246, says, and one doubts very much that it is in any way an accurate account of what was said, but Glabrio may very well have made a speech.

⁶⁴ The size of the Roman force is not discussed by Bar Kochva in his account of the battle (*Seleucid Army*, 156–162); J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland*, vol. 2, Berlin 1912, 134–136; Bevan, *House*, 2.83–86; Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.175 (very brief); Errington, *CAH* (2), 284 (even briefer).

advance. On the north, the Roman left, the sea was as confining as the hills.⁶⁵ Glabrio's advance was thus confined to the narrow lower ground, slowed up by the missiles and the light infantry, and then brought to a halt by the solid block of the long-speared phalangites. Antiochos, having blunted the first Roman advance, then withdrew his phalanx behind the double wall and ditch. The Roman forces were thus exposed to more missile attacks, and were wholly unable to break the Seleukid defences.⁶⁶ It is at this time that the Aitolian attack on the Roman camp, recorded by Appian, presumably took place.⁶⁷ In short the Romans were being beaten.

The flanking moves were almost as unsuccessful. Flaccus with his two thousand men had to attack two forts sited close together; he failed to capture either.⁶⁸ The Aitolians sent to hold the hills had been two thousand in number, and it seems that most were in these two forts. The rest, about six hundred, were in the fort tackled by Cato, who also had two thousand men. He lost his way—but this may be Cato gilding the lily—but then at daylight discovered the Aitolian position. The advanced picquet was charged and scattered; then the main force was attacked. One version has the Aitolians still asleep, which is scarcely reconcilable with the timing and the preliminary attack, which must have been a noisy affair. Whatever the details, Cato was successful. He led his men along the track and down the hill to take Antiochos' army in flank and rear. Having been under fierce attack for some hours by an enemy superior in numbers, the Seleukid army was in a nervous state. In the minds of every soldier was the knowledge that this pass had been turned in the past. They were *expecting* Cato and his two thousand men to attack from the hills, and so when this actually happened panic set in. The whole army broke and fled.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Livy 36.18.2–4; App. *Syr.* 18.

⁶⁶ Livy 36.18.5–8; App. *Syr.* 18–19.

⁶⁷ Livy 36.19.7; App. *Syr.* 19.

⁶⁸ Livy 36.19.1; App. *Syr.* 18.

⁶⁹ Livy 36.18.8–19.3; Plut. *Cato Maior*, 13.1–7; App. *Syr.* 19.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE NAVAL WAR: KISSOS

The king's army is described by Livy as being totally destroyed during the next two days; Antiochos is supposed to have survived with no more than 500 of his men.¹ Livy's account, as so often, does not ring true; the description he gives is a generalised account which might apply to any defeat.² Certainly the stages of the royal army's flight—Skarpheia, Elateia, Chalkis—can be accepted, but there were other possible destinations for the defeated soldiers as well. Further, although Livy describes the Roman pursuit as relentless, in fact it was no such thing. First, the Aitolians from Herakleia had attacked the Roman camp, no doubt as part of Antiochos' battle plan. There were enough troops guarding the camp to frustrate the attack, but it certainly called for the attention of Glabrio.³ Second, the initial pursuit was by the infantry, men already fatigued by the battle; the cavalry were not sent in pursuit until the 'third hour of the night', which, since the battle was over in the morning, meant that the fugitives had eighteen hours' start.⁴ Finally, when Glabrio himself set out, he marched slowly and steadily, keeping his men well in hand. One must conclude that substantially more than 500 of Antiochos' troops will have survived.⁵

Nevertheless enough had been lost that the king made a quick decision to return to Asia. His first escape had been to Chalkis,⁶ his headquarters, where he will have had some troops in garrison. Others were at Demetrias, some of whom had been released by Glabrio after their capture in Thessaly, and others were the men also in

¹ Livy 36.19.1 (= Pol. 20.8.6).

² Livy 36.19.4–6.

³ Livy 36.19.7; App. *Syr.* 19.

⁴ Livy 36.19.8.

⁵ Livy does not really make an estimate of Seleukid casualties, being content to quote Valerius Antias in a disbelieving way, and saying that 500 men escaped with the king (36.19.11–12 = Pol. 20.6).

⁶ Livy 36.19.9.

garrison there.⁷ There were still a thousand soldiers in Elis, and more were in garrison in Akarnania. In total Antiochos thus still had several thousand troops in Greece, in addition to those who escaped from the battle and evaded the pursuit to reach Chalkis independently. But these troops were scattered, and to gather them all together would take too long.

Antiochos also had ships. Close to the battlefield, at Thronion in Epiknemidian Lokris, was a small fleet of ten warships, under the command of Isidoros. Warned of the defeat of the army by the arrival of fugitives, including the wounded and dying Alexander the Akarnanian, Isidoros sailed to Demetrias.⁸ Further south, a large supply fleet on its way from Asia to Antiochos at Chalkis was intercepted off Andros by the Roman fleet out of Peiraios, still under the command of A. Atilius Serranus. He captured some ships, and sank more, but others also escaped.⁹ But above all Antiochos had most of his original fleet still intact, presumably mainly at Demetrias, where Isidoros had gone, but others will have been at Chalkis.

In theory it was open to Antiochos to send the ships to Asia and to stand on the defensive in Chalkis, behind the moat of the Euripos and the strong fortifications of Salganeus, while more reinforcements were brought across the Aegean. But this option depended on the continued naval command of the Euripos, and on support continuing to be manifested in Greece. To be sure, the Aitolians were still in the war, but against this there was the rapid collapse of his position in Thessaly, and, as Glabrio approached, in Boiotia also, together with hostility from Achaia, from Macedon, and the resistance he had encountered at Larisa and Akarnania. It was clear that the attempt to replace the Roman hegemony by a Seleukid one had failed, at least for the moment.

Glabrio's army marched through Lokris and into Boiotia, whose cities switched sides again as nimbly as the Thessalians had done. At Koroneia, finding a statue of Antiochos still in place at the federal Boiotian sanctuary of Athene Itonia, Glabrio allowed his troops to pillage the area.¹⁰ This was regarded as sufficient collective punish-

⁷ Livy 36.35.4; the size of the garrison is not stated, but some thousands may be conjectured; fugitives from the battle reached the city.

⁸ Livy 36.20.5–6.

⁹ Livy 36.20.7–8.

¹⁰ Livy 36.20.1–4; the statue was quick work by the Boiotians, unless it was just a relabelled old one.

ment for the Boiotian treachery, and it also ensured that none of the Boiotians made any attempt to resist the Roman march. But the delay involved must have let even more of the fugitives from Antiochos' army get away.

The naval control of the Euripos was a precarious matter. Antiochos had had experience of its difficulty in the previous November, when his ships had been unable to prevent Mikythio and some of his soldiers from crossing from the mainland to Chalkis; the presence of an active Roman fleet at Peiraios effectively neutralised his own fleet, apparently based at Demetrias. The length of the Euripos, the narrow crossing at Chalkis, and the size of the Roman fleet meant that Glabrio would be able to land a force in Euboia with little difficulty. Antiochos could presumably have held the city and its mainland outfort at Salganeus, but he was now very heavily outnumbered, and if he stayed he would soon be reduced to defending a besieged city. He had wider responsibilities than that. The general problem will have become obvious as soon as the news of the disruption of the Seleukid convoy off Andros arrived. At that point it was clear it was time to leave.

The king left Chalkis, with wife, treasure, soldiers and ships, before Glabrio arrived. The royal governor also left, courteously opening the city to the Romans as he did so (thus avoiding an assault), and the rest of Euboia followed Chalkis in submitting to the new conquerors.¹¹ The consul then turned back to attend to the Aitolians. There was no point in attempting to follow Antiochos across the Aegean to Asia with the Roman forces. Atilius' fleet might be strong enough to attack a supply convoy, but it was not numerous enough to dispute the command of the Aegean with Antiochos' full fleet. Antiochos' hundred ships were not all present in the area of Chalkis or Demetrias, but they were still available, so much so that Atilius, with twenty-five ships, could not afford to move far from the Peiraios.

Glabrio's decision was no doubt partly due to the wording of his province—'Greece'—but to concentrate on the Aitolians was also a reflection of his own strength. He had suffered some casualties in the battle. Livy admits to 200 dead,¹² but this must be taken as only a minimal estimate. It is composed of those killed in 'shock of battle',

¹¹ Livy 36.21.1–3.

¹² Livy 36.19.12.

and fifty killed by the Aitolians, presumably at the camp. It takes no account of the wounded, for a start. The Romans had been bombarded for some time before the assault with darts and arrows, and had been initially repulsed by the Seleukid phalanx of spearmen (presumably this was Livy's 'shock of battle'). Under these circumstances a considerably larger number of dead and wounded is to be expected, and a multiplication of Livy's figures by a factor of ten at least is likely to yield a more acceptable figure for deaths, though this is no more than a guess. This is in addition to deaths from sickness and accidents and to losses from desertion, of course.

Glabrio had taken his time over this pursuit. Livy admits that the journey from Thermopylai to Koroneia, less than fifty miles, took several days,¹³ and Glabrio had already delayed the pursuit for a day before he even began the march. It will have taken him a week or more to reach Chalkis—and to go from Thermopylai to Chalkis by way of Koroneia is the long way round. All this suggests that the king and the remnants of his army were not Glabrio's main concern. He quite deliberately marched through Boiotia, made an example of the federal sanctuary at Koroneia and the city there, and ensured that he controlled that land before approaching the fortifications of Chalkis on the mainland at Salganeus. And when the king escaped there were no recriminations. The conclusion must be that he was not intent on capturing the king.

The explanation may well lie in the terms under which Glabrio operated. His province was Greece, and the war he was fighting was one against Aitolia, so he could argue that the fight against Antiochos' army was only undertaken in order to clear the way for an attack on the Aitolians. In strategic terms, also, Glabrio had to deal with the Aitolians in Greece before any attack could be launched into Asia, even if he had the authority to go beyond Greece. It was also fully consonant with the reluctance of the Senate to indulge in a war with Antiochos in the first place. A diplomatic approach from the king at this point might well have met with a positive response—but the Roman demand would still have been that he desist from attempts to control the Asian cities. Defeat in battle might also allow the Romans to increase these demands, perhaps to include the evacuation of Thrace.

¹³ Livy 36.20.2; see Paton's note 2, pp. 220–221 of volume 10 of his Loeb edition.

Glabrio's first move, when he returned to Thermopylai, having seen the king escape and established his control of Boiotia and Euboea, was to contact the Aitolians and suggest a discussion of terms.¹⁴ This was rejected without serious discussion by the Aitolians holding Herakleia, and so Glabrio moved his army up to besiege the city. Philip was also brought into play, and was allowed to lay siege to Lamia.¹⁵

The Aitolian council met at Hypata, after these sieges had continued for some weeks.¹⁶ It would seem that no attempt was made to relieve either city. The multitude of possible threats to the Aitolian lands will have dispersed the league's forces;¹⁷ also the full Roman consular army, together with the Macedonian army with Philip, each within supporting distance of the other, were sufficient deterrents to any relief attempt, for even the full Aitolian levy could not face such a large Roman force. Not surprisingly, therefore, the one positive action the council took was to send delegates once again to see Antiochos. At least two of these delegates were Thoas and Nikandros, though there may have been more. As summarised by Livy, the message they carried was that Antiochos' forces were needed in Greece, but failing an army, could he please send money? It was pointed out that by maintaining the Aitolians in the fight he was preventing the Romans from attacking him in Asia. This is an unusually realistic summary, so realistic in fact that the accuracy of the latter part of the message may well be doubted.¹⁸ It was also scarcely necessary: Antiochos could obviously work it all out for himself.

Glabrio spent twenty-four days in taking Herakleia,¹⁹ having spent perhaps a week in his pursuit of the royal army; more time was taken up in his return to Thermopylai, contacting the Aitolians, and

¹⁴ Livy 36.22.1-3; in form this is a demand for the surrender of Herakleia, but Livy's words imply a much wider remit; if Herakleia *had* been surrendered, it would certainly have opened up the possibility, if no more, of a wider negotiation.

¹⁵ Livy 36.22.4 (Herakleia); 25.1 (Lamia).

¹⁶ Livy 36.26.1: 'a few days' before Herakleia fell, and the siege lasted 24 days.

¹⁷ Plut. *Flam.* 4 notes that Macedonians were harrying and plundering the Dolopes and Athamanians and Aperantians. He places this at the time of the sieges of Herakleia and Lamia, which implies a major Macedonian raid into the Acheloos valley; but Philip had already taken Athamania, so Plutarch may well be generalising here.

¹⁸ Livy 36.26.2-4. Was this Livy's summary of a speech in Polybios, composed on the Thukydeidean principle that 'this was what should have been said'?

¹⁹ Livy 36.23.6.

in preparations for the siege. The Thermopylai battle was fought on or about April 24,²⁰ so Herakleia fell early in June, by which time the Aitolian council had already sent its envoys to ask Antiochos for help. Philip's siege of Lamia had been unsuccessful,²¹ but after Herakleia fell, the city surrendered to the Romans,²² at which point—about mid-June, by now—the Aitolians became willing to discuss peace terms.²³ A ten-day truce was followed by a second truce, also of ten days.²⁴ During this time Nikandros returned from Antiochos with the promise of money immediately and more troops and ships later.²⁵ The argument among the Aitolians was finely balanced, and was first discussed by the *apokletoi*. This group tended to accept the situation and wished to take the terms offered by Glabrio. But the *apokletoi* had not the power of decision on questions of peace and war. A full emergency assembly was called.²⁶ It was fully understood that rejecting the terms meant continuing the fight.

The council called the assembly to meet at Naupaktos, perhaps assuming that Glabrio would simply wait where he was, and that the truce would be extended again. But the debate in the assembly revealed a strong intention to fight on, and this opinion was relayed to Glabrio.²⁷ Claiming the need to sacrifice to Herakles on Mount Oeta, Glabrio then occupied the Korax passes with an advance force under Ap. Claudius Pulcher, and then sent his main army across Aitolia to besiege Naupaktos.²⁸ Philip was left to tidy up in Thessaly. The main prize left was Demetrias, occupied by Antiochos' garrison, and with Isodoros' detachment of ships in the harbour. Philip

²⁰ Calculated from the approximate time of Glabrio's crossing, combined with Plutarch's comment that the battle was fought at the time of the new moon: Plut. *Cato Maior* 13.1; cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, 329–331; the original calculation was by J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland*, vol. 2, Berlin 1912, 224–227.

²¹ If part of the Macedonian forces were raiding as far as Aperantia (see note 17), there cannot have been many troops left for the siege of Lamia.

²² The two sieges are described in some detail: Herakleia at Livy 36.22.5–24.11, and Lamia at 36.25.1–7; the Romans ordered Philip to give up the siege of Lamia once the Roman army was free of Herakleia. This treatment of an ally can scarcely have reassured the Aitolians, who had been invited to become Roman allies as the way to restore peace.

²³ Livy 36.27.1, exaggerating; Pol. 20.9.1.

²⁴ Livy 36.27.3 and 28.8; Pol. 20.9.4 and 10.11.

²⁵ Livy 36.29.3–11; he fell into Philip's hands briefly on his journey; Pol. 20.10.16–11.10.

²⁶ Livy 36.28.8–9; Pol. 20.10.13.

²⁷ Livy 36.29.1 and 30.1.

²⁸ Livy 36.30.2–6.

had no wish to become involved in another siege—he had been singularly unsuccessful so far in such enterprises—and Antiochos' troops in Demetrias were doing nothing useful. So Philip's agents found agreement easy: Isodoros' ships could leave, Antiochos' soldiers were to be escorted overland to Lysimacheia. Of course, this left the Aitolian partizans in the city exposed; some of them 'left the city', but Eurylochos committed suicide. Where these men could go, with most of Greece in enemy hands, is not obvious. Perhaps Isodoros took some with him; perhaps other Thessalian cities took them in; perhaps they went off with the soldiers being sent back to Asia. Philip then took control of the city, one of the main prizes for which he had joined the war.²⁹

This removed the last of Antiochos' footholds in Greece which he could still reach. His detachment in Elis held out, but was negotiated out by an agreement between the Eleians and the Achaians. As soon as Antiochos was defeated at Thermopylai, Achaia exerted pressure on both Elis and Messene. Elis negotiated, but it is clear that the presence of Antiochos' troops was a major factor in maintaining the city's independence, even now.³⁰ Messenia, without such support, appealed to Flamininus at Chalkis. This was only briefly successful, for Flamininus' terms were that the Messenian exiles be accepted back and that the city join the Achaian League.³¹ The lesson was that Rome's control was even more direct and inescapable when no great power balance was available. Without Antiochos' implied threat, Rome would have to exert much more direct and continuous authority.

Antiochos had sailed to Ephesos when he left Chalkis, and where he had met the Aitolian delegation in June.³² That meeting, and the information he could extract from Thoas, who remained with him,³³ indicated that the war would continue, and the cash and promises he sent by the hand of Nikandros were clearly intended to keep the

²⁹ Livy 36.33.1–7.

³⁰ Livy 36.31.1–3; Livy's words show that agreement was not reached at first; at 36.35.7–8 an agreement is close, which seems to imply that the royal troops had left. By September Elis had joined the Achaian League, technically voluntarily, for Diophanes was described as the unifier of the Peloponnese on the base of a statue to him (Paus. 8.30.5), and he left office in that month.

³¹ Livy 36.31.5–9; cf. Aymard, *Premiers Rapports*, 342–348, and Errington, *Philopoemen* 122–123.

³² Livy 36.21.1.

³³ Livy 36.26.6.

Aitolians fighting for as long as possible; in this it may well have succeeded, though there was little enough inclination on their part to give in. He could not be sure that the Romans would carry the war farther east, into Asia, or perhaps Thrace, but he had to assume that they would. He went to Lysimacheia to prepare for the continuation. The admiral Polyxenidas was alerted to watch the activities of the Roman fleet.³⁴

The Seleukid fleet used in the previous October had included forty *tectae* and sixty *apertae*.³⁵ The size of these ships is nowhere stated, and the Roman quinqueremes are also referred to as *tectae*, 'decked ships'. Yet the two were not actually comparable in combat, and the Seleukid ships are generally thought to be triremes, considerably smaller than the Roman, and certainly lighter.³⁶ The Roman fleet at Peiraios under Atilius was 25 strong, all quinqueremes, and this fleet could also count on help from Eumenes, who had spent the last winter at his island of Aigina with three ships.³⁷ This disparity in strength in Greek waters between the Seleukid and the allied fleets goes far to explain the inactivity of Atilius, except in the raid on the Seleukid supply convoy, but it may well be partly due to also to the lacklustre leadership of Atilius himself—he had turned up the year before at Gytheion at the last minute, and is said by one historian to have done 'nothing'.³⁸

He was not helped, of course, by the uncertainty as to his relief. The new naval *praetor* was C. Livius Salinator, and he had left Ostia with some of his ships in early spring. His fleet consisted of fifty *tectae*—that is, quinqueremes—and he collected 24 *apertae*—smaller, lighter ships—at Neapolis. He also had to collect sailors and marines, the former supplied by the Italian allies of Rome, the latter by the Roman maritime colonies, who had protested about their conscrip-

³⁴ Livy 36.41.1–7; most of this is a paraphrase of advice supposedly given by Hannibal, which shows the usual lack of understanding of the strategic situation—the Romans could scarcely cross the Aegean while the Aitolians were active enemies in Greece—and which shows either a serious failing by Hannibal himself (if the passage is genuine *reportage*) or a serious failing by the man who composed the passage, who is either Livy or his source, supposedly Polybios; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.281.

³⁵ Livy 36.43.3.

³⁶ Thiel, *Studies*, 273–275.

³⁷ Livy 36.42.6.

³⁸ Zon. 9.19.

tion earlier: no doubt their mustering took time.³⁹ More ships were collected at Rhegion and Lokroi in southern Italy as he passed by, and six Carthaginian ships, sent by the anti-Barkid factions in power there, also joined.⁴⁰ The fleet—56 *tectae* and more than 24 *apertae*—reached Kerkyra, so Livy says, while the two armies were at Thermopylai, that is, in late April. This seems early, and an alternative date of June has been suggested, and this seems, given Livius' problems so far, more likely.⁴¹

Livius pressed on with all speed to reach the Aegean, but did not reach Delos until July or August, when the next time-correlation is made, with the siege at Naupaktos, which cannot have begun before mid-July, and went on certainly until mid-September. It seems unlikely that Livius could take three months to sail from Kerkyra to Delos, which an April arrival at Kerkyra requires. It is true that he dealt blows at Kephallenia and Zakynthos on the way, but neither operation seems to have occupied him for very long. The activity he indulged in there is described as plundering, and since both islands were later still in enemy hands, neither adventure will have seriously delayed him. He was met at Skyllaion point, the eastern point of the Argolid, by Eumenes with his three ships, which were based at Eumenes' island of Aigina, and then both of them joined Atilius and the Roman fleet at Peiraios.⁴²

A lengthy delay then took place at Peiraios. Even allowing for leaving Kerkyra in early June, the voyage around the Peloponnese, and the actions in the Ionian islands, Livius must have been at Athens by late June. Yet he did not sail for Delos until after the siege of Naupaktos had begun. His arrival at Delos must therefore be placed about the beginning of August,⁴³ which suggests a period of some weeks at Peiraios.

Of course, there was plenty to do. The ships would need drying out and cleaning after the voyage from Italy, the crews were entitled

³⁹ Livy 36.3.4–6; 42.1.

⁴⁰ Livy 36.42.2; App. *Syr.* 22.

⁴¹ Livy 36.42.3–6; he does not say the same day as the battle, so the precise date is not certain; it is suggested that 'the king' here is Philip, not Antiochos, hence the suggestion of June not April; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 2.282. The problem is that a suggestion of hostility is involved, which should not apply to Glabrio and Philip. The usual get-out is that perhaps Livy misunderstood Polybios.

⁴² Livy 36.42.6–7.

⁴³ Livy 36.43.1; Thiel, *Studies*, 291.

to a rest and some refreshment ashore. Above all, consultations were needed. There were, by this time, a large number of important individuals who needed to be met and spoken with. Livius will have had to be briefed by the man he replaced, Atilius, and he would also need to meet the captains of Atilius' ships and inspect every ship, or at least have them inspected by competent subordinates. There were also the four legates, Flamininus, Villius, Servilius, and Octavius, who were still in Greece; the Achaian leaders, including the current *strategos* Diophanes, in office until September, and his successor, Philopoimen, elected to his sixth term in September;⁴⁴ the consul Glabrio, whose army was now pinned down in the Naupaktos siege, which showed no signs of coming to an end; King Philip; King Eumenes, who had some helpful ships and had met Livius on his arrival.⁴⁵ Of all these, of course, Livius would need to be especially attentive to the consul Glabrio, whose plans might well affect his own, and to Eumenes, who was the only man of all the Roman allies present who had a naval capability; but the rest would need to be met and consulted, if only for their *amour propre* to be soothed. No doubt also, the Athenians would need to have smiles bestowed on them.

It will have become clear to Livius very quickly that no help could be expected from any Greek state, or from the Roman army in Greece, in the next stage of the campaign—always excepting Eumenes. Glabrio, even if he had the authority, was clearly going to be unable to move out of Greece in the current campaigning season, and certainly not before his term of office expired. He had been a successful commander, but could now be expected to be replaced by a rather more prominent political figure for the invasion of Asia, if that was what the Senate decided must be undertaken. Therefore Livius was the only Roman magistrate who could pursue Antiochos to Asia. Glabrio would be keen to have the Seleukid navy kept at a distance while he attended to the Aitolians.

Livius' first, cautious, move was to sail his fleet to Delos. This move, and Livius' destination, are clues to what was happening in the Aegean and Asia. Since Livius and Eumenes were together, it was now fully clear that Eumenes had thrown in his lot with Rome.

⁴⁴ Errington, *Philopoemen*, 300–301.

⁴⁵ Livy 36.42.6.

This had been obvious enough for some time, but no overtly hostile move had been made by either Eumenes or Antiochos against each other's territories and forces. Eumenes' Asian territories were extremely vulnerable to Seleukid power, for after all the bulk of Antiochos' army had remained in Asia, right on Eumenes' doorstep. Yet the interventions by Eumenes' troops at Chalkis had not resulted in any hostilities between his and Antiochos' forces. Even during Antiochos' withdrawal from Chalkis, it seems that he had carefully avoided the European territories of Eumenes. These were the islands of Aigina, where Eumenes had been based and where his ships were, and Andros, immediately south-east of Euboia. A recently reinterpreted inscription from the island of Tenos (the next island to the south-east beyond Andros) has revealed that Antiochos stopped there in his voyage to Ephesos.⁴⁶ This means he did not stop at Andros.

Antiochos was sailing from Chalkis in Euboia to Ephesos. He could sail either south along the Euripos, in which case Andros would be the next island he passed after Euboia, and Tenos the one after. Or he could sail north, in which case he would sail out into the Aegean by the way he had arrived, through the strait between Euboia and Thessaly. This would take him close to Demetrias, where he could have collected any of this ships which were there, though some, those under Isidoros, were certainly still there later. To reach Tenos from there he would then need to sail along the east coast of Euboia (a notoriously dangerous passage),⁴⁷ past Andros to Tenos. Because his destination was Ephesos, the southern route, since it was both safer and shorter, is clearly the more likely. In addition, there had been the recent naval action between the Roman fleet based at the Peiraios and Antiochos' supply fleet, which had taken place off Andros. By taking his whole fleet through these waters, Antiochos would demonstrate his power once more—for the Roman fleet was still only the smaller one commanded by Atilius, and was thus far too small to risk a fight with Antiochos' superior forces. But the most sensible, and shortest, route was through the strait between Andros and Euboia, and then directly across the sea to Chios. This was an open sea voyage of about sixty miles, about the same distance as

⁴⁶ G. Reger, 'Athens and Tenos in the early Hellenistic Age', *Classical Quarterly* 42, 1992, 365–383.

⁴⁷ Herodotos, *Histories*, 8.6–7, for example.

that which his fleet had made on the voyage from the Chersonese to Europe in the previous October (when his route included the voyage from Lemnos to the Sporades, about sixty miles).

It follows that Antiochos, if he did not stop at Andros, but did go on to Tenos and stopped there, was acting politically. If Andros was enemy territory, a conquest there would be a useful further statement, as well as a helpful means of delaying any further attack on Asia, a distraction of Eumenes' energies, and perhaps a hostage to hold over the Attalid king. But it seems clear that he ignored Andros, but he did land at Tenos. And Tenos was the headquarters of the League of the Islanders, the Nesiote League, an organisation which was at that time under the hegemony of Rhodes. The League consisted of most of Kyklades islands, including the holy island of Delos, and on Tenos, since it held the League headquarters, there were men from the other islands, and soldiers from Rhodes.

Antiochos, of course, knew this perfectly well. Therefore, to land at Tenos was a deliberate act on his part. Perhaps, after their agreement in 197, and their joint activity in Karia, he had thought that he and Rhodes were allies, but Antiochos would scarcely assume such an important matter without checking. On the other hand, he may also have had recent information about the new Rhodian attitude. Rhodes had remained neutral in the war until now, but by August the Rhodian fleet was openly committed to the Roman side.⁴⁸ When exactly Rhodes took this decision is not clear, but it must have been some time before the city's fleet sailed, and indeed time must also be allowed for the ships to be manned and outfitted, though it is possible that, since there was a war on, they were kept at instant readiness; the earliest date is presumably that on which the news of Antiochos' defeat at Thermopylai was received, and so early in May.

Further, Rhodes did not plunge into the war without previously contacting the Roman commander and co-ordinating moves with him. This is presumably one reason why Livius delayed at Delos in August, though Livy ascribes the wait to foul winds.⁴⁹ Yet the clue

⁴⁸ Livy 36.43.2; Polyxenidas is said to have drawn attention to the possibility of the junction of the Roman, Attalid and Rhodian fleets; hence he knew that Rhodes was certainly operating on the Roman side. Berthold, *Rhodes*, 151–153, does not hazard anything chronologically specific.

⁴⁹ Livy 36.43.1; Thiel, *Studies*, 291, points to the conjunction in time of Livius

is there, once again, in the place to which Livius sailed. Delos was, like Tenos, a member of the Nesiote League. Livius would not go there unless he knew he would be welcome, and after Antiochos' visit to Tenos he knew he was.

The visit of Antiochos to Tenos was thus not an accident, and the fighting which occurred was part of the overall war.⁵⁰ Antiochos' visit—which took place in May, something over a week after the Thermopylai fight—was perhaps intended to force Rhodes to an open decision. If his fleet was welcomed, or even tolerated, at Tenos, Antiochos would be able to assume that the Nesiotes, and hence Rhodes also, would at worst remain neutral. If his visit provoked hostilities, as it did, he would know that the Rhodian decision had been made to join the war on the Roman side. And if Rhodes had not decided, the sight of his fleet at Tenos might just throw the Roman-Rhodian negotiations off track.

The fighting was not all that serious. Antiochos was not apparently intent on the conquest of the island. Control of Tenos would not be sufficient to prevent the Roman fleet crossing to Ionian waters, any more than his own continued control of Demetrias did so. Livy notes that he sailed by way of Tenos,⁵¹ but it is only the inscription honouring the doctor Apollonios of Miletos for his work in succouring the wounded which provides the information that the fighting was more than a tavern brawl. Tenians and 'Nesiotes', that is, citizens of other islands, were involved in the fighting, and there were Rhodian troops stationed on the island as well, though we are not told if they became involved.

By the time he was back at his main base at Ephesos, therefore, Antiochos knew that he faced the hostility of Rome, Rhodes, Pergamon, and Achaia, while his only ally was the besieged Aitolians. It is thus scarcely surprising that when Nikandros and Thoas arrived in early

being windbound at Delos while Isidoros could sail from Demetrias to Asia; but such co-ordination is not possible from our source, and anyway we do not know that Isidoros had a clear run. But this does not alter the fact that being windbound at Delos was an excellent excuse for Livius not to advance further eastwards. Polyxenidas' scouting ships were certainly able to reconnoitre Delos and return to Ephesos while the Roman fleet lay in harbour.

⁵⁰ The fighting is known from the references to a doctor's services in assisting the wounded; the inscription is *IG XII*, 5, 824 as reconsidered by various hands, and summarised by Reger, 'Athens and Tenos' (note 46).

⁵¹ Livy 36.21.1; emending 'Tenedum' of the MSS to 'Tenum'; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 251.

June, he should be happy to supply money to enable the Aitolians to continue in the fight. It is also clear that a naval watch was kept on the central Aegean, since the admiral Polyxenidas was quickly informed of the arrival of Livius and his fleet at Delos.⁵² No doubt a watch was also kept in other areas, including Rhodes. Antiochos himself attended to the Hellespont.⁵³

This was the crucial area since, if the war went on, the Hellespont was the first line of defence against a Roman land attack. No Roman army could be transported from Greece by sea in the face of Seleukid sea power, which fully matched that of Rome, and was scarcely inferior to that of Rome, Pergamon and Rhodes combined. The Roman army, which Antiochos must assume for the present would be that which was already in Greece under Glabrio, would therefore have to march through Macedon and Thrace to the Straits. It followed that the control of the Hellespont, by land and sea, was of the first importance. For, once that control was lost by Antiochos, it would permit a Roman army to cross to Asia, and would put it in contact with Eumenes' kingdom, which stretched northwards to the south side of Mount Ida in the Troad. It further followed that the arrival of the Roman fleet at Delos required Antiochos' urgent attention, since Livius would have to defeat the Seleukid fleet first, though control of the Hellespont was the ultimate aim of the naval war.

The Hellespont being a seaway would need to be defended by sea, but being a strait, it would also need to be fortified and defended by land. The city of Lysimacheia had been rebuilt and was well stocked with supplies. Forward of that city, in Thrace there were two possible bases for the Roman fleet, the small cities of Ainos and Maroneia, with the Macedonian city of Abdera and the island of Samothrace; the first two were occupied by Seleukid forces, presumably at this time.⁵⁴ This, with Antiochos' control of Thrace, brought Antiochos finally to the eastern border of Macedon, and it was in this area that he received the troops which had been captured by Philip at Demetrias and then disarmed and liberated. The few thousand soldiers were no doubt welcome. The deed also imple

⁵² Livy 36.43.2.

⁵³ Livy 36.43.3.

⁵⁴ The occupation is only known from the eviction of the Seleukid garrisons in 189 (Livy 37.60.7); the only time when it made sense to move troops into the cities was in 191.

that Philip was still to a degree keeping his options open. The presence of a Seleukid army on his eastern border will have concentrated his mind.

Antiochos, no doubt by prearrangement, brought his fleet from the Hellespont to Ephesos when informed of Livius' arrival with the Roman fleet at Delos.⁵⁵ This gives some indication of the length of time Livius delayed at that island. He could have reached the Asian coast in no more than a day's sailing from Delos. But the news of his arrival at the island had to go from Delos to Ephesos, then to Lysimacheia, the fleet there had to be alerted, and Antiochos had to sail with it to Ephesos, and at the end of all that Livius was still at Delos. Livius' actual straight-time journey was not more than seventy miles; the distance involved for Antiochos was about ten times that, and could scarcely have been accomplished in less than ten days, and even two weeks would not be unreasonable, considering the built-in potential for delays involved. Further, it was only after three more days that the Seleukid fleet itself sailed to position for the coming campaign;⁵⁶ still Livius was at Delos. The excuse of the Etesian winds cannot be accepted after all that.

Livius must, therefore, have been at Delos for something of the order of three weeks, at the least. This may have been the fault of the foul winds, as Livy claims, but it would seem more likely to have been deliberate, in that Livius was making diplomatic contacts and military plans. He had with him King Eumenes, who remained at Delos all the time.⁵⁷ But when Eumenes reached his kingdom again, he was able to bring out his own fleet immediately.⁵⁸ So one reason for Livius delaying will have been so that Eumenes could alert his men to launch, equip and man his ships.⁵⁹ Similarly the Rhodian fleet came north at about the same time that Livius finally left Delos, for he met their ships soon after the battle at Kissos,⁶⁰ and they will have set out some time earlier. Thus Livius had clearly spent the time at Delos actively organising for the next stage in the campaign by sea.

⁵⁵ Livy 36.43.3.

⁵⁶ Livy 36.43.8.

⁵⁷ Livy 36.42.12; Eumenes went to Elaia when Livius sailed from Delos.

⁵⁸ Livy 36.43.12.

⁵⁹ Eumenes must have sent a message ahead by ship; this ship had no problem with the winds, it seems.

⁶⁰ Livy 36.45.5.

Antiochos met his council at Ephesos, discussed the options, and sensibly left the naval war to the professional, Polyxenidas, who took the fleet of two hundred ships to sea, seventy of them decked *tectae*, the rest the weaker open *apertae*.⁶¹ The opponents he had to face were: the Romans, who had 81 *tectae*—the heavier, slower quinqueremes—and 24 *apertae*; King Eumenes, who had three ships at Delos but was soon able to increase his contribution to a total of fifty—24 *tectae*, of the trireme class, and 26 *apertae*; and the Rhodians, who came out in 191 with at least 25 ships, and possibly two more, all *tectae*.⁶² If all these fleets joined together Livius would have under his command 130 *tectae* and fifty *apertae*. To these Polyxenidas could oppose his 70 *tectae* and 130 *apertae*. It follows that Polyxenidas' strategy was aimed at keeping his enemies separated, so that he could defeat them singly,⁶³ while Antiochos organised the collection and manning of reinforcements, designed to bring the number up to something like parity, or, better, superiority.

These figures will have been known, at least approximately, to both sides. Antiochos' ships had been in the Aegean for years, and Atilius' and Livius' fleets had been long enough at the Peiraios and Delos to have been counted over and over again. The rival strategies were also therefore clear: the Seleukid fleet must prevent its enemies from uniting; the allies must unite before the Seleukid fleet could interfere. Polyxenidas therefore brought his fleet out of Ephesos and sailed north, through the channel between the island of Chios and the mainland, to take up station at Phokaia.⁶⁴ There he was between Eumenes' base at Elaia, where most of his ships were, and the line of approach of the Roman fleet from Delos. Livius could either sail west or east of Chios: either way, he would need to pass Phokaia.

This must have been Polyxenidas' intention. However, the position could also become a trap. The city of Phokaia rapidly accepted a Roman alliance when Livius arrived, and it may be that Polyxenidas did not feel it was a safe place for his base. Also, it was not as good an interception post as it may have seemed at first. The Roman

⁶¹ Livy 36.43.3–8; App. *Syr.* 22; Thiel, *Studies*, 273–275, opts for Appian's total number.

⁶² Thiel, *Studies*, 260–261, and 269–270; Berthold, *Rhodes*, 151; Hansen, *Attalids*, 80.

⁶³ As he is depicted as explaining at Antiochos' council: Livy 36.43.3.

⁶⁴ Livy 36.43.8.

approach to Elaia could well have been made northabout by way of the coast of Lesbos, and thus out of sight of the Seleukid fleet; the readiness of Eumenes' ships to come out will have become apparent, once Polyxenidas scouted Elaia, and this could mean that he risked being caught between the two fleets. Further, it might be that Livius would join up with the Rhodian fleet first; given the reputation and capabilities of the Rhodians at sea, it made sense to keep them isolated, if possible. It was marginally less dangerous to face a Roman-plus-Pergamene fleet than to face a Roman-plus-Rhodian one. For whatever reason, or accumulation of reasons, Polyxenidas changed his plan. He left Phokaia and sailed back through the Chian channel to take up his station at a place called Kissos, on the southern coast of the Erythraian peninsula.⁶⁵

Here Polyxenidas was between the fleets of Livius and Eumenes on the one hand, who would now be able to effect their junction unmolested, and that of Rhodes on the other, which had apparently reached Samos.⁶⁶ Livius sailed his fleet across from Delos to the southern port of Chios, Phanai, then sailed half way up the channel to Chios city.⁶⁷ The island-state was clearly a Roman ally,⁶⁸ and this will have been yet another of the diplomatic preparations Livius had been making from Delos. There he will have been given full details of Polyxenidas' movements, which were visible from Chios city as he sailed back and forth along the strait, if he did not already have them, and Eumenes, assured that the Seleukid fleet was to the south, was able to sail off to collect his own fleet from Elaia. The Roman fleet moved on to Phokaia, and there Eumenes joined him.⁶⁹ This rendezvous was a minor diplomatic triumph for Livius, for this was the city which had been a Seleukid base until a few days before, and which now joined the Roman alliance. Again it is necessary to assume that this was pre-arranged. Terms, one may assume, were

⁶⁵ Livy 36.43.10; cf. Thiel, *Studies*, 299, who gives as Polyxenidas' reason for moving from Phokaia to Kissos that he had heard that Rhodes had joined his enemies, but he seems to have known this earlier, when Livius was still at Delos.

⁶⁶ Samos had been assigned to Rhodian protection by the treaty between Rhodes and Antiochos in 197; it is clear that this meant Rhodian control of Samian foreign affairs; the Rhodian fleet joined Livius so quickly after the battle of Kissos that it must have been close; Samos, the Rhodian naval base next year, is the obvious place for it. Cf. Shipley, *Samos*, 194–195.

⁶⁷ Livy 36.43.11.

⁶⁸ The island became the site of a supply base for the Roman fleet (Livy 37.27.1).

⁶⁹ Livy 36.43.11–12.

quickly agreed, which will have been, on the Phokaian side, a *deditio*, placing the city in Roman hands unreservedly, and on the Roman side, the granting of the full panoply of self-government.⁷⁰ Rome therefore demonstrated in Asia its continued policy of liberation, a gesture which will have reverberated to good effect among the many cities of the Greeks in Asia.

Livius and Eumenes brought their joint fleets—now with 105 *tectae* and 50 *apertae*—south again through the Chian channel.⁷¹ No explanation of their plan has reached us, but their main aim was obviously to link up with the Rhodian squadron, which they will have known to be at Samos. The general position of Polyxenidas' fleet was also surely known: if not its exact position, then at least that it lay somewhere between Chios and Samos. In fact Polyxenidas had stationed his fleet at the last place he could choose, since if he had been any further east the joint fleets could have evaded him by sailing directly across the mouth of the gulf for Samos.

The joint fleets apparently intended to rendezvous at Korykos, the cape from where a crossing to Samos could be begun. Polyxenidas had positioned his fleet before Korykos, at a small port called Kissos.⁷³ As the allied fleet sailed along parallel to the coast, in a sequence of squadrons, with two Carthaginian ships in advance, the Seleukid fleet came out to block the way. Given the disparity in numbers the only chance of a Seleukid victory was in tackling the allies in sections. This Polyxenidas had achieved, for his whole fleet was able to tackle the Roman ships, who were themselves in two groups, with Eumenes' force coming up later. Livius countered by moving his own squadron—thirty vessels in advance of the rest—seaward, and so allowing his second squadron, of 45 ships, to take up station between him and the coast, while Eumenes' ships were to come into the line between the Roman ships and the coast. This sideways move (by both Roman squadrons) of course delayed the clash of the two battle lines, and so foiled Polyxenidas' intention. The interval of delay as the Romans manoeuvred was partly taken up by the best recorded

⁷⁰ App. *Syr.* 25.

⁷¹ Livy 36.43.13.

⁷² Sources for the battle: Livy 36.44.1–45.4; App. *Syr.* 22; Thiel, *Studies*, 306–309; Rodgers, 398–401; Bevan, *House*, 2.92–93.

⁷³ It appears that the *apertae* on neither side were engaged, so the numbers were 105 against 70.

part of the battle, where the two Carthaginian ships in advance were attacked by three Seleukid ships—one was captured, the other escaped.

The delay contrived was sufficient to give Livius the superiority in the line of battle which his extra numbers all along implied. When the lines closed it was soon clear that the bigger and heavier Roman ships, which were slower but which carried large numbers of soldiers for boarding and for defence, could outmatch the swifter but lighter Seleukid triremes. Livius' sideways move had also had the effect of producing a seaward overlap of the Roman line as against the Seleukid, so that his rightward squadron could turn landwards in order to attack the Seleukid line in flank. When this situation became clear Polyxenidas had no choice but to retire. The battle closest to the shore, between Eumenes' ships and the Seleukid right, was undecided until the Seleukid ships there were compelled to retire so as to conform with Polyxenidas' move. As in all such battles the victor lost disproportionately few ships—only the one Carthaginian ship which was captured before the battle proper, in the preliminaries—while the defeated lost substantially: Polyxenidas lost ten ships sunk and thirteen captured (73).

There was no pursuit. Polyxenidas got his surviving 47 ships into Ephesos; Livius and Eumenes met the Rhodian squadron from Samos and the triple fleet sailed to Ephesos and demonstrated before the harbour.⁷⁴ There could be no further fight, when one side now had 130 ships and the other only 47. It was now October and the Aegean sailing season was almost over. The allied fleet, having only just united, now separated again for the winter. Eumenes' fleet and the Rhodian ships went home; the Roman fleet—by itself now clearly strong enough to deal with Polyxenidas' ships—sailed to Chios, then to Phokaia, before camping for the winter at Kanai, a small port in Eumenes' territory a little north of Elaia. A southern guard was left at Phokaia, four ships,⁷⁵ partly no doubt to hold the city to its Roman alliance, and partly as an outpost of warning in case Polyxenidas came out. Livius and Eumenes together now had placed themselves in a strategically commanding position between Antiochos' fleet at Ephesos and the key position of the Hellespont.

⁷⁴ Livy 36.45.5–6.

⁷⁵ Livy 36.45.6–8.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

WINTER MANOEUVRES

None of the participants in the war could be under any apprehension that a decision was near. The Romans may have won a battle and a siege in Greece, and a naval battle in the Aegean, but in none of these cases had the full force of their enemies been engaged. The siege of Herakleia had resulted in the defeat of no more than two thousand of the Aitolians; ten thousand Seleukid soldiers were involved at Thermopylai, seventy of the king's warships at Kissos. In all these cases the Romans had been able to bring superior numbers into action at the decisive point, but in none of these fights had a clear decision in terms of the war as a whole been reached. After Herakleia, Glabrio had besieged Naupaktos for two months with no success. After Kissos the Seleukid fleet had removed itself with ease to the safety of the harbour at Ephesos, and the allied fleets had dispersed for the winter, so that the junction would need to be achieved again next year. Both the Aitolians and Antiochos survived and continued the war with scarcely diminished strength and determination.

Antiochos involved himself in extensive preparations for the next phase of the war during the winter of 191/190. As ever, this involved recruiting both military and naval strength and making diplomatic preparations. The key to the defence of the kingdom was still the Hellespont, but after the defeat at Kissos, the Pergamene kingdom took on an added importance. It seems that Antiochos had been remarkably restrained in his relations with Eumenes, and it was only in the battle off Kissos that Seleukid and Attalid forces actually came to blows. Eumenes had clearly supported Rome from the time of the new war against Nabis in 192; and even before that he had put Attalid troops into Chalkis, but they had pulled out of the city when Antiochos arrived, and, good mercenaries, had bargained their way out of the Salganeus fort afterwards; Eumenes had stayed at Aigina during all the fighting, and Antiochos had carefully avoided Eumenes' island of Andros when he retired from Greece, though he had had landed at, and fought in, Tenos, the next island. This would appear therefore to be a deliberate policy of restraint, presumably in the

hope that Eumenes had not wholly committed himself to the war on the Roman side.

For from Antiochos' point of view, Eumenes was in a very awkward situation. His kingdom was surrounded on three sides, south, east and north, by Antiochos' lands, and overt hostilities might well result in the invasion of his kingdom, which was small enough to be conquered almost entirely in a few days. So an invasion would mean, in the circumstances, the likely loss of Eumenes' entire kingdom, except for the two islands. Presumably Antiochos believed that such a threat was sufficient to compel Eumenes to refrain from active warfare.

Eumenes would seem to have understood. At no time during the war in Greece did he commit his forces to the war against Antiochos.¹ Even the installation of a garrison in Chalkis was a move against the Aitolians, not against Antiochos. Yet there can be no doubt that Eumenes had in fact thrown in his lot with the Romans, and his policy had in fact been quite consistent from soon after his accession in 197. He had appreciated that he would in fact have greater power, and more freedom of action under the distant and negligent Roman suzerainty, than under the close and restrictive overlordship of Antiochos. So when, at last, a Roman force of sufficient size to challenge Antiochos in Pergamene waters finally arrived, under Livius' command, Eumenes came out in his true colours, and was the first to greet the new praetor when he arrived. His presence with Livius at Delos was surely known to Antiochos, whose ships scouted Livius' presence there, and the most remarkable example of Antiochos' restraint is that, even with this evidence before him, the Seleukid king did nothing against the Attalid state. The existence of Eumenes' fleet at Elaia was scarcely a secret, and its state of instant readiness can have been easy to discover. Antiochos could well have intervened by land, by attacking the fleet base with his army. Yet he did nothing. Perhaps he hoped that Eumenes was still paralyzed with fear for his kingdom. Instead Eumenes had finally decided that he would have to risk all. His participation at Kissos put him finally

¹ A suggestion has been made (Hansen *Attalids*, 79), that Pergamene forces were involved both at Thermopylai and in the convoy attack off Andros, but it is only a supposition: there is no evidence for it, and, given the fairly detailed sources for both, especially Thermopylai, it is more reasonable to reject the suggestion.

and openly on the Roman side. For Antiochos, there was now no further point in restraint.

The Roman alliance now consisted of almost all the states of the Mediterranean, except Aitolia and the Seleukid kingdom. With the withdrawal of Antiochos from Greece, those who had been tentative in their commitment became bolder. So King Eumenes and King Philip were now fully committed to Rome; Carthage had provided ships and supplies, as did its neighbour King Masinissa of Numidia; the Greek states, Achaia, Akarnania, Athens, Boiotia, Thessaly, were all now openly with Rome. And on the Asian side the example of Phokaia's alliance with Rome was having its effect. The three cities which had been under pressure from Antiochos in 192 may be presumed to be on the Roman side because they had remained independent of Antiochos since his arrival in 196, and they had been used by Rome in the diplomatic arguments between the Lysimacheia conference and the outbreak of war: Smyrna, Lampsakos, and Alexandreia Troas. Now Phokaia had also joined Rome, and Chios had happily provided itself as a base for the fleet, and as a place where supplies could be stockpiled. Rhodes and the Nesiote League had come out onto the Roman side late in 191, and Samos, not a member of the League, was within the Rhodian hegemony. And on the Asian mainland other cities took the opportunity of the winter to detach themselves from the Seleukid system and slide into the Roman: Erythrai, just across the channel from Chios, was one,² and others were teetering on the brink, or were contacted during the winter. Most were considering their options. Then the problems of Phokaia gave them pause.

Antiochos was very busy during the winter in organising reinforcements and seeking support. He brought his son Seleukos, for whom he had once claimed to be campaigning in Thrace, to Ionia, and placed him in command of an armed force, with which he invaded the Attalid kingdom.³ Seleukos camped so as to threaten Phokaia, the Pergamene naval base at Elaia, and the Roman base at Kanai, and any city in the area which felt like changing sides. In retaliation Eumenes brought up his own land forces, 2,000 infantry

² At Livy 36.43.10 Polyxenidas is able to use Kissos, an Erythraian port, without difficulty or dispute; at 37.8.5, Livy refers to 'Romans from ... Erythrai'; the city clearly changed sides in the winter.

³ Livy 37.8.5.

and 500 cavalry, persuaded Livius to come out with 5,000 men from the camp and they raided the land around Thyateira, which was in Antiochos' kingdom. Having collected substantial quantities of loot, they retired.⁴ This was no doubt very gratifying, but Seleukos was not to be moved. The main object of the allies' exercise had been to shift Seleukos and his army, and in this they failed. Instead he stayed in place, and succeeded in reversing the political situation in Phokaia.

This city had been Polyxenidas' base, then Livius' base, and it had accepted Roman suzerainty. It was internally divided over its allegiance, and a substantial part of the population wanted to revert to the Seleukid alliance. They had discovered, as all did who submitted to Rome in wartime, that their liberation was strictly limited, and came with a large price attached. A contribution to Roman expenses was required, and so were supplies and quarters for the ships and sailors and soldiers. Livius had left four Roman ships at the city in October; by mid-winter the available supplies were running short—the nearby presence of Seleukos' army will have prevented the collection of more—and the contribution—five hundred sets of clothing—had been collected and delivered. There was no sign that the Seleukid fleet was coming out, so the ships were then withdrawn. The argument in the city took on class overtones: the oligarchy, dominating the government, wished to remain with the Romans; the democracy, who were going hungry, were disillusioned and were being roused by their spokesmen, all the more easily now that the Roman ships had departed. The presence of Seleukos and his force in the near vicinity was an encouragement also. At some point a joint delegation of three of the Seleukid partizans and two pro-Romans went to Seleukos to ask him to keep away. This, of course, only set him on the keener, and he showed conspicuous favour to his friends among the delegation and moved his forces closer to the city.⁵ It is reasonable to suppose that similar arguments occurred in other Asian cities. Nearby Kyme, for example, had joined the Roman alliance, presumably under Phokaia's example and the threat of the Roman fleet, but was also no doubt now also feeling the pressure of Seleukos' army's presence.⁶

⁴ Livy 37.8.6–7.

⁵ Livy 37.9.1–4; Pol. 21.6.1–2.6 (from the *Suda*).

⁶ Kyme's revolt to Antiochos is noted at Livy 37.11.15; it must, therefore, have

This political turmoil was quite likely to distract the Romans in the winter, and if it continued it was a useful card for Antiochos and Seleukos to play. But the main problem was still the Roman fleet. The performance of the heavier Roman ships in the battle off Kissos had been impressive. During the winter, therefore, construction work was pressed, both to replace the Seleukid losses in that battle, and to bring the total fleet to at least equality of numbers with its opponents'. Also some of the new ships under construction were designed to counter the heavy Roman vessels. Polyxenidas organised the construction of the new ships at Ephesos, and in five months he brought his fleet back up to seventy vessels, but the new ships were all bigger than the twenty or so triremes he had lost at Kissos: eighteen of the new ones were *penteres* and *tetreres*, which the Romans would have called quinqueremes and quadriremes, five were even bigger, two *hepteres* ('sevens') and three *hexeres* ('sixes').

This construction, achieved in less than six months, is a remarkable achievement, and gives some indication of the resources which the Seleukid monarchy could command. Yet this was only what was going on in Ephesos. At the same time Hannibal was put to use, at last. He was despatched to Syria to organise the collection of, and the construction of, a new fleet in the ports of Phoenicia, Syria and Kilikia. (His Punic origin would no doubt be a useful stimulus to support in Phoenicia.) Again, many of these ships were of the bigger types: thirty *penteres* and *tetreres*, with three *hepteres* and four *hexeres*, and in addition ten triremes and some smaller *apertae*. Presumably the triremes were already available: new construction will have been concentrated on the bigger vessels. In five months or so the Seleukid monarchy organised and financed the building of 48 quadriremes and quinqueremes, and twelve even bigger ships. It was an achievement on the scale of what the Roman republic achieved, and suggests as clearly as anything that this war was a contest of equals, of equal great powers. No other state could have achieved this at the time.⁷

And Antiochos called up his main army. His normal standing force was something in the region of 30,000 men in size. It was part of this force that he had taken the expeditionary force to Greece,

revolted *from* him earlier; since it was on the coast, and between Phokaia and Elaia, this is not surprising.

⁷ Cf. Thiel, *Studies*, 273–276.

and from which came later reinforcements as well. From the behaviour of some of the men, a considerable proportion of these men were mercenaries: the thousand-man detachment under Euphranes of Crete in Elis, for example, and another thousand who agreed to serve with Philip after their capture in Thessaly. But most of his troops were Antiochos' own subjects, and were loyal to him, such as those who escaped with him from the defeat at Thermopylai, and those captured by Philip at Demetrias who agreed to be repatriated through Macedon and Thrace. The losses by battle and desertion among the men in Greece had been serious, but it is likely that the king had brought back, or received back, a good half to three-quarters of the men involved.⁸ He had not, that is, suffered a serious loss to his military power by the Greek expedition.

In theory, therefore, it was possible for Antiochos to collect an army comparable in size to that which had fought at Raphia in 217 or at Panion in 200. The first had been over 70,000 strong, and the second probably the same. He did not do so, for the army with which he fought the final battle at Magnesia was about 45,000 in number.⁹ It is therefore necessary to investigate why the king did not gather his full military strength.

The short answer is in two parts. The first is geographical: the war took place in the farthest corner of his empire, and it may well be that it was simply not possible for the more distant contingents to reach the battlefield in time. Yet they did have several months, even a year, to make the journey, for example from Media or Susiana, and the contributions of these areas was smaller than the numbers to be extracted from the more urbanised parts, such as Syria, Babylonia, and Asia. The second reason is more convincing: it was necessary to leave substantial forces on guard in other parts of the empire. In particular, a substantial guard needed to be kept in Palestine, against a possible attack out of Egypt by Antiochos' son-in-law, Ptolemy V.

It was no secret that the Ptolemies had long cultivated the friendship of Rome. It was also no secret that there had been active and

⁸ The actual numbers involved depend on how many troops Antiochos actually took to Greece, and what his total losses were, but one would expect that between 5,000 and 15,000 returned to Asia with him in one way or another. His losses were by no means crippling since his investment had not been very large.

⁹ See chapter 15.

recent diplomatic contacts between the two, contacts which had taken place since the crisis in Greece had developed. At the time that Glabrio had set out from Rome for Greece, in January 191, envoys from Ptolemy reached Rome with rich gifts of gold and silver. They arrived at the same time as the envoy of Philip who came with offers of military and logistical assistance. The Ptolemaic gifts were refused, but when both envoys offered troops, Philip's were accepted, Ptolemy's rejected.¹⁰ The reason was obvious: Philip could be controlled, Ptolemy could not. And Ptolemy's reason for joining in the war could only be to regain his lost lands in Asia and, particularly, Palestine. This would spread the war to the far eastern end of the Mediterranean, and undoubtedly prolong it, perhaps indefinitely. Rome had no wish to do this.

Ptolemy tried again after the initial victories in Greece. The Aitolians captured at Herakleia, including Damokritos, the boaster, were brought to Rome for imprisonment.¹¹ Soon after, more envoys from Ptolemy and Kleopatra arrived, and so this was in the summer of 191. They gave congratulations on the Roman victory, specifically over King Antiochos.¹² The Aitolians had been old friends of the Ptolemies, and were tactfully not mentioned; alternatively, and perhaps more likely, the envoys had been sent off in haste, between the news of the flight of Antiochos and the victory over the Aitolians. The story which the envoys told of panic and confusion in Asia and Syria is not borne out in any other source, and was, at the least, a diplomatic exaggeration; in fact it was probably a straight lie.

The purpose of these Ptolemaic interventions was to gain permission from Rome to join in the war; as Livy summarised their message: 'the rulers of Egypt were prepared for whatever the Senate might order'.¹³ In other words Ptolemy asked permission to invade Syria. The situation had, of course, now changed. If the war was to go on, a Roman army would have to be sent to invade Asia, and in such a case, the Ptolemaic invasion of Syria might well be a useful distracting move. But the overall situation had not really changed enough, and Rome's priorities in this war remained as before; to re-establish control over Greece, and rebuff Antiochos; above all Rome

¹⁰ Livy 36.4.1-3; Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 105-106.

¹¹ Livy 37.3.8.

¹² Livy 37.3.9-10; Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies*, 106-107.

¹³ Livy 37.3.10.

had no wish to extend the war further. The non-committal answer—the envoys were merely thanked, and given a present¹⁴—is good evidence that Rome's aims in the war remained limited to these minima. At the same time, the absence of a definitive refusal of Ptolemaic aid allowed the Senate to keep the possibility in mind for later use, if necessary. A defeat of the Roman expeditionary force might justify calling in Ptolemaic assistance. The ambiguity of the answer was not lost on Ptolemy, who exploited it for his own purpose next year. The existence of the embassy, and the Senatorial answer, will no doubt have been reported to Antiochos—it would be in Rome's interest to see that he heard of it, but it was hardly a secret; and the possibility of Ptolemaic intervention will have been in the back of his mind all the time; hence his need to leave a substantial fraction of his armed force in Syria.

Ptolemy's ambassador is said to have recommended that Rome continue the war by invading Asia. By the time he reached Rome the situation in Greece had been resolved into the siege of Naupaktos, and the sea-war was still unresolved: Livius' victory at Kissos did not happen until late September, perhaps even later. Even if that had been known in Rome by the time of the elections, it will have become clear that the sea-war was not yet over, and, given that Antiochos had the winter during which to recover his strength, the possibility of its continuation in Greece next year could not be ignored. So the elections for the magistrates for the next year were held in the knowledge that a major campaign would need to be conducted by at least one of the consuls.

Given that the elections were conducted by P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, it is not wholly surprising that two Cornelians were elected, L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Laelius, the brother and colleague of Scipio Africanus;¹⁵ L. Scipio gained Greece in the allotment of provinces, though one source has it that the Senate really wanted Laelius to have it.¹⁶ According to Livy, it was Africanus' decision that his brother should have it, with the understanding that Africanus himself would go east as a legate,¹⁷ but that seems unlikely, to say

¹⁴ Livy 37.3.12.

¹⁵ Livy 36.45.9.

¹⁶ Cicero, *Philippic* 9.17; cf. Briscoe, 'Flaminius', 51; Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 128–129, and id. *Scipio Africanus*, 202–203.

¹⁷ Livy 37.1.9.

the least. The Senate would scarcely delegate such a decision, and many senators would not be happy that Africanus could think in terms of such back-seat driving.

Much less attention was paid to command of the fleet, which went to L. Aemilius Regillus; other praetors were placed in Apulia, Bruttium and Sicily, each in command of an army or a fleet.¹⁸ L. Scipio was to take over Glabrio's army, and he could also take as reinforcements 8,000 infantry and 300 cavalry;¹⁹ Regillus was also to take twenty more warships and 3,000 troops to the Aegean.²⁰ Further, A. Cornelius Mammula, whose praetorship had been among the Bruttians, was to take his army to Greece. It was thought Glabrio might wish to finish off his Aitolian war, but he was expected to hand over his current army to Scipio.²¹ This odd business is nowhere explained, though concern for the consul's *dignitas* has been supposed.²² From a purely logistical point of view it would have been more sensible for the Bruttian army to be assigned to Scipio, while Glabrio retained his own force. But it may be that the Senate had in mind the relative strengths of the two enemies; the Aitolians were much less numerous than Antiochos' army, and Glabrio's army was now an experienced and victorious force, and with the extra troops Scipio was authorised to recruit, its strength was more of a match for Antiochos. The army commanded by A. Cornelius Mammula in Bruttium had been two Roman legions and 20,000 Italian allies, with 800 cavalry, a total of over 30,000 men, though few of its men had seen action.²³ Glabrio's army was some 5,000 or 6,000 men greater than this, even before Scipio's reinforcements were added. This was straining Roman and Italian manpower to the very limits, given the commitments in Cisalpina and Spain.²⁴ If the army which went to Asia was defeated, Rome would be in a very difficult situation indeed, but there would be a force in Greece which should be able to hold the line there.²⁵

¹⁸ Livy 37.2.1.

¹⁹ Livy 37.2.2-3.

²⁰ Livy 37.2.10.

²¹ Livy 37.2.7-8.

²² Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 292.

²³ Livy 35.41.7 and 36.2.7.

²⁴ In 190 P. A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower*, Oxford, 1971, calculates a total of 212,400 Italians in arms (table XII, p. 425) a higher total than in any other year. (Of course, the figures are approximations only, no regard for either casualties or reinforcements being had; cf. also Afzelius, *Römische Kriegsmacht*, 34-77.

²⁵ Consider this scenario: Antiochos victorious in Asia, followed by his invasion

The Roman task in Greece and Asia was not made easier by the failure of the Senate to persuade the Aitolians to make peace. By insisting on the *deditio* process, and by failing to spell out what this meant, the Senate, apparently gripped by a collective wish to punish the Aitolians, ensured that the war there continued.²⁶ The truce expired in the spring, and the Achaians were first off the mark with a raid along the Aitolian coast of the Gulf of Corinth.²⁷ Glabrio broke up his winter camp at Elateia, and attended first to the one place close to the Aegean coast which remained under Aitolian control, Lamia,²⁸ for if Antiochos returned to Greece, he would need to land in Aitolian territory somewhere; taking Lamia would marginally reduce the chances of a successful landing still further. Glabrio took the city after a short siege.²⁹

The Aitolians had blocked the pass over Mount Korax which Glabrio had used the previous summer, so he now marched due south from Lamia through Doris³⁰ to lay siege to the city of Amphissa.³¹ He was as unsuccessful here as he had been at Naupaktos, and when the consul L. Scipio arrived—having marched by way of the Zygos pass and the Peneus valley, like Glabrio the year before—with his reinforcements (13,000 infantry and 300 cavalry)³² he discovered that the main force he had intended to use against Antiochos was locked into a siege.³³ This situation was so favourable to Antiochos that one may voice strong suspicions that he had something to do with it. He had supplied the Aitolians with money the previous summer for the express purpose of keeping them fighting; a further contribution may well have been supplied during the winter. Glabrio's first move to take Lamia, besides removing a landing place for the invasion,

of Greece with 30,000 men, catching the Roman army there besieging the Aitolians; the Romans stood to lose up to 70,000 men in such a case.

²⁶ Diod. 29.4; Livy 37.1.2–6.

²⁷ Livy 37.4.6.

²⁸ Livy 37.4.8–10.

²⁹ Livy 37.5.1–3.

³⁰ The stretched resources of the Aitolians is clear in this instance, for in defending their land at Korax they had left open the approach to Delphi, one of their most prized possessions.

³¹ Livy 37.5.4–6.

³² This number consists of the reinforcements he had been authorised to take (8,000 foot and 300 horse) plus 5,000 discharged veterans who had volunteered; they were former soldiers of Scipio Africanus, and as highly experienced troops they were immensely valuable (Livy 37.4.3).

³³ Livy 37.6.1.

meant also the loss to Aitolia of the possibility of the easy receipt of Seleukid gold.

The new consul reached the Malian Gulf and halted his army there. To give his forces something to do he laid siege to Hypata, but when the citizens indicated that they would resist and that it was the decision of the Aitolians as a whole to fight on,³⁴ it became clear that the Romans would be unable to march east for the present. Glabrio had been quite correct to attack; had Scipio arrived earlier he would have had to do so anyway. For before he could move into Asia the fighting in Greece had to be stopped, and it was only by vigorous military action that he would persuade the Aitolians that they were likely to be beaten. Scipio abandoned the Hypata siege and brought his force south to Amphissa. The people there now withdrew to their acropolis, but the consul camped at a sufficient distance from the city so as to avoid having to assume command of Glabrio's army for the moment. He sent his brother Africanus ahead to find out the exact situation.³⁵

The resumption of war in Greece had no doubt dismayed those states which were only indirectly affected. The Athenians for one sent a delegation to see if they could help to calm things down.³⁶ Again, this intervention is so opportune and so advantageous to the Romans that one might suspect that the Athenian embassy had been solicited by the Roman side. It was in the interests of Rome to break the connection between the Aitolians and Antiochos, since it was clearly not their intention to fight both at once. It was also impossible to make peace with either, since the terms which could be offered to either were unacceptable in the absence of a substantial defeat for one or the other. But the Athenian embassy provided a way out, which Africanus saw so quickly that it may be that he had instigated it.³⁷

The Athenian embassy, headed by Echedemos, saw Africanus first, then his brother the consul, then visited the Aitolian leaders, of whom

³⁴ Livy 37.6.2.

³⁵ Livy 37.6.3-4; had the consul moved any closer he would have been legally bound to take over Glabrio's command; the actual distance may have been 60 stades (Pol. 21.4.9) which is something over six Roman miles.

³⁶ Livy 37.6.4-6; Pol. 21.4.1.

³⁷ Livy 37.6.5; Pol. 21.4.3; Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations*, no. 94, lumps together attempted arbitrations by Athens and Rhodes over several months; they need to be kept separate.

the *strategos* was now Archedamos, who had apparently gathered at Hypata. Glabrio meanwhile was continuing the siege of Amphissa, and the consul stayed outside the immediate area so as not to force the legal handover. The Aitolians met Africanus, who first encouraged their hopes, then told them that the only terms he could offer were the same as offered to the Senate earlier, which he defined as either total submission—*deditio*—or a subordinate alliance and a punitive tribute of a thousand talents. They went off to argue it out among themselves, and Echedemos followed them to suggest another truce, of six months, so that the Senate could be consulted again.³⁸ It was surely obvious to the Aitolians what this was for: it would not take six months to go to Rome, 'consult', and return: the six months was obviously to allow the consul to fight Antiochos. But Aitolian statecraft had never allowed anything to come before the survival of the league. It was clear that a continued fight at that moment would mean their destruction, city by city and canton by canton, a process made longer only by the financial help from Antiochos, who was now unlikely to provide military assistance. Glabrio's army had already taken two of their cities, and had invaded their land twice, and it had now been reinforced.

And their league was being reduced elsewhere. Already Philip had snapped up the Thessalian members, and Dolopia in the north;³⁹ Glabrio had seriously interfered with the Aitolian power in Delphi during the winter,⁴⁰ and the loss of Amphissa would detach the temple-city from the league definitively. On the other hand, a six-month truce would remove this Roman army from Greece, and send it to Asia, where it stood a good chance of being destroyed by Antiochos. If that happened the Aitolians would find themselves on the winning side again. On the other hand, if the Romans won in Asia, then either the war would go on, and the Roman army would still be miles away, or peace would result, in which case the Aitolians would pose a much lesser threat to Rome than at present, and so easier terms would likely result. Or, another alternative was that the Senate might modify the peace terms, even without a Roman victory

³⁸ Livy 37.6.6–7.7; Pol. 21.4.10–5.11.

³⁹ Livy 36.33.7 and 34.9.

⁴⁰ Ditt. *Syll* (3), 607–611, documents from the base of an equestrian statue of Glabrio; cf. G. Daux, 'Manius Acilius Glabrio', *Delphes au II^e et au I^{er} siècle*, Paris 1936, 225–233.

in Asia. They could scarcely be made worse. From the Aitolian point of view, a six-month delay had lots of advantages. So Echedemos' suggestion was accepted and the truce was made. Antiochos would have to go with the war on his own.

This all took some time. The Roman consul had mustered his troops at Brundisium on the Ides of July, which was 18 March.⁴¹ He then had to cross to Greece and march his army to Hypata, and the subsequent events in Greece until the conclusion of the truce cannot have taken much less than a month; it was probably at least May before Glabrio finally handed over command of his army to L. Scipio after the Aitolians' agreement to the new truce, and so only then was it possible for the consul to begin moving his troops towards Asia. Thus from about that time also Antiochos will have known for certain that he was going to have to face a Roman invasion of his kingdom during 190, if the Roman fleet could secure the Hellespont. And so the time had come for the final diplomatic intrigues, and the naval war now became yet more important.

Diplomacy, of course, had never entirely ceased. During the winter Antiochos had contacted at least two of his neighbours. He obtained military assistance from the Galatians of the Asian interior, probably without difficulty, since they were effectively subject to his authority. They provided a substantial force of 3,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry.⁴² King Ariarathes of Kappadokia was induced to provide 2,000 infantry as well.⁴³ By this time Ariarathes had been brought into Antiochos' alliance by being given Antiochos' daughter to wife,⁴⁴ the girl who had earlier been offered to Eumenes.⁴⁵ Antiochos also contacted King Prusias of Bithynia,⁴⁶ whose geographical position

⁴¹ Livy 37.4.1; it is this dating which is more convincing than Glabrio's Nones of May (January) for an army sailing from Italy to Greece.

⁴² This follows from the Galatian contingents in the Seleukid army at Magnesia: Livy 37.40.10 and 13; App. *Syr.* 32 does not give figures.

⁴³ Livy 37.40.10.

⁴⁴ Diod. 31.19.7; App. *Syr.* 5; precise dating is not possible for either of these sources.

⁴⁵ Livy 37.31.4; Livy places Antiochos' approach after the Romans had taken Lysimacheia, but it must have taken place much earlier for the troops to reach his army in western Asia.

⁴⁶ Livy 37.25.4; the date of this approach is not known; it is placed by Livy later in the year, but it would make more sense to see it as an earlier attempt, with the Galatians and Kappadokia, to line up all Asia in Antiochos' camp. In fact, it seems likely there were several approaches by Antiochos, for Prusias proved to be particularly hard to get. He had already been approached by Rome in 196 over the

was more important than any possible military contribution he might make.⁴⁷

Bithynia controlled the eastern coast of the Propontis and the Bosporos, from the mouth of the Rhyndakos to the Pontos. This included a whole string of useful ports: Daskyleion, Apameia, Kios/Prusa, Nikomedia, Kalchedon, any or all of which could be used by the Romans as disembarkation ports in Asia if necessary. In addition there was Kyzikos, a major city with a long tradition of friendship with the Attalids. If Antiochos based his defence of the Hellespont on his base at Lysimacheia, this could be by-passed, for there were other ports on the Thracian side of the Propontis which could be used to embark their army for the crossing: Bisanthe, Perinthos, Selymbria, Byzantion. Antiochos could not keep a grip on all these from a base at Lysimacheia; they could only properly be defended from a position still farther forward in Thrace, which would require that his main field army be advanced that far. Antiochos had clearly decided that he would base his defence on Lysimacheia, though holding it required also that he maintain control of the sea.

Prusias at first inclined to ally with Antiochos, though without any real enthusiasm.⁴⁸ An alliance would leave him vulnerable to Roman reprisals, and also to Seleukid control. He clearly much preferred to remain neutral. He was rescued by a message from the consul. The Roman army was moving slowly but steadily towards the Hellespont. It was undertaking a major logistical exercise, which King Philip had to facilitate by providing at least some of the supplies for the Roman army. In its march east that army would be in friendly territory—Macedon—as far as the hinterland of the city of Maroneia. From there to the south side of Mount Ida in the Troad, only two cities were outside Antiochos' control (ignoring for the moment the Bithynian ports) and those two were Lampsakos and Alexandreia Troas, on the Asian side of the Straits. The Roman army would thus be unable

issue of the city of Kios, given him by Philip, and which the Senate tentatively suggested he surrender. If he wanted to keep it—and he had refounded it and named it for himself as Prusa, so this seems a fair bet—Prusias would need to step very carefully.

⁴⁷ The coincidence of Antiochos contacting the Galatians of Asia and the Bithynian king is marked, for it was the ancestor of Prusias who had invited the first wave of Galatians across the Straits in order to use them as a defence against Seleukos I and Antiochos I.

⁴⁸ Pol. 21.11.1–2; Livy 37.25.4–7.

to rely on local supplies after leaving Macedon, and would be unable to rely on receiving any sea-borne supplies as well. It was therefore necessary to carry everything needful with them. And this took time to collect and to organise. Philip was also the brother-in-law of Prusias, and had had friendly relations with him before. He could thus forward the diplomacy of the Romans and could speak with rueful experience of their power. Scipio was able to contact Prusias, whether or not with Philip's help, and to exert diplomatic pressure. The process was slow and it was not until June or July, after a visit by C. Livius Salinator, the former naval praetor, who had by then been replaced in command by L. Aemilius Regillus, that Prusias finally determined to remain neutral, but by not aligning himself definitively with Antiochos he was in effect now inclining towards neutrality, which favoured Rome.⁴⁹

This neutrality, of course, would be allowed to continue only so long as it actually did work in favour of Rome; should the use of Prusias' ports and supplies become necessary for the Roman war effort, then Prusias would have rapidly been compelled to become a belligerent. The latent matter of Kios/Prusa, the subject of a senatorial letter back in 196,⁵⁰ lay available for Roman use if required. One wonders if Prusias really fully understood the position. It was perhaps fortunate for him that he was not compelled to make an active decision.

The prospective use of Bithynian ports was no more than a final desperate alternative for a crossing at the Hellespont was clearly the preferred option. If it was necessary to adopt the Propontis-crossing alternative it would mean not only that Lysimacheia was still in Antiochos' control, but that his navy also patrolled the Hellespont unhindered. In that case transporting an army across the Propontis, no matter how many cities on each shore were friendly and welcoming, was a nightmarish thought for the Romans. The key remained, therefore, control of the Hellespont, and that meant a naval victory for one side or another in the eastern Aegean. And a total victory for one side might well decide the war. If the Roman fleet was destroyed it might be very difficult to man another. It was not so much the ships—another thirty quinqueremes and twenty triremes

⁴⁹ Pol. 21.11.3–12; Livy 37.25.8–14.

⁵⁰ Livy 33.30.4.

were being built at Ostia in the current year⁵¹—but manning another fleet might be extremely difficult. It has been calculated that the fleet in the east required 30,000 men to man the 77 ships;⁵² it may have been more, since the size of the Roman naval presence in the Adriatic at this time is unclear.⁵³ If this eastern fleet was destroyed, the men were lost: this was the character of naval war. If the ships were sunk the men probably drowned; if captured they were enslaved; in either case they were lost to Rome. Given the difficulties already experienced in acquiring men for Livius' ships it is difficult to see that Rome could man another fleet of this size, as well as maintaining all those armies. Even if manpower was not a problem, manning a fleet certainly could not be done quickly. If the Roman fleet was beaten in 190, no new Roman fleet could arrive before several months had passed, and meanwhile Scipio's army would be stuck in Thrace, dependent on exiguous local supplies, and making no progress.

On the other hand, Antiochos' fleet was not nearly so crucial to his survival. If his fleet was destroyed it was not the end of the war. He would then face the invasion of his territory by a Roman army, but it would still be possible to defeat that army on land. So a naval victory was not vital for him, though it would be welcome, and he spent a good deal of his and his subjects' energy and resources in building up his fleet during the winter. Further, the disposition as well as the strength of the rival fleets had reverted to that which had obtained before the Kissos fight the previous autumn.

With Polyxenidas at Ephesos there were now 23 large warships of quadrireme size and greater, 47 triremes, plus the *apertae* which probably numbered a hundred or so: it may be, however, that fewer of these were available, since they had been fairly useless the year before, and their crews would be more useful in the newly-built larger ships. In addition, Hannibal had gathered and built a new fleet in Syrian and Kilikian ports, numbering 37 heavy warships of quadrireme size and greater. On the allied side, the Rhodians were

⁵¹ Livy 37.4.5.

⁵² Brunt, *Italian Manpower*, 670.

⁵³ L. Scipio ordered three of his legates to gather ships at Brundisium to transport his force of 13,000 infantry and 300 cavalry to Greece (Livy 37.4.2). This sort of detail does not appear in other years. The question is: is this simply Livy describing a normal process, or were special measures needed because the normal shipping had been removed?

placed between these two Seleukid fleets. They fielded a fleet of 36 ships in the spring, and 39 in the summer, not of the varied sizes of the Seleukid vessels, for the Rhodians built mainly quadriremes, but they were but much better handled.⁵⁴ The Roman and the Pergamene fleets at Elaia and Kanai remained the same size as the previous autumn: 77 Roman and 50 Pergamene—but half of the Pergamene ships were *apertae*. The strategic problem was therefore: for the Romans to defeat or blockade Polyxenidas' fleet; for the Seleukids, to keep the Roman-Pergamene and the Rhodian fleets apart, and to unite their own two fleets; for the Rhodians, to maintain their intermediary position, and to prevent the Syrian fleet from sailing into the Aegean to join that of Ephesos. At least this is how it seemed in the end; at the beginning of the sailing season it seemed to the participants, at least to the allies, somewhat different.

Livius had placed his winter camp with some deliberation. After the battle of Kissos he had first withdrawn to Chios and had paused there. This island was the site of the Roman supply base, and would have been the obvious place for a winter camp. But Livius had then moved north to Kanai, in the territory of King Eumenes. This was close to Eumenes' own naval base at Elaia, where the two could mutually support each other, and the two did in fact join forces in a raid to Thyateira during the winter. But Kanai was also substantially closer to the main object of the naval war, the Hellespont, and with the Seleukid fleet defeated and penned into Ephesos, it seems that Livius had decided back in the autumn what his first move in the spring would be.

At about the time that Scipio was crossing the Adriatic with his reinforcements, and Glabrio was resuming his war with the Aitolians by the capture of Lamia, Livius took half his ships—30 quinqueremes, and seven Attalid vessels—and sailed to the Hellespont.⁵⁵ He could have used Alexandreia Troas as his base, but his object was to seize control of both shores of the Strait before Antiochos could respond. Livius was thus using one of the advantages of sea-power, the ability to move swiftly and strike unexpectedly.⁵⁶ It seems clear enough that in doing this Livius was fulfilling the main import of his instructions, for his whole purpose was to facilitate the land campaign, and

⁵⁴ Livy 37.9.5; Berthold, *Rhodes*, 154.

⁵⁵ Livy 37.9.6.

⁵⁶ He has been generally condemned for this: Thiel, *Studies*, 317, and Berthold, *Rhodes*, 154; Rodgers, 403–405, merely describes briefly.

he presumably expected the Roman army from Greece to reach the crossing point fairly early in the year. His latest news from Greece was of the winter truce, and perhaps of the plans of Scipio to invade Asia. By the time he began his move, however, all this had been dislocated by the resumption of the Aitolian war, though he will not have known of this.

Livius' arrival in the strait produced rapid submissions from nearby cities: Elaious near the tip of the Chersonese, and Rhoetion and Dardanos near his anchorage at the Harbour of the Achaians, whence he went to sacrifice at Ilion. He moved upstream to the Narrows: Sestos surrendered, Abydos resisted. The first four cities had been ungarrisoned; Abydos had a royal force holding it.⁵⁷ This brought Livius to an immediate halt. By settling down to besiege Abydos, he was admitting that his *coup* had failed. If he could not take Abydos, he would be even more unable to take Lysimacheia, and he now risked being pinned down and his force destroyed.

The Rhodians had, at much the same time, but without a rendezvous arranged, sent a fleet of 36 ships to Panormos in Samos. They were commanded by Pausistratos, and were ambushed there by Polyxenidas, who blocked the harbour entrance, then sent in a 'pirate' ally under Nikandros to attack by land.⁵⁸ When Pausistratos attempted to break out, he faced seventy Seleukid ships. Only seven of the Rhodian ships, equipped with the nasty firebasket which frightened off all attackers, escaped capture, but twenty were taken, and the rest sunk.⁵⁹ Polyxenidas now had ninety ships, and had successfully kept his enemies well apart.

Livius heard of this defeat from an Erythraian trireme which had gone to establish contact with Pausistratos but had been too late to be part of the disaster.⁶⁰ At once Livius broke off his siege of Abydos

⁵⁷ Livy 37.9.7–11, 12.1–4.

⁵⁸ Nikandros is so described by Livy—'*archipirata*'—but it is perhaps permissible to have some doubts: after all this is the description by an enemy. Later Thiel, *Studies*, 319, note 497, manages to describe as 'privateers' a group of king's ships from Abydos, and Bevan, *House*, 94, calls them 'corsairs'. Historians for some reason are all too ready to ascribe seaborne raids in wartime to pirates. It is difficult to accept that Antiochos would have accepted the existence of a pirate fleet under Nikandros (he is said to have had at least five ships) operating so close to some of his main port-cities, and Nikandros did not spring up from nothing; he is perhaps better seen as a commander of a Seleukid naval detachment.

⁵⁹ Livy 37.10.1–11.13; Pol. 21.7.1–4; App. *Syr.* 24; Shipley, *Samos*, 194–197; Berthold, *Rhodes*, 145; Thiel, *Studies*, 318–322; Rodgers, 404–405.

⁶⁰ Livy 37.11.14.

and returned with all his ships to Kanai.⁶¹ Meanwhile the long pressure exerted by Antiochos' son Seleukos had finally brought Phokaia back to the Seleukid alliance, and this was followed by other nearby cities, of which Kyme is mentioned specifically.⁶² Livius and Eumenes brought out their ships and made an attempt to recover these cities, but failed; and a quick ravaging of the nearby countryside scarcely persuaded the Seleukid partisans to change their minds.⁶³

Livius, however, had achieved the most important thing, which was to unite his fleets, for by dividing them when he went to the Hellespont, he had hazarded them all. (It is noticeable also that these events include references to ships provided by Erythrai, Mitylene and Kos;⁶⁴ it would seem that Livius had been as diplomatically active as Antiochos during the winter.) Polyxenidas' job should have been to attack the Roman fleet when it was divided, but he did not make the attempt, probably because he did not have the time. For by attacking the isolated squadron of the Rhodians he had shown that he understood the need—as he had in his attack at Kissos the year before—to keep his enemies' fleets separated. But the Roman and Attalid fleets were in fortified bases, and the aftermath of Kissos had shown that a powerful and victorious fleet could not attack such a base—for Livius had made no attempt on Ephesos at the time. The window of opportunity for Polyxenidas, if it really existed, was perhaps no more than a day or so.

Livius pressed on from Phokaia, which he left in Seleukid hands, paused in Erythraian territory, then came again to the bay of Ephesos. Meanwhile the Rhodians had gathered up a new fleet of twenty ships, and sent them to Samos under the command of Eudamos.⁶⁵ So Livius' next task, as it had been in the year before, was to unite his Roman-Pergamene fleet with that of the Rhodians'. After some days of manoeuvring in the bay of Ephesos, Livius finally achieved this at Samos, where he then had a force of 120 warships, as against

⁶¹ Livy 37.12.4.

⁶² Livy 37.11.15; App. *Syr.* 25; Appian claims that Samos joined Antiochos, but since the Rhodians were able to use the island soon after, this is unlikely; Shipley, *Samos*, 196–197, accepts Appian's account.

⁶³ Livy 37.12.5–6.

⁶⁴ Erythrai: Livy 37.11.14; Mitylene: 37.12.5; Kos: 37.11.13 (with the Rhodians at Panormos).

⁶⁵ Livy 37.12.7–9; App. *Syr.* 25.

the ninety which Polyxenidas had in Ephesos harbour.⁶⁶ This situation was a stalemate, which in many ways was to the advantage of Antiochos. Livius could not attack the Seleukid fleet in Ephesos; Polyxenidas did not have the numbers to tackle the allied fleet; but the allies could not leave the scene to garrison the Hellespont for the Roman army's crossing, since that would expose the Aegean and Greece to a stroke by Polyxenidas' fleet.

Nor could the allies simply blockade the Seleukid fleet in Ephesos harbour. For one thing, a second Seleukid fleet was on its way, or soon would be, from Syria. Whether the allies knew of this is not clear, but the Rhodians at least discovered it before it could reach the Aegean. And, second, there were Seleukid ships in the Hellespont, who were able to establish local control over the strait, and to raid into the Aegean from there.⁶⁷ This was one of the reasons for Livius' attack on Abydos, the Seleukid fleet base—but ships were also based, surely, at Lysimacheia.⁶⁸

Just as Livius had gathered up small naval contingents from nearby cities, to involve them on the Roman side definitively, so Antiochos during the winter established contact with a number of independent fleet commanders in Greek waters. One of these, Nikandros, who had a small fleet of five ships—and so a force of several hundred men—was induced to be the decoy in the fight at Panormos.⁶⁹ Another group, based at Kephallenia in the Ionian Sea, was interfering with supplies shipped from Italy. The commander here was a Spartan called Hybristas, though his sailors were local men. Livius was concerned enough to send four triremes under Epikrates of Rhodes to deal with the problem, which suggests that the pirate numbers were fairly small.⁷⁰ Out from Abydos came ships of Antiochos which raided as far south as Chios, to which those Roman ships which had passed Kephallenia safely were headed.⁷¹ These are usually described as pirates, but they may well be royal fleet detachments, or even independent allies of the king. Livius detached two quadriremes to cope

⁶⁶ Livy 37.12.10–13.7.

⁶⁷ Livy 37.14.3.

⁶⁸ If Lysimacheia was on the coast; cf. note 59 of chapter 3.

⁶⁹ Livy 37.11.6; referred to as 'pirates', but possibly regular Seleukid sailors (see note 57).

⁷⁰ Livy 37.13.11–12.

⁷¹ Livy 37.14.3.

with the menace to his trans-Aegean supplies, but it does not seem likely that they would make much difference. He was slowly being compelled to detach more and more ships to deal with this problem. It is clear that two ships would scarcely affect the position in Chian waters—the raiders would simply intercept the supply ships elsewhere—and that the real answer was to control the Hellespont. This could not be done whilst Polyxenidas' fleet was intact and able to get out of Ephesos. Alexander the Great would have recognised the problem: it was akin to that of the Gordian knot. And the solution was the same: a spasm of violence.

Livius had already tried to provoke a fight by trailing his coat in front of the harbour, without success. He had landed soldiers to raid the Ephesian countryside, only to find that they were intercepted and driven off by the garrison under Andronikos of Macedon. A second raid was hampered by the need to prepare for another interception—and, of course, the first had gathered up all the easy plunder, which had then been lost to Andronikos' men.⁷² Then Livius planned to sink blockships in the harbour entrance to prevent the Seleukid ships from sailing.⁷³ He had got no further than considering the matter when his relief arrived, but it would not have worked: what was sunk could be raised, or the ships could be got out of the harbour in some other way.⁷⁴

Livius' relief was the new praetor L. Aemilius Regillus. He had left Italy with twenty ships, but had left no less than eighteen of them in the Ionian Sea to cope with Hybristas and his Kephallenians.⁷⁵ Either the problem was more serious than Livius had thought, or Aemilius was guilty of over-reaction. He had met the four ships under Epikrates of Rhodes which Livius had sent to deal with Hybristas and his Kephallenians when he reached Peiraios and had

⁷² Livy 37.13.7–10.

⁷³ Livy 37.14.5–6.

⁷⁴ King Eumenes is said to have pointed out the weaknesses of the plan at once (Livy 37.15.1–4); Thiel, *Studies*, 329–330.

⁷⁵ Original allotment: Livy 37.2.10; he arrived at Peiraios with only two quinqueremes. It is Thiel's assumption (*Studies*, 262–263 and 326–327) following on a suggestion by de Sanctis, *Storia*, 211, that the missing eighteen were left to suppress the Kephallenian 'piracy', but no evidence exists for this. Other possibilities exist, though if for 'Kephallenian piracy' one may substitute an assignment to patrol all the west coast of Greece, the use of eighteen ships would be more likely.

brought them along with him. So he arrived at Chios, the Roman base, with his own two ships and the four triremes. Presumably having learnt where Livius was, Aemilius then sailed to Samos, being met on the way by an honour guard of two Roman and two Attalid ships, and there he took over the command.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Livy 37.14.1-4.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE NAVAL WAR: SIDE AND MYONESSOS

A conference was held to brief the new praetor of the fleet. Attending were the two Roman commanders, the retiring praetor, Livius, and the new one, Aemilius, King Eumenes, and at least two Rhodians, Eudamos and Epikrates. Livius put forward his idea of blockships, but no-one liked the idea, and Eumenes is credited with the most cogent objections, but he and Eudamos failed to suggest any alternative strategy; Epikrates of Rhodes pointed out that the new Seleukid fleet gathering in Kilikia needed to be considered. The report of the conference is in a highly rhetorical mode, and has clearly been worked over by both Polybios and Livy; it is not to be trusted, therefore, as a wholly accurate record, though many of the things said may well be preserved in the report. Epikrates, for example, is depicted as being particularly concerned that the new Seleukid fleet might be directed at Rhodes and its mainland territories, and as a result the existence of the Seleukid base at Patara became important.¹ It seemed a strong possibility that some such attack might be made, since it would be a useful method of disturbing the Rhodians and perhaps of weakening the allied fleet. This, after all, was the main purpose for the present of Seleukid strategy.

The central decision of the council, though it must have been Aemilius' in the end, was to maintain the blockade of Ephesos, even if this was wearing down the allied ships and crews.² To help soothe Rhodian concerns, Livius was sent to the threatened area to investigate the situation. His mission was as much diplomatic as naval and military. He took a carefully contrived mixture of vessels: two Roman, four Rhodian, and two Smyrnaean ships, thus emphasising the existence of the alliance, and of local allies. On the way he called at the coastal cities which were either allies of the Romans, or were Rhodian dependents and allies—Miletos, Myndos, Halikarnassos,

¹ Livy 37.14.1–15.8.

² Livy 37.15.9.

Knidos, Kos—no doubt to provide Roman reassurances.³ It was thus in part a diplomatic cruise.

At Rhodes the problem of the new Seleukid fleet was discussed, and the availability of the harbour at Patara loomed ever more important. Three more Rhodian ships were now added to the small fleet, and Livius sailed across to Patara. It was intended to make a surprise attack on the place, but the weather prevented a close approach. A landing at the nearby town of Phoinikos was made, and an attack launched, first by men from the Adriatic island of Issa and troops provided by Smyrna, then by soldiers from the Roman ships. But they were opposed both by the townspeople and the garrison (presumably from Patara). Livy claims a Roman victory, but it seems better to interpret the encounter as a drawn battle, but a strategic defeat for the allies. Both sides had casualties, and both withdrew, though the allied force came nowhere near gaining their objective and Patara remained a Seleukid base available for the fleet from Syria.⁴

Livius sailed north from Patara along the coast to look at Telmessos,⁵ the principality of a descendant of Lysimachos, but if an assault was planned there it was too late, for the whole area was warned of his presence by now. Strategically Livius was actually defeated, since neither Patara nor any other Seleukid place was taken. The episode emphasises the great importance of Patara. It is clear that Livius and the Rhodians regarded the port as the key to the whole area,⁶ though there were other ports which the Seleukid fleet could use. Telmessos was one, and, to the east, the places Antiochos had called at on his way west in 197—Myra and Limyra, for example. But Patara was the best harbour and was best placed for a fleet sailing from the east. As the reports of the new Seleukid fleet became more definite, the problem became yet more acute.

Livius returned to Italy after Telmessos. He sent the Rhodian ships home, no doubt with a full report. Another report went to Aemilius with his other vessels. He himself called in at Thessaly on his way,

³ Livy 37.16.1–2.

⁴ Livy 37.16.3–12.

⁵ Livy 37.16.13.

⁶ G. E. Bean, *Lycian Turkey*, London, 1978, 82–91, calls Patara harbour, 'the most important in Lycia' (at 85); cf. Thiel, *Studies*, 330–333, on this expedition; Berthold, *Rhodes*, 155; Cohen, *Hellenistic Settlements*, 329–330.

to provide yet another report to the consul L. Scipio.⁷ It was thus by now sometime in May. The Roman army in Greece had yet to begin its march eastward, the Hellespont was still firmly under Antiochos' control, and the Seleukid navy in Ephesos was undefeated, indeed victorious, and was about to be reinforced from the east. This situation may well be one of the reasons why the Scipios were so apparently slow in beginning the march east, and so diligent in acquiring support and supplies from Philip of Macedon. The agreed neutrality of Prusias of Bithynia, which must have been discussed about this time, though it was not finalised until some time later,⁸ became as important to the Roman side as the guaranteed safety of Patara as a fleet base for the Seleukids.

All this activity by the Roman fleet in the Aegean (and the army in Greece) has tended to distract attention from the inactivity of the Seleukid fleet and army. But at this stage, inactivity was the correct strategy for Antiochos to adopt. Polyxenidas' early attempt to disrupt the allied rendezvous by the attack on the Rhodians at Samos had been successful only to a lesser degree: the captured ships were a useful reinforcement, but they did not provide the Seleukid fleet with a definitive numerical superiority. For that Polyxenidas would have to await the arrival of the Syrian fleet under Hannibal.

It was the threat of this fleet which in fact dominated events. Aemilius took the whole allied fleet south to attack Iasos, a town in a sheltered inlet—and thus a useful shelter for a fleet—which also was held by a royal garrison.⁹ This was not a haphazard, or ill-considered, or impulsive move. If Patara and Telmessos could not be captured, then depriving Hannibal's fleet of possible shelter at Iasos might be enough to deter its approach, though it would leave Rhodes vulnerable. Livius' earlier voyage along the coast had shown that other ports were in allied hands, and the preferred option was clearly to deprive Antiochos of Patara, which was a major Seleukid naval base. Without it, Hannibal's fleet would have a long voyage directly across the front of the Rhodians, whose island and mainland pos-

⁷ Livy 37.16.11–14.

⁸ Livius, the ex-praetor, finalised arrangements with Prusias, but only after he had been to Rome and then back to Asia; so at the earliest late June or July.

⁹ Livy 37.17.3–4; Thiel, *Studies*, 333–334 is scathing on this voyage, wrongly. It was an intelligent move in the circumstances. Berthold, *Rhodes*, 155–156, essentially follows Thiel.

sessions would provide the allies with plenty of bases and refuges. But since Livius had failed at Patara, Iasos became important as a second choice, both as a Seleukid fleet refuge and as an allied naval target.

Aemilius failed to take Iasos just as Livius had failed to take Patara, in part because the Iasian exiles in his own camp did not wish to see their city damaged by their allies.¹⁰ When the Rhodians and King Eumenes also urged this argument, Aemilius gave in. It was all very well to have plenty of allies, but to keep them the Romans needed to pay heed to their wishes. Aemilius now began a move towards Patara, but was deterred when he was informed by the Rhodians that, even if he took the place, it could not hold all his fleet. It seems clear that he had hoped to maintain his central position between the two Seleukid fleets, but based at Patara rather than Samos. He would certainly have defended Rhodes more effectively from Patara, and he must have feared a direct assault on the island by Hannibal, whose fleet would certainly be carrying enough troops to permit a nasty ravaging, if not a full occupation. Frustrated in all his endeavours—like Livius—Aemilius returned to Samos.

Aemilius has been criticised—pilloried, rather—for this expedition. Livy recounts how murmurs among Aemilius' own military tribunes at the distraction of the fleet from its true purpose of watching Polyxenidas' fleet at Ephesos reached his ears and persuaded him to return.¹¹ Partly on the basis of this, and partly on his supposed stupidity, Thiel has described Aemilius as a 'fool', and nothing he did has escaped his acerbic pen.¹² This is unjustified: the southward expeditions have good justifications, in the circumstances of the moment. The motives of the Rhodians in commending this expedition towards their territory are also regarded as suspect.¹³ There is no doubt that the Rhodians were concerned to further and defend their own interests,

¹⁰ Livy 37.17.5–8.

¹¹ Livy 37.17.9–10; the reason for turning back—the comments of junior officers, is accepted by Thiel, *Studies*, 334; this does, of course, allow better and more likely reasons to go unexplored.

¹² Thiel, *Studies*, calls him 'fickle' and 'not blessed with large quantities of insight and discernment' on 334, a 'fool' on 348, and so on; he can do nothing right for Thiel, except inadvertently.

¹³ Berthold, *Rhodes*, 155, comments that it was 'clearly in the interests of the Rhodians', with a clear implication that they should be prepared to sacrifice all for Rome and its alliance: Livy's influence again.

but in this they were sensible and normal. It was to further and defend their own interests that both Antiochos and the Romans were fighting. It would be unreasonable for allies of these great powers to surrender their interests for the well-being of the great powers, who were much more able to look after themselves. So Rhodian motives were certainly selfish, in that they were concerned to prevent Hannibal's eastern fleet from reaching the Aegean. But that is not to say that they were *only* self-interested. The interests of the alliance as a whole clearly coincided here with Rhodian interests, and both Livius and Aemilius had realised that. In fact, Rhodian self-interest might have been served better, in the short term, by contracting out of the war. In military terms, the loss of twenty ships at Samos (and more later) was a greater percentage loss of manpower and *matériel* than any other combatant suffered at any time in the war. Rhodes could have avoided this by maintaining its old friendship with Antiochos and remaining neutral.

During the fleet's absence from Samos, as it happened, Polyxenidas had not moved from Ephesos. This lack of Seleukid naval action had its effect on the next phase. Antiochos had finally gathered his land army, at Sardis, and, probably in May, he moved to make a serious attack on Eumenes' kingdom. Until then his son Seleukos had maintained the Seleukid armed presence in the coastlands about Phokaia, with a fairly small force, which was sufficient to hold on to the old cities and to provide garrisons, to maintain pressure on the local cities, but not much more. He had camped in Attalid territory in the winter and the spring, but had been unable to prevent, or interfere with, the joint Roman-Attalid raid on Thyateira. Now, presumably reinforced from Antiochos' main force, he mounted his own raid towards the naval base at Elaia, and then marched on Pergamon, which he blockaded. Then from inland, marching along the valley of the Kaikos, Antiochos brought the main Seleukid army to join in.¹⁴

This series of moves and marches had more than one aim. No doubt the optimum result would have been the capture of Pergamon and the total conquest of the Attalid kingdom: not an impossible ambition, though one unlikely to be realised quickly in the face of the substantial fortifications of the city. The capture of Elaia would

¹⁴ Livy 37.18.1-6; App. *Syr.* 26.

be a resounding success. Almost as worthwhile would be the ravaging to the Attalid lands, the acquisition of loot and supplies, the physical destruction of the kingdom's infrastructure. Neither Elaia nor Pergamon were taken, and both Seleukos and Antiochos were careful not to become fully entangled in sieges. What did happen, and what must have been one of Antiochos' principal intentions, was that Eumenes sailed home with this whole fleet.

The main strategic problem in the summer of 190 was control of the Hellespont. It is necessary to keep this in mind at all times. Control remained with Antiochos, and would do so as long as he had a fleet of such strength that it posed a threat to Roman-allied command of the eastern Aegean. Antiochos would no doubt prefer to unite his fleets and defeat Aemilius' forces, but this was not really necessary. In fact, a smashing defeat for the Romans might be diplomatically counter-productive. So far nothing had really been done which had angered Rome, but a destruction of her fleet might so inflame Roman passions that peace would recede, and diplomacy become impossible. For Antiochos' purpose was peace. Victory followed by peace would be satisfactory, but a reasonable peace without a victory would be just as welcome. He had never had any intention of invading Italy, and had no real ambition to control Greece, if Rome would do that for him. A half-share of the world would do.

One approach to peace would be to detach Rome's allies. The invasion of the Attalid kingdom—a project which, one might have thought, could well have been initiated much sooner—might compel Eumenes to seek peace. He certainly demonstrated anxiety, and took the risk of travelling from Elaia to Pergamon through the blockading Seleukid forces to be in his capital.¹⁵ The danger of the defection of Eumenes may have been discerned also by Aemilius. He had already gone out of his way to use the fleet in an attempt to shore up Rhodes' defences; now he came to the assistance of his other major ally with the whole of his fleet.¹⁶

Antiochos detected a chance to open negotiations. It may be that it was at this point that news reached both sides that the new truce in Greece had been agreed.¹⁷ This meant that the Roman army

¹⁵ Livy 37.18.7.

¹⁶ Livy 37.18.9.

¹⁷ Pol. 21.8.1–3; this is a fragment without clear dating, but it does fit with a

there would soon be free to march east, a clear incentive to Antiochos to make a serious effort to negotiate. So he came to Elaia, camped close to the walls and invited Aemilius to talk. Polybios and Livy credit Eumenes with arguing against talks, and this may be correct, since he was himself now in a very weak position.¹⁸ But the absent, yet now approaching, consul was a more restraining influence on the praetor. Aemilius could scarcely even contemplate talks with Scipio so near, and, as Eumenes is made to point out, even a truce would merely halt affairs as they were at the moment of the truce, with the result that the Romans would sit still and consume all the supplies both their own and their allies.

Aemilius, as he was bound to do, both consulted his allies and then rejected the offer of talks.¹⁹ This does not mean that Antiochos was not serious in his offer. There is no guessing what terms he would have accepted at this stage in the war, but it would clearly be in his interest to make peace at this point, before the Roman invasion of his Asian territories began. He knew that the Roman army was then in Macedon, so it had not yet reached his territories in Thrace, and his own territories were still intact. No doubt he would have had to accept Roman terms, but so far as he knew these still applied only to Greece and the Asian cities. A few of these he had already lost—Miletos, for example²⁰—and he would no doubt be prepared to surrender such places definitively. But having made the offer of talks Antiochos was in a good diplomatic position with regard to the few neutrals still around.

Further, in a more machiavellian mode, the prospect of sowing confusion between Romans and their allies was alluring. He may well have heard of the discussions over the southward expedition, and he had surely heard of the arguments over Iasos between Aemilius, the Iasians, Rhodes, and Eumenes. The prospect existed, it may have seemed, of separating Aemilius from the rest. Then there was the even more attractive prospect of dividing Aemilius and Scipio. If Aemilius could be induced to agree to a treaty, it would block Scipio's

remark by Livy (37.18.10) that the threat of a Roman attack was growing; Polybios' notice is of the news reaching Aemilius, but it will have reached Antiochos almost as quickly.

¹⁸ Livy 37.18.10–12; Pol. 21.10.1–10.

¹⁹ Livy 37.19.1–6; Pol. 21.10.4–10.

²⁰ Shown by the fact that Livius called there on his voyage south earlier: Livy 37.16.2.

advance while the Senate discussed it. Even if it was rejected there—the most likely outcome—the Roman armies in Greece would have been stuck in Greece for another campaigning season, and who knew how annoyed the Greeks and Philip would get at their continued presence? And by the time the Senate acted, the Aitolian terms would have expired and fighting would no doubt resume in Greece. Truly, initiating talks with Aemilius, if such talks could actually take place, offered Antiochos great dividends.

But Aemilius very properly rejected the offer. So, leaving Seleukos to continue the blockade of both Elaia and Pergamon Antiochos took the main Seleukid army to the north, through Attalid territory, first to threaten the coastal city of Adramyttion and then to ravage the fertile inland plain of Thebe.²¹ Both areas were becoming strategically more important as the Roman army advanced. Adramyttion in Antiochos' hands would be a powerful block on the route the Romans must use in their southward march once they had crossed the Hellespont, and the plain of Thebe was their inland alternative: the destruction of supplies there was thus a legitimate war-measure. Meanwhile a detachment of Achaians under the former *strategos* Diophanes had arrived to assist the Attalids, and conducted some useful raids on Seleukos' forces—though the extent of their success is clearly exaggerated in Livy, taking his tone and detail from the Achaian patriot Polybios.²² Antiochos ravaged his way south from Adramyttion, where he had been foiled by the arrival of the allied fleet from Elaia with reinforcements for the garrison. He took a series of small, unknown places in Pergamene territory, and returned to his own territory at Thyateira and Sardis, menacingly close to the southern Attalid boundary.²³

The joint fleets had been a major factor in deterring Antiochos from what seemed to be a serious attack on Adramyttion. When he returned south, the fleets followed. An attack was launched by the allies on Phokaia, no doubt hoping that the Seleukid support had been distracted, but Seleukos was vigilant, the allied troops wasted the advantage of a surprise attack from the sea by a preliminary looting of an island nearby, and the garrison of three thousand men successfully fought off the assault on the city.²⁴

²¹ Livy 37.19.8; Pol. 21.10.12–14.

²² Livy 37.20.1–21.4; App. *Syr.* 26.

²³ Livy 37.19.8 and 21.4–5.

²⁴ Livy 37.21.6–9.

Now that Eumenes had demonstrated his loyalty to the alliance by the suffering of his subjects, Aemilius used him to take command at the Hellespont. The approach of the consular army made this necessary, and it would have the added advantage of suppressing the raids out of Abydos by the Seleukid ships. Sending the Attalid fleet north did not significantly weaken the main allied fleet, which still had all the Roman ships and a quantity of the Rhodians, and was numerically superior to the Seleukid fleet at Ephesos. Of course, if the Syrian fleet got through all these calculations and dispositions would have to be changed. The main fleet then returned to Samos.²⁵

The inactivity of Polyxenidas at Ephesos while the allied fleet was at Elaia and busy off Aiolis is a puzzle. In theory the Seleukid fleet should have been able to come out, sail south and collect the Syrian fleet. In fact this was probably not possible without a substantial stockpile of supplies prepared in advance. In addition, of course, the joint fleets' advance would then be blocked by the whole of the united allied fleets, probably based at Rhodes. So the opportunity for action by Polyxenidas' fleet out of Ephesos was not actually present.²⁶ Nor was it really necessary. As before, the mere existence of the Seleukid fleet was sufficient for Antiochos' main purposes, and by their separate existences the two fleets were keeping the allied fleets were being separated as well. But the move of Eumenes and his ships to the Hellespont was dangerous, indeed decisive, for it forced Antiochos into making a move at sea.

His first need was to bring the Syrian fleet west. Hannibal had been given the task of collecting these ships and forming them into a fighting fleet. It had taken much longer to do this than to reinforce the Aegean fleet, which had been accomplished during the winter. Precise reasons are not available, but conjecture would suggest any combination of the usual sources of delay in wartime: lack of resources, lack of manpower, the need to adapt civilian usages to those of wartime. There was no lack of maritime expertise in the area. The Phoenician cities of Arados, Sidon, and Tyre, Laodikeia-ad-Mare, Seleukeia-in-Pieria, the cities of the Kilikian coast, were all major ports, and places with shipbuilding and naval traditions. There were resources for building in the Lebanese, Amanus, and Taurus

²⁵ Livy 37.22.1.

²⁶ Thiel, *Studies*, 338.

mountain forests and iron mines. Manpower was available in the many cities. Whatever the precise reasons, it had taken until July for the fleet to be ready.²⁷ One further reason for the delay may be the need to produce a bigger fleet than the reinforcements built at Ephesos, and construction of the new ships will thus have taken longer. But at last Hannibal had his fleet and began to sail west, following the route which Antiochos had used seven years before in his mopping up of the fragments of the Ptolemaic empire.

The voyage was slowed by contrary winds,²⁸ and perhaps by the need to practice manoeuvring, for this was a very new fleet. Further, Hannibal was hardly in his element, or in the bloom of his youth. He had 47 warships, including three *hepteres* and four *hexeres*, which were bigger than any vessels on the allied side, thirty quinqueremes and quadriremes, and ten triremes. This variety perhaps reflects in part the availability of ships in the Syrian and Kilikian ports. The triremes, for example, were unlikely to be new construction; even the quadriremes seem likely to be older ships. The bigger vessels will be new. So this variety of sizes was partly the result of the defeat at Kissos the year before, when the bigger Roman ships had been too much for the lighter Seleukids. It probably also owes something to the Seleukid military philosophy. In his army Antiochos had units of every conceivable type of soldier, light and heavy infantry, charioteers, missilemen, dartmen, light horsemen from the steppes, ordinary cavalry, and heavy armoured cataphracts, so much so that contemporaries were irresistibly reminded, misleadingly, of the old Achaimenid empire's swarm of soldiers. Antiochos' empire was so huge and varied that a use could be found for all these units, and the king himself had shown ingenuity and flexibility in deploying them, though the core of his army was always the *sarissa*-men of the phalanx. The Roman military philosophy, by contrast, was to employ as few types of soldier as possible, so that their armies were composed almost exclusively of heavy infantrymen, with some cavalry. Other units might be added, light infantry especially, but they were usually mercenaries or allies, as the men of Issa and the Smyrnaeans Livius had used in his attack at Patara. This practice of simplicity and uniformity applied in the Roman navy also, for the preferred

²⁷ Livy 37.22.2.

²⁸ Livy 37.23.4.

Roman warship was the quinquereme, with the Italian allied cities providing triremes. The Rhodians had the same idea, but preferred quadriremes, which were quite sufficient to dominate the Aegean, and perhaps needed fewer resources to build, and fewer men to operate. Now these different approaches were also exemplified in the two fleets. The Seleukid fleet, with four or five different types of warship (perhaps six if there were also *apertae* with Hannibal's fleet) was about to challenge the Rhodian fleet with no more than two kinds of vessel.

Since losing twenty ships at Samos at the start of the campaign, the Rhodians had built new ships and recruited new crews. They were more able to do this than the Seleukid ports, being more adapted to naval warfare, but even so they had done little more than replace the ships lost at Samos. Further, when news arrived that Hannibal's fleet was on its way, the Rhodian main fleet was divided between Samos and Rhodes, and other ships were scattered at various other places inbetween. In response Eudamos sailed south from Samos with thirteen Rhodian ships, and on the way collected one each from Kos and Knidos, both quinqueremes. When he reached Rhodes he added six *apertae* and sailed east to join Pamphilidas, who had already set out, with thirteen Rhodian ships, to when he added four collected from Karian ports on his way.²⁹ He spent some time, no doubt deliberately, relieving the sieges of some small coastal towns on the mainland. The note in Livy mentions Daedala, a fort of the Rhodians between Kaunos and Telmessos in an isolated section of the Peraia, the city's mainland territory.³⁰ But he also says that 'several other fortresses of the Peraia' were under siege.³¹ This implies a fairly serious invasion of Rhodes' territory along the Knidian peninsula. This situation would help to explain the sensitivity displayed by Rhodes towards Hannibal's approach. With these land forces in the area, he would be able to make serious inroads into Rhodian power locally. It is doubtful that Pamphilidas' campaign of siege-relief had more than a momentary effect, and the co-operation of the besiegers with Hannibal's fleet is to be presumed. The two Rhodian fleets made a rendezvous at Megiste, an island of the

²⁹ Livy 37.23.2-4.

³⁰ P. M. Fraser and G. E. Bean, *The Rhodian Peraea and Islands*, Oxford 1954, 54-55.

³¹ Livy 37.22.3.

Rhodians just east and south of Patara.³² They were thus between the approaching Seleukid fleet and its likely advanced base, Patara, and the Seleukid forces operating at large along the coast further west. Eudamos took over command of the whole. His fleet consisted of 32 quadriremes, two quinqueremes, and four triremes, and with them he sailed eastwards into the Pamphylian Gulf.

He waited at Phaselis,³³ a point of interception which would force the Seleukid fleet to make the longer voyage, and a station which would allow the Rhodians to intercept Hannibal if he tried to cut across the mouth of the gulf rather than coasting. No doubt the Rhodians could recall the tactics used by Antiochos in 197, when he had seized advanced posts and then mopped up behind. One of those naval bases had been at Korykos, a few miles south of Phaselis. But when sickness spread amongst his crews, from contamination from the land, Eudamos was forced to move his fleet. He took station farther east, at the mouth of the Eurymedon river, and learnt from the citizens of Aspendos, a few miles upstream, that Hannibal's fleet was approaching Side.³⁴ Its precise location was reported by men posted in a watch tower.³⁵

Hannibal also learnt of the Rhodian approach, presumably from his own lookouts—the sheer dependence on the land of both fleets is notable. The Seleukid fleet, in fact, was the better prepared, and took up its line of battle before the Rhodian fleet was ready. The seaward wing was commanded by Hannibal, the landward by a royal Friend called Apollonios; the Rhodians by contest, who were outnumbered, were in three squadrons: Eudamos commanded opposite Hannibal, Pamphilidas in the centre, and Charikleitos the landward wing, opposite Apollonios. This was a much more flexible and adaptable formation than the clumsier Seleukid, just as the Rhodian ships tended to be nimbler than the heavy Seleukids, as well as being manned by more experienced crews and commanded by experienced admirals.

The Rhodian fleet, unprepared at first, began in a muddle, and Eudamos with six ships found himself briefly fighting the whole of Hannibal's wing. This paradoxically had the effect of cancelling

³² Livy 37.22.5; Fraser and Bean, *Rhodian Peraea*, 54.

³³ Livy 37.22.95–23.1.

³⁴ Livy 37.23.2–3.

³⁵ Livy 37.23.5.

Hannibal's numerical superiority, for with six ships holding the whole of the Seleukid seaward wing in play—perhaps twenty ships—the remaining two Rhodian divisions could fight on more or less equal terms against Apollonios' squadron. In such a fight professional training and ability provided the edge. Employing the *diekplous* manoeuvre, the Rhodians swiftly inflicted such damage that Apollonios was compelled to consider retreat. He was saved from total disaster by Eudamos, whose ships were slowly losing their fight against Hannibal's wing. Eudamos hoisted the signal demanding help, and the squadrons of Pamphilidas and Charikleitos broke off their fight and rowed to his assistance. At this Hannibal also broke off and retreated. The Rhodians did not pursue right away; then when they saw how damaged the Seleukid ships were—twenty were crippled—an attempt was made to follow up the victory, but Hannibal manoeuvred towards the coast, and the Rhodians gave up.³⁶

The result was superficially a Rhodian victory, but it was by no means a decisive one. One Seleukid ship, a *hepteres*, had been captured. About half the Seleukid fleet had been damaged seriously, but ten Rhodian ships also required to be repaired, and the Rhodians had had fewer ships in the battle to start with. Hannibal may have withdrawn from the battlefield, but he and his fleet had survived, and his skilful manoeuvring at the end had preserved the damaged ships so that they could be repaired. The Rhodians also withdrew from the battle, first to Phaselis, and then to Rhodes, with the result that Hannibal was able to move into Pamphylian waters.³⁷ The Rhodians put a squadron of twenty ships at Megiste, under Charikleitos, stationed to be between Hannibal and his intended next base at Patara.³⁸ In other words Hannibal and his fleet would have to fight again before reaching his base. Sensibly he delayed, repairing his ships first; it was clearly going to be some time before he could move again.

³⁶ Livy 37.23.7–24.9; Nepos, *Hannibal*, 8.4; Thiel, *Studies*, 341–344; Rodgers, 408–411; De Sanctis, *Storia*, 4.1, 182–184; Bevan, *House*, 102–103.

³⁷ Livy 37.24.9–11; he says Hannibal 'did not dare pass by Lycia', but that means he was free to use all Pamphylian waters, as far as Korykos, at least.

³⁸ Livy 37.24.12; Livy implies that Charikleitos used Patara, but this harbour remained in Antiochos' use for another year; no doubt Charikleitos looked at Patara on his way from Rhodes to Megiste. He would not wish to be caught between Hannibal's fleet and whatever force there might be at Patara.

This dislocated all Antiochos' purposes. Without the Syrian ships, Polyxenidas' fleet in Ephesos was not strong enough to challenge that of Aemilius at Samos, particularly when some of the Rhodian ships were returned to Samos.³⁹ For the allies, after the celebrations were over and more sober assessments took place, it became clear that the Rhodian victory was much less impressive than at first hearing. Eudamos tried again to get Aemilius to make an attempt on Patara,⁴⁰ but all Aemilius would do was to send Pamphilidas with four of the Rhodian ships to reinforce Charikleitos at Megiste.⁴¹ With the progressive repairs to the damaged ships at Rhodes, this would enable the Megiste squadron to maintain its numerical edge on Hannibal's fleet. But Hannibal continued to be a threat, one which both Rhodes and Aemilius had to bear in mind all the time. The continued approach of the Roman army through Macedon and Thrace now made it crucial to try to regain the command of the Hellespont from Eumenes, about whose precise activities we have no information, but whose presence in the strait would provide the Romans with the ability to cross into Asia. With no alliance available from Bithynia, Antiochos was reduced either to facing the Romans in Thrace without control of the Hellespont in his rear—a strategy designed only for disaster—or to facing the Romans in the narrow Seleukid territory in Hellespontine Phrygia, with hostile Pergamene territory in his rear, or to fighting the Roman fleet with the aim of ultimately clearing Eumenes away from the Strait. Just to emphasise the importance of the place, Aemilius now sent a third of his own Roman ships to reinforce Eumenes there.⁴²

This was one of the decisions which were presumably reached at a council held by Aemilius at Samos at this time.⁴³ The occasion was the approach of Antiochos and his army to the coast, from his

³⁹ Eudamos had left 3 Rhodian ships at Samos, a Rhodian foothold in events in Ionia, when he sailed south, and now he took seven ships back to Samos: Livy 37.24.13.

⁴⁰ Livy 37.24.13–25.2.

⁴¹ Livy 37.25.3.

⁴² This follows from the numbers Aemilius commanded at Myonessos a little later; cf. Thiel, *Studies*, 348–349, referring also to J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland*, vol. 2, Berlin 1912, 160.

⁴³ Livy 37.26.12–13, implying a council. The decisions themselves are not reported either, but have to be inferred from what follows; cf. Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 330; Thiel, *Studies*, 349, note 602.

headquarters at Sardis.⁴⁴ The purpose was probably to force a battle with the Roman fleet. With Scipio's army marching eastward it was only a matter of time before it crossed into Asia, and the only way to prevent that was to regain control of the Hellespont which meant defeating Aemilius' fleet. The fact that Aemilius had weakened himself by sending Roman and Attalid ships to the Hellespont, and Rhodians to the south will have been an encouragement.

Aemilius' council had to consider also whether to accept a battle; the alternative was to abandon the base at Samos and concentrate all the ships at the Hellespont. This was a viable military and naval strategy, since the main purpose of the fleet was to ensure that the army made the crossing. But it was not a viable *political* strategy. The Romans were leading an alliance, and the allies had to be considered. So the Rhodians had been helped to guard their territory against Hannibal's fleet, just as Eumenes had been helped in the winter and again when Antiochos invaded his kingdom. So also the smaller allies had to be protected. Antiochos came down to the coast, conferred with Polyxenidas at Ephesos and then marched to lay siege to the small city of Notion, on the coast.⁴⁵ This was a clear indication of what would happen to such cities if the Roman fleet left Ionian waters, and one of the decisions at Aemilius' council was to assist the city with his fleet.⁴⁶ This was what Antiochos wanted, and Polyxenidas brought out the Seleukid fleet to lie in wait.⁴⁷ It seems obvious that Antiochos' siege of Notion was undertaken in order to force the allied fleet to come to its assistance. He and Polyxenidas had designed an ambush.

Aemilius had 58 Roman warships, and 22 Rhodian with him. This was an increase of sixteen in the Rhodian total, but where they came from is not clear. Perhaps the Rhodian shipyards had been busy, and the ships damaged at Side are another possibility.⁴⁸ There seems to have been a good month at least between the battles of Side and Myonessos; since these ships had sailed from Side to Rhodes without difficulty, it appears that the damage they had suffered was

⁴⁴ Livy 37.25.2.

⁴⁵ Livy 37.26.5; as Livy explains this was the old name for the site, which had been united with Kolophon a century before, and was now in effect the city of the Kolophonians. Cf. G. E. Bean, *Aegean Turkey*, London 1966, 154–155.

⁴⁶ Livy 37.26.10–11.

⁴⁷ Livy 37.26.7.

⁴⁸ Thiel, *Studies*, 349, note 602.

not too bad; repairs will not have taken very long. The net result had been a very slight reduction in Aemilius' numbers, but a major increase in the allied force at the Hellespont.

The Roman-Rhodian fleet sailed from Samos with several objectives, first to reprovision from the supplies at Chios,⁴⁹ second to relieve Notion, and third to face the Seleukid fleet if it came out. The first necessity was supplies, but Aemilius learnt that only grain was available at Chios, though the city of Teos, was said to have supplied wine to Antiochos' forces.⁵⁰ He determined on a raid on Teos in an attempt to seize supplies of wine for himself.⁵¹ It may also have been in his mind that this might bring out the Seleukid fleet as effectively as an attempt to relieve Notion. Also, Teos was substantially further away from Ephesos than was Notion, and so he would get better notice of a Seleukid fleet sortie if one took place. He took the fleet into Teos' northern harbour, and set about ravaging the land until the Teians, safe for the moment behind their walls, should come to terms.

On the way the allied fleet sighted a fleet of about fifteen ships, light, speedy craft, which had been raiding in Chios. They are referred to by Livy as 'pirates', but Aemilius assumed that they were ships of Antiochos.⁵² Since they were raiding a Roman ally, and took refuge in a town which was part of Teos' territory, which was subject to Antiochos—Myonnessos⁵³—it seems that Aemilius was right. These ships escaped, but were able to inform Polyxenidas that the allied fleet was at sea, and where it had gone—further confirmation of their royal allegiance.⁵⁴

Polyxenidas had brought the fleet out with the intention of ambushing the Roman fleet when it came to relieve the siege of Notion. He lay off shore, behind an island called Makris, but when he heard that the Romans were at Teos, he investigated, and hoped to repeat his tactics at Panormos by attacking the ships as they emerged from the narrow harbour.⁵⁵ Before he could put this plan into effect the

⁴⁹ Livy 37.21.1.

⁵⁰ Livy 37.27.2–3.

⁵¹ Livy 37.27.3.

⁵² Livy 37.25.4–5.

⁵³ Myonnessos was a city, with a steep rock connected to the mainland by a causeway; cf. Bean, *Aegean Turkey*, London, 115–117, with a drawing of the rock.

⁵⁴ Livy 37.28.4.

⁵⁵ Livy 37.28.4–8.

Romans first moved their ships out of the northern harbour, and sailed round a headland to the southern harbour, the better to load the wine the Teians promised to deliver. Then Aemilius heard from a local peasant of Polyxenidas' presence at sea, and his proximity.⁵⁶ Consequently, when Polyxenidas appeared, he discovered that the allied fleet was almost prepared.

There was confusion during the allies' putting-to-sea, but not so that the fleet was caught half in and half out. Aemilius, leading, held back until all were out, then attacked, leading a line which was aimed at the right-centre of the Seleukid line, with his fleet echeloned back. This left him as vulnerable to attack by greater numbers, as Eudamos had been at Side, but the danger was the greater here since there was also a substantial overlap of the lines at the end in favour of the Seleukid fleet. Eudamos, his experience at Side having alerted him to the danger of an oblique attack of this type, detached himself and his Rhodian squadron from the left of the line, which was a long way from being engaged, and rowed across behind the allied line to transfer to the right, where he could block the overlap. The result was the reverse of the Seleukid intention, for the original overlap of about ten ships was itself combatted by double that number, while the Seleukid landward wing, which originally faced the Rhodians, was left with no-one to fight, but was so far delayed that the fight at the seaward end was over before they met the enemy. The Seleukid seaward wing was overwhelmed by the Rhodians, and Aemilius in the centre broke through the Seleukid line, whereupon Polyxenidas ordered the retreat. 29 Seleukid ships were sunk and 13 captured, half of the whole fleet, for the loss of only three of the allied ships (two sunk, one captured).⁵⁷

This battle was decisive for the naval war, and, in fact, it was also decisive for control of the Mediterranean for the next six centuries and more. Polyxenidas took his remaining ships—47 of them—back to Ephesos, and sent reports to Antiochos, who immediately raised the siege of Notion.⁵⁸ Aemilius followed the enemy fleet and demonstrated his control of the seas by cruising about outside the harbour of Ephesos, then sailed off to Chios for repairs and sup-

⁵⁶ Livy 37.28.9–29.2.

⁵⁷ Livy 37.29.5–30.10; Thiel, *Studies*, 352–357; Rodgers, 414–417; Bevan, *House*, 104–106.

⁵⁸ Livy 37.31.3.

plies.⁵⁹ From there he distributed his forces. First a message went to Scipio that the sea was secured, and so also, therefore, was the Hellespont. Then thirty Roman ships and the Rhodians—by their own special request, determined as they were to ensure that the Romans knew to whom they were beholden—went to the Hellespont, where there were already 23 Roman ships and the Attalid fleet.⁶⁰ The Hellespont thus, in actual ships as well as strategic weight, became the centre of naval affairs.

The concentration of allied ships at the Hellespont did not completely end the need for naval vigilance. Hannibal's fleet was still in Pamphylian waters, watched and blocked from advancing by the Rhodians at Megiste, and with the harbour at Patara still available for his use. Polyxenidas' fleet at Ephesos was still substantial. It had been shown that Samos was not a good station for watching Ephesos, since the harbour was on the south side of the island. Further, there was unfinished business at the city of Phokaia. So Aemilius, having sent half of his fleet to the Hellespont, used the other half to assault Phokaia.

The Roman fleet went into the two harbours of the city. Negotiations with the leading citizens came to nothing, and part of the city-wall was then battered down. Aemilius held off the assault, offering terms. The magistrates appealed to King Antiochos, fruitlessly, then opened the gates. Aemilius proclaimed an amnesty, but his soldiers refused to accept the idea, and ran amok. These were men who had been fighting from their ships for perhaps two years, and now almost for the first time they had the chance of loot, and at a city which had reneged once, and defied them twice. Aemilius protected as many of the inhabitants as he could, but let the sack run its course. Then, one wonders with what sense of irony, he restored to the city its 'liberty', but, just to make sure that it remained properly liberated, he stationed his remaining ships there for the winter.⁶¹

This was, however, more than revenge and unfinished business. Phokaia had a capacious harbour, and the city was located in a most advantageous position for the immediate strategic situation. Aemilius had to protect the approaches to the Hellespont, in case

⁵⁹ Livy 37.31.5.

⁶⁰ Livy 37.31.6.

⁶¹ Livy 37.31.7–32.14.

Polyxenidas' fleet came out to dispute control of that strait. And with Eumenes' fleet also at the Hellespont, it was necessary to mount guard over Elaia and the Attalid coastlands. From Phokaia these tasks could be accomplished. He could get early warning of a sortie out of Ephesos from any of the friendly cities of the Erythraian peninsula or from Chios, and could send on a warning of his own to the Hellespont. If Polyxenidas turned south, he could follow in order to catch the Seleukid fleet between his own fleet and that of the Rhodians'. In addition, of course, condign punishment could be meted out to a faithless city, as a timely warning to others, and if any criticism came, Aemilius could blame the sack on undisciplined soldiers. This man was not such a fool as has been painted.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

MAGNESIA

The defeat of his main fleet at Myonessos compelled Antiochos to make some rapid decisions. Raising the siege of Notion was symbolic of the abandonment of the Ionian coastal cities, and this was confirmed when he refused to assist Phokaia in its agony. He could not afford to become locked into a series of small fights and sieges when the main enemy was imminent. It was now necessary to gather his whole army together for the forthcoming campaign on land, in Asia. This meant he had finally to make a decision about where to meet the Roman attack. Their army was passing the Thracian cities of Ainos and Maroneia about the time of the battle of Myonessos, leaving those cities to one side, and their Seleukid garrisons unmolested.¹ These were small forces, but the same fate was clearly in store for the much greater forces he had stationed in the Chersonese. With Roman control of the sea now assured, Scipio could ignore even the garrisons of Lysimacheia and Abydos, and could cross the Hellespont elsewhere. From the Roman point of view such small forces were unimportant, for their main target was Antiochos' main army. Therefore Antiochos needed to concentrate all these troops where they would be useful.

Roman, Rhodian and Attalid ships supposedly controlled the Hellespont, yet Antiochos was able to evacuate Lysimacheia without the allied navies realising what was going on. The ships which had fought at Myonessos had had plenty of time to reach the area, and will have been able to do so well before a message could have travelled by land from Antiochos' headquarters to order the evacuation; also Eumenes' ships and a contingent of Roman ships had been in the area for months. In total there were seventy or so allied warships in Hellespontine waters. Further, to ship several thousands of Seleukid troops, plus civilians from the cities in the area who wished to go with them—and some would so wish, though as Appian reports,

¹ Livy 37.33.1.

they were most unhappy about it²—would require a substantial number of vessels, and these were clearly easily available to the Seleukid organisers. One wonders just what Eumenes and his ships has been doing for the previous months in these waters if all these Seleukid ships was were so easily available, and what the fifty Roman and Rhodian ships were about in permitting the crossing of all these people. The evacuation of Lysimacheia gained these soldiers—equivalent to at least half a Roman legion, if not more—for Antiochos' use, and the whole process was a minor triumph of planning and execution.

Livy's account ignores this, but claims that there were 'supplies of all kinds' left in the city.³ This may well be true—though Livy's phrase is mightily unspecific—but it does not reduce the value of the men gained by Antiochos. Livy also notes that substantial numbers of Romans had been left behind along the roads of Thrace.⁴ It is certain that the army had taken a long time on the march. Why this should be so is something of a problem, for the distance travelled was not really very far. Good roads existed as far as the Macedonian border, and the march through Thrace—say from Abdera to Lysimacheia—was no more than 250 miles. The Roman-Aitolian truce had been concluded in May, yet the army did not reach the Chersonese until November. The march should not have taken the Romans four or five months. Part of the process apparently involved the capture or building of forts in Thrace, for this was where the sick and exhausted men were left. But a fit army, and this one consisted of men who had spent a year in Greece, plus the 5,000 hardened veterans out of Italy, should have been able to cover that sort of distance in less than a month, perhaps no more than a fortnight. So one wonders what the Roman army was doing all that time. The issue of the naval war was, of course, undecided until September, but Eumenes could claim to have had control of the Hellespont from about the time the army was ready to march east. That was what Eumenes had been sent there for, after all.

So the Romans were delaying their march for some other reason. Livy's perfunctory reference to its hardships is unconvincing, little

² App. *Syr.* 28.

³ Livy 37.33.1-2.

⁴ Livy 37.33.3.

more than a conventional essay on a typical march through difficult country. There was nothing going on in Greece which need delay them after the truce with the Aitolians was agreed. King Philip of Macedon was generous with supplies, and permitted his own men to volunteer for service with the Roman army,⁵ and since it was May when the Romans moved north to collect those supplies, the harvest was in and no delay need have occurred in the collection. There is, in other words, no physical or logistical reason which can be adduced to account for the delay. It must therefore be a deliberate act of the Roman invaders.

The climate might be a factor: the northern and eastern Aegean lands are hot in summer, but scarcely oppressively so for men brought up in Italy, either inland or coastal. There were negotiations with Prusias of Bithynia during this time, but they were scarcely important enough to cause any delay, and anyway were over by July at the latest. There is no indication that anything was going on in Italy to hold them back. The long delay by the Senate in meeting the Aitolian envoys who had gone to Rome to discuss peace terms may be part of it,⁶ but that delay was deliberately designed to maintain and prolong the Aitolian truce so that the Scipios were not threatened in their rear while campaigning against Antiochos. This delay, in other words, was aimed at helping them, and so it was up to the Scipios to move faster. And yet they took nearly half a year over the march.

A clue may exist in a word used by Livy. He describes the sick and exhausted men left along the line of march in Thrace as being left in forts.⁷ Thrace was enemy territory, recently conquered by Antiochos, and it must be assumed that there were Seleukid forces in the area. There were certainly garrisons in Ainos and Maroneia, and until the evacuation, in Lysimacheia. One may, therefore, postulate others in the inland area—and perhaps in the cities of the northern Propontis coast. Further, the Thracians themselves, though conquered by Antiochos, were not, as was to be shown two years

⁵ Livy 37.7.12–16, an account which emphasises the *ease* with which the march was accomplished; at Magnesia there were 2,000 Macedonian and Thracian volunteers serving with the Romans (37.39.12).

⁶ The Aitolian envoys were not interviewed formally by the Senate until the new consular year, in November (Livy 37.49.1).

⁷ Livy 37.33.3.

later, either disarmed or cowed.⁸ The forts were therefore needed to protect the line of march, and Rome's possible retreat, and they were also not temporary structures, but constructed to be of some strength and permanence. They will also have been garrisoned, for it would scarcely be reasonable to expect them to be held only by sick and exhausted men. So one of the reasons for the long delay may well be resistance encountered from both Thracians and Seleukid forces, and the resultant need to spend time building those forts. This is the only explanation which seems to be available, even though Livy ignores it.⁹

In the Chersonese, Lysimacheia was quickly occupied by the Romans, and preparations were made to cross to Asia.¹⁰ Once across, there was a delay, partly for religious reasons—though this only affected Africanus, and did not delay the army as a whole. The main reason was for continued military preparations.¹¹ Both sides used the delay also for diplomacy. Prusias of Bithynia had wavered earlier in the year over which side to join. He had been contacted by both Antiochos and the Romans. Eventually a visit by the former naval praetor C. Livius Salinator had persuaded him of the advantages of the Roman alliance.¹² No doubt the approach of the Roman army also exerted its persuasive effect. But his negotiations and his decision had wider effects.

One of Prusias' main concerns was his relations with the city of Herakleia Pontika, with which he had recently been at war.¹³ The prospect of friendship between Prusias and Antiochos was thus alarming to Herakleia, for it would foreclose on its alternatives. At the same time Prusias' alliance with Rome was even more threatening since it would free him to attack the city, all the more easily if

⁸ The returning Roman army was ambushed very competently and successfully by the Thracians, and relieved of much of its Asian loot (Livy 38.40.6–41.4).

⁹ At the same time, so do the other sources. And modern historians, following Livy, do not seem to notice the problem; Scullard, *Scipio Africanus*, 265, simply evades the issue, though he makes a point of Africanus' delay of a month because of his position as a Salian priest.

¹⁰ Livy 37.33.4–5.

¹¹ Livy 37.33.6–7; Pol. 21.13.10–14. Polybios is clear that the army was waiting for Scipio, but there will have been plenty to do at the same time.

¹² Livy 37.25.4–14; Pol. 21.11.1–12; Prusias is depicted as fearful that he would be evicted by the republican Romans, and had to be reassured by soothing letters from the two Scipios.

¹³ Memnon, *FGH* 434 F19, 1–3; G. Vitucci, *Il Regno di Bitinia*, Rome 1953, 51–53.

Antiochos was beaten. So Prusias' option for the Roman side, which took place in July, with Livius' visit, and the approach of the Roman army to Antiochos' border, provoked the Herakleians to intervene. Like every other participant in these events, the Herakleians' primary concern was self-preservation; as with Smyrna, Lampsakos and Alexandreia Troas, the prospect of an alliance with a distant Rome was preferable to any sort of relationship with any Hellenistic king. Both Prusias and Antiochos would be much more controlling.

An Herakleian embassy contacted a Roman commander, whom the Herakleians referred to as Publius Aemilius.¹⁴ No contemporary Aemilius was called Publius so far as we know, so the choice is between L. Aemilius Regillus the fleet commander, and L. Aemilius Scaurus, who later commanded a Roman fleet detachment at the Hellespont.¹⁵ On the whole the former is the more likely, with a mistaken *praenomen* (perhaps from Scipio Africanus, with whom the Herakleians later corresponded). This embassy contacted Aemilius before the Roman army arrived, so it must have been one of their sea-commanders. The embassy was given a letter promising friendship (*philia*, or in Latin, *amicitia*). This took place before the visit of Livius to Bithynia and the arrival of the army at the Chersonese. When the Roman army did arrive, the Herakleians prudently contacted the consul Scipio, no doubt to point out that they had a friendship agreement already. A reply was received from the consul's brother, Africanus, confirming the earlier agreement.¹⁶

This provided Herakleia with a degree of protection against Prusias, but full protection required peace, just in case Antiochos won. The Herakleians thereupon sent envoys to both the consul and Antiochos, urging peace by negotiation. The Roman reply stated that they had suspended operations, which is not quite what the Herakleians meant.¹⁷ No reply is recorded from Antiochos, but, if he did send one, it will have been a rejection, for the very fact that the Herakleians, an independent Greek city in Asia, made the proposal, meant that the Asian cities he was fighting the Romans over, would have to be surrendered. And by now, with the coups and counter-coups in the

¹⁴ Memnon, *FGH* 434, F18, 6.

¹⁵ Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 736, n. 29.

¹⁶ Memnon, *FGH* 434, F18, 7-9; on the whole episode, cf. P. Desideri, 'Studi di Storiografia Eracleota, II: La Guerra con Antioco il Grande', *Studi Classici e Orientali*, 19/20, 1970/1971, 487-537.

¹⁷ Memnon, *FGH* 434, F18, 7-9.

Aeolian and Ionian cities over the winter, there were more at stake than just the original two or three.¹⁸

The Herakleian arbitration offer dates to the time when the Roman army was camped at Lysimacheia. Antiochos also used this delay to propose new peace talks.¹⁹ He sent Herakleides of Byzantion, one of his Friends, to discuss terms with Scipio Africanus, using the release of Africanus' son, who had been captured on patrol,²⁰ as a means of opening the conversation. In fact, he found Africanus had not left the Chersonese, and put his terms to the consul's council, which he would have had to do anyway. He then spoke to Africanus separately. Antiochos offered to recognise the Roman protection of those cities of the Asian coast who had taken the Roman side, and to pay half the costs of the war.²¹

The summary provided by Polybios is generally assumed to be the most likely to be accurate, but that in Livy has a significant extra detail. Whereas Polybios lists the cities which Antiochos says he will abandon as 'Lampsakos, Smyrna and Alexandria (Troas) and such other cities as had made common cause with Rome', Livy adds to the cities specifically named, 'and Lysimacheia'. This may well be an important item since, if it is correct, it implies that Antiochos, through Herakleides, was also offering to give up Thrace, which was indefensible without control of Lysimacheia. It also explains the otherwise inexplicable emphasis on Lysimacheia in the discussion Herakleides had with Scipio Africanus after the meeting with the consul's council.²² Africanus is made to explain that if Antiochos had made such an offer before the Roman army took Lysimacheia then terms could have been agreed. As it was, now that the Romans

¹⁸ Indeed, the thought occurs that this may be yet another of Africanus' ploys. He may well have suggested Athenian intervention at Amphissa; why not Herakleian intervention now? There is no evidence, but then there wouldn't be.

¹⁹ The precise sequence here is impossible to sort out, but it may be that Antiochos' embassy was provoked by the Herakleian offer of arbitration. On the other hand it may more easily be explained by the Roman delay, and by the prospect of a Roman invasion which he clearly could not prevent.

²⁰ This capture of Africanus' son is a minor puzzle. There are several different versions: Livy 37.34.4–5 and 6 (two versions); Pol. 21.15.2–3; Valerius Maximus 3.5.1; Pliny, *NH* 35.22; Justin 31.7.5. I favour the version (Livy's second) which has him captured not long before the approach by Herakleides, simply as being the least unlikely.

²¹ Livy 37.34.1 and 35.1–4; Pol. 21.14.1–3; even more briefly by Justin 31.7.8.

²² Livy 37.36.1–8; cf. Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.179–180; Bevan, *House*, 2.106–107.

have reached Asia, the terms as stated by the consul were that Antiochos must surrender all his lands west of the Taurus. As Antiochos is said to have remarked when he was told of this, 'no more severe demands could be imposed on him even if he was defeated in a battle',²³ or, in another version, it was 'an incitement to war'.²⁴ He thereupon broke off the negotiations and prepared to fight.

This was obviously the Roman intention. We need not take seriously the allegations that terms could have been agreed earlier, for the period implied in what Africanus is said to have stated them was back in May 'while he [Antiochos] was still master of Lysimacheia and the approach to the Chersonese'—which is Thrace. But at that time none of the naval battles had taken place, and Antiochos had recovered control of many of the coastal Asian cities, for example, Phokaia and Kyme, and Polyxenidas had just inflicted a nasty defeat on the Rhodians at Samos. Antiochos could not possibly have suggested such terms then, and anyway Aemilius had refused even to discuss terms at the time, and he had undoubtedly reported this to the consul.

There is no real sign that Antiochos expected the discussions at the Hellespont to produce acceptable peace terms. The Romans had not marched through Thrace and crossed the Hellespont with a great army simply in order to hold a peace conference. By electing Lucius Scipio as consul, the Roman electorate expected a substantial victory, which would be signalled only by a massive roll-back of Seleukid power. If this took place without a battle it would no doubt be most satisfactory, but much more gratifying would be a military victory as well. The Romans knew that such victories were the most convincing mark of their power. Hence the suggested new terms, which were clearly designed to force Antiochos to fight. But Antiochos will have known this as well as anyone. So he had not expected to be offered acceptable terms of peace, any more than he expected his own to be received with pleasure, even though he was offering terms which would have prevented the war in the first place. So, by extracting a statement of Roman war-aims from the consul, Antiochos was doing something which was as much directed at his own people as for his own information.

²³ Livy 37.36.9.

²⁴ Justin 31.7.9.

A substantial section of Antiochos' army was composed of men from Asia, partly from the ancient Greek cities of the coast, partly from the deep interior—Galatians and Kappadokians—but the most important men mainly came from the cities which had developed in the interior over the previous century and a half. In 220 Antiochos' cousin Akhaïos had a force of 6,000 troops with him when he took the title of king, and they had refused to allow him to march on Syria in order to make a throw for the whole kingdom, though they were happy enough to campaign into the Pisidian mountains to chastise the Pisidians.²⁵ They were loyal, that is to say, in part, as Polybios reports, to Antiochos III, though they were also able to accept Akhaïos as king in Asia Minor; that is, another part of their loyalty was to their own local area, which is what one would expect from Greeks and Greek-speakers. Antiochos had an army of nearly 50,000 men with him in December at the battle of Magnesia; assuming he could raise more troops from Asia than Akhaïos, a good quarter of these men were from his Asian lands.²⁶ These men might not be the most enthusiastic of Antiochos' subjects, but at the same time they had no wish to become Roman subjects, which was what was implied by the terms as stated by the consul.²⁷ By publicising the suggested Roman terms, Antiochos was aiming to cement the loyalty of the Asian Greeks to him.

But loyalty is a mutual process. Even in this crisis of his kingship, it was necessary for Antiochos to ensure the defence of the rest of his kingdom. The Roman invasion threatened the Asian provinces immediately, but there was also a threat to his Syrian lands from Egypt and from Cyprus. And that threat had taken concrete form in the recent weeks. The absence of the Seleukid fleet under Hannibal, still in Pamphylian waters, but away from the Syrian ports since June, had been too great a temptation for Ptolemy V. He had more

²⁵ Pol. 5.57.6, 72.3 and 73.2.

²⁶ Akhaïos' force is the minimum of troops who could be raised in Seleukid Asia. Since his death in 213 Asia had been at peace, a circumstance in which the population will have increased. Akhaïos will not have called up all the available troops (but cf. Bar Kochva, *Seleucid Army* 41), and since Antiochos had expanded the area held by Akhaïos by taking control of the coastal cities, Karia, the south coast, and the Attalid borderlands, it seems reasonable to assume that the manpower available to him from Asia was double that of Akhaïos in 220, that is, about 12,000 men, half of his heavy infantry.

²⁷ The enlargement of the Attalid kingdom had not yet been suggested, at least publicly, so far as we know; no doubt Eumenes had hopes.

than once asked to join in the war on the Roman side, and the Senate had always refused, presumably unwilling for the war to expand even further, and no doubt fully aware of the likelihood of a Ptolemaic defeat, and therefore of the need for a Roman rescue. But since June, when Hannibal's fleet had set out on its voyage westwards, Ptolemy's fleet had been the only one in Syrian-Egyptian waters, and it had bases in both Egypt and Cyprus. A naval raid was mounted during 190 on the rich autonomous island-city of Arados, which captured the city without fighting, and subjected it to a detailed and comprehensive looting. The raiders went on to attack and loot the Aradian *peraia*, a series of towns along the Syrian coast, before withdrawing, unmolested. As the Egyptian inscription recording the raid notes: 'They returned rich'.²⁸

On the face of it, this should have resulted in a declaration of war by Antiochos. It did not, of course, for the obvious reason that he was busy enough in Asia. But it may have been intended to provoke such a declaration. Ptolemy could then complain of Antiochos' aggression and faithlessness in breaking the treaty of peace between the two kings, and look to Rome for support in the subsequent fighting, with the prospect of picking up a reward in the peace settlement. If this was the plot, Antiochos' failure to declare war in response scuppered it, but he obviously had to take precautions against what was clearly a heightened Ptolemaic threat.

The raid on Arados took place in the late summer, the only time it was meteorologically possible, while the Aradians' own ships, along with all the others which could be collected in Phoenicia, were with Hannibal's fleet in Pamphylian waters. Antiochos took measures to protect Syria in case of a repetition, or in case Ptolemy, emboldened by the success of the raid, mounted a full land invasion with the aim of recovering his lost provinces in Palestine and Phoenicia. In fact, the choice of Arados, the only Phoenician city never to have been part of the Ptolemaic kingdom, may well have been made so as to encourage the other Phoenician cities, Tyre, Sidon, Tripolis, Byblos, to rebel. These cities had been part of the Ptolemaic kingdom until only a few years before, conquered by Antiochos in the war which had ended in 193. The fact that their ships were, in effect, hostage with Hannibal, would be a deterrent to rebellion. This

²⁸ The full evidence for this raid is detailed in Appendix 2.

new problem now meant that Antiochos had to leave an even greater portion of his army in southern Palestine than perhaps he had originally intended. A force was already there before the raid, of course, since the threat from Egypt had been obvious all along, but now the threat was greater, and there was no possibility of relaxing that guard, or of reducing the Palestinian force, and it may be that Antiochos had to reinforce it, perhaps by placing troops also in the cities of Syria or Phoenicia. It was all a drain on the forces available to him at the decisive point, which was where he would meet and fight the Roman army. It is also possible that the fleet with Hannibal was now returned to Syrian waters as another defence measure—certainly the fleet is never heard of again, though the Rhodians remained on guard against it at Megiste Island until the winter.

It is the threat to Palestine and Syria which is the likely explanation for the unexpectedly small size of the Seleukid army at the battle of Magnesia. Antiochos commanded armies at other times of two basic sizes. In 'normal' campaigns, such as that into the east between 211 and 205 the size of his force was about 30,000 men.²⁹ This was an army which was intended to be on campaign for several years, and so it would thus appear to be Antiochos' standing army, that which he kept in being at all times. It was this army which campaigned in Syria and Palestine in 219–218, 202–201, and 199–198, in Asia in 216–213, and after 205, and perhaps in Thrace in 196–193. It was composed of a variety of contingents, light and heavy infantry, cavalry, cataphracts, elephants, slingers, pioneers, and so on, a balanced force capable of undertaking a wide variety of military tasks and campaigns.

On occasion, however, Antiochos found it necessary to embody a much larger force. At Raphia in 217 he had 70,000 men, and an army of about the same size was required at Panion in 200.³⁰ That is, at the great military crises he was able to double the size of his army. The extra men came from the cities of the kingdom, called out for the emergency. They were trained, of course, having served for some time as young men in the usual way, but they were not the professional experts found in the 'normal' standing army. Their

²⁹ Pol. 10.28–31; Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 142–145, without considering numbers.

³⁰ Raphia: Pol. 5.79; Panion: Pol. 16.18–19.

place in battle was thus in the phalanx, where minimal training only was required.³¹

The explanation for Antiochos' smaller than expected army at Magnesia can thus be seen. It was a major military crisis, on the same scale as Raphia and Panion, yet his army was only about 50,000 strong. The 'missing' 20,000 men will thus have been the force left in Palestine and Syria—perhaps not even embodied, but available in their cities—to face the threat of Ptolemaic attack. This will have been the more acceptable to Antiochos, in view of the size of the Roman army advancing towards him, which his 50,000 outnumbered. Also the military performance of the Roman army in Greece under Glabrio the year before had scarcely been outstanding. As Appian reports, Antiochos had become overconfident.³²

The Roman army remained at the Hellespont for 'a considerable time', according to Livy, which must be a month or so.³³ Refreshed by the rest, the army then moved south, more or less along the Asian coast. Livy mentions stages at Dardanos and Rhoetion by the Hellespont (starting from Abydos), followed by the obligatory sacrifice at Ilion.³⁴ He then swiftly moves to the mouth of the Kaikos, reached on the sixth day from Ilion.³⁵ Eumenes had tried to pace them with his fleet, but could not round Cape Lekton, and had to land and move overland. The Roman camp was close to Elaia, and Eumenes

³¹ The men I describe as 'citizens' are those Bar-Kochva in *Seleucid Army* describes as 'settlers' or 'military settlers'. By the 190s they were no longer settlers, but descendants of settlers at three or four generations' distance in time. By this time they were citizens of regular *poleis* who had inherited a military obligation to serve. They will have had basic military training as ephebes in the usual Greek way, and some no doubt joined the regular army. Most will have returned to civilian life, but were obviously available at need, in such cases as Raphia and Panion. But Antiochos could not call them out too often, for fear of disrupting city-life too much—and for fear of unpopularity.

³² App. *Syr.* 28, an interesting description of Antiochos' reaction to adversity, if true. 'Overconfidence' is a minimal summary.

³³ Livy 37.33.6; Briscoe, *Comm. Livy* 2.337–338, suggests the whole of March (Roman calendar = late October to late November) was involved, being the time Africanus was immobilised for religious observance. He was at Lysimacheia, the army apparently across the Strait in Asia. Pol. 13.10–14 says the army waited for him; this may be so, but there was plenty to do in the meantime.

³⁴ Livy 37.37.1–3.

³⁵ Livy 37.37.4; this is about the same marching distance as had been undergone in Thrace, which makes the long delay there still more perplexing.

brought supplies down from Pergamon.³⁶ Scipio Africanus fell ill, and not even the release of his son could cure him. He stayed at Elaia.³⁷

Antiochos' army was camped at Thyateira,³⁸ just outside Eumenes' kingdom, placed so as to be able to march to intercept the Romans whether they came along the coast, or inland through Pergamon, or by a route still further inland; also from there Antiochos was able to draw supplies from his own lands, and mount raids into hostile territory. He had had patrols watching the enemy in Hellespontine Phrygia from the time of their landing,³⁹ and no doubt also on their way south, but as soon as the Romans left Ilion⁴⁰ and headed south Antiochos would know which route they must follow; his ravaging of the Thebe plain, and the attempt to capture Adramyttion earlier in the year had been aimed at closing this route. But from Elaia they still had a choice, either to march up the Kaikos valley, thereby achieving a powerful and defensible base at Pergamon, or to move south along the coast, protecting the coastal cities such as Phokaia and Smyrna, and perhaps to threaten Ephesos. That would also allow the army to be supplied from the sea, and relieved the strain on Eumenes' kingdom, whose resources had been substantially diminished by Seleukid ravaging in the last year. But now Antiochos could seize the initiative. He marched from Thyateira south-west along the valley of the Phrygios river to its junction with the Hermos, near Magnesia-by-Sipylos.⁴¹ Here he blocked the Romans' further route southwards, protected his own naval base at Ephesos, and also blocked the route eastwards up the Hermos valley which led to Sardis. He also moved his army to a place which he had clearly chosen in advance as a suitable battleground. There he established his camp.

Antiochos' army⁴² was composed of a basic force of heavy infantry in two corps, the professional, full-time Seleukid *argyraspides*, 10,000

³⁶ Livy 37.37.4–5.

³⁷ Livy 37.37.6–8; either the promised return at the Chersonese had not taken place, or Livy is confused; cf. Diod. 29.8.2 also.

³⁸ Livy 37.37.6.

³⁹ This is the implication of one of the stories of the capture of Africanus' son: Livy 37.34.6; rival patrolling is to be expected, of course.

⁴⁰ Livy 37.37.4.

⁴¹ Livy 37.37.9; Livy claims that Antiochos 'retired' in this movement; even more fantastically he ascribes the move to fear of the sick Africanus, absent at Elaia.

⁴² Listed by Livy 37.40.1–41.1 and App. *Syr.* 32; discussed by Bar Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 167–169.

strong, and a larger force who comprised the citizen phalanx, 16,000 in number, who were the men called up for the emergency, men who had done their military service in the past, the men who were the citizens upon whose loyalty the Seleukid rule ultimately rested. This force included the citizens of the nearby Asian cities, whose political situation would change drastically if Antiochos lost the battle—and if they survived it.

This heavy infantry, armed with the long Macedonian *sarissa* spear and organised to fight in the tight solid blocks of two phalanxes, comprised something over half of Antiochos' manpower present on the battlefield.⁴³ There were other groups of infantry, 3,000 Galatians, and 4,700 light infantry, as well. The cavalry was even more varied. The latest cavalry development was a force of 6,000 heavy-armed cataphracts, not only horse-borne, but armoured as well. They were mounted on a specially bred powerful type of horse, developed in eastern Iran, the Nisaian breed, capable of carrying the heavy weight of the armoured man, and the horse-armour as well. In addition there were two units, each a thousand strong, of royal horseguards—the *agema* and what Livy called the *regia ala*—more traditionally armed, and 2,500 Galatian cavalry, also of the traditional, lighter type. Two units of light horsemen, 500 Tarentines, and 1,200 Dahai, the one named for a development originating in southern Italy, from the old Spartan colony of Taras, the other recruited from the horse nomads of the Kara Kum desert in central Asia, and the same people who had formed the basis for the first Parthian kingdom, completed the cavalry. The number of horsemen in the army and present at the battle, was thus over 12,000, and the Romans were about to discover the sheer power of the well-trained and armoured cataphracts. There were also 54 elephants, and a force of charioteers,

⁴³ Livy and Appian both claim that the citizen phalanx was drawn up in sections with two elephants and some light infantry between each section; this is described by H. Delbruck, *History of the Art of War*, vol. 1, *Warfare in Antiquity* (trans. W. J. Renfroe, jr), Lincoln, Nebraska, 1975, 400, as fantastic, and I have to agree, though J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland*, vol. 2, Berlin 1912, 181, and Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 167, accept it. But Antiochos knew the unreliability of elephants in battle, and knew the strength of the phalanx, which lay in its density and solidity; for him to have broken it up is not believable. It is best to see the elephants in front of the phalanx: they were certainly somewhere there, because they got in the way during the fighting and broke up the phalanx by their panic. Presumably their purpose was to disrupt the opposing legion and *ala*, which were deployed with intervals between the sections.

and another of camel-borne Arab archers. This variety of soldiers is typical of Seleukid armies, though the charioteers were new. The overall commander was King Antiochos, with his son Seleukos as his second-in-command. There is no evidence that Hannibal was present.⁴⁴

The consul L. Scipio—his brother was still sick at Elaia—discovered that the Seleukid army had been at Thyateira, and thought it was still there. He marched his army up the Kaikos valley and across to the Phrygios before realising his mistake. He then followed Antiochos down the Phrygios to the chosen battlefield.⁴⁵ He camped first to the north of the Hermos river, with Antiochos to the south, then two days later the Romans moved across the river in one move to make a new camp in the angle of the Phrygios and the Hermos, the exit from which was blocked by Antiochos' camp.⁴⁶ If Antiochos thought he might be able to interfere with this move he was mistaken, for the Roman army staff work was well done. Two skirmishes, one when the Romans arrived, the other when they crossed the river,⁴⁷ had confirmed what both sides knew full well, that the defensive was the stronger, and that light cavalry could not beat steady infantry.

The Roman force was much less varied than the Seleukid. The basis was, as with Antiochos' army, the heavy infantry of the two Roman legions and the two Italian allied *alae*. The numbers of men were, however, substantially greater than is implied by these units. The two legions had about 10,000 men in normal strength conditions,⁴⁸ but had been reinforced by 5,000 volunteers, and 7,000 extra recruits; the Italians had numbered 15,000 men when Baebius brought his original force to Greece, but Glabrio had brought 6,000 more

⁴⁴ Hannibal had been last mentioned with the fleet in the Pamphylian gulf; historians want him to be present simply so that he can be beaten by Scipio again. But no source puts him at the battle, and we must believe he was not there.

⁴⁵ Livy 37.38.1–2.

⁴⁶ The geography of the battlefield was sorted out by J. Kromayer, whose plan is at sheet 9 of *Schlachtfelder Atlas zur Antike Kriegsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1922, a copy of which is in Bar Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 164, who discusses it all at 163–165, based on a personal inspection of the site.

⁴⁷ Livy 37.38.3–4 and 6.

⁴⁸ Livy 37.39.7, says all four were 5,400 strong; Appian says Romans and Latins were 10,000 in number each (*Syr.* 31); Livy's number is not acceptable except as a theoretical strength, for it takes no account of sick, casualties, or other losses. Appian's is clearly no more than an approximation, based on normal strength.

Italians with him to Greece, and Scipio another 5,000. Thus the two legionary forces counted 17,000 men, the two *alae* 26,000, a total of 43,000 heavy infantry—less garrisons, sick, deserters, and dead, which, even if they amounted to 10,000 men, still left a larger number of these troops than in the Seleukid army. In addition, there were the contingents of cavalry attached to each, which numbered perhaps 2,000 in all. To this Italian force, there were added troops contributed by Eumenes, Philip, the Achaians and some mercenary troops, amounting to 3,000 cavalry and 4,000 light infantry, and 2,000 volunteers from Macedon and Thrace, and only sixteen elephants.⁴⁹ This is a much simpler composition than the various units and sub-units in the Seleukid force, but it is an army of about 50,000 men.

Livy claims that Antiochos' force was 60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry,⁵⁰ and the Roman force is usually stated as 30,000 in all.⁵¹ Neither figure is to be accepted. In his description Livy only accounts for three quarters of the Roman infantry, and the Roman total, even on Livy's numbers, is considerably over the 30,000 figure. But Livy, here and in his casualty figures after the battle, is concerned to understate Roman numbers and to overstate those of Antiochos in order to magnify the Roman victory: one gained when outnumbered two to one would sound the more glorious. He certainly omitted some units in his description, which was of the lines of battle, and there were also other troops left to guard each camp. On the Roman side these were Macedonians and Thracians, supposedly two thousand of them, and it is generally thought that Antiochos left a much larger force in his own camp. This seems unreasonable, and it is better to assume that Livy's numbers are wrong.

The totals stated for the Achaian and Attalid contingents also look to be suspiciously small. Diophanes the Achaian had brought 1,500 men to assist Eumenes at the blockade of Pergamon earlier in the

⁴⁹ Livy (37.39.7–13) provides specific numbers, Appian (*Syr.* 31) only a list of contingents. Most of these can be seen, or be made to correspond, but there are others. Appian mentions 'Eumenes' army', and some light infantry which Livy misses; Livy mentions the Macedonian/Thracian group omitted by Appian. Cf. Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 165–166.

⁵⁰ Livy 37.37.9, but his individual unit-totals add up to less than that.

⁵¹ Livy 37.39.7–10; App. *Syr.* 31.157–159; accepted without discussion by Bar Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 165, and by other moderns. There appears to be a general attitude of regarding the Romans as the military underdogs in this matter, an assumption that they were the heirs of the Greeks of Marathon and Plataia fighting the eastern hordes of Dareios and Xerxes reincarnated in Antiochos.

year. If all these were present at the battlefield, Eumenes' contribution was no more than 2,300 men, of whom 800 were cavalry. If Eumenes could raise that number of horsemen, he should have been able to produce several thousands of infantry. Eumenes had, after all, a considerable number of cities in his kingdom, and other areas of Greek and Macedonian settlement outside the cities. Many of his cities were small, such as Pitane and Myrina, but Pergamon and Adramyttion were both substantial places. His land should have been able to produce several thousands of hoplite-standard soldiers. Some will have been left to garrison these cities, of course, but even so a contribution of only 1,500 infantrymen is a paltry effort. Either Eumenes was not trying, or Livy's numbers are wrong.

None of these conjectures and doubts can be proved, of course, but there is a good deal more uncertainty about the sizes of the two armies than Livy's concrete-seeming figures suggest. The Romans were a military people, they knew full well that Antiochos was a capable general, they had good information about the size of force he could field, and they will not have underestimated the ability, experience, and morale of an army which had campaigned successfully in Syria, Iran, Asia, Thrace, and Greece for thirty years, under the same king. The Romans will not deliberately have sent an army only half the size of the Seleukid to fight in the middle of the enemy's territory. One must assume, given the uncertainty of the numbers, that the two armies were in fact much more nearly equal in size than Livy makes it appear.

Antiochos' army, said to be 60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, was actually considerably smaller than that. The two phalanxes, the *argyraspides* and the citizens', amounted to 26,000 men. There were also 3,000 Galatians, who probably rated as heavy infantry, and nearly 5,000 light infantry; a total infantry force of about 33,000, which was somewhat less than the Roman infantry force. In cavalry, however, as Livy indicates, Antiochos was superior. He had 6,000 cataphracts, and the *regia ala* and the Galatians counted 4,500; the Tarentines and the Dahai were something less than 2,000 in total. The cavalry was therefore over 12,000, which is near to Livy's summary figure. He has, therefore, overstated the Seleukid infantry figure by doubling it, while understating the allied figure by halving it. In actual numbers, Scipio commanded something like a maximum of 50,000 men, Antiochos 45,000 or so. Allowing for Roman losses on the march from Greece—dead, sick, garrisons—it would seem

that the armies were about equal in size. (In each case, the exotic corps—elephants, chariots,—cannot be numbered as ‘men’, but were relatively few.)

An ancient battle with large forces involved was an uncontrollable event. Most generals made no real attempt to do so. Antiochos was usually with his cavalry, and led their charge. At Raphia in 217, he led a successful cavalry charge, while his infantry lost the battle elsewhere on the field.⁵² The reasons are simple: an inability to communicate effectively, and once a battle began, there was little room for manoeuvre. The communication problem was made the more difficult at Magnesia by the morning fog, but with a battle line five kilometres long, and over 200,000 feet pounding the ground to dust, even a clear day would not have helped very much. So the winning was accomplished before the fight began, by the disposition of the opposing forces, and by the quality of the opposition each unit faced. This put a substantial degree of responsibility on the shoulders of the subordinate commanders, who had to decide when and where to attack. Antiochos commanded the right wing of the cataphracts himself, and, on the left, where there was a miscellany of forces, the commanders were his son Seleukos, apparently directly commanding the other cataphracts, and Antipatros. The centre, by which Livy must mean the main citizen phalanx, was commanded by Zeuxis and Minnio⁵³—further confirmation, perhaps, that many of the men were local, for Zeuxis was the long-serving viceroy of Asia, and Minnio probably came from one of the coastal cities. It is not known who commanded the other phalanx, the *argyraspides*; it may have been the king himself. If so, he made a mistake in taking on both the phalanx and the cataphracts. There must have been a senior officer commanding that phalanx, though we do not know who he was; this may be significant. But the king was there, and it was his responsibility.

On the Roman side the overall commander was L. Scipio, the consul. Appian and Plutarch preserve a tradition that Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, consul in 192, was in effective command.⁵⁴ This is to some extent reflected in the Livian account in which no commander

⁵² Pol. 5.84.8–10; cf. Bar Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 135–137.

⁵³ Livy 37.41.1; Livy’s account of the Seleukid battle line makes little sense at the wings, but he does place the two phalanxes fairly clearly.

⁵⁴ App. *Syr* 30.152 and 154; Plut. *Mor.* 197D–E; cf. Briscoe *Comm. Livy* 2.346.

is named, though the consul is credited with organising the battle line.⁵⁵ But it would go wholly against all Roman tradition, custom, even law, for a consul to be present at a battle and not to be in active command. L. Scipio has a bad press in the Roman historians, which is no reason to accept their opinion. Only two of the allies' subordinate commanders are known: King Eumenes,⁵⁶ who commanded the cavalry on the Roman right, facing Seleukos, and in the camp the commander was M. Aemilius Lepidus.⁵⁷

Scipio the consul was anxious to fight. The longer his army waited the more difficult it would be to gather supplies, for he was now in enemy territory. It was December, scarcely the best month for fighting. In Rome the elections had already taken place, and new consuls had been elected, so that Scipio could expect to be replaced by one of the new men, who would be anxious for glory, as soon as whoever it was could get to Asia. Equally it was in Antiochos' interest to delay the battle as long as he could, for he had assured supplies and he will have known of the Roman custom of annual magistrates.

The position the Roman army held was guarded on each flank by the two rivers, the Hermos and the Phrygios. If Scipio attacked, this would sacrifice some of that protection. Antiochos' force, which, since he had the more cavalry, took up more space, had less of this protection. But to bring the Seleukid army to battle, Scipio had to induce Antiochos to believe he could gain a positional advantage. So, after two days at his second camp, close to where he had crossed the river, Scipio moved forward some more, perhaps halving the distance between the rival camps to about two kilometres. But to make his sacrifice as small as possible he massed his cavalry on his right wing, with all the lights and the mercenaries there as well, all under King Eumenes' command, and kept his left wing, the leftmost Latin *ala*, firmly based on the river.⁵⁸

Antiochos' line was more complex. He stationed his two phalanxes opposite the Roman infantry, but between them he placed half of his heavy cavalry. The rest, with the lights and the chariots, faced the Roman right, which was cavalry and peltasts. But in that Seleukid

⁵⁵ Livy 37.39.9.

⁵⁶ Livy 37.39.10.

⁵⁷ Livy 37.43.1.

⁵⁸ Livy 37.39.2–6.

left was also included the other half of the heavy cavalry cataphracts.⁵⁹ It is clear from this disposition that Antiochos regarded the cataphracts as his battle winner, and he was almost right. When the Roman line had moved forward, Antiochos accepted that the battle must be fought without any more delay.

The fighting began on the Seleukid left, where the chariots, equipped with a frightening array of spikes and scythes,⁶⁰ now found themselves at a disadvantage, since the Roman advance had left them with too narrow a space in which to develop a charge. The light-armed troops facing them, archers, dartsmen, slingers, mainly Cretans and 'Trallians', and cavalry, were able to foil their attack by their missiles. The chariots either escaped off to the left between the two armies, or turned back on their own lines, where they disrupted the cavalry formations behind them, in particular the cataphracts. Seizing his moment, Eumenes led a charge of his force of cavalry—partly Attalid, mainly Roman and Italian—which broke up the cataphracts and drove off the light infantry who were stationed there to protect the left flank of the main Seleukid citizen phalanx. There was still more Seleukid cavalry on the far left flank, but these units seem to have been disrupted as well, and were probably also demoralised by the destruction to their right. The lighter-armed allied horsemen had the advantage over the cataphracts in a *melée*, for the purpose of the cataphracts was to charge and destroy the enemy formation with the shock of their weight, so they were ineffectual except in a charge, and they appear to have been vulnerable to a flank attack.⁶¹

In the centre, between the two lines of heavy infantry, the Roman skirmishers drove back the Seleukid lights, and attacked the elephants which appear to have been placed in front of the citizen phalanx. Like the chariots, they were easily dealt with by the allied lights, who could disable the beasts by spear thrusts at their eyes, or by hamstringing them. The elephants were thus maddened, at which point they became dangerous to everyone in range. When it was threatened from the flank by the allied cavalry and lights, the citizen

⁵⁹ Livy's account places a whole series of light infantry units on the two wings, which is so unlikely as to be dismissed. Presumably he simply duplicated the left wing on to the right, and found a list of units he had to place somewhere: App. *Syr.* 32 is to be preferred here.

⁶⁰ Livy 37.40.12 and 41.6–7.

⁶¹ Livy 37.41.8–42.3; App. *Syr.* 33–34.

phalanx formed square, so that its flank was protected, but this process effectively immobilised it. Since, like the cataphracts, the phalanx as a battle-winner depended on its weight in the charge, this meant it was for the present counted out of the battle, though it was able to preoccupy the enemy forces, including the opposing legion and the Italian *ala*.⁶²

On the Seleukid right, however, the battle went very differently. The fighting here was apparently unimpeded by the Seleukid skirmishers and exotic forces. The phalanx of the *argyraspides*, facing a Latin *ala* and a Roman legion, was placed somewhat forward of the general line, and so closer to the allied forces. We do not know what the *argyraspides* did in the battle, but we must assume they closed with the opposing infantry. Having a kilometre or more to move, this would take some time. In the meantime, the Seleukid cataphracts, commanded by the king in person, with the cavalry *agema* next to them, 4,000 horsemen in all, charged the allied infantry facing them. They will have struck part of the Italian *ala*, the other part of which, with the legion next to it, was occupied by the *argyraspides* when they arrived. The cavalry broke through and drove the disorganised fugitives back towards their camp.⁶³ There they were rallied by the tribune M. Aemilius Lepidus and the camp garrison, and Antiochos failed to take the camp—but then it was scarcely cavalry work.⁶⁴ Worse, he was held up in the attempt and delayed from pursuing any other quarry. All these moves, on the left, in the centre, and on the right, took place at more or less the same time, but it was the two cavalry attacks by the rival kings which were crucial. The heavy infantry fights were slower to have an effect, but the decisive action did take place in the centre. The missile troops on the Roman side bombarded the immobilised great phalanx,⁶⁵ which was uncomfortable for the men, but infuriating for the surviving Seleukid ele-

⁶² Livy 37.42.4–6.

⁶³ Livy 37.42.7–8; Bar Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, 171–172, using Justin 31.8.6, claims that this charge broke a Roman legion; Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 2.355, denies this and maintains that it was an Italian *ala* which the king charged. If a legion was broken Livy may well have suppressed the fact, and he is not altogether clear about who was attacked by the king. But his whole account of this part of the battle is concentrated on the king's charge, and the defence of the Roman camp. What the *argyraspides* were doing is never stated, though it must be presumed they attacked.

⁶⁴ Livy 37.42.8–43.6; App. *Syr.* 36.

⁶⁵ App. *Syr.* 35.

phants which were somehow involved. The great animals panicked and were driven back, and their antics broke up the phalanx. At this the heavy infantry of the legion and the *ala* in the centre advanced, and, after hard fighting, the phalanx finally collapsed.⁶⁶ When Antiochos returned from his victory on the right, he found his centre and left defeated and dissolving. He retired from the field.⁶⁷ The Seleukid camp was defended against Roman attack as stubbornly as the Roman had been against Antiochos, but the Roman manpower strength was now overwhelming. The camp fell.⁶⁸ The Roman victory was complete.

⁶⁶ Livy 37.43.7; App. *Syr.* 35.

⁶⁷ Livy 37.43.6; App. *Syr.* 36.

⁶⁸ Livy 37.43.7 and 10–11; other modern accounts are by Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.180–181 (very brief, and accepting Livy's figures for troops and casualties); Bevan, *House*, 2.109–11.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

MAKING PEACE

The battle had been hard for both sides, and casualties are not accurately known. The losing side, as always, lost the more heavily, but the Roman side had suffered badly too. Livy's figures—53,000 dead and 1,400 (and fifteen elephants) captured on the Seleukid side, and 349 dead on the Allied side—are unbelievable.¹ On the Roman side the defeat of an Italian *ala* or of a Roman legion will have resulted in at least several hundred dead; Livy admits to there being 'many' wounded, and many of these would die. On the Seleukid side, Livy's figure for the dead is probably higher than the total number actually involved in the battle. The lights and the cavalry of the left wing had been scattered rather than involved in a prolonged fight; on the left the *argyraspides*' fight had been so unimportant that no source mentions it; just possibly they had never come to grips with their opponents; certainly their casualties were not heavy. The Dahai light cavalry had not been involved in any of the fighting and will have got away with few or no casualties. The hardest fighting was undergone by the citizen-phalanx, and it was here that the main casualties were sustained; but many of these men will have got away as well, though considerable numbers of them no doubt died under the missile bombardment (Livy writes of 'piles of corpses'), and in the hard fight at the camp, where Livy writes of 'great slaughter'—and there the Romans will have suffered too.² It is, given Livy's false numbers, not possible to give an estimate of dead based on any evidence, but at a guess it seems likely that at least 10,000 on the Seleukid side, and perhaps half that on the allied side will have been killed.

¹ Livy 37.44.1–2; on the allied side he only notes *Roman* dead and those of Eumenes' cavalry; the Italian and other allied dead are not mentioned; App. *Syr.* 36, has the same figures.

² Livy 37.43.7 and 10; on the other hand, these are conventional phrases in battle descriptions.

The question of casualties is also the question of the survivors. If Livy's figures are accepted, it must also be accepted that Antiochos' army was totally destroyed, and that Scipio's force was almost wholly intact. But this is not so, and the behaviour of the Romans in the next days can only be understood if the damage inflicted by the Seleukid army is also understood and accepted to be substantial. No serious pursuit took place, though Eumenes' cavalry started briefly on one.³ Instead, the Seleukid camp, captured after bitter fighting, was looted.⁴ It was not until the day after the battle, according to Livy, that prisoners were rounded up.⁵ This perhaps accounts for the very small number said to have been taken, and one would expect that most of those had been wounded or unconscious. And then the Romans sat in their camp and waited for surrenders to arrive.

Antiochos rode from the battle as fast as he could, a sensible move since he presumably expected a pursuit. He collected other fugitives on the way, so that by the time he reached Sardis, about thirty miles from the battlefield, he had a force of some size with him.⁶ Livy called it 'moderate' in number, which must in the context imply a force of several thousands. He paused there to gather information, and learnt that his son Seleukos had survived and was on his way, no doubt with more troops, and certainly with a number of high-ranking Friends of the king, towards Apamea-Kelainai.⁷ Antiochos made arrangements for governing and garrisoning Sardis and for the government of Lydia, and, taking Queen Euboia and their daughter, he followed Seleukos to Apamea.⁸

Along the way Antiochos' discussions with his advisers were bedevilled by recriminations. This is only reported by Appian, but will

³ Livy 37.43.8.

⁴ Livy 37.43.7, 11, and 44.3.

⁵ Livy 37.44.3.

⁶ Livy 37.44.5; App. *Syr.* 36.

⁷ Livy 37.44.6; App. *Syr.* 36.

⁸ Livy 37.44.6–7; Livy's words are 'his wife and daughter', so he is not specific on the queen's identity. This has left the door open to speculation that it was really Laodike, and that the daughter was 'the one earlier offered in marriage to Eumenes' (Briscoe, *Comm. Livy*, 2.357, and references). But that daughter had in fact already gone to Pharnakes of Pontos, now known to have been married to Nysa by c. 195 (S. V. Tracy, 'Inscriptiones Deliacae: IG XI 713 and IG XI 1056', *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung*, 1992, 303–314). The identity of the wife and daughter in 190 is therefore best seen as Euboia and a baby.

have come from Polybios, who is clearly the common source for both Livy and Appian. (Livy ignores this.) It seems that the argument went back and forth over all the relations with Rome. Antiochos was blamed for the Roman war itself, for evacuating the Chersonese, for not contesting the Romans' crossing of the Hellespont, for his dispositions at Magnesia, and for the use of 'raw recruits' there.⁹

Appian says that these were aired by Antiochos' Friends, apparently among themselves, but the attitudes of blame and recrimination will have inevitably spilt over into their discussions with the king. Which is to say that demoralisation spread through the officers and commanders. Antiochos had to take this into account in his next decisions. His first priority was clearly to conserve as much of his military strength as he could, which meant rallying the fugitives, reimposing discipline, mending wounds, reconstituting units. Part of this process applied to the navy as well. Polyxenidas took the fleet out of Ephesos when the news of the great defeat reached him and sailed south. In theory this would sandwich the Rhodian fleet at Megiste between Polyxenidas' fleet of 47 vessels and that of Hannibal in Pamphylian waters, which was at least 25 strong. But Livy says Polyxenidas feared to meet the Rhodians at Megiste, even though there were probably no more than twenty of their ships there. This suggests not so much fear as a lack of manpower and armament. Presumably the military personnel were absent, and maybe the rowers too, and Polyxenidas was voyaging under sail, and so incapable of fighting. Most of his rowers and marines were probably local, from Ephesos and the other Ionian cities, and would not wish to leave, especially at such a crucial moment. His voyage, therefore, depended on speed for its success. He did succeed in reaching the Seleukid naval base at Patara. Livy's comment that he stopped there for fear of the Rhodian squadron on guard at Megiste probably avoids the main point, which is that Patara had been Polyxenidas' destination all along. And to get there he had sailed a fleet of almost fifty ships past a whole string of allied cities and islands, and through the seas between Rhodes and that city's *peraia*, without interruption or perhaps even detection. Admittedly it was December, and fleets were not expected to be at sea at that time, but, if Livy's assumption is

⁹ App. *Syr.* 37; his contrasting of 'raw recruits' and 'professional soldiers' is the contrast between the citizen phalanx, which was destroyed, and the *argyraspides*.

correct, the Rhodian ships were still manned and ready at Megiste; if that is so, presumably those of Hannibal were not far off, and manned and ready also. But no-one would wish to sail along the south Asian coast in winter—as Antiochos could personally testify, after his shipwreck six years before, it was dangerous. Polyxenidas' fleet was now only a hundred miles or so from Hannibal's fleet, if it was in Pamphylian waters, and only sixty miles from Rhodes. Polyxenidas left the fleet at Patara, manned by most of the men who had sailed from Ephesos, and went on 'to Syria'.¹⁰

All this was an attempt to consolidate the king's military power. His two fleets were closer together, but clearly short of manpower, unless Hannibal could get his ships moving, or unless the fleet at Patara could be manned. It was, however, December and it must be assumed that Hannibal's fleet had been laid up for the winter. (We do not even know if it was still in Pamphylian waters.) The ingathering of the fugitives from the army was also no doubt equally inconclusive, but considerable numbers clearly survived, perhaps as much as three-quarters of the total involved in the battle. Many of the survivors, however, faced an even more difficult dilemma than either Antiochos or Polyxenidas.

Some of the survivors of the collapse of the citizen-phalanx will have had their homes in nearby cities, and following their defeat their priority will have been to get home. So after the battle Antiochos will have been unable to gather up many of the soldiers whose cities lay close to the victorious Romans. The magistrates of many of these cities reacted with alacrity to the news of the king's defeat. Within a day envoys came from the nearest city, Magnesia-by-Sipylos, to offer its surrender; they were more or less accompanied by envoys from Thyateira, who must have followed in the tracks of the marching Roman army before the battle, no doubt to be on hand to congratulate the winner, and/or avoid a sack. These were followed a few days later by envoys from Ephesos—who can have set out only after the departure of Polyxenidas and his fleet—from Magnesia-ad-Maiandros, and from Tralles.¹¹

This amounted to the surrender to the Romans of much of the Seleukid lands between the southern boundary of the Attalid kingdom

¹⁰ Livy 37.45.2; Thiel, *Studies*, 361–362.

¹¹ Livy 37.44.4 (Thyateira and Magnesia-ad-Sipylos); 45.1 (Tralles, Magnesia-ad-Maiandros, Ephesos).

and the Maiandros river. After resting his forces and accepting the surrenders, L. Scipio, presumably with the main Roman army, moved up the Hermos valley towards Sardis, which was in no condition to resist and was surrendered by a delegation of citizens and garrison soldiers. He was joined there by his brother Africanus, now recovered from his illness after his stay at Elaia.¹² The appointment of new officials by Antiochos for the city of Sardis and its garrison thus had no effect. A number of other cities, none named, also surrendered, but it seems reasonable to assume that they were all included within the quadrilateral bounded by the Hermos and Maiandros rivers and the longitude of Sardis, including any along the Erythraian peninsula which had not surrendered earlier.

All this—naval movements and surrenders of cities—will have become known to Antiochos at Apameia-Kelainai along with the difficulties in reviving his strength and the demoralisation of his Friends. This whole series of events must be assumed to have taken some weeks. Antiochos, for one, had to travel two hundred miles or so from Magnesia to Apameia-Kelainai, and there receive reports which had come from similar distances, and conduct discussions. So he had time to recover his balance somewhat, and that will include a recovery of a good deal of his military strength.

Antiochos reached the conclusion that more was to be gained by peace talks than by continued fighting. He sent a herald, Mousaios, to open negotiations with the consul, and soon afterwards Zeuxis and Antipatros reached Sardis to discuss terms for an armistice.¹³ It was by now early in January, and well past the time when the armies expected to be in winter quarters. Scipio could scarcely expect his troops to continue on active service much longer, so the proposal for an armistice was well-timed. It was also, of course, a diplomatic tactic Antiochos had attempted in the past. At last the Romans were prepared to respond.

Zeuxis and Antipatros were men who had been high in Antiochos' confidence throughout his reign, and Zeuxis had ruled Asia Minor for him for two decades. Antipatros is repeatedly described as Antiochos' nephew, though his parentage is unknown; so a relative certainly, and a trusted one.¹⁴ This was an even more convincing

¹² Livy 37.45.3; App. *Syr.* 38.

¹³ Livy 37.44.4–5; Pol. 21.16.1–4.

¹⁴ Grainger, *Prosopography*, 38 (Antipatros) and 122–123 (Zeuxis).

embassy than those sent to Italy before the war, or that of Herakleides of Byzantion before the battle. But they were still a step away from the king himself. Similarly the Roman negotiators were one step away from the Senate, whose agreement to any terms of peace was necessary. So any terms agreed in these discussions were provisional only, and subject to renegotiation. This makes the meeting different from those in Italy and in Asia before the war began. Both sides were, in other words, reserving their final positions. Peace talks may well have been going on, but there was still a long way to go before the war could be said to have ended. Both sides were confident that they could resume the fighting if necessary, and with a reasonable chance of winning. The battle of Magnesia is decisive only in retrospect; it was not a definitive end of the war at the time, to any of the participants.

A pair of speeches, one by Zeuxis and one by Africanus, are all that Livy provides on these armistice talks, and Polybios is not much more forthcoming.¹⁵ There were some pre-meeting discussions (as at the Lysimacheia meeting). Zeuxis and Antipatros first saw Eumenes, on the assumption that he would be more difficult to persuade than the Romans. This in itself is an interesting light on the perceptions the Seleukid side had of Roman policy and intentions; Eumenes took his cue from the Romans, and the Seleukid envoys probably realised this, and yet the Romans were not interested in acquiring territory in Asia for themselves. What this preliminary meeting told them was that a truce and negotiations were attainable. The Roman side, including Eumenes, had now worked out the terms to be presented, and had designated their principal speaker, who was to be Africanus. That it was not the consul is a clear sign of the tentative nature of the agreement expected, for Africanus only held a legateship from his brother, whose term of office had expired, though his *imperium* would not lapse until he was relieved by the arrival of his successor. But all the Romans were fully aware of the need to defer to the ultimate authority of the Senate, and so were careful to limit the involvement of their official personalities.¹⁶

Zeuxis and Antipatros had, no doubt, also discussed with the king what terms they might accept, but since Antiochos was relatively

¹⁵ Other sources include App. *Syr.* 38 (a speech by Scipio only), Diod. 29.10, Justin 31.8.8.

¹⁶ Livy 37.45.6–18; Pol. 21.16.5–17.8.

close at hand, they were able to act merely as messengers, and the agreement to the armistice terms would have to come from him. Zeuxis is said to have spoken to the consul's council of the virtues of mildness and magnanimity, and indicated, at least in some accounts, contrition on the king's behalf,¹⁷ no doubt knowing full well that he was wasting his rhetoric on the air. Africanus then answered, claiming first that the Romans' terms were just the same as they had been at the Hellespont, which he spelled out in detail, but then he added several more punitive terms.¹⁸ The king must withdraw to south of the Taurus, surrendering the whole of his Asian territories; so far, so familiar; this was an item only to be expected, and had been the main point already made in the Hellespont talks. He also made it clear that this included the surrender of 'Europe', meaning Antiochos' conquests in Thrace. But the additions were new and they significantly increased the severity of the terms. Antiochos had offered to pay half the costs of the war, but at the Hellespont the consul had demanded the full costs; these were now stated to be 15,000 talents of silver, and 500 were to be paid over at once as part of the armistice terms. Eumenes was now also included in the armistice, to the extent of 400 talents and some grain he claimed was owing to his late father. These financial terms might be considered to be elaborations on the original terms, or perhaps interpretations of them, though the sums were immense, and were not so much a calculation of cost as a swingeing fine. But then there came a series of quite new terms. Five named individuals were to be surrendered by Antiochos: Hannibal, Mnasilochos of Akarnania, the Aitolian Thoas, and two Chalkidians, Philo and Euboulidas; and the king was to hand over twenty hostages, chosen by the Romans who provided a list, as guarantees that the truce would be observed. Some of these terms were impossible to fulfil: Hannibal, for example, seems to have left the king's lands by the time the terms were ratified, or soon did, at least. And the surrender of men who were the king's guests, who had taken refuge with him, was a matter highly repugnant to the king, involving as it did his personal honour; no doubt this was why it was included: if the king complied, his honour was impugned, and his word could never be accepted again; if he refused, Rome had a perfect excuse to resume the war.

¹⁷ Livy 37.45.7; Diod. 29.10.

¹⁸ Livy 37.45.11–18; Pol. 21.17.1–8; App. *Syr.* 38; Diod. 29.10.

But this was a problem which could be dealt with later. The only one of these terms which had to be implemented at once was the handing over of 500 talents. The rest, including the provisions for giving up the five men, did not have to be carried out until ratification, and that would be some time yet. For the present the terms were acceptable to Antiochos, as a basis on which a final peace could be worked out. It would cost him only 500 talents and twenty hostages, and neither of these was crippling. The envoys were able to announce acceptance on the spot, though Livy's assertion that Zeuxis and Antipatros had been instructed to accept any terms at all may be doubted. And, in fact, one wonders what expressions appeared on the Romans' faces at this instant acceptance: if these terms were so easy to accept, perhaps they should have insisted on still more stringent ones. No doubt this message went back to Rome. The fact that they had not demanded harsher terms is, in fact, a testimony to the continued military and political power of Antiochos locally and in the rest of his kingdom; it is evidence that he had recovered enough of his military power that the consul did not feel it possible to push any harder. Antiochos had, therefore, recovered his balance militarily by this time, had a substantial army to hand, and he had removed much of his fleet to a place where it was in a more convenient position for later use; in short, he had shown that he was able to resume the fighting if he found the suggested terms of the armistice unacceptable. Both sides, in other words, were still reserving their final decisions on the peace terms.

Zeuxis and Antipatros, having signified their acceptance of the armistice, left Sardis to report to Antiochos at Apameia-Kelainai.¹⁹ The consul, to show his appreciation that the armistice had been accepted, began to disperse his troops into winter quarters²⁰—that is to say, he had until then maintained his forces in a state of readiness so as to be able to continue the campaign if necessary. No doubt the dispersal was no more than preparatory at first. Then the hostages and the 500 talents were delivered, by which time the consul was at Ephesos.²¹ The Roman troops, paid out of the money extracted

¹⁹ This is not detailed in the sources, which go straight to the envoys' journey to Rome, but it is beyond doubt that they will have reported to this king, who had to provide the hostages: Pol. 21.17.10 says the envoys left Sardis after the presentation of the terms, but does not say where they went—to the king, surely.

²⁰ Livy 37.45.19; Pol. 21.17.11.

²¹ Livy 37.45.20; Pol. 21.17.11; App. *Syr.* 39.

from Antiochos, were then finally distributed into several of the cities which had already surrendered, of which Tralles, Ephesos, and Magnesia-ad-Maiandros only are mentioned,²² but the effect was to ensure that the conquered area was garrisoned by a Roman army.

The scene of action transfers forthwith to Rome. Delegations from all the affected states headed for the city. According to both Livy and Polybios, they started out at once, but since they do not seem to have arrived until 'the beginning of summer', there was obviously some delay.²³ One would expect a delay anyway, for the selection of delegates, discussions of aims, and so on, as well as for the journey. If they all really did set out at once, they all travelled during the winter, and very slowly, and that seems unlikely.

Meanwhile, however, the Senate had to deal with the Aitolians. The delegation from the league which went to Rome to discuss the peace settlement had been kept waiting all the summer and autumn of 190. Then the elections for the Roman magistrates for 189 intervened so that the Aitolians were not received until very late in the year, sometime in November.²⁴ The reason became obvious when the meeting finally took place. Both sides were waiting for the result of the Asian campaign, and so both had been quite content to wait and delay. But by November the Roman-Aitolian truce which had been arranged in May had either expired or was about to expire, and some discussion had to take place. The Aitolians were belligerent, harping on about their past services to Rome, as they always did, and successfully annoyed the senators collectively. They refused to agree to the *deditio* process, or to agree to an alliance, by simply not replying.²⁵ The senators therefore had no choice but to send them home, on the motion of their former enemy Glabrio, and they were put in the charge of A. Terentius Varro for their journey through Italy²⁶—which suggests that the truce had now expired and they needed protection. The truce's expiry meant that the Senate knew that the war in Greece would resume, and the Senate made a formal notification that no other Aitolian delegation should be

²² Livy 37.45.19.

²³ Livy 37.45.21; Pol. 21.17.12.

²⁴ Livy 37.49.1; Diod. 29.9; on the Aitolian war, cf. Grainger, *League of the Aitolians*, ch. 21.

²⁵ Livy 37.49.1–5; Diod. 29.9.

²⁶ Livy 37.49.7–8.

received except by consent of the Roman magistrate in Greece,²⁷ which was normal practice; in other words, the war would soon start up again in earnest, and, as usual, the terms of peace were to be negotiated on the spot, and then ratified later by the Senate.

The other reason for seeing the Aitolians just after the elections was to clear up the problem of the provinces for the new magistrates. If peace could not be made with the Aitolians, then one of the consuls would have to be assigned to Greece: the other was clearly going to have to go to Asia, for there was no sign by the time of the elections that the war there was close to a conclusion. It had been a difficult election,²⁸ but, once the Aitolian problem was seen to be a problem still, then both consuls had to go east. There seems to have been no question of proroguing the *imperium* of L. Scipio. Lots were drawn, and M. Fulvius Nobilior, the plebeian consul, was assigned to Aitolia, and the patrician, Cn. Manlius Vulso, to Asia.²⁹ Since the Aitolian war was going to resume, Fulvius was assigned the army taken across to Greece by the propraetor A. Cornelius Mammula earlier in the year. In theory this army had gone 'to Aitolia', but it seems to have got no further south than Apollonia, its landing place. As a threat—and it had little other purpose other than to intimidate the Aitolians—it had completely failed. Fulvius was given 12,600 extra troops as reinforcements, plus the thirty ships which had been ordered to be built the year before, and which were presumably now ready. The reason for the ships was that he was assigned the island of Kephallenia as his province as well as Aitolia. The island was actually part of the Aitolian League, as well as a source of the raiders who had disrupted the Roman supply line, but it was clearly regarded as a separate political problem by the Senate. Fulvius would thus have an army of two legions plus 4,000 reinforcements, and two Italian *alae* plus 8,000 reinforcements, the usual cavalry contingents, who were to receive 600 extra horsemen, and thirty ships with crews and marines. His army would thus be somewhere in the region of 35,000 men, plus ships. This was roughly the size of the army which

²⁷ Livy 37.49.8.

²⁸ The elections: Livy 37.47.6–8; Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 135–136.

²⁹ This time the province treally was 'Asia'; Scipio's province had been 'Greece' according to Livy (37.1.7), though it is clear that the task was the war with Antiochos, as Cicero, *Philippic* 11.17 notes. Fulvius' province was specifically Aitolia and Kephallenia.

Glabrio had commanded against the Aitolians the year before. The same number of reinforcements was authorised for Vulso—4,000 Roman and 8,000 Italian infantry, with 600 cavalry—presumably on the assumption that Scipio had suffered considerable casualties. The Senate will have received information about the march towards the Hellespont during the summer and autumn, but the battle had not yet been fought when these extra forces were being authorised.³⁰ Aemilius' successor with the fleet in the Aegean was the praetor Q. Fabius Labeo. Other praetors went to the normal provinces, Sicily, Sardinia, Spain. The threat of invasion from the east was clearly no longer perceived, though the Sicilian praetor still had considerable forces at his command. Sicily and Sardinia were again ordered to provide double taxes for the armies in Greece and Asia.³¹

This was in November, so Fulvius could not reach Greece for several months. The Aitolians took advantage of the hiatus and began their offensive in December, immediately upon the expiry of the truce. King Amyntandros of the Athamanians had intrigued with his former subjects during the truce and he began by launching a swift campaign to recover his kingdom from its Macedonian occupiers, assisted by 1,000 Aitolian soldiers. The Aitolians then helped him to resist the counter-attack by King Philip, and went on to recover their own lost territories from the Macedonians: Dolopia, Aperantia and Amphilochia.³² They thus pushed Philip's army well to the north of the Aitolian heartland, provided a protective cordon around the north, and re-established contact with the Ionian Sea and with the city of Ambrakia, which had been isolated by Philip's occupation of Aperantia. Further, they could also now threaten Thessaly and Epeiros once more.

All this took place before the news of Antiochos' defeat at Magnesia arrived in Greece. The further news of the king's truce with Scipio was another blow,³³ and the Aitolians, having now demonstrated their willingness to fight and their ability to recover from defeat, as well as the popularity of their league in those areas subjected by

³⁰ Livy 37.50.1–7.

³¹ Livy 37.50.8–10.

³² Livy 37.49.6, 38.1.1–3; Pol. 21.25.1–7; Livy's statement that the Dolopes had never been Aitolian is wrong: they had been a member of the league since the 270s.

³³ Livy 38.3.6; Pol. 21.25.8.

Philip—for their recovery of those lands had been welcomed by the people there—but also having carefully limited their actions to recovering historic league members, solicited the intervention of Athens and Rhodes once more, and sent a new delegation to Italy to begin negotiations again.³⁴ They had also heard that their delegation's negotiations in Rome had failed, and that the new consul Fulvius with reinforcements was on his way.³⁵ Their assumption must have been that Rome would now modify the original demand for *deditio*, at least to the extent of spelling out its meaning. The news of the explicit terms, well short of anything approaching *deditio*, which Africanus had proposed to Antiochos, will surely have strengthened their resolve in this.

Before their envoys could reach Rome—they were kidnapped by the Epeirotes before they could leave Greece³⁶—Fulvius arrived. He crossed to Apollonia, probably as soon as he could, and so in March, bringing his reinforcements. He fell among the Epeirotes, who persuaded him that his target should be Ambrakia, a city originally Epeirate—it had been King Pyrrhos' capital—and one which they hoped to recover. So he marched south and laid siege to the city. And there he stuck for the whole of the summer, for the inhabitants, reinforced judiciously by groups of Aitolians, defended themselves with vigour and ingenuity. Philip joined in with a force commanded by his son Perseus, but his attempt to recover control of Amphilochia was prevented by the Aitolians. Also the Aitolians managed to ravage Akarnania, almost a traditional practice for them.³⁷

This is all rather odd. It does not seem to make much sense that a Roman army of more than 35,000 men should be held up by the siege of a single medium-sized city, whose total population cannot have been a third of that. Certainly one may admire the fight the Ambrakiots made, and certainly the Aitolians conducted themselves with determination and ingenuity, but the Roman army—helped also by a Macedonian force, and presumably by a force of Epeirotes as well—should have been able to do more than simply conduct an unsuccessful siege. It is possible that Fulvius was not very bright, and

³⁴ Livy 38.3.7–8; Amyntandros also sent off envoys to Rome and to Scipio in Asia (38.3.1–2).

³⁵ Pol. 21.25.9; Livy 38.3.6.

³⁶ Pol. 21.26.7.

³⁷ Pol. 21.26.19–28.18; Livy 38.3.9–7.13.

could not see the bigger picture; it is rather more likely that he had specific instructions to concentrate on the Ionian Sea coastlands. His province included Kephallenia, of course, the source of the anti-Roman 'pirates', and later he would spend almost as long reducing that island.

From the Aitolian point of view this was all most successful. Eventually they gained their point, and Fulvius spelled out precise terms of peace, rather than insisting on the *deditio*: an indemnity of five hundred talents of silver, Aitolia to become a Roman ally, Roman and Italian deserters to be surrendered, and any lands conquered by the Romans since the war began to be surrendered. Kephallenia was excepted from all this, since it was the object of special Roman concern.³⁸ These were rather better terms than had been suggested by Africanus the previous year: a halving of the indemnity from the original thousand talents, but above all the *deditio*'s vagueness and menace were set aside in favour of precision. The Aitolians will not have liked them much better, for the alliance placed them in a position of inferiority to Rome,³⁹ but they knew that, without allies, they would eventually be doomed. So to these terms the Aitolians finally agreed,⁴⁰ though they were modified somewhat by the Senate later in the process of ratification.⁴¹

Thus a large Roman army was pinned down in Greece for the whole of the campaigning season of 189. There seems little doubt that Rome could have achieved peace with Aitolia earlier by giving up that demand for *deditio*, but from the conduct of the Aitolian envoys in the Senate in November 190 it seems that their other demand for an alliance—which meant reducing Aitolia to a Roman client—would have also been as obdurately resisted at that time. Only when Aitolia had become convinced that it would lose a continued war, and when Rome could see no need to continue that war, was an agreement possible. And that point arrived once it became clear that Antiochos would be unable to resume the war in Asia. *That* was the achievement of the other consul of 189, Cn. Manlius Vulso.

³⁸ Livy 38.9.9–10.

³⁹ Justin 32.1.2 says flatly that the Aitolians lost their independence.

⁴⁰ Livy 38.9.11–12; Pol. 21.29.1–30.8.

⁴¹ Livy 38.11.1–9; Pol. 21.31.3–32.15; the variations were mainly elaborations of details, but Oiniadai was handed to the Akarnanians.

Vulso reached Ephesos in the spring, presumably in March, 189.⁴² There is no mention of the reinforcements which he had been authorised to levy, and it seems likely that he took none of them with him. The news of the victory at Magnesia was at Rome by January, two months after the reinforcements had been voted, but well before they were shipped out. It seems probable that a new decision was reached, that they were not required. Scipio, after all, had over 40,000 men and, since Antiochos had now been defeated, a larger army was no longer needed. Vulso also had no contact at the time with King Philip, so he will not have travelled through Macedon, and probably not through Greece. He took over Scipio's army, and it was this force he commanded in that campaign.

Vulso arrived during the truce with Antiochos. He faced the problem of commanding and controlling an army for perhaps a year, with nothing to do, and at the same time being prepared for a possible renewal of the war. His province being 'Asia', he had, even before he arrived, devised a programme of activity. Indeed, his swift arrival, and his immediate announcement of a campaign against the Galatians, suggests more than a mere consular initiative by Vulso himself. Neither the Galatians nor the Kappadokians had been mentioned in the truce terms, though they had contingents with Antiochos in the battle. No doubt Antiochos and his envoys had assumed that they were included in the truce as Antiochos' allies, but the Romans had now decided otherwise, though whether they had deliberately omitted them at the time of the discussions is not clear. Certainly both Scipios were subtle and ruthless enough to do so, and Vulso arrived determined to exploit the loophole. But concealed within the consul's intention to mount a Galatian campaign was another purpose: to so conduct himself and his army that *Antiochos* would be rendered incapable of resuming the war. Needless to say, no explicit instructions are known, and none can be seen in the available sources,⁴³ but they are implied in the conduct of Vulso during the spring and summer.⁴⁴ In the background were two other events, being pursued

⁴² Livy 38.12.2.

⁴³ The possibility of a Galatian war had been envisaged before Vulso left Rome: Livy 37.51.10.

⁴⁴ Vulso was criticised after the war for waging war on the Galatians without authorisation (Livy 38.45.4, 46.1-15), in a senatorial speech for once in defence—rather late—of the 'Gauls'.

simultaneously with the Asian campaign, the Aitolian war and the peace negotiations with Antiochos' envoys in Rome, which were clearly affected by the events in Asia, and which also had an effect on these events.

Antiochos had had perhaps three months in which to prepare for a new summer campaign for 189, if there was to be one. He had gone to Syria after arranging for the truce, leaving his son Seleukos in command in Asia.⁴⁵ Seleukos had his headquarters at Apamea-Kelainai, but he controlled the Maiandros valley as far west as Antiocheia-on-Maiandros, a well-fortified city at the junction of the main river and the Morsynos.⁴⁶ Seleukos had an army of unknown size under his command, but it was obviously not a negligible force, and it is evident that Antiochos' purpose during the winter was to gather up more troops from the rest of his kingdom in order to continue the fight if the terms organised at Rome proved to be too severe for his taste. For the present, however, Seleukos was clearly outnumbered by Vulso's forces. With a truce in force, Vulso could not risk a fight with Seleukid troops, but he was able to use his greater numbers to pick his way through the complex politics of Asia.

The route Vulso's army took towards his Galatian enemy was roundabout, to say the least, and can only be explained by the need to avoid a collision with Seleukos' forces, but it must also have been arranged with Seleukos' agreement.⁴⁷ Vulso set off first from Ephesos southwards, having persuaded Attalos, Eumenes' brother and regent, to help out with a thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry.⁴⁸ He crossed the Maiandros river, established friendly relations with the important city of Alabanda, and then encamped his army opposite Antiocheia-on-Maiandros, where Seleukos was. Vulso there received a supply of grain which Livy says was owed to the Romans by an agreement with Scipio. This agreement is not elsewhere referred to and was not part of the truce terms; it was presumably a later agreement, made during the truce. Seleukos did, however, refuse to supply

⁴⁵ As appears from their respective situations when Vulso began his campaign.

⁴⁶ Livy 38.13.5; Pliny, *NH*, 5.108; Cohen, *Hellenistic Settlements*, 250–253.

⁴⁷ I have discussed this campaign in detail in 'The Campaign of Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia Minor', *Anatolian Studies* 54, 1995, 23–42; cf. also Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.184–185.

⁴⁸ Livy 38.12.8; Attalos' younger brother Athenaios brought another 1,000 infantry and 300 cavalry later on; this force of 2,800 is substantially greater than that contributed by Eumenes to the army at Magnesia.

grain for the Attalid troops who accompanied the Romans, and Vulso had to accept that.⁴⁹

Vulso then moved further south, and threaded his way through the lands of several cities. Those which were Seleukid he carefully avoided. Of those which were independent, some were welcoming and some were hostile; the latter suffered for their hostility, and paid for it by indemnities in food and silver which were used to maintain the army in supplies and pay.⁵⁰ At the borders of Pamphylia, which was Seleukid territory, Vulso turned north into the lands of the independent Pisidian cities. He encountered Seleukos again east of Apameia-Kelainai, and was allowed to send his sick men to the city, or perhaps more likely, through it and on to Roman-controlled territory, and also divested himself of surplus equipment. Seleukos also provided guides for the next stage of the march, which was therefore through Seleukid territory. The army was in fact guided away from Seleukid cities, and marched in easy stages until it reached the borders of the territory of the westernmost Galatian tribe, the Tolistobogii.⁵¹

These were allies of Antiochos, as were the other Galatian tribes, the Tektosages and the Trokmi. Yet neither Antiochos nor Seleukos was able to do anything to assist them. Vulso's campaign march had effectively destroyed any authority they might have over the Galatians, for Seleukos had been compelled first to provide food, then guides, to their Roman and Attalid enemies, and had completely failed to block Vulso's advance, either by military action or by the terms of the truce—nor was any Seleukid help forthcoming in the crisis of the invasion of their territories. The existence of the truce had prevented Seleukos from taking any hostile action, and so long as Vulso did not violate the strict letter of the truce himself Seleukos was also

⁴⁹ Livy 38.12.8–13; Livy's text here is a mixture of a political narrative and a travelogue, with the seams showing.

⁵⁰ Cf. for this matter of food and pay, Grainger, 'Campaign', 28.

⁵¹ Livy 38.13.11–15.15. Vulso has the reputation of looting his way through Asia, a campaign of destruction and barbarism. In fact he collected 275 talents and 60,000 *medimnoi* of grain, enough to pay and feed his army for about a month. He could scarcely expect to be supplied from Italy or the western Mediterranean while in the middle of Asia, and the Roman Senate did not send supplies of money. If he was to campaign he had to live off the country, and neither Seleukos nor Attalos could provide supplies. One of Vulso's purposes, though, was probably to use up as much of Seleukos' store of supplies as possible, for this would prevent Antiochos from reinforcing his son's forces from the troops in Syria and the east.

helpless. In addition, the grain agreement had no doubt depleted the reserves of food which Seleukos held, and this prevented him from maintaining a large force at Apamea-Kelainai, as a result of which he did not have the force available to block Vulso's path even if he had wanted to or had the inclination to. In the end he had been compelled also to permit Vulso to march through Seleukid territory to attack Seleukid allies.

Vulso went on to win sanguinary victories over two of the tribes,⁵² who could not then be expected to contribute any further forces to their erstwhile ally, even if they had wanted to. Vulso's march had, in the process, and surely deliberately, also undermined the whole political foundation of Seleukid rule in Asia. Antiochos had been shown to be wholly unable to defend his allies; the Romans had shown that they could march an army right into the centre of Asia, and could deal on an individual basis with a whole variety of independent cities and states. Such pretensions as Antiochos had to act as protector to these small states had therefore vanished. By the time he had finished the Galatian campaign, in mid-autumn, Seleukos and his small army at Apameia-Kelainai had been isolated, and this was the single remnant of Seleukid power, surrounded by states from Alabanda to the Halys river, who had made separate arrangements with Rome.

Vulso's campaign ended at about the same time that Fulvius reached an agreement with Aitolia.⁵³ And while each had been conducting a very visible, conspicuous campaign, the real settlement had been worked out at Rome. The news of the victory at Magnesia reached Rome more or less simultaneously with the arrival of King Eumenes and the Rhodian delegates,⁵⁴ and presumably the Smyrnaean delegates arrived at the same time since they had all set off together.⁵⁵ Antipatros and Zeuxis, Antiochos' negotiators, arrived as well,⁵⁶ and other delegates arrived later, men from the various cities of the Asian coast.⁵⁷ It was apparently not until early summer—say, in May—

⁵² Livy 38.16.1–27.9; Pol. 21.33, 37.1–39.14; the Trokmi, the easternmost of the three parts of the Galatians, were not attacked.

⁵³ The synchronism is actually the end of the war in Galatia and Fulvius' invasion of Kephallenia: Livy 38.28.5.

⁵⁴ Livy 37.52.1–2.

⁵⁵ Livy 37.55.2.

⁵⁶ Livy 37.52.2.

⁵⁷ Livy 37.55.4; Pol. 21.24.2.

that the real and public discussions began,⁵⁸ but it is reasonable to assume that several more private negotiations had gone on before then. It was in the interest of the Senate to await the results, or at least the early results, of the work of Vulso in Asia. His campaign will have got under way during April, and by May, it will have become clear in Rome that Seleukos and Antiochos were quite unable to interrupt his progress into the interior. No doubt the news of his progress was made available to Antipatros and Zeuxis, even if they did not receive regular bulletins from Seleukos and Antiochos.

It was therefore clear that Antiochos was going to have to accept the Taurus line as his future boundary. Any arguments his delegates might have prepared to the contrary were undermined by the news of Vulso's work.⁵⁹ Therefore the negotiations could concentrate on the disposition of the spoils.⁶⁰ The Senate added some clauses to the basic agreement made with Antiochos in Asia, concerning reductions in the numbers of ships and elephants, and restrictions on the mercenaries he could recruit, none of these details would be serious limitations on his power; in particular, there were no provisions for enforcement beyond the immediate future. Antipatros was able to accept them, and to signify that to the Senate.⁶¹ This aspect of the discussions need not have taken very long, and must have happened before the details of the disposition of the surrendered lands were discussed, for the Senate and its allies would need some idea of what was available before beginning their deliberations.

Antipatros and Zeuxis would also be interested to see if Antiochos' enemies became so greedy as to fall out with each other. A resumption of the war was not outside Antiochos' calculations, and his envoys will have had instructions, as a matter of course, to see if the enemy alliance could be broken. With Aitolia still fighting, another ally, particularly one in Asia, might make it possible to deal with Vulso's army when the armistice ended—which could be at almost any moment, if either side wished to denounce it. Vulso's army stranded in the middle of Asia must have been a very tempting

⁵⁸ Characterised in the usual way by speeches by Eumenes (Livy 37.52.3–53.18; Pol. 22.19.1–21.1), and a Rhodian (Livy 37.54.3–28; Pol. 21.22.5–23.13).

⁵⁹ No arguments by Zeuxis and Antipatros are cited by either Polybios or Livy, who merely record them as 'begging for mercy' (Livy 37.55.2; Pol. 21.24.2).

⁶⁰ Livy 37.55.5–7; Pol. 21.24.6–8; these are summaries only; the full text was much longer and more detailed.

⁶¹ Livy 37.53.3; Pol. 21.24.3.

target. And in fact the Rhodians did become greedy. They claimed that the city of Soloi in Kilikia, because it was a Dorian colony, and perhaps even one of their own, should become part of the Asian territories which they were gaining. Antipatros quickly pointed out that it was on Antiochos' side of the Taurus, and the Senate slapped the Rhodians down.⁶² It was not, perhaps, exactly the dispute that Antipatros had hoped for in the way of disagreement, but it was a symptom. The Senate resolved the problem, and put off the moment of decision, by assigning a group of ten commissioners to deal with all the disputes on the spot in Asia.⁶³ This also put the problem into the future, when it would be hoped that Antiochos would have accepted and ratified the peace treaty.

The Roman fleet command had gone to the praetor Q. Fabius Labeo, who took over from L. Aemilius Regillus at about the same time that Vulso arrived at Ephesos. It seems that Aemilius had brought at least some of his ships into Ephesos, which thus acquired the Roman fleet in place of that of Antiochos. Livy remarks that Labeo was looking for something to do, perhaps stimulated to emulation by Vulso's work on land, and the Aegean had now become an area with no enemies: Polyxenidas' ships were laid up at Patara. He tried to intervene in a local war in Crete, apparently with little success.⁶⁴ He also, a little later, and probably after the news of the conclusion of peace at Rome had arrived in the east, sent three ships to accept the surrender of the garrisons Antiochos had put into Ainos and Maroneia.⁶⁵ Labeo's real achievement, though, was to maintain the Roman naval presence in the Aegean and among the Asian ports during the long year and a half between the armistice after Magnesia and the final ratification by Antiochos. It was the constant reminder of Roman power, by the presence of Vulso's army and Labeo's fleet, which lay behind the work of the ten commissioners.

⁶² Livy 37.56.7–10; Pol. 21.24.10–15; presumably the claim to Soloi also implied Rhodian hegemony over the coasts between Rhodes and Soloi, that is, Pamphylia and Kilikia Tracheia.

⁶³ Pol. 21.24.5; Livy 37.55.7 names the envoys. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 137, comments on the supposed party allegiances, but the most telling aspect is the collective lack of experience of eastern matters. Only one man had been involved in eastern affairs in the past—P. Cornelius Lentulus—and that as far back as 196. Rather than seeing the list in party terms, it might be better to see it as a deliberate senatorial move to bring fresh and unprejudiced minds to the difficult matters of distributing the spoils and judging between rival claims.

⁶⁴ Livy 37.60.1–6.

⁶⁵ Livy 37.60.7.

This ratification took time. The agreement made by Antipatros at Rome took place late in the summer, and the final terms must have been with Antiochos by the autumn at the latest, which was also when Vulso finally withdrew from Galatia to Ephesos.⁶⁶ It was also the time when the Aitolians finally accepted the terms Fulvius put to them. In other words, ratification could have taken place well before the end of 189; yet Antiochos did not do so until the late spring of the next year.⁶⁷ Once again, a long delay needs to be explained.

One factor was, no doubt, the continued fighting in Greece, where Fulvius did not finish his campaign until the late winter, when he finally compelled the surrender of the small city of Same in Kephallenia and so completed his conquest of that island.⁶⁸ There was then a flare-up of trouble in the Peloponnese in which Fulvius was also involved. These disturbances may well have fuelled the hope in Antiochos' mind that a renewal of war might still be possible. But another, and perhaps more important, factor was surely Antiochos' distaste for the whole peace agreement, which, after all, involved him surrendering, after one defeat on land, a large and rich province which he had been to a great deal of trouble in the past to secure, and another (Thrace) which he had only recently conquered. And the news that most of Asia was destined to go to Eumenes cannot have made the pill any the less bitter, or easier to swallow. Then there were the extra terms which the Senate had added to the original agreement made with Africanus: surrender of all his elephants, surrender of all but ten of his warships, a prohibition of sailing these few ships west of Cape Kalykadnos, a prohibition on his hiring mercenaries.⁶⁹ On top of these there was the financial clause; Antiochos had to hand over 2,500 talents of silver before ratification was completed; it may have been difficult to collect that quantity of money, which was about a year's tax revenue for the kingdom. It was also necessary before ratification to evacuate his soldiers from inland Asia, and this was a difficult task in the winter with the Taurus passes blocked by snow. Some civilians will also have wished to leave, and Antiochos had obligations to assist them. There will have been anquished discussions at Antiochos' court during the winter. Probably,

⁶⁶ Livy 38.27.1–9.

⁶⁷ Livy 38.39.1.

⁶⁸ Livy 38.28.5–30.1.

⁶⁹ Livy 38.38.2–17; Pol. 21.42.1–27.

as with most political decisions, the delay was due to a combination of many or of all these factors.

Arrangements had to be made for the preliminary delivery of the silver, and for the mutual oath-taking which it was decided was to be the form of ratification. Vulso took his army to Apameia-Kelainai 'at the beginning of spring';⁷⁰ this had been Seleukos' headquarters the previous year, and Vulso's occupation is a sign that the Seleukid army had been withdrawn. It was also to be the delivery point for the surrendered elephants. But first, and most important, there was the silver. This, in fact, was the real moment of ratification, for if Antiochos decided not to ratify, and thus to renew the war, he would not surrender this enormous sum of money, which would be enough to finance any new campaign he decided on, at least for a year. So if he did hand it over, he was signalling that he was accepting the Senate's revised terms. For the hand-over Vulso had to go to Pamphylia, where the metal had been landed.⁷¹ Even now there was a problem, for the officer in command of the Seleukid garrison at Perge in Pamphylia refused to evacuate the city without specific orders from the king. Vulso was sensible enough to give him thirty days for these orders to arrive, and then he marched away to Apameia,⁷² perhaps relieved that he would not be on hand at the end of the thirty-day period. It was small items like that at Perge which might disrupt the whole process. Pamphylia was one of the disputed elements in the treaty, since on the Seleukid side it was claimed that the hills north of Pamphylia were the real Taurus line and therefore that Pamphylia should be Antiochos'.⁷³

At Apameia the definitive text of the peace terms had arrived, with the commissioners, and there Vulso swore to it. One of the commissioners, the consular Q. Minucius Thermus, was sent to Antioch-in-Syria to get the equivalent oath from Antiochos. The elephants were delivered to Vulso, who gave them to Eumenes who, one hopes, was grateful for the responsibility of stabling and feeding them. Orders were sent to Labeo to burn the Seleukid ships, fifty of them, at Patara, which he did.⁷⁴ All this was sensibly done

⁷⁰ Livy 38.37.8.

⁷¹ Livy 38.37.9; Pol. 21.40.8-11.

⁷² Livy 38.37.10-11; Pol. 21.41.1-5.

⁷³ Livy 38.39.17.

⁷⁴ Livy 38.39.1-6; Pol. 21.43.1-3.

before the detailed work on the status of the various cities and areas of the surrendered territory was done by Vulso and the commissioners, a task in which Antiochos had no say. Antiochos was thus pinned down to peace before the contentious business between the allies was allowed to begin. Antiochos, at last, had admitted that the war was lost.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

RESULTS

One modern historian, perhaps only referring to one part of his kingdom, has commented that 'Antiochos did not lose very much' as a result of his defeat by the Romans.¹ Perhaps a little callous and Rome-centred, this judgment has elements of truth about it. Antiochos had put a great deal of effort into establishing his rule in Asia Minor: he had sent Akhaïos to recover it from Attalos I in 223, almost his first political act after his accession; he had reconquered it from Akhaïos in a war lasting four years, 216–213; he had repeatedly visited the land, dealing with its innumerable intricate and awkward problems, its cities, its kingdoms, its petty disputes, and always there were more to attend to.² To have got rid of these never-ending problems was surely a considerable relief.³

Further, as was shown twenty years later, in military terms the Seleukid kingdom had not lost a great deal: Antiochos IV in 166 could still field, in a celebratory parade, an army of almost 50,000 men,⁴ to whom must be added those who were still on guard and in garrison throughout the kingdom, from Kilikia and Palestine to eastern Iran. Antiochos IV must therefore be assumed to have had at least as many soldiers as his father despite having lost the services of the men of Asia liable to be mobilised, who had probably numbered between 10,000 and 15,000 men in 190.⁵ In geopolitical terms the barrier of the Taurus mountains might be considered a more effective boundary than the porous, city-rich coast of Ionia and Aiolis and Karia, with all their busy ports and restless populations.⁶ Certainly

¹ B. Levick, *Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor*, Oxford, 1968.

² Cf., generally, Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities*.

³ Cicero.

⁴ Athenaios 5.194 (= Pol. 30.25.1–11).

⁵ See chapter 15, note 26.

⁶ That the Taurus was the new boundary is stated in the treaty (Livy 37.38.4); it is discussed by A. H. McDonald, 'The Treaty of Apamea (188 B.C.)' *JRS* 57, 1967, 1–8, M. Sordi, 'Il confine del Tauro e dell'Halys e il sacrificio in Ilio', *Contributi dell'Istituto di Storia Antica* 8, 1982, 136–149, A. Giovannini, 'La Clause Territoriale de la Paix d'Apamée', *Athenaeum* 60, 1982, 224–236.

there was no serious apprehension of any invasion by land from Asia during the rest of the Seleukid dynasty's period of power. The real danger still came from the south and the east, from Egypt and the Parthians, but not from the Attalid Eumenes II and his successors, nor even from the Roman province of Asia after its establishment in 129. It could be argued, therefore, that Antiochos III's defeat in 190 was by no means a disaster for his kingdom, and that the loss of Asia was paradoxically a benefit. It might also be argued that the prohibition on maintaining more than ten warships, with which he could not operate west of the mouth of the Kalykadnos river in Kilikia, was also a benefit, in that it substantially reduced the costs of government; any attempt to compete with Rome at sea was probably doomed anyway.⁷

Yet it is reasonably certain that the Seleukids would not have seen it at all in such a light. The loss of Asia was decisive in that it reduced the Seleukid kingdom from one of two great powers in the Mediterranean world to one of half a dozen secondary powers—though no doubt the predominant one amongst them—and that cannot have been a pleasant process to go through. From the time that Manlius Vulso marched his army back to Rome, leaving King Eumenes as the lord of Asia Minor, Rome was clearly the one and only superpower in the known world. All problems had thenceforth to be referred to the Senate. The Seleukid king was now of no more account than Ptolemy or Eumenes or the Carthaginian republic.

The Roman commissioners handed over most of the territory taken from Antiochos III to Eumenes II, reserving some for Rhodes, and detaching many of the cities along the coast into independence.⁸ The result was a swollen Attalid kingdom, and a multitude of minor problems which had continually to be considered at Rome. These had been the issues with which Antiochos had been dealing before Magnesia; if the Romans did not like it, it was their own fault.

⁷ A. H. McDonald and F. W. Walbank, 'The Treaty of Apamea (188 B.C.): the Naval Clauses', *JRS* 59, 1969, 30–39.

⁸ Pol. 21.45.12; Livy 37.39.5–17; cf. D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, Princeton, 1950, 108–109; E. Bickerman, 'Notes sur Polybe, 1: Le statut des villes d'Asie après la paix d'Apamée', *REG*, 1937, 217–239; on the treaty as a whole, cf. Bevan, *House*, 2.113–114; Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.185–193; Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 639–643 (and other references); Errington, *CAH* (2) 286–289; G. Le Rider, 'Les Clauses Financières des Traités de 189 et 188', *BCH* 116, 1992, 267–277.

The suspicion with which Rome had come to regard Antiochos was only momentarily stilled by his defeat. A royal hostage, in the person of Antiochos III's second son Antiochos, was kept at Rome all during the rest of the reign of Antiochos III, and after Seleukos IV showed signs of independent activity, he was replaced by Seleukos' own son Demetrios who stayed in Italy all through the reign of Antiochos IV, the former hostage. The escape of Demetrios in 162 brought a high-powered embassy from the Senate to Syria which set about deliberately reducing Demetrios' military power, until he was assassinated by an enraged Seleukid subject. After all, in terms of territory, Antiochos III and Seleukos IV still had a huge kingdom, stretching from the Mediterranean to Central Asia, and the Ptolemies were always apprehensive of the threat of conquest. But the Ptolemaic government knew well enough that the union of the Seleukid and Ptolemaic kingdoms was wholly unacceptable to Rome. When Antiochos IV stood victorious at the gates of Alexandria in 167, with a Seleukid governor of Egypt already appointed, the intervention of Rome sent him immediately marching home. This was another legacy of Magnesia and the subsequent peace.

The peace terms negotiated at Apamea were only observed in gross terms: the Seleukid fleet at Patara was burnt, the Seleukid army evacuated Asia, and the surrendered lands were delivered over. These were terms which Antiochos III could scarcely avoid complying with. In the smaller details, however, there was no attempt either by Rome or Antiochos to put several of them into effect. Of the five men named to be handed over to Rome, Thoas was certainly surrendered, but lived to be released and to become Aitolian *strategos* again twice more, in 181/180 and 173/172;⁹ Hannibal was not given up, but was desultorily hounded by Rome until he committed suicide in Bithynia in 183;¹⁰ the fate of the other three men named is unknown, but if Antiochos failed to surrender one man, he might well have failed to hand over these as well. The fleet at Patara may have been burnt, but the fleet which served under Hannibal seems not to have been pursued, and Antiochos IV had a substantial naval force by 170, which could well have included vessels built for use in 191–192. The restrictions on recruiting mer-

⁹ Pol. 28.4.12; Klaffenbach in *IG IX.1.li*.

¹⁰ Livy 39.51.1–12.

cenaries were soon ignored or forgotten, and Antiochos IV had Mysians, Thracians and Galatians in his Daphne parade.¹¹ Of course, the death of Antiochos III in 187 brought such arrangements legally to an end from the Seleukid point of view, but Rome's power was such that it was probably deemed sensible to observe the main elements of the treaty even after the king's death; no doubt this was one of the main reasons for holding on to a royal hostage for so long. Seleukos IV was made joint king with his father by 189; presumably this took place after the oath-taking which was the method used for the treaty ratification; had Seleukos been king at the time of the oath-taking he would have had to be included in it. Since he had not been so included, the legal force of the treaty ended when Antiochos III died—at least in Seleukid eyes.¹² Seleukos IV and Antiochos IV were thus quite at liberty to recruit where they wished, to build ships and collect elephants, or to fail to implement the details of the treaty. So Antiochos IV had forty elephants as well as mercenaries in the Daphne parade,¹³ and had used his fleet in the war with Ptolemy. The payment of the indemnity was notoriously completed five years late—another of these 'details'. There is no record of Roman complaints about Seleukid tardiness, presumably for lack of legal grounds: Antiochos IV's exuberant apologies when he paid the final instalment were thus ironic.¹⁴

Rome had succeeded in defeating and reducing all possible competitors. The indirect rule system installed by Flamininus in Greece was completed by the subjugation of the Aitolians, and was in effect extended into Asia. But the use of secondary powers as Roman surrogates, such as the Achaian League and the Attalid kings, was never satisfactory. Within fifteen years it was deemed necessary to destroy Macedon, and from then on no similar power could trust the word of the Roman Senate more than temporarily. The Greek system lasted only to 146, when the north African system also collapsed. Rome was compelled to assume direct rule in all these areas, and this was extended to Asia soon after. In other words, the system of political control installed jointly by Scipio Africanus, Flamininus, and

¹¹ Pol. 30.25.3 and 5.

¹² The status of the treaty is discussed by E. Paltiel, 'The Treaty of Apamea and the later Seleucids', *Antichthon* 13, 1979, 30–41.

¹³ Pol. 30.25.11.

¹⁴ Livy 42.6.7.

Manlius Vulso between 202 and 188 was successful for not more than a long generation, about forty years. However, it may well have been necessary as a preliminary to direct rule. The Aitolians' resistance to the act of *deditio* was mirrored forty years later by the Achaians' defiance in 146. The prospect of ruling such states directly was one which Romans must have considered in the 190s, and had then refused to undertake. Direct rule would have required such enormous numbers of troops—for rebellions would be certain to erupt—that Rome would have been drained. Only after the north Italian and Spanish problems were mainly solved could troops be spared for garrisoning and directly controlling annexed territories.

All this was not inevitable, however. Indirect control of Greece could have been maintained in conjunction with Antiochos III. He had offered, in every contact he had with Roman officials and the Roman Senate from 196 onwards, an alliance, which amounted to a joint world-rule, with the mutual boundary at Thrace and the Aegean. The alliance he repeatedly suggested would be on the basis of a mutual guarantee of territories, which would leave Greece to Rome, while Antiochos kept Thrace and Asia. The senators could not, or would not, see the advantages of such an arrangement, but only took account of their fears. For thirty years they had lived in the shadow of other great powers, Carthage and Macedon, who had been deeply hostile. Having survived their attempts to destroy the Roman commonwealth in Italy—and Rome was still fighting against the old attempts by the Gauls to be free to raid into Italy—the Senate could not conceive of another great power being interested in anything else. But such evidence as survives suggests that Antiochos had no interest in Italy, nor even in Greece. Rome would not see that.

Rome was encouraged in this view by self-interested allies. The Achaians were unconcerned about Antiochos, but did want Roman support for their ambitions in the Peloponnese; so they declared war before the Romans, to put them under obligation—and this was successful, just as it had been for the Athenians in 200, when the opponent was Philip of Macedon. King Eumenes was, on the other hand, extremely concerned about Antiochos, and was even keener to see him embroiled with Rome. The reluctance of both great powers to go to war is clear, and the readiness of their clients for them to do so—the Aitolians as well as the Achaians and Eumenes—is just as clear. The fact that war resulted, despite the reluctance of the king

and the Senate, suggests that they were largely unable to control their clients. The war was produced by the clients, not the principals.

The result was an unnecessary war, and the fatal weakening of the Seleukid kingdom. Antiochos' retreat to the Taurus boundary after a single defeat was a recognition by him, not that Rome would necessarily be victorious over him if he went on fighting, but that a war between the two powers would be mutually ruinous. It is worth considering how the war might have continued if Antiochos had rejected the chance to make peace with Rome after Magnesia. The Roman army was not able to continue its campaign for some time: it was December and winter quarters beckoned. So Antiochos had some months to gather a new army. In the spring he could have brought up an army of at least 50,000 men to fight again, and he would have retained the alliances of the Galatians and Kappadokia. Rome would have to send another army to reinforce that which had fought at Magnesia, or possibly to replace it with anew one. This was already a difficult political issue at Rome; recruiting a new army for service far away for an indefinite period would not be popular. The new consul Cn. Manlius Vulso had to fight his way eastwards against a numerous and professional Seleukid army, not against the small cities and Galatian tribes which in fact he did fight. No doubt Vulso's victims of 189 would be happy to help resist the Roman advance.

There is no sign that Vulso had the professional military expertise needed for such a task. The war would be one of sieges, with the Romans fighting their way east city by city along the Royal Road towards the Taurus. It had taken Antiochos four years to defeat Akhaios fighting along that road in the other direction in 216–213, and it had then taken him a year to take the city of Sardis. The Roman fleet could control the Aegean Sea, and perhaps to mount a further offensive along the coast of southern Asia Minor, but this was not a prospect likely to appeal to the Rhodians, who might attempt to pull out of the war. Meanwhile the Aitolians will have fought on, as they did into 188, encouraged and supplied by Antiochos. Risings against Roman power in Greece and the Roman-occupied parts of Asia could be expected. And Rome was still fighting in Spain and North Italy at the time.

The Romans could certainly count on allies: the Attalids, no doubt, perhaps Philip of Macedon, and they might finally resort to calling

in Ptolemy as well. But the Aitolian war, given encouragement, would certainly flare up again—as it did after the ending of the truce—and the Achaians were thoroughly unhappy about Roman domination. The attitude of Carthage would certainly be a problem in such circumstances. Antiochos could well afford to send Hannibal home at last, perhaps even in the fleet he had commanded. So the Roman alliance system, which had stood the test of a short war, was not guaranteed to last through a long war. The first Roman reverse of any seriousness—and in a long war there would have been some—would encourage defections. Above all, the war would have been both lengthy and expensive in money and manpower. And in the end, whatever the overall result of the fighting, Rome would still have had to make peace with the Seleukid kingdom, which would still exist, largely intact. One cannot imagine Roman armies in the early second century B.C. fighting their way as far east as Babylonia and Iran. But above all else, the war would have lasted a long time and would have consumed many lives, Roman as well as Greek.

Antiochos' decision to sue for peace after Magnesia was therefore an act of great statesmanship. He had the choice of fighting on, with a good chance of making the conflict so difficult for the Romans that a peace more satisfactory to him than the Apamea treaty might in the end be arranged—always ignoring the destruction of lives and property which would occur. His decision for peace was not inevitable after the defeat at Magnesia, nor was it altogether a submission to Roman force. It was a considered response to the new political situation he now found in Asia. For it would be clear to him that, unless he could make a decisive break from direct contact with Rome, wars between the two great powers would break out again. An agreed boundary somewhere in Asia with Roman and Seleukid forces close to each other would certainly produce another war sooner or later; this, after all, had been the pattern of Seleukid-Ptolemaic relations for over a century, involving many wars, two of which Antiochos himself had fought. The truth of such a relationship was demonstrated in the next fifteen years by the fate of Macedon.

By accepting Roman peace terms, Antiochos therefore broke off the contact he had recently achieved with Rome, and Rome responded by handing over the surrendered territory to Eumenes, minus the Greek cities of the coast. Even if no hint of this intention had been supplied to Antiochos by the Scipios, he could have assumed it or something like it, for Rome had shown no interest in acquiring direct

rule in Greece in the pre-war negotiations, and have still less interest in ruling in Asia. The policy of 'liberation' which Flaminius, and so Rome, had pursued in Greece, and had used as the Roman *casus belli* in the current war, could be assumed to be applied in Asia as well, and to more cities than the three arguably at issue.

The war, and the peace treaty which followed it, was a Roman answer to Antiochos' request for an alliance, which would have divided the world between the two states. The peace treaty produced a slightly different division of the world, this time with a large space inserted between the two major states. In a sense, therefore, Antiochos' original policy had been implemented. The treaty certainly eliminated the possibility of another war between the two principals, and this was presumably partly the intention—and they never did fight each other again. But it cannot have been the Roman intention to destroy the Seleukid state. The continued existence of the former Roman enemies, the Macedonian kingdom, Carthage, the Aitolian and Achaian Leagues, demonstrated otherwise. Nor could the collapse of the Seleukid state have been either intended or predicted. The Seleukid state was not killed by a single lost battle against Rome in the far west of its territories in 190; it committed suicide by means of internecine conflict within the royal family a generation later. After 188 there were still two major territorial powers in the Mediterranean world, separated by Greece and Asia Minor.

APPENDIX 1

ROMAN ARMY NUMBERS

Some confusion regarding the sizes of ancient armies is inevitable, but the problem of the size of the Roman expeditionary force in Greece and Asia in 192–188 is unusually awkward. This is due to apparently directly conflicting testimony by Livy and Appian, with possible help from Polybios.

The army which fought Antiochos was the same in both Greece and Asia. It began as a force commanded by the praetor M. Baebius Tamphilus, which was at first stationed in Bruttium in 192. At that point it consisted of two Roman legions, 15,000 Italian infantry, and 800 cavalry.¹ If the legions were 5,200 infantry strong, as is supposed at this period, with 300 cavalry, the total force which Baebius commanded was 25,400 infantry and 1,400 cavalry.

Baebius was later ordered to march his force to Tarentum and Brundisium, and was given permission to cross to Macedonia if the situation required it.² He was still in Italy when, after the elections for 191 (held early), he was given definitive orders to cross to Epeiros, and to make his winter camp at Apollonia.³ On the reasonable assumption that he took all his force with him, he therefore landed at Apollonia with 25,400 infantry and 1,400 cavalry. We have no warrant for assuming he did anything else, or took anything less than his whole force.

In the meantime the consul for 192, L. Quinctius Flamininus, had been instructed to make a new levy, of 4,000 Roman and 6,000 Italian infantry, and 300 Roman and 400 Italian cavalry.⁴ Later in the year these troops were allocated to the consul who won Greece in the lot, which turned out to be M'. Acilius Glabrio. He was also given command of the Baebian force at Apollonia.⁵

¹ Livy 35.20.12.

² Livy 35.23.5.

³ Livy 35.24.7.

⁴ Livy 35.24.7.

⁵ Livy 36.1.8–9.

It is at this point that confusion enters. Appian reports that Glabrio crossed to Apollonia with '2,000 cavalry, 20,000 infantry, and some elephants'.⁶ These figures (with the elephants now said to number 15) are also stated by Livy, and this is assumed to be based on a lost passage of Polybios.⁷ But this repetition by two sources, written centuries apart, and hypothetically assigned to a third, does not amount to a certainty. And the figures bear no relation at all to any other numbers already provided by Livy. '20,000 infantry', for example, is not a figure which can be derived from anything allocated to either Baebius or Glabrio, nor can it be subdivided into any known Roman army formation. By stretching the issue it might apply to two legions and about 10,000 Italians, but the cavalry figure is far too high for such a force.

One solution is to cut down the force which Baebius had taken to Apollonia, so that Glabrio may be said to have brought over his own reinforcements plus the rest of Baebius' army, supposedly left at Brundisium. The detachment of Ap. Claudius Pulcher which was sent by Baebius to Thessaly in the early winter is enlisted in this case. Pulcher had a force of 2,000 infantry, according to Appian, though Livy does not venture a figure.⁸ From this it has been supposed that Baebius had only a small force with him, otherwise he would have sent a larger force with Pulcher. But this presupposes that Pulcher was intended to fight Antiochos' force of 10,000-plus soldiers. This is not the case, as is shown by the fact that Pulcher carefully stayed out of the way until Antiochos had left Thessaly.⁹ His force was, therefore, only a fraction of the total force which Baebius had brought across. If Pulcher's detachment was all, or even the larger part, of his whole force, Baebius would have commanded it himself. So a much larger force remained at Apollonia, under Baebius' immediate command. And this supports the assumption that Baebius had brought his whole force of 26,800 with him.

(There was also another Roman detachment in Greece at this time, the 500 infantry who were defeated in the fight at Delion and at Salganeus. If these men came from Baebius' force—they may have come from the fleet—this would add weight to the above argu-

⁶ App. *Syr.* 17.

⁷ Livy 36.14.1 (and Sage's note 3 on pages 196–197 of the Loeb edition).

⁸ App. *Syr.* 16; Livy 36.10.10–12.

⁹ Livy 36.10.13–14.

ment. The total of detachments would thus amount to ten per cent of Baebius' total force.)

So the real difficulty is with the force said to have accompanied Glabrio. Either Baebius did not take his full force with him to Apollonia, or the force Glabrio took across is wrong. Since it appears that Baebius' force was large, and that there is no real indication that Baebius had not taken all his force with him, it seems that the strange number Glabrio is credited with crossing with is wrong. What he took with him was the force raised by L. Flamininus: 10,000 infantry, and 700 cavalry.

So, in Thessaly and at Thermopylai, Glabrio commanded a maximum force of 35,400 infantry and 2,100 cavalry—though at the battle he will have had considerably less, due to detachments (facing Demetrias, Hypata, and Herakleia, for instance).

This was the army, less casualties, which L. Scipio took over in 190,¹⁰ and which marched into Asia during that year. He was also allocated as reinforcements, another 3,000 Roman and 5,000 Italian infantry, 100 Roman and 200 Italian cavalry,¹¹ and was further allowed to take on 5,000 volunteers as well.¹² He therefore had, in theory, 50,800 Roman and Italian soldiers under his command at Magnesia. This is before deducting casualties, deserters, sick, and any detachments, and before adding in the troops from the Achaian League, Eumenes, and volunteers from Greece who fought in the battle. These additions probably more than compensated for any losses. At Magnesia, Scipio will have commanded an army of at least 50,000 soldiers, and probably more.

¹⁰ Livy 37.2.2.

¹¹ Livy 37.2.3.

¹² Livy 37.4.3.

APPENDIX 2

THE PTOLEMAIC RAID ON ARADOS

The basis for the statement in Chapter 15 that a naval attack was made by Ptolemaic forces on the island-city of Arados and its *peraia* in 190 is a hieroglyphic document, of which two copies have been found and published.¹ Both are damaged, but enough has survived to provide a clear date, the name of the leader of the expedition, and an excited account of the raid.

The date of the document is 24 Gorpaios/24 Pharmouthi of the 23rd year of Ptolemy Epiphanes, which is May 181. It was a decree in honour of Aristonikos. This man is also known from a variety of other sources. He is noted by Polybios as a eunuch—Polybios expresses surprise that he should also have been a successful soldier—participating in raising mercenaries in Greece, suppressing a revolt in the Delta, with the rank of *syntrophos* of the king.² He is recorded as a *proxenos* at Delphi.³ In Alexandria he was priest of Alexander and the Lagids, the most prestigious Ptolemaic priesthood.⁴ Altogether an important man. In the honorific decree, he is noted as having been active in the suppression of the southern rebellion between 199 and 190 (years 6 to 15 of Epiphanes).

The raid is described in the decree. Aristonikos 'seized Arados, which is in the island'. He captured 'the land' and 'the maritime places'. He looted all these, taking 'silver, goods, and things innumerable' from the sacred places'. 'They returned rich', 'having struck the place of the navigators'. In plainer terms, the Ptolemaic fleet under Aristonikos' command captured the island of Arados and the

¹ G. Daressy, 'Un decret de l'an XXIII de Ptolémée Epiphane', and 'Un second exemplaire du decret de l'an XXIII de Ptolémée Epiphane', *Recueil des Travaux*, 33, 1911, 1-8, and 38, 1916-1918, 175-179.

² Pol. 22.17.5; 22.1; *Suda* 1.356-357.

³ Ditt. *Syll* (3) 585, line 140; cf G. Daux, *Delphes au II^e et au I^{er} siècles*, Paris 1936.

⁴ *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* 5022, also 1853, 2152, 2194, 14895; R. A. Parker, 'A Ptolemaic Marriage Document from Deir al-Ballas', *Journal of the American Research Centre in Egypt*, 2, 1963, 113-116.


ports of its *peraia*, and looted the city and its temples, both on the island and on the mainland.

The date of the raid is not stated, but by inference from the general political situation and from the details of Aristonikos' career it may be put at 190. He was busy in the south until 190, and after December 190 the Roman-Seleukid truce was in effect and it would not have been safe for the Ptolemaic government to become involved in hostilities in Syria. Hence the campaigning season of 190 is the only time available.


As to why it is not recorded in other sources, again the general political situation may be adduced as a reason. The raid took place in a time of peace. It may have been intended to provoke Antiochos to war with Ptolemy, but it was hardly in Antiochos' interest to respond in that way while the consular army was marching towards his Asian territories. Nor was it in Rome's interest to take official notice of the raid, since Rome's interest lay in restricting the war to the present participants. Extending it to Egypt would prolong the war almost indefinitely. The same arguments applied even when Ptolemy was being provocative as when he was being generous. And Ptolemy, once his ploy had failed, had nothing else to offer, and no time to do anything else. It may have been recorded in the lost sections of Polybios, but other historians had no real interest in such a sideshow, when the naval war in the Aegean and the battle of Magnesia were occupying their attention.

It may be noted also that the raid is not referred to in any modern accounts either.⁵


⁵ They are referred to by D. J. Thompson, *Memphis under the Ptolemies*, Princeton 1988, 120 n. 82.




Map 1. The Powers of the Hellenistic World, 202-196 B.C.



Map 2. Southern Asia Minor



Map 4. Central Greece



Map 5. Route of Manlius' March

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